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The influence of noise on net revenue and values of investment properties: Evidence from Switzerland.  
Stefan Sebastian Fahrländer Fahrländer Partner AG Michael Gerfin Department of Economics University of Berne Manuel Lehner Fahrländer Partner AG  
In this study we use hedonic models to measure the influence of noise nuisance on rents, costs and values of investment properties in Switzerland. Country-wide data is provided by institutional real estate investors. The effects are measured for aircraft noise, road traffic noise and railroad noise. We show that negative effects appear between lower and upper tresholds which vary between different noise types and across residential and non-residential properties. Rents, costs and values are affected below the administrative tresholds given by the LSV and the negative impact ceases at an upper threshold. However high noise nuisance might influence investment decisions, i.e. offices are built instead of housing etc. These important effects are not given account in the data. In addition, directly measured reductions on market values are lower than the expected reductions based on empirical effects on rents and costs. The reasons for the different market value reductions may be found in the Swiss tenancy law. Rents for dwellings within existing rental agreements can only be 
(Referenzzinssatz) and the CPI. The analysis shows that the average contract duration is dependent on the noise nuisance, which leads to a significant reduction of noise-induced losses within periods of increasing market rents. 
Keywords: Hedonic prices, Investment property, Noise nuisance, GAM, Spline 
Session: Real Estate Investment H24, June 9, 2016, 3:30 - 5:00pm
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THE INFLUENCE OF NOISE ON NET REVENUE AND VALUES OF 
INVESTMENT PROPERTIES:  
EVIDENCE FROM SWITZERLAND 
 
STEFAN SEBASTIAN FAHRLÄNDER, MICHAEL GERFIN** and MANUEL LEHNER*** 
 
Keywords: Hedonic prices, investment property, Switzerland, noise nuisance, GAM, spline. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In Switzerland, road and rail traffic as well as aircraft noise are important sources of nuisance 
in settlement areas. The fact that real estate markets value traffic noise has been shown by 
different empirical studies, e.g. Andersson et al. (2009), Day et al. (2007) and Kim et al. (2007). 
Nelson (2008) published a meta analysis of studies assessing the impacts of aircraft and road 
traffic noise. Most of the existing studies explore noise effects on prices of private properties 
and market rents for apartment. 
So far, there is little knowledge on the effect of noise on investment properties. This part of the 
building stock contains multi-family houses as well as office buildings, shopping malls, mixed-
used properties and others. With a house owner quota of only about 40 per cent, the major part 
of Swiss households rents a flat. In addition to the general importance of the rental market, the 
question of the impact of noise on investment properties becomes important because of 
                                                 
  Baumhaldenstrasse 34, 8055 Zürich, Switzerland, +41 79 707 85 27; sf@fpre.ch. 
** Department of Economics, University of Bern, michael.gerfin@vwi.unibe.ch. 
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Fundamenta Group, Migros Pensionskasse, Intershop, Pensimo Management, Swisscanto 
Asset Management, Swiss Life, UBS Fund Management. This paper benefited from 
helpful comments by Dominik Matter. The usual disclaimer applies. 
 First draft: April 2014. Drafts have been presented to the FOEN and to various 
institutional real estate owners/managers. 
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deadlines for noise remediation. In a couple of years Cantons and railway companies will have 
to compensate house owners for losses due to excessive noise nuisance.1 Today there is only 
compensation for private properties and multi-family houses affected by aircraft noise around 
Zurich airport. 
Estimating hedonic models for investment properties is a challenge, since noise nuisance can 
affect market rents, contract rents (i.e. historical market rents) and owner side costs as well as 
risk assessments (discounting factors in DCF appraisal). In addition there is no database with 
detailed and harmonised transaction data. For this study a uniquely large and well-described 
dataset of institutional properties has been compiled. It contains comparable information across 
all appraisal-relevant components of investment properties as well as the market values of these 
properties. 
This study is based on the theory that noise affects both the gross revenue (reduction of rental 
income) as well as the owner-side costs (increased owner costs due to higher fluctuation, 
vacancies and maintenance costs). With the available data, noise effects can be measured on 
both the gross revenue as well as the owner-side costs. In addition, the data allow estimating 
the influence of noise nuisance directly on the market values. 
In Switzerland, several studies estimating the influence of noise nuisance on market rents for 
rental apartments exist (for an overview see Table 1 and Fahrländer Partner, 2013). One single 
study measures the influence of aircraft noise on values of investment properties (see 
Bundesgericht, 2011). The observed reductions of the market values of around 1.5% per dB(A) 
are significantly higher than the measured reductions on apartment rents of approximatly 0.3% 
per dB(A). This supports the hypothesis formulated above that noise not only causes losses at 
the income side, but also leads to higher costs and higher risks for the owner. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  According to the federal “Lärmschutzverordnung” LSV (Bundeskanzlei, 1986), the trigger for 
compensation is average noise dB(A) above the “Immissionsgrenzwert” IGW. These IGW differ by 
planning zones, noise source and between day and night. 
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Table 1: Hedonic pricing studies in Switzerland 
Authors Study area Dependent 
variable 
N 
Price reduction per dB(A)  
(approximately, in %) 
Threshold in dB(A) 
    Day Night Day Night 
Baranzini & Ramirez (2005) Canton of Geneva Market rents 13‘064 0.28*  50  
Baranzini et al. (2006) 
Canton of Geneva Market rents 2‘794 
0.18-
0.22* 
 50/55  
Baranzini & Schaerer (2007) 
Canton of Geneva Market rents 10‘396 
0.20-
0.23* 
 50  
Schaerer et al. (2007) 
City of Geneva Market rents 3‘327 
0.17-
0.20* 
 50  
City of Zurich Market rents 3‘194 
0.37-
0.38* 
 55  
Banfi et al. (2007) City of Zurich Market rents 6‘204 0.20* 0.31* 55 50 
City of Lugano Market rents 547 0.50* 0.60* 55 50 
ZKB (2010) 
Switzerland Market rents 635‘504 
0.19* 0.19* 501 40 
0.26** 0.26** 501 40 
0.11*** 0.11*** 501 40 
Bundesgericht (2011) 
Switzerland 
Values of 
investment 
properties 
2‘000 
1.20***  45  
1.80***  50  
1 if night noise < 40dB(A); * Road traffic noise, **Rail noise, ***Aircraft noise. 
 
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the underlying data. Section 3 presents 
the results of the empirical models used to examine the effect of noise on contract rents, owner-
side costs and market values of investment properties. Discussion of the results is found in 
section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 DATA AND SAMPLES 
2.1 DATA OF INVESTMENT PROPERTIES 
The analysis is based on country-wide data of investment properties provided by institutional 
investors. Market values as of 31 December 2012 as well as cashflows (rental incoms, vacancies 
and owner-side costs) for the year 2012 are available.2 The data pool includes 3’027 properties 
with 8’824 addresses and 240’000 rental units. The total market value of the represented 
properties is around 51.7 Billion Swiss Francs. The data include residential and commercial 
properties as well as mixed-use properties. Information is available on three levels: Property, 
address and single rental unit.3 Market values, owner-side costs and structural variables are 
                                                 
2  Cashflows of Migros Pensionskasse represent the period July 2012 to June 2013. 
3  A single property can consist of several buildings or of several entrances into a building. 
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available on the property level. Locational data such as distances to points of interest and noise 
pollution is compiled for every single address (house entrance). Rental incomes and detailed 
information about the rental units such as floor space and number of rooms are available on the 
rental unit level (for variable descriptions see Appendix A). 
From the available data, samples with rental units as well as samples with properties are formed. 
With 2’362 observations the market value sample includes most of the pooled properties (Table 
2). On the cost side, however, some records can not be harmonised or no owner-side costs are 
reported. The sample is thus reduced to 1’141 properties. 
Table 2: Samples for econometric analysis 
Sample Number of properties Number of addresses Number of rental objects 
Apartments 2‘066 5‘507 65‘301 
Offices 752 878 4‘413 
Retail 587 723 2‘126 
Restaurants 166 166 220 
    
Owner costs 1‘141   
Market values 2‘362   
 
In general, it can be stated that the samples are well distributed over the country (see Figure 1). 
An obvious concentration of observations exists in the urban areas with a significant rental 
market. 
Figure 1: Spatial distribution of the samples 
Apartment rents sample       Market values sample 
 
 
2.2 LOCATION VARIABLES 
Hedonic models often use two location levels: the macro-location i.e. the village or city district 
and the micro-location, usually information of proximity to services, image of the 
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neighbourhood, noise nuisance and others. While information of the general price level (macro-
location) is used from the hedonic models of FPRE, the general assessment of the micro-
location is derived from several parameters and proxies (see Appendix A).4 
Noise exposure data is provided by the Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN). The noise 
database sonBASE was created in 2008 by the FOEN and contains noise data from different 
noise models. For this study, two different datasets are available. The first one, the grid data 
(10x10 meters) provides noise values at four meters above the ground. The second dataset 
includes the maximum noise value per building of the swissBUILDINGS3D building data set 
(provided by the Federal Office of Topography). The FOEN performs its own calculations for 
road traffic noise and railway noise. Data on aircraft noise is provided by the Federal Office of 
Civil Aviation (FOCA). For this study, the grid data from the calculation model 2009 and the 
building data set from the calculation model 2010 are available. This data allows assigning the 
noise exposure for each address. All the data is measured four metres above the ground (open 
windows) and is assigned to all floor levels. The data represent average noise levels dB(A) for 
the period 0600 to 2200 hours (day) and 2200 to 0600 hours (night). 
  
                                                 
4  Fahrländer Partner (FPRE) provides hedonic models for market rents for daily use by owners, brokers and 
consultants. For the methodology see Fahrländer (2006). 
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3 MODELS AND RESULTS 
To select the model variables, this study relies on Sirmans et al. (2005), Malpezzi (2002) and 
Wilhelmsson (2000) who evaluated the control variables which are most commonly used in 
hedonic studies. In a first step (section 3.1), impacts of different noise sources on different 
property types are expolored using nonparametric cubic splines (as shown in Fahrländer, 2006) 
in generalized additive models (Hastie & Tibshirani, 1990). Minimum thresholds of noise 
effects were detected in all cases, maximum limits only in some.   
In a second step, log-linear hedonic models are developed to measure noise impacts on rents 
(section 3.2), owner costs (3.3) and market values (3.4) using OLS regressions. All models 
include fixed effects (macro-location price indicators) derived from the hedonic models of 
Fahrländer Partner (Fahrländer, 2006). In a third step, the empirically measured reductions on 
market values are compared to indirect reductions resulting from additional costs and reduced 
rents (3.5). 
3.1 EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF NOISE IMPACT 
To explore noise impacts, all the parameters describing the micro-location must be used to 
isolate the influence of noise nuisance. This can only be done with highly dissaggregated data 
representing the small-scale conditions at a certain address. For the explorative analysis of the 
impact of noise a generalized additive model with cubic regression splines is used to analyse 
the pattern of the impact of the different noise sources and levels on rents, costs and values. 
Since noise from different sources cannot be combined, every single noise source is tested 
seperatly. 
The objective of these estimations is to find adequate thresholds for all models. The 
determination of the thresholds was performed manually for each combination of noise source 
and property type using spline plots as shown in Figure 2. The example shows the influence of 
rail noise at night on rents of apartments. The thresholds are later used to estimate partwise 
linear terms, with zero below the lower threshold, a linear slope between the lower and the 
upper threshold and a maximum for properties above the upper threshold. 
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Figure 2: Influence of rail noise at night on contract rents of apartments 
 
 
Table 3 shows the findings of the exploratory analysis. In the apartment rents model we found 
a maximum thresholds of noise impact at 57dB(A) (aircraft noise) and 55dB(A) (road and rail 
noise), the minimum and maximum thresholds are shown in the row “range”. Apartment rents 
and market values of residential properties are sensitive to noise during the nights while office 
and retail rents are affected by daytime noise. 
Table 3: Noise thresholds and affected observations 
Model 
Dependent 
variable 
Period N= Aircraft noise  Road traffic noise  Rail noise 
    Range Affected  Range Affected  Range Affected 
Apartments 
ln(rent) 
[CHF/a] 
Night 65'301 50-57dB 1'301 (2.0%)  45-55dB 22'603 (34.6%)  47-55dB 2'658 (4.1%) 
Offices 
ln(rent) 
[CHF/a] 
Day 4'413 >55dB 105 (2.3%)  >55dB 2'805 (63.6%)  >55dB 108 (2.4%) 
Retail 
ln(rent) 
[CHF/a] 
Day 2'126 >50dB 26 (1.2%)  >55dB 1'425 (67.0%)  >40dB 335 (15.8%) 
Restaurants 
ln(rent) 
[CHF/a] 
Night 220 no observations  >50dB 93 (42.3%)  >50dB 14 (6.4%) 
            
Owner costs 
ln(costs) 
[CHF/m2a] 
Night 1'141 >50dB 30 (2.6%)  >45dB 451 (39.5%)  >47dB 20 (1.8%) 
            
Market values            
Resid. properties 
ln(value) 
[CHF/m2] 
Night 1'945 >50dB 39 (2.0%)  >45dB 1'154 (59.3%)  >47dB 95 (4.9%) 
Other properties 
ln(value) 
[CHF/m2] 
Day 417 >50dB 4 (1.0%)  >50dB 392 (94.0%)  >50dB 28 (6.7%) 
 
  
lower threshold:
47dB
rail noise night (dB)
influence on ln(NetRentPerYear)
30 40 50 60
-0
.1
0
-0
.0
5
0
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0
0
.0
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3.2 NOISE IMPACT ON CONTRACT RENTS 
Two different models have been estimated explaining the contractual rents of apartments. Both 
models are based on equation (1) where 𝛽𝑖 represent the coefficients of contiuous and dummy 
variables and ?̂?𝑖 vectors of coefficients of factor variables and interaction terms. The noise 
interaction terms include a RangeDummy to separate the effects within the lower and upper 
thresholds. 
ln(NetRentPerYear) =  
     ∝  + 𝛽1 ∙ ln(𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜) +  ?̂?2(𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 × 𝐼𝑠𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒) +  ?̂?3(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
+ 𝛽4 ∙ 𝐼𝑠𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑇𝑜𝐿𝑎𝑘𝑒 + ?̂?5(𝑍𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 × 𝐼𝑠𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒) +  ?̂?6(𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑) 
+ ?̂?7(𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 × 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑜𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠) +  ?̂?8(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠600𝑚 × 𝐼𝑠𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒) 
+ ?̂?9(𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 × 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) + ?̂?10(𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 × 𝐼𝑠𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒) 
+ ?̂?11(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 × 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 × 𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡) 
+ ?̂?12(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 × 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 × 𝑅𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡) 
+ ?̂?13(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 × 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 × 𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡) 
+ 𝛽14 ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑂𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽15  ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑂𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
2 
+ ?̂?16(𝐵𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒) + ?̂?17(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +  𝛽18 ∙ ln(𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎)  
+ ?̂?19(𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 × 𝐼𝑠𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒) + ?̂?20(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑠) + 𝜀  
(1) 
 
The first model does not include the spatial-type-interactions for the noise variables but 
country-wide coefficents for noise. All noise coefficients in this model turn out with a highly 
significant and negative impact. The second model includes interaction terms for different 
spatial types for road traffic noise and rail noise, as shown in Table 4.5 The strongest price 
impact is found in rich communes (type 4), where each decibel road traffic noise above the 
threshold causes a rent decrease of approximately 0.33%. In suburban residental communes 
(types 5 and 6) the decrease is less (0.15% and 0.25% per decibel) but also highly significant. 
Apartment rents in big cities (type 1) and regional centres (type 2) are not significantly sensitive 
to road traffic noise. The rail noise coefficents are more difficult to estimate due to fewer 
observations with excessive rail noise. Significant coefficients can be estimated for large cities 
                                                 
5  Selected estimation results are shown in Appendix B. 
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and residential communes of regional centres, where rail noise clearly causes lower apartment 
rents. 
Table 4: Coefficients for noise nuisance on contractual apartment rents 
  Spatial type 
 Switzerland Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5 Type 6 Type 7 
Max. Aircraft noise 
night (>50dB(A)) 
-0.0017               
Road traffic noise 
night (>45dB(A)) 
-0.0009 0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0014 -0.0033 -0.0015 -0.0025 -0.0009 
Rail noise night 
(>47dB(A)) 
-0.0009 -0.0019 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 -0.0007 -0.0016 0.0004 
Bold: p < 0.01. 
Type 1: Large urban centres; Type 2: Middle-size urban centres; Type 3: Other centres; Type 4: Rich communes; Type 5: Residential communes of 
large urban centres; Type 6: Residential communes of middle-size uban centres and other centres; Type 7: Other communes. 
 
Similar models are estimated for office and retail rental units as well as for restaurants. In the 
models for offices, significant negative coefficents can be estimated only in rich communes 
(type 4, see Table 5). Estimations for retail contract rents and restaurants do not generate 
significant coefficients. These models are therefore not subject to further analysis in this article. 
Table 5: Coefficients for noise nuisance on contractual office rents 
  Spatial type 
 Switzerland Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5 Type 6 Type 7 
Aircraft noise day 
(>55dB(A)) 
-0.0088               
Road traffic noise 
day (>55dB(A)) 
0.0025 0.0038 0.0040 0.0114 -0.0279 -0.0060 0.0067 0.0061 
Rail noise day 
(>55dB(A)) 
0.0025 0.0006 0.0043 -0.0021 0.0187 0.0042  -0.0082 
Bold: p < 0.01. 
Type 1: Large urban centres; Type 2: Middle-size urban centres; Type 3: Other centres; Type 4: Rich communes; Type 5: Residential communes of 
large urban centres; Type 6: Residential communes of middle-size uban centres and other centres; Type 7: Other communes. 
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3.3 NOISE IMPACT ON OWNER-SIDE COSTS 
This model includes data of the owner-side running costs. Since the various cost categories 
cannot be consistenty harmonised for the different data providers, this model is only estimated 
for the total annual running costs per square meter floor area, as shown in equation (2). The 
noise interaction terms include a RangeDummy to separate the effects within the lower and 
upper thresholds. 
ln(RunningCostsPerSQM) =  
     ∝  + ?̂?1(𝑍𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒) +  ?̂?2(𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝) 
+ ?̂?3 (𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 × 𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡) 
+ ?̂?4 (𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 × 𝑅𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡) 
+ ?̂?5 (𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 × 𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡) 
+ 𝛽6 ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑂𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 
  
𝛽7
∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑂𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2  
+ ?̂?8(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒) + ?̂?9(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
+ 
  
𝛽10
∙ ln (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎) +
  
𝛽11
∙ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝜀 
 
(2) 
The results of the estimation suggest that a positive interrelation between noise and owner-side 
costs exists (see Table 6). However, only the coefficient of the aircraft noise is statistically 
significant. The result can be interpreted as follows: each dB(A) aircraft noise above 50dB(A) 
causes 0.88% additional owner-side running costs. 
Table 6: Coefficients for noise nuisance on owner-side costs 
 Switzerland 
Max. aircraft noise night (>50dB(A)) 0.0088 
Road traffic noise night (>45dB(A)) 0.0044 
Rail noise night (>47dB(A)) 0.0011 
Bold: p < 0.01. 
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3.4 NOISE IMPACT ON MARKET VALUES 
Two models were estimated to assess noise impacts on market values. Both models are based 
on equation (3). The noise interaction terms include a RangeDummy to separate the effects 
within the lower and upper thresholds. 
ln(MarketValuePerSQM) =  
     ∝  + 𝛽1 ∙ ln(𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜) +  𝛽2 ∙ (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)  +  ?̂?3(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
+ 𝛽4 ∙ 𝐼𝑠𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑇𝑜𝐿𝑎𝑘𝑒 + ?̂?5(𝑍𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒) +  ?̂?6(𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑) 
+ ?̂?7(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑇𝑜𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 × 𝐼𝑠𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒) +  ?̂?8(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠600𝑚 × 𝐼𝑠𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒) 
+ ?̂?9(𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 × 𝐼𝑠𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒) + ?̂?10(𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 × 𝐼𝑠𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒) 
+ ?̂?11(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 × 𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡) 
+ ?̂?12(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 × 𝑅𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡) 
+ ?̂?13(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 × 𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑁𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡) 
+ 𝛽14 ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑂𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  
  
𝛽15
∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑂𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2  
+ ?̂?16(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒) + ?̂?17(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
+ 𝛽18 ∙ ln(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎) +
  
𝛽19
∙ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝐴𝑝 + 𝜀  
(3) 
 
The first model shows the influence of the explanatory variables on all properties where no 
spatial or typological distinction of the properties is made. This model confirms the expected 
relation beween noise and market values (see Table 7). The general negative noise effect on 
market values of investment properties can therefore be confirmed from an empirical 
perspective. In the second model, the noise effect is differentiated according to property types. 
The estimation shows that market values of pure residential properties (“Residential“) and 
residential properties with additional utilizations (”Residential +”) are signifcantly affected by 
all three types of noise. For office and retail properties, a similar effect can not be shown. 
However, a negative noise effect is indicated by the negative coefficients. 
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Table 7: Coefficients for noise nuisance on property market values 
  Property type 
 All types Residential Residential+ Office Office+ Retail Mixed 
Aircraft noise -0.0038 -0.0040  -0.0368    
Road traffic noise -0.0023 -0.0044 -0.0090 -0.0039 -0.0060 -0.0006 -0.0034 
Rail noise -0.0023 -0.0028 -0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0067 -0.0025 -0.0006 
Bold: p < 0.01. 
 
3.5 DIRECT AND INDIRECT NOISE IMPACT ON MARKET VALUES 
As shown above, we have developed statistical models to quantify the noise impact on revenues 
and costs of investment properties. In addition, a model is available to estimate the influence of 
noise on market values. These models now allow to compute the value reduction of properties 
at a given noise exposure in two ways: 
- Apply noise coefficients from the market value model to calculate the value reduction. 
- Apply noise coefficients of the income and cost models to calculate the reduced net 
income. Then capitalize the reduced net income to calculate the value reduction. 
We apply these two calculation methods to a typical residential property from the sample of 
this study. The property contains 40 apartments and generates CHF 600’000 net annual rental 
income. At 55dB(A) aircraft noise, a value reduction of about 6.9% is expected due to the 
reduction of net rents, increased costs and higher risks (see Table 8). By contrast, the estimated 
reduction is only 2.0% when using the market value model. 
Table 8: Example: direct and indirect noise impact on market values 
 
No aircraft noise 
55dB(A) aircraft 
noise 
60dB(A) aircraft 
noise 
Net rental income [CHF/a] 600'000 594'922 592'902 
Owner costs [CHF/a] 126'000 131'668 137'591 
Net income [CHF/a] 474'000 463'254 455'312 
Market value [CHF] as a function of costs and revenues1 11'850'000 11'029'853 10'840'757 
    
Market value [CHF], using coefficients of the market value model 11'850'000 11'615'354 11'385'355 
    
Reduction of market value, as a function of costs and revenues1  -6.9% -8.5% 
Reduction of market value, using coefficients of the market value model  -2.0% -3.9% 
Delta of reductions  4.9 PP 4.6 PP 
1Net capitalization rate without noise: 4%, Net capitalization rate with noise: 4.2%. 
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This large difference is surprising because one would expect more or less the same market value 
reductions from the two calculation methods.6 In the example, the net income is capitalized and 
therefore considered perpetual. In today's appraisals for investment properties the discounted 
cashflow method (DCF) is widely used. In DCF models, the assumptions about revenues and 
costs are not constant, but depending on market conditions and the property itself. A lower 
estimate for income potential of noise-affected properties is expected than for non-noise-
exposured properties. In addition, higher costs and vacancies would probably be assumed. The 
direct reduction of market values would therefore be stronger than in this simple capitalization 
of the value components. The empirical results show the contrary (for discussion see section 
4.2). 
 
4 DISCUSSION 
4.1 COEFFICIENTS AND THRESHOLDS 
Since existing studies use different thresholds to measure noise impacts, we use a noise 
pollution of 55dB(A) to compare the effects measured in this study with results of existing 
studies. As shown in Table 9, we find similar noise impacts on apartment rents, with a wide 
range depending on the spatial type. Further we find less strong effects on market values. 
Table 9: Comparison of the results with existing studies 
 Noise impact at 55dB(A) pollution 
Apartment rents Aircraft noise Road traffic noise Rail noise 
Existing studies in Switzerland -1.1%1 -0.9% to -3.5% -1.3%1 
    
This study: Country-wide results -0.9% -0.9% -0.7% 
This study : Large urban centres  not significant -1.5% 
This study: Residential communes of large urban centres  -1.5% -0.6% 
This study: Residential communes of middle-size uban centres  -2.5% -1.3% 
    
 Noise impact at 55dB(A) pollution 
Market values Aircraft noise Road traffic noise Rail noise 
Existing studies in Switzerland -6.0% to -12.0%   
    
This study: Country-wide results -2.0% -4.3% -2.2% 
1Remark: Value comes from a single study. 
                                                 
6  Since appraisals usually also consider potential rents instead of contract rents i.e. the re-rental to a market 
rent in the future, the directly at the market value measured reduction should even be bigger than the one 
calulation with the net capitalization model. 
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As shown in section one, most of the existing studies use the “IGW” as a threshold to quantify 
noise effects on rents and prices. In this study we show that the different noise types have 
different thresholds that differ from the thresholds given by the LSV. Thresholds also vary 
across residential and non-residential properties. In our tests, this leads to different coefficients 
in comparison to IGW-based models even if we use identical data. Figure 3 shows 
schematically how the choice of the threshold affects the noise influence for residential rents 
using rail noise data. The higher the threshold is set, the greater the discount will be. This 
example illustrates that the IGW-based coefficients poorly estimate the actual noise impact 
whereas the coefficient estimated with the lower – empirical – threshold is accurate. In addition, 
the effect at a high noise level is overestimated in a model using only a lower threshold since 
data suggest the use of an additional upper threshold is necessary. It has to be assumed that 
existing Swiss studies using IGW-based thresholds are inaccurate. 
 
Figure 3: Variation of the coefficient using different thresholds (schematic) 
 
4.2 SWISS TENANCY LAW AND AVERAGE RENTAL PERIOD 
The reasons for the different market value reductions (as shown in section 3.5) may be found 
in the Swiss tenancy law. Rents for dwellings within existing rental agreements can only be 
adjusted in accordance with the change of the “reference interest rate” (Referenzzinssatz) and 
the consumer price index CPI. In case of a change of tenant, the rent can be adjusted to the 
market level. Typically, in an investment property the rental income is a mixture between older, 
indexed rents, and newer rents which are closer to the current market level. The rents observed 
in this study are therefore a mixture and they have – in a market with rising market rents for 
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around 15 years – increased stronger than the reference interest rate and the CPI. It must 
therefore be assumed that the net income and thus the market value of a property increases with 
a higher tenant turnover. A proxy for tenant turnover is the average rental period within a 
property. The analysis of the available data shows that the average contract duration is also 
dependent on the noise nuisance, at least for aircraft and rail noise (see Figure 4).7 Therfore, it 
is reasonable to assume that a tenant moves after a shorter period of time when he lives in a 
noise affected apartment compared to a situation without noise nuisance. With every change of 
tenant, the owner has the possibility to adjust the rent to the market level. Therefore the Swiss 
tenancy law may have the side effect of reducing noise-induced losses on gross revenue within 
periods of increasing market rents. 
 
Figure 4: Average rental period and noise exposure 
 
4.3 NOISE AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS 
In this study, the influence of noise on values and value components of investment properties 
is analysed. Contracts of existing apartments, offices and retail spaces are used as empirical 
objects of investigation. What can not be examined, however, is the influence of noise on 
investment decisions. We assume – and this was also confirmed in interviews with several 
players in the market – that investors, developers and landowners optimise properties within 
the existing law considering noise nuisance. For example, in some cases apartments are not 
                                                 
7  Apartments with a high nuisance of road traffic noise are typically in the big cities, where market situation 
is extremely tense, expecially in the lower price segments. 
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built on the lower floors near heavily traveled roads, although it would be permitted in the 
corresponding zone and it would – if there was no noise – yield higher rental incoms than other 
uses. In extreme cases, entire buildings with offices, retail spaces or industrial uses are 
implemented as ”noise catchers” in order to create profitable residential uses in other parts of 
the building lot. The noise exposure leads, in such cases, already at the point of investment 
decision to a reduced value of the property. We further asume that long term strategies on 
renovation or repositioning of existing properties are affected by the noise as well. An excellent 
example of this behaviour can be observed at the Weststrasse in Zurich: In 2010, a massive 
reduction in road noise was achieved by a major traffic planning project (Kanton Zürich, 2011). 
In the decades before, only little investment was made anlong this road and the buildings were 
mostly inhabited by housholds with low incomes. Since the end of the project, major 
investments by the owners of the buildings were done and the social structure of households 
has changed significantly. 
There is still a need for research in this area. Today, there is no transparency about noise-
induced owner-side losses in cases where the investment decision is dependent on the noise 
situation. Scientific work on this issue would probably be based on the analysis of case studies, 
comparing investment projects in scenarios with and without noise, realising ”highest and best 
use” projects. 
 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study quantifies the impact of noise nuisance on rents, costs and values of investment 
properties. We assume that this is only possible in the range of medium noise. The coefficients 
are probably only reliable in relatively homogeneous noise situations, since the study is based 
on averaged day and night values. In extreme situations (i.e. strong aircraft noise in the early 
morning) the actual price impacts are likely to be higher. Strong noise nuisance most likely 
affects investment decisions and the effects can therefore not be observed empirically. To do 
so, it would be necessary to assess the “highest and best use” for each property with the 
assumption that there was no noise pollution. 
The data used in this study represent the last few years, a period marked by rising rents and 
tight supply. The measured noise coefficients are valid for this period and can vary with 
changing market conditions. We suspect that apartment seekers cannot fully cover their 
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preferences (i.e. noise sensitivity) in the current market environment. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that noise sensitivity of people varies greatly due to the genetic predisposition.  
This study does not allow any conclusions about the effects of noise on privately owned 
residential properties. There, the impacts may be different than in the investment property 
sector. 
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APPENDIX 
A: VARIABLES AND EXPECTED IMPACTS 
Table 10: Model on apartment rents: descriptive statisics and expected impacts 
 Variable Description Min Max Median SD Exp. impact 
Dependent 
 NetRentPerYear Net rent per year [CHF/a] 3’352 76’392 15’216 6’156  
Macro-location and contract      
 Macro Price level FPRE [CHF/m2a] 139 536 250 56 + 
 IsCentre Is in a urban centre [dummy]      
 SpatialType Spatial type [factor]      
 YearQuarter Quarter of the contract [factor] 1995 2013 2011 4 + 
Micro-location 
      
 IsCloseToLake Dist. to lake of max. 500m [dummy]      
 Exposition Expostion [factor]      
 ZoneType Building zone [factor]      
 DomSegementDemand Dominant segment of demand [factor]8      
 DistToLocalServices Distance to a local supplier (shop, post…) [km] 0.0 2.2 0.3 0.2 - 
 NumServices600m Number of local suppliers within 600m [num] 0 4 3 1.4 + 
 LandscapeQuality Landscape quality index [index] 3.7 30.3 20.5 4.3 + 
 PublicTranspGroup Public transport group [factor]      
 AircraftNoiseNight Max. aircraft noise night [dB(A)] 30 62 30 3.7 - 
 RoadNoiseNight Road traffic noise night [dB(A)] 30 68 42 7.8 - 
 RailNoiseNight Rail noise night [dB(A)] 30 66 30 5.5 - 
Object and property 
      
 YearOfConstruction Year of construction [num] 1903 2013 1973 20.73 + 
 BuildingType Type of building [factor]      
 Condition Condition of the building [factor] 1.0 5.0 3.0  + 
 FloorArea Floor area of the apartment [m2] 20 199 80 25.5 + 
 NumRooms Number of rooms in apartment [num] 1.0 9.0 3.5 1.1 + 
 FloorLevel Floor level [num] -2 18 2 2.2 + 
  
                                                 
8  Segmentation of demand in the housing market as described in Fahrländer Partner & sotomo (2012). 
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Table 11: Models on costs and market values: descriptive statisics and expected impacts 
 
Variable Description Min Max Median SD 
Exp. impact 
values 
Exp. impact 
costs 
Dependent 
 RunningCostsPerSQM Annual running costs [CHF/m2a] 21 129 44 27.1   
 MarketValuePerSQM Market value per m2 [CHF/m2] 885 49’123 3’402 3’125   
Macro-location and contract      
 
 Macro Price level FPRE [CHF/m2a] 52 2‘496 202 175 +  
 AverageContrDuration Average contract run-time [d] 96 41‘705 2‘999 3‘093 + - 
 IsCentre Is in a urban centre [dummy]       
 SpatialType Spatial type [factor]       
Micro-location 
      
 
 IsCloseToLake 
Dist. to lake of max. 500m 
[dummy] 
     
 
 Exposition Expostion [factor]       
 ZoneType Building zone [factor]       
 DomSegementDemand 
Dominant segment of demand 
[factor] 
     
 
 DistToLocalServices 
Distance to a local supplier (shop, 
post…) [km] 
0.00 2.13 0.21 0.23 -  
 NumServices600m 
Number of local suppliers within 
600m [num] 
0 4 3 1.4 +  
 LandscapeQuality Landscape quality index [index] 3.7 30.3 21.5 4.4 +  
 PublicTranspGroup Public transport group [factor]       
 AircraftNoiseNight Max. aircraft noise night [dB(A)] 30 62 30 8.0 - + 
 RoadNoiseNight Road traffic noise night [dB(A)] 30 70 48 7.2 - + 
 RailNoiseNight Rail noise night [dB(A)] 30 66 30 6.2 - + 
Object and property 
      
 
 YearOfConstruction Year of construction [num] 1600 2013 1969 29.6 + - 
 PropertyType Type of property [factor]       
 Condition Condition of the building [factor] 1.0 5.0 2.0  + - 
 TotalFloorArea Total floor area property [m2] 90 56‘350 2‘573 5‘537 +/- - 
 AverageFloorAreaAp Average apartment size [m2] 16 223 77 19.7 - - 
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B: ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Vectors of coefficients ?̂?𝑖 (factor variables and interaction terms) are not completely shown in 
the following table due to their length. Instead the table shows a selection of combined 
characteristics. Noise coefficients are not shown since these are presented in section 3. 
Table 12: Model on apartment rents: selected coefficients 
  Global  IsCentre=1 (yes)  IsCentre=0 (no)  SpatialType=4 
Dependent: ln(NetRentPerYear) Coeff t value  Coeff t value  Coeff t value  Coeff t value 
Macro-location and contract        
 ln(Macro) 0.4087 78.5  - -  - -  - - 
 YearQuarter: 2000:4 - -  -0.2115 -11.4  -0.1708 -5.7  - - 
 YearQuarter: 2012:3 - -  0.0444 3.4  0.1014 3.7  - - 
Micro-location            
 IsCloseToLake: Yes 0.0030 1.0  - -  - -  - - 
 Exposition            
 ZoneType : Residential - -  0.0000 0-level  0.0000 0-level  - - 
 ZoneType : Central/old town - -  -0.0178 -4.7  0.0109 2.9  - - 
 DomSegementDemand : 2 0.0107 1.3  - -  - -  - - 
 DomSegementDemand : 4 0.0244 2.9  - -  - -  - - 
 DomSegementDemand : 8 0.1035 11.7  - -  - -  - - 
 DistToLocalServices - -  - -  - -  0.0375 2.7 
 NumServices600m: 0 - -  0.0000 0-level  0.0000 0-level  - - 
 NumServices600m: 4 - -  -0.0190 -2.6  0.0192 3.8  - - 
 LandscapeQuality - -  - -  - -  0.0031 4.2 
 PublicTranspGroup: A - -  0.0905 13.4  - -  - - 
 PublicTranspGroup: B - -  0.0835 13.0  0.0051 1.7  - - 
 PublicTranspGroup: C - -  0.0714 11.2  0.0133 4.8  - - 
Object and property            
 YearOfConstruction -0.1253 -24.7  - -  - -  - - 
 YearOfConstruction2 0.00003 25.2  - -  - -  - - 
 BuildingType: 6-10 Apartments -0.0235 -2.6  - -  - -  - - 
 BuildingType: 11-15 Apartments -0.0277 -3.1  - -  - -  - - 
 BuildingType: > 15 Apartments -0.0520 -5.9  - -  - -  - - 
 Condition: 5.0 0.0000 0-level  - -  - -  - - 
 Condition: 4.0 -0.0399 -10.1  - -  - -  - - 
 Condition: 3.0 -0.0880 -22.5  - -  - -  - - 
 ln(FloorArea) 0.7150 232.4  - -  - -  - - 
 NumRooms: 2.5 -0.0348 -10.1  - -  - -  - - 
 NumRooms: 3.5 -0.0296 -10.9  - -  - -  - - 
 NumRooms: 4.5 0.0000 0-level  - -  - -  - - 
 NumRooms: 5.5 0.0183 4.3  - -  - -  - - 
 FloorLevel: Ground floor - -  0.0000 0-level  0.0000 0-level  - - 
 FloorLevel: 3th floor - -  0.0304 9.3  0.0391 8.1  - - 
 FloorLevel: 5th floor - -  0.0471 6.9  0.0287 3.0  - - 
Degrees of freedom: 64’983, adjusted R2: 0.78 
Bold: p < 0.01.  
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ABSTRACT 
In this study we use hedonic models to measure the influence of noise nuisance on rents, costs 
and values of investment properties in Switzerland. Country-wide data is provided by 
institutional real estate investors. The effects are measured for aircraft noise, road traffic noise 
and railroad noise. We show that negative effects appear between lower and upper tresholds 
which vary between different noise types and across residential and non-residential properties. 
Rents, costs and values are affected below the administrative tresholds given by the LSV and 
the negative impact ceases at an upper threshold. However high noise nuisance might influence 
investment decisions, i.e. offices are built instead of housing etc. These important effects are 
not given account in the data. In addition, directly measured reductions on market values are 
lower than the expected reductions based on empirical effects on rents and costs. The reasons 
for the different market value reductions may be found in the Swiss tenancy law. Rents for 
dwellings within existing rental agreements can only be adjusted in accordance with the change 
of the “reference interest rate” (Referenzzinssatz) and the CPI. The analysis shows that the 
average contract duration is dependent on the noise nuisance, which leads to a significant 
reduction of noise-induced losses within periods of increasing market rents. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
In dieser Studie ermitteln wir mittels hedonischer Modelle den Lärmeinfluss auf Mieten, Kosten 
und Werte von Renditeliegenschaften in der Schweiz. Landesweite Daten wurden durch 
institutionelle Immobilieninvestoren zur Verfügung gestellt. Die Effekte werden für Flug-, 
Strassen- und Bahnlärm gemessen. Wir zeigen, dass Lärmeffekte zwischen unteren und oberen 
Schwellenwerten auftreten und sich zwischen verschiedenen Lärmarten und Nutzungen 
unterscheiden. Die Lärmwirkung beginnt teilweise bereits unterhalb des 
Immissionsgrenzwertes (IGW) und verstetigt sich bei einem – je nach Lärmart und Nutzung 
unterschiedlichen – oberen Schwellenwert. Lärm beeinflusst aber auch Investitionsentscheide. 
So werden an lärmbelasteten Lagen beispielsweise Büros anstelle von Wohnungen gebaut etc. 
Diese wichtigen Effekte können mit den vorliegenden Daten nicht berücksichtigt werden. Wir 
zeigen, dass direkt gemessenen Abschläge auf den Marktwerten niedriger sind als aufgrund der 
empirischen Mindererträge und Mehrkosten erwartet würde. Der Grund dafür ist im 
Schweizerischen Mietrecht zu finden. Wohnungsmieten mit bestehenden Verträgen können nur 
in Übereinstimmung mit dem Referenzzinssatz und der allgemeinen Teuerung angepasst 
werden. Da die durchschnittliche Vertragslaufzeit mit zunehmender Lärmbelastung abnimmt, 
wird der negative Lärmeffekt in Zeiten steigender Marktmieten deutlich kompensiert. 
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ects of uncertainty and local labor demand shocks on the
U.S. housing market. We use binary uncertainty indicators and a Bartik (1991) index to quantify both
uncertainty and labor demand shocks. Controlling for a broad set of variables in 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ects regressions,
we nd uncertainty shocks exhibit small adverse level eects, where housing prices and median sell prices
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are introduced the eects of uncertainty shocks on the housing market dominate that of local labor
demand shocks on housing prices, median sell prices, the share of houses selling for loss and transactions.
Furthermore, the aforementioned uncertainty shock eects are the largest for the States that exhibit
higher housing price volatilities. Our results indicate uncertainty shocks dampen housing price volatilities.
Consequently, these results lends to the support for the presence of real options eects in the housing
market.
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1 Introduction
Three well documented features of the recent Great Recession are the decline in housing prices, the
increase in unemployment rate, and the increase in the presence of uncertainty in the U.S. Figure
1 shows the correlation between the U.S. housing price growth rate and some of the uncertainty
measures in the recent literature over the period from 1990 to 2014 with the highlighted recession
periods: there is a clear negative correlation between the housing price growth rate and the shown
uncertainty measures.1 Figure 2 also shows a strong negative correlation between the monthly U.S.
unemployment rate and the Bartik index that proxies the U.S. labor demand shocks from 1990
to 2014. There are numerous recent papers that deal with the eects of uncertainty on aggregate
economy as well as housing and labor markets separately.2 This paper, however, examines the
simultaneous eects of uncertainty and local labor demand shocks on the U.S. housing market.3
More precisely, we seek to answer (i) how does uncertainty shock aect the housing market, (ii)
how does a local labor demand shock alter the housing market if the shock occurs in a period of
high uncertainty and (iii) how robust are the outcomes given the choice of the uncertainty proxy
and the threshold level dening a period of high uncertainty?
We address these questions using monthly U.S. state-level data from 1990 to 2014. We use
binary uncertainty dummies to indicate the periods of high uncertainty and a variation of Bartik
(1991) index as local labor demand shocks to quantify the impact of these two shocks on the
housing market. Our approach thus corresponds to models using two-state Markov-switching
processes, where regime changes can be documented by an uncertainty index crossing various
1 We use four dierent uncertainty measures in our analysis: the macroeconomic uncertainty by Jurado, Lud-
vigson and Ng (2015), the VIX by Bloom (2009), the policy uncertainty by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2012), and
our measure, which is analogous to Baker et al (2012) but on a State level ("State" uncertainty).
2 Just to mention a few, Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2014) show that uncertainty adversely impacts the
economy, while Dorofeenko, Lee and Salyer (2014) investigate the impact of uncertainty on the housing market.
Leduc and Liu (2015) link uncertainty and the labor market by developing a model in which there is an option
value channel due to uncertainty that arises from search frictions and an aggregate demand channel associated
with rigid prices. Shoag and Veuger (2014) show empirically that the cross-sectional variation in uncertainty across
states matches the distribution of employment outcomes between 2007 and 2009, and that uncertainty may amplify
labor demand shocks. Jaimovich and Siu (2015) uncover the structural changes in the labor market in the past
recessions.
3 We specically look at the average housing prices, the median selling prices, the share of houses selling for
loss, the transactions and houses sold as foreclosure.
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threshold values, which are based on the percentiles of the distribution of the uncertainty proxy.
This approach diers from the one used in, for example, Bloom (2009), who denes periods of
uncertainty as the proxy being 1.65 or more standard deviations above the mean. We use the
macroeconomic uncertainty measure by Jurado et al (2015), as well as an uncertainty measure
that is akin to the policy uncertainty proxy by Baker et al (2012) but on a State-level, the VIX
which is also used by Bloom (2009), and the policy uncertainty by Baker et al (2012) to analyze
the state level housing markets.
Controlling for a broad set of variables, including income, unemployment and the volatil-
ity index VIX, we nd that uncertainty shocks decrease average housing prices in our baseline
specication by 1.42% and increases the percentage loss of houses selling by .52%-points. These
results are in contrast to Dorofeenko et al (2014), who show that an increase in their measure of
uncertainty has an increasing eect on house prices due to the default premium on the housing de-
velopers. Furthermore, an increase in local labor demand shock, dened as the shock to a change
in state-level employment relative to a change in national employment, increases house prices,
median sell prices and transactions and decreases the share of houses selling for loss. However,
when both shocks are introduced, the eects of an uncertainty shock dominate the labor demand
shock on all of these variables. Moreover, the above results are robust to dierent threshold values
that are ranged from 80th, 85th, 90th and 95th percentile of an uncertainty proxy. Furthermore,
the aforementioned uncertainty shock eects are the largest for the States that exhibit higher
housing price volatilities. Consequently, our results indicate uncertainty shocks dampen housing
price volatilities. Our results, as in Bloom (2014), provide further evidence of real option value
eects of waiting during a high period of uncertainty in the housing market.4 One of the implica-
tions of our results is that in order for stimulus packages to work properly, highest priority should
be given to the reduction of uncertainty.5
4 See also Aastveit, Natvik and Sola (2013), in which structural Vector Autoregressions are used to document
wait-and-see eects in monetary policy during periods of high uncertainty.
5 Especially in light of the results of Stroebel and Vavra (2015) , who show that there is a causal relation between
changes in housing prices and changes in retails prices and thus consumption.
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2 Data, Bartik Index and Uncertainty Measures
2.1 Data
We use monthly state-level data from 1990:1 to 2014:12; the data and sources are described in
detail in the Appendix. Zillow Real Estate Research data and Freddie Mac provide information
on various aspects of the housing market, such as the housing price, median sales price, the share
of houses sold for loss and turnover. These variables constitute the vector of dependent variables.
2.2 Bartik Index
The Bartik (1991) index and an uncertainty indicator are the two main variables for this paper.
The Bartik index is a measure of the predicted change in demand for employment in a state given
by the interaction between a state's initial industry mix and national changes in industry employ-
ment. The index compares the preexisting dierences in the sectoral composition of employment
across states with the broad changes in national employment, especially changes subject to a
trend, asymmetrically impact states. In this paper, we follow Saks (2004) and Charles, Hurst and
Notowidigdo (2013) to construct two (similar) variants of the Bartik index. We use the index of
Saks (2004) as benchmark due to its transparency and straightforward interpretation:
bartikit =
X
j
eijt 1
eit 1
  ~eijt   ~eijt 1
~eijt 1
  et   et 1
et 1

(1)
where i=state, j=industry, t=month; ~eijt = national industry employment outside of state i; eit=
state employment =
P
j
eijt; et= national employment =
P
i
eit.
The rst fraction reects the share of industry j employment relative to the total employment in
state i in t 1, the second fraction is the growth rate of industry j outside of state i and the third
fraction reects the change in national employment. Thus, the term in brackets reects the change
in industry j employment (outside state i) relative to changes in national employment. This term
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is weighted by the \importance" of industry j in state i in t   1. We use j=4 sectors across
i=51 states in this analysis: manufacturing, private services, public services and construction and
logging, as this provides sucient variation on the state level.6
2.3 Uncertainty Measures
Various uncertainty proxies have been proposed in the recent literature. Often, theoretical mod-
els use Markov-switching or autoregressive processes to model stochastic volatility as a proxy for
uncertainty measure. As shown in Figure 1, depending on the preferred proxy, the number of un-
certainty shocks may dier considerably, although it is also possible that dierent proxies capture
dierent aspects of uncertainty. The VIX is constructed as the square root of a weighted average
of out-of-the-money put and call options forward prices for the next 30 days and measures the
expected volatility of the S&P 500 index. The Policy Uncertainty proxy of Baker et al. (2012) is
a composite index, consisting of newspaper coverage of policy-related economic uncertainty, the
number of expiring federal tax code provisions and the variation of economic forecasters estimates.
Jurado et al. (2015) estimate uncertainty as the conditional standard deviation \of the purely
unforecastable component of the future value", which translates to removing the forecastable com-
ponent of a multitude of aggregated and weighted nancial and real variables before calculating
their conditional standard deviation. Finally, the U.S. state level uncertainty proxy consists of the
newspaper coverage of policy-related economic uncertainty from 2000:1 to 2014:12. As can be seen
in Figure 1, there are considerable dierences in uctuations, and thus in the periods classied as
uncertain.7
In order to count the number of uncertainty shocks, a denition of the threshold value is
needed. Bloom (2009) suggests using \1.65 standard deviations above the mean, selected as the
5% one-tailed signicance level treating each month as an independent observation". However,
specifying the threshold in this manner does not leave any adjustment opportunity if the assump-
6 The time series of the bartik index aggregated across states is displayed in Figure 2.
7 See Strobel (2015) for potential reasons for this observation.
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Table 1: Number of months dened as uncertain
20 % 15% 10% 5%
1    1    1    1   
Percentile (P) Normal (N) P N P N P N
Macro 124 104 103 96 80 86 58 76
Policy 192 188 174 175 156 162 138 148
State-level 36 27 27 21 18 18 9 13
VIX 240 222 225 217 210 206 195 197
Note: Number of months defined as uncertain from 1960:1 - 2011:12 for Macro Uncertainty, 1985:1 - 2015:2 for Policy Uncertainty, 2000:1
-2014:12 for state-level uncertainty and 1990:1 - 2015:2 for the VIX; the  one-tailed significance level is from the Normal Distribution and
the series assume to follow i.i.d. as in Bloom (2009).
tion of Normality and independently and identically distributed uncertainty shocks does not hold.
Table 1 shows the number of months dened as "uncertain" by various uncertain proxies. For
example, using the Macro uncertainty measure, when  equals 5% then the Normal Distributional
assumption leads to seventy-six uncertain periods instead of fty-eight periods when one uses
the corresponding percentiles of the actual distribution. We use the corresponding percentiles at
various levels in our analysis to show the robustness of empirical results as well as to avoid the
Normal i.i.d. assumption.8
3 Empirical Results
As we seek to investigate the presence of real options eects in the housing market, we interact
uncertainty and labor demand shocks, while accounting for spatial dependence and endogeneity.
To this end, we use the standard errors developed in Driscoll and Kraay (1998) to account for
spatial dependence, heterogeneity and autocorrelation. We are unable to formally control for
endogeneity issue between uncertainty measure and explanatory variables because uncertainty is
by denition unobserved. In this manner, we follow the denition of uncertainty that Jurado et
al. (2015, p.1177) use; \as the conditional volatility of a disturbance that is unforecastable from
the perspective of economic agents". This endogeneity problem is further exacerbated due to the
8 We tested for the Normality of the uncertainty proxies using the Jarque-Bera test, and the null of Normality
was rejected for each proxy.
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fact that uncertainty is ultimately subjective. The latter issue is, however, somewhat mitigated
because we consider macroeconomic uncertainty, not rm or household-level uncertainty, and we
do not include the proxies but use them to identify periods of increased uncertainty.
Our biggest concerns regarding endogeneity, however, are the feedback eects and simultaneity
between the housing market and the covariates. To guard against feedback eects, we only include
lagged explanatory variables. The VIX, due to its construction as expected volatility of the
S&P 500 index, is unlikely to be strongly inuenced by housing prices and Macro Uncertainty is
constructed to avoid any dependencies on any single (or small number) of observable economic
indicators. Policy Uncertainty and the state-level uncertainty measure, constructed using news
paper coverage, might be aected in the same period. However, it seems rather unlikely, that
housing prices today aect yesterday's news coverage. Additionally, a rich set of controls is
included to avoid an omitted variable bias.
As in Bartik (1991), the local labor demand shocks bartikit are constructed to be exogenous
given a constant labor supply. Binary uncertainty indicators are coded to be one if uncertainty is
above a threshold value and zero otherwise. Our regression model is given by
yit = xit 
!
 + 1unc;it 
!
 1t  + bartikit 
!
 2t  + 1unc;it   bartikit 
!
 3t  + i + uit (2)
where xit  is a vector containing up to  lags of the control variables,  is the corresponding
parameter vector, i is the state specic intercept, 1unc;it  and bartikit  are (1  ) vectors
of lagged uncertainty indicators and labor demand shocks, respectively, and jt  , j = 1; 2; 3
are the corresponding (  1) parameter vectors. An element of jt  reects the impact of the
respective lag, while the sum of the elements gives the long-run impact.9 The coecients of main
interest are 1t  , 2t  and 3t  . 1t  reects the impact of a regime-change from low to
high uncertainty, 2t  reects the impact of a local labor demand shock on the housing market
9 We experimented with dierent lag-lengths and use  = 6 lags as baseline specication, but the results are
not sensitive to the number of lags as long as we use more than two and less than seven.
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Table 2: Long-run Eects of Uncertainty, Bartik and Interaction term
Dependent Variable 1macro Bartik Bartik*1macro
log(house price) -.0142*** 10.925*** -14.35***
(.00344) (3.8337) (4.3892)
log(median sell price) -.0180** 32.627*** -31.68***
(.00752) (10.679) (11.765)
% selling for loss .52575 -1133.** 994.94**
(.37032) (492.26) (485.88)
turnover -.0036 147.26** -202.0**
(.05451) (66.317) (79.781)
Note: Sample period from 1990 onwards. The long-run effects of uncertainty (95th percentile threshold), bartik and interaction term are
presented with corresponding standard errors in brackets. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level, ***
indicates significance at 1% level
and 3t  states the (change in the) eect of a local labor demand shock due to a period of high
uncertainty. As the months dened as high uncertainty dier across the proxies, the variation
used to identify
!
 1t  and
!
 3t  , the coecients of uncertainty and the interaction term, diers
as well.
Our empirical objectives are to show (i) the quantitative eect of uncertainty on the housing
market, (ii) the change in the impact of local labor demand shocks on the housing market if they
occur during periods of uncertainty and (iii) the sensitivity of the results with respect to varying
threshold levels and dierent uncertainty proxies. Table 2 shows our benchmark regression results
based on the Macro Uncertainty measure, 1macro; from Jurado et.al. (2015). All the estimated
!
 j represent the long-run eect, i.e. the sum of the estimated elements of
!
 jt  .
10
The second column of Table 2 shows the long-run impact,
!
 1; of uncertainty on housing prices,
median sell prices, the percentage loss of houses selling and turnover; we control for the federal
funds rate, housing starts proxying for residential investment, income, industrial production, ina-
tion, population, the S&P 500, the unemployment rate and the VIX. Moreover, for the regressions
where turnover is the dependent variable, we include housing prices as control variable.11 As
opposed to the results in Dorofeenko et al (2014), uncertainty adversely aects house prices and
10 We use 95th percentile as our cut o point for the Macro Uncertainty measure.
11 We also control for autocorrelation and hetroskadascities in all our empirical regressions.
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the median sell prices on average by 1.42% and 1.80%, respectively. Uncertainty itself, however,
impacts neither turnover nor the share of houses selling for loss. The results for dierent threshold
values (i.e. percentile cutos) are shown Figure 3. Regardless of the threshold value, the sign and
the signicance of the estimated
!
 1 for the log house price and log median sold price do not
change.12
The column three of Table 2 shows the long-run impact of labor demand shocks, proxied by the
bartik index. The impact is highly signicant for all dependent variables, even after controlling
for state-level unemployment. For example, one standard deviation increase in the local labor
demand shock (i.e. the bartik index, which is dened as change in state-level employment relative
to a change in national employment), increases house prices, median sell prices and transactions
on average by .14%, .43% and 1.92%-points, respectively and decreases the share of houses selling
for loss by 14.77%-points. Due to linearity, the signs reverse in the case of adverse labor demand
shocks - as observed in most states during the Great Recession period.13
The above results indicate that the uncertainty and labor demand shocks aect the housing
market variables in opposite direction. To determine the quantitative eects of these two shocks
on the housing variables, we introduce an interaction term,
!
 3: the results are shown in the fourth
column of Table 2. If the labor demand shock occurs during a period of high uncertainty then, for
almost every dependent variable and threshold level, the eect of uncertainty shock dominates the
labor demand shock: a clear sign change from the estimated
!
 2being positive to the estimated
!
 3
being negative. For the expositional purpose of the interaction term, Figure 4 shows the eects of
labor demand shock with - and without uncertainty shock (e.g. Macro Policy uncertainty shock).
The blue line (Bartik Normal Times) summarizes the long-run impact of labor demand shocks,
!
 2, on the various dependent variables, while the red line (Bartik High Uncertainty) represents
the impact of labor demand shocks in uncertainty times, i.e.
!
 2+
!
 3. Figure 4 clearly shows
12 All of the coecients are signicant at a 1% signicance level.
13 We report the impact of a standard deviation increase due to the scale of the bartik. Mean local labor demand
decreases from 1990 until 2014 by .004%-points, while one standard deviation corresponds to .013%-points: E.g.
for the log house price, an increase of 0.14% as 0.01310:93:
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Table 3: Long-run Eects of Uncertainty, Bartik and Interaction term: Other Uncertainty mea-
sures
Dep. Variable 1macro Bartik (B) B*1macro 1state B B*1state 1vix B B*1vix
log(house price) -.0142*** 10.925*** -14.35*** -.0048*** 15.315*** -17.63*** .00191 12.625*** -11.40
(.00344) (3.8337) (4.3892) (.00144) (4.2199) (4.4932) (.00482) (4.2128) (7.1745)
log(med sell price) -.0180** 32.627*** -31.68*** -.0033 30.296*** -24.84** -.0058 42.316*** -44.64***
(.00752) (10.679) (11.765) (.00405) (11.723) (12.330) (.00930) (12.339) (16.513)
% selling for loss .52575 -1133.** 994.94** .48216** -1229.** 1038.6* .48033 -1584.0*** 1517.5**
(.37032) (492.26) (485.88) (.23001) (479.62) (558.01) (.54268) (524.17) (699.86)
turnover -.0036 147.26** -202.0** -.0577*** 81.225* -152.3*** .05951* 95.007* -102.4
(.05451) (66.317) (79.781) (.02065) (43.376) (57.010) (.03517) (54.964) (98.765)
Note: The long-run effects of uncertainty (95th percentile threshold), bartik and interaction term are presented with corresponding standard
errors in brackets. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level. We do
not include policy uncertainty by Baker et al (2012) as the results similar to other measures and due to the space limitation.
that when uncertain periods occur then the eect of the labor demand shock is greatly muted.
These dominating uncertainty shock eects lend some support to the real options eects in housing
market: housing market participants "wait and see" when uncertainty shocks arrive.14 Figure 5 is
analogous to Figure 4, but with the State Policy uncertainty shock: the results are not overturned.
We note, however, our results are somewhat sensitive to the choice of the uncertainty proxy,
which can be seen in Table 3. For example, the impact uncertainty shocks on the growth rates of
housing prices, median sell prices is robust although slightly diers quantitatively: one exception
is when the VIX is used to dene periods of high uncertainty. This result is to be expected as the
dierent uncertainty proxies indicate dierent periods of high uncertainty, and moreover the level
variable VIX is included as control variable in all the regressions in Table 3.15
14 See also Davis and Quintin (2014), who nd that uncertainty about housing prices kept the default rate low
relative to a situation without uncertainty.
15 Although we do not show the results with the Policy Uncertainty shock is Table 3, the wait-and-see eects
(
!
 3) from the Policy Uncertainy are not as strongly associated if high threshold values (90th or 95th percentile)
are used. The reason might be that when the 95th percentile threshold, the Policy Uncertainty proxy represents
only the periods that are associated with the post 2011 period (this includles the period during the European Debt
crisis). And hence, there is not enough sample size to test for the interaction terms. However, if the 85th percentile
is taken as threshold value, the interaction eects become signicant again, as more periods, especially the months
before 2010, are classied as periods of high uncertainty.
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Table 4: Long-run Eects of Bartik and Interaction term grouped by the magnitude of the housing
price volatility over time.
Housing Price Volatility low medium high
Bartik (B) B*1
low
state B B*1
medium
state B B*1
high
state
log(house price) 18.47** -6.85 7.055*** -9.26 21.26*** -25.0***
(7.802) (7.131) (2.596) (6.253) (6.899) (8.905)
Note: The long-run effects of bartik and interaction term based on State-level uncertainty (95th percentile threshold) are presented with
corresponding standard errors in brackets grouped by housing price volatility across states. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates
significance at 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level.
3.1 State Level Real Option Eects
To assess whether uncertainty shocks amplify housing price volatilities, and hence further provide
empirical evidence for the real option eects, we analyze the uncertainty eects on three dier-
ent groups that are sorted according to their housing price volatilities over time. Three groups
represent all fty one U.S. States with equal size. We refer these three groups as low, medium
and high. We investigate the occurrence of real option eects for each one of the groups based on
our regression model (2), using the 95th percentile of the State-level uncertainty proxy, so as to
exploit the variation in uncertainty across States. The results for the three dierent groups are
shown in Table 4.
The most striking dierence between the three groups is with respect to the signicance and the
magnitude of the interaction eect (
!
 3) for the high group. As one moves away from the low to high
volatility group, the interaction term (
!
 3) not only decreases in magnitude from -6.85 to -25 (i.e.
one standard deviation increase in the interaction term decreases -0.09% to -0.32% in the log house
price) but also becomes highly statistically signicant. And if one also looks at the total eect of
Bartik demand shock on the changes in log house price (i.e. @log(house price)@bartik =
c!
 2 + 1unc
c!
 3);
the eect decreases with increasing housing price volatilities. We interpret these empirical results
as an informal evidence that uncertainty shocks dampen housing price volatilities as the demand
for houses decrease due to the wait and see (real option) eect in the housing market. Figure 6
shows the changes in turnover (transaction for houses) by groups over time: Figure 6 lends some
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Table 5: Long-run Eects of Bartik and Interaction term grouped by the impact of the bartik in
each State.
Bartik Index low medium high
Bartik (B) B*1
low
state B B*1
medium
state B B*1
high
state
log(house price) 9.835*** -5.16 52.98*** -16.1 104.9*** -102.**
(2.328) (5.947) (9.703) (14.43) (21.13) (45.07)
Note: The long-run effects of bartik and interaction term based on State-level uncertainty (95th percentile threshold) are presented with
corresponding standard errors in brackets grouped by housing price volatility across states. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates
significance at 5% level, *** indicates significance at 1% level.
support that indeed the demand for housing does decrease for the group (States) that exhibit high
house price volatilities.
For the robustness check, we also sort groups by the economic condition: sorting by the
importance of local labor demand shocks. We calculate the impact of the bartik index based on
our model (2) with housing prices as dependent variable, but running time-series regressions for
each State. We only select States where the bartik has a signicant impact (5% level) on housing
prices, which results to 37 States. We then sort these 37 States into three almost equal size. Table
8 shows the long-run eects of Bartik and Interaction term grouped by the impact of the bartik in
each State. Table 8 shows that uncertainty shocks aect and amplify house prices more in regions
that have high income level. Consequently, the results in Table 8 again lend us empirical support
that higher the eects of uncertainty shock the higher the real option eects in housing markets.
4 Conclusion
Our empirical results lend support for the real option eect of wait-and-see in the U.S. housing
market and are in line with some of the predictions of Bloom's (2009) theoretical model. Using
the State-level panel data from 1990:1 to 2014:12, we show (i) uncertainty has a small but highly
signicant impact on the level of housing prices, (ii) uncertainty diminishes the eects of (adverse)
labor demand shocks and (iii) the results are robust to changes in the threshold dening times of
high uncertainty but are somewhat sensitive to the choice of uncertainty proxy. We interpret this
11
result as the dierent proxies capturing dierent aspects of uncertainty, with the proxy of Jurado
et al. (2015) being well suited, due to its construction, to capture the spells of uncertainty that
induce macro-level real options eects. These ndings are important for policy makers, because
since uncertainty can delay the potential impact of adverse real shocks due to real options eects,
such as selling ones home for loss or as foreclosure, it might be possible to mitigate adverse eects
of real shocks during periods of high uncertainty before they materialize.
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Table 6: Uncertainty Proxies
Variable Availability Source Regional level
Macro Uncertainty 1960M1-2011M12 Jurado et al. (2015) National
Policy Uncertainty 1985M1-2015M2 Baker et al. (2012) National
State Uncertainty 2000M1-2014M12 Self constructed State
Vix Uncertainty 1990M1-2015M2 FRED National
Table 7: Dependent Variables
Variable Availability Source Regional level
House Price 1975M1-2014M12 Freddie&Mac State
Median Sold Price 1996M4-2014M12 Zillow Database State
% Selling For Loss 1998M1-2014M12 Zillow Database State
Total Turnover 1998M1-2014M12 Zillow Database State
6 Data Appendix
The state-level uncertainty indicator was constructed as the monthly number of news-paper articles
in a state containing either one of the keywords \economic uncertainty", \economy uncertain" or
\economy uncertainty" from 2000:1 until 2014:12 from the homepage www.newslibrary.com. In
creating this index, we follow Baker et. al (2012). The data sources are given in the following
tables.
Table 8: Control Variables
Variable Availability Source Regional level
Federal Funds Rate 1954M7-2015M1 FRED State
Housing Starts 1988M1-2015M1 FRED State
Income 1950Q1-2014Q3 BEA State
Industrial Production 1919M1-2015M1 FRED National
Ination Rate 1947M1-2015M1 FRED National
Population 1972-2013 FRED State
S&P 500 1970M1-2015M3 Datastream National
Unemployment Rate 1976M1-2014M12 FRED State
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1 Introduction and Background
This paper employs an extensive household survey data set covering a wide
range of transition countries to empirically characterize housing and mortgage
choices and modes of acquisition by households. The paper provides a descrip-
tive overview of the types of dwellings, housing tenure, mode of acquisition, and
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mortgage prevalence by country. Wide variations in housing situations are ob-
served across transition countries. To explain these patterns, empirical models
of both acquisition mode (privatized, purchased or built with mortgage from a
bank, purchased or built without a mortgage, cooperative, inherited, or other
mode) and housing tenure choice (rent, own, other) are estimated using limited
dependent variable methods (dichotomous probit and multinomial probit mod-
els). These models are estimated conditional on the type of dwelling (detached
house, semi-detached house, apartment/at, part commercial/industrial, mobile
home/tent/ger, improvised housing unit, etc.). Furthermore, the prevalence of
mortgage nancing and terms are analyzed. The survey includes a number of
questions on mortgages, including the currency in which the mortgage is de-
nominated, the type of interest rate (xed, variable, etc.), monthly mortgage
payment, amount borrowed, down payment, term of mortgage, and payment
arrears. In addition, the survey provides information on the rental equivalent
for owner-occupied houses. Household responses to these survey questions are
used to model mortgage prevalence and choice based on household and country
characteristics. Household income and sources of that income (wage and salary,
self-employment, sales or bartering of farm products, pensions, state benets,
friends and family, etc.) are used as explanatory variables, along with other
household characteristics and country xed e¤ects. Data used in this study are
from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Life in
Transition Survey, LITS II, for the year 2010.
Privatization has been investigated extensively since the seminal events in
Russia and elsewhere in the 1990s. Boycko et al (1996) provides a fascinating
look at that experience, placing an emphasis on the key role of property rights
and the need to depoliticize rms in the face of strong opposition. Their es-
sential observation is that ultimately rms owning assets in the Former Soviet
system had to learn to be responsive to the market rather than to political in-
uences. Restructuring of a planned economy requires privatization of urban
land and real estate. So, in order to facilitate that restructuring urban land
and buildings have to be privatized, complementing the privatization of plants
and equipment. Without privatization of land and buildings, Boycko et al main-
tain that control rights over those complementary physical assets are divided
between local politicians and rm managers resulting in a very ine¢ cient own-
ership structure inhibiting transition. Another reason for privatizing land and
real estate is that it provides a source of capital for rms to use in restructur-
ing. By privatizing the housing stock owned by a state-owned enterprise, for
example, capital is raised that can be used for investment in new equipment
and machinery necessary to be competitive in world markets. Case studies of
land and housing privatization in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Poland are
provided in Strong et al (1996). They chronicle the ways in which controls over
rights to acquire and dispose of property and on the pricing of property assets
were relaxed and/or removed, resulting in functioning housing markets.
Homeownership is a¤ected by both economic and life-cycle factors faced by
households. Economic factors such as the conditions in housing and mortgage
markets are major determinants of homeownership. In a comparative perspec-
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tive across countries, the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing also has an
impact. Additionally, the life-cycle aspects of renting vs. owning are important
as household composition transitions over time.
Barakova et al (2014) explain that wealth, followed by credit and income, are
the primary constraints on homeownership. In their study they use data from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to examine the likelihood of
homeownership during the period of the housing boom 2003-2007 in the United
States. Unlike the borrowing constraints from income and credit, they nd
that the wealth constraint persists despite easier underwriting practices during
this period.
Tenure choice, between renting and owning, is one classical aspect of the
housing decision investigated by economists. An early study of the economic
and life-cycle aspects of tenure choice is Henderson and Ionnides (1983). Hu-
bert (2007) provides a very good over view of the major issues related to tenure
choice, with an emphasis on the ways that imperfect information and frictions
a¤ect the workings of the housing market in particular. In a recent paper with
an international perspective, Boehm and Schlottmann (2014) provide evidence
on housing tenure transitions. They use both German and U.S. data to investi-
gate how households may transition from renting to owning, and perhaps back
to renting again. Their study nds that in housing and mortgage market con-
ditions, as well as di¤erences in the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing,
account for observed di¤erentials in tenure transitions.
Additional complexities arise in the context of both developing and transi-
tion countries. For example, Anderson (2001) investigates emerging housing
markets in the former Soviet country of Moldova and nds that house prices are
determined by traditional factors such as location and physical characteristics.
But, he also nds that factors specic to the transition context of the country
matter. Morais and Cruz (2009) investigate homeownership in Brazil taking
into account the dual nature of the housing market in that country. With
both formal and informal housing markets, households have the choice of which
market in which to participate, as well as the tenure choice conditional on the
market choice. Their evidence indicates that additional education increases the
probability of a household choosing to participate in the formal housing market,
either as a renter or an owner. Given that choice, they nd that the probabil-
ity of ownership is higher for non-afro descendents, male-headed households,
and households working in the public sector. They also nd that lower in-
come households, younger households, recent migrants, and single mothers have
higher probabilities of renting or owning housing in informal settlements. Own-
ership in the formal housing market is well predicted by wealth, age, household
size, and marital status.
Furthermore, in a former Soviet context there is the system of informal favors
chronicled by Ledeneva (1998) by which goods such as housing were allocated
informally in place of reliance exclusively on the price mechanism. That system
is known as blat, dened by Ledeneva as, "...the use of personal networks and
informal contacts to obtain goods and services in short supply and to nd a
way around formal procedures." Blat represents a form of exchange that falls
3
between gift and commodity, with its own distinctive norms of reciprocity and
ethics. The presence of the blat system suggests that in transition countries
once within the sphere of inuence of the Soviet Union, factors that capture
connections or social capital may help explain homeownership.
These studies suggest that the key factors to consider are economic, demo-
graphic or life-cycle, and informal. In the models that are estimated below all
three types of explanatory variables are used. Economic factors include the re-
spondents income and its sources. While it would be helpful to include wealth
measures as well, there are none available in the LITS II survey. Demographic
and life-cycle factors used in the models include age, marital status, and length
of residence in the current location. A key informal factor included in some
of the models is membership in the Communist Party, or membership of the
respondents father in the Party. This factor captures the blat e¤ect, or social
capital measure, by which allocation of scarce housing resources may have been
a¤ected in Soviet times.
2 Model of Housing Acquisition with Favors
In this section a model of housing acquisition with favors is presented. While
there are multiple aspects of acquisition that should be considered, this model
focuses on the specic feature of transition economies related to favors or infor-
mal payments that were common in the early years of transition. The basic
approach taken in this model is that in the housing market of a transition
country the acquisition of a house may require both a formal payment and an
informal payment or the use of a favor (blat). That informal payment may be
required either in lump-sum form, in which case it has no e¢ ciency e¤ect, or in
a form that is related to the quantity of housing, in which case an ine¢ ciency
is introduced. If the informal payment is related to the quantity of housing the
payment acts like a tax on housing.
Suppose we have a household purchasing two goods x1, x2 where the rst
good is housing and the second good is a composite consumption good. The
utility function is taken as Cobb-Douglas in form:
U = Ax1x
(1 )
2 (1)
The the goods prices are p1 and p2. The household budget function given
income Y is then written as,
Y = p1x1 + p2x2: (2)
In addition to the usual budget, suppose that the acquisition of housing
requires an informal payment, which may be either a lump-sum amount, or a
variable payment that depends on the quantity of housing. We can denote the
informal payment or favor (blat) as,
B = b0 + b1x1; (3)
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where b0 is the lump-sum payment or favor required and b1x1 is the variable
payment that depends on the quantity of housing.
In a competitive market context with no informal payments required, the
utility maximizing solution is derived using the Lagrangian,
L = Ax1x
(1 )
2 + [Y   p1x1   p2x2] (4)
and the usual rst order necessary conditions are,
@L
@x1
= Ax 11 x
(1 )
2   p1 = 0 (5)
@L
@x2
= (1  )Ax1 x 2   p2 = 0 (6)
@L
@
= y   p1x1   p2x2 = 0 (7)
Equations (5) and (6) yield the traditional conditions that the marginal
utility of each good must equal its price. Furthermore, the equations generate
the condition,
Ax 11 x
(1 )
2
(1  )Ax1 x 2
=
x2
(1  )x1 =
p1
p2
; (8)
which indicates that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) must equal the
price ratio.
Now, if we incorporate the informal payments for housing in the model we
have another form of budget equation constraint and the Lagrangian becomes,
L = Ax1x
(1 )
2 + [y   p1x1   p2x2] + [B   b0   b1x1]: (9)
The Lagrangian multipliers  and  represent the marginal utility of income
and favors (blat), respectively.
Di¤erentiating with respect to the two inputs and the two Lagrangian mul-
tipliers yields the system of rst order necessary equations,
@L
@x1
= Ax 11 x
(1 )
2   p1   b1 = 0 (10)
@L
@x2
= (1  )Ax1 x 2   p2 = 0 (11)
@L
@
= Y   p1x1   p2x2 = 0 (12)
@L
@
= B   b0   b1x1 = 0: (13)
In this case equations (10) and (11) yield the condition for the optimal goods
consumption,
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Ax 11 x
(1 )
2
(1  )Ax1 x 2
=
x2
(1  )x1 =
p1 + b1
p2
6= p1
p2
: (14)
This condition di¤ers from equation (8) in that the MRS is now not equal to
the simple input price ratio. Rather, the MRS must equal the price ratio altered
to include the two Lagrangian multipliers and the marginal informal payment.
Consequently, the households MRS exceeds the ratio of goods prices. This
expression indicates that the rate at which the household is able to substitute
one good for another generally exceeds the rate at which it can economically
substitute goods when informal payments or favors are included.
Two observations are important at this point. First, notice that the lump-
sum portion of the informal payment, b0; does not a¤ect the optimality condi-
tion. While this term e¤ectively reduces the income of the household it does
not alter the e¢ cient combination of goods desired. Second, notice that the
marginal informal payment, b1; does enter equation (14) and has an impact on
the optimal housing consumption of the household. The marginal informal pay-
ment distorts the households consumption decision. E¢ ciency requires that
the household operate using the combination of goods where the ratios in equa-
tion (14) are equal. Due to the inequality in this expression we know that there
is an ine¢ cient allocation of resources. The household is diverted from pursuing
the e¢ cient allocation due to the informal payment required for housing.
This model provides several implications to test. First, households that are
endowed with a larger stock of favors that can be used in acquiring housing are
less constrained in their housing consumption. A household with no stock of
favors to use in acquiring housing is limited to the cash market and is therefore
unable to purchase a home which requires both a monetary payment and an
informal payment or a favor. In the empirical models that follow, the prevalence
of blat and its e¤ects on housing allocation is proxied by survey respondents
membership in the Communist Party, or a family history of membership in the
Party. While this is a crude and incomplete indicator, it captures an aspect of
the transition context that is important.
3 Life in Transition Survey Data
Data employed in this study are from the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD) Life in Transition Survey, LITS II, for the year 2010.
The LITS survey provides a cross-section data set on a wide range of variables
covering 29 transition countries plus Kosovo. The overall sample size is approx-
imately 33,000 with about 1,000 responses per country, varying with country
population size. The survey includes a number of questions on housing and
mortgages as well as a wide range of other topics. For the purpose of the present
analysis, the survey questions regarding housing in Section 2 of the survey are
the primary source of data. Individual responses to the governance questions
are used to examine citizensviews on government performance and informal
payments, gifts (or bribes) related to the delivery of those public services.
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The survey questions for which responses are analyzed are as follows:
 Question 201 asks whether the respondent owns a detached house, a at,
or other form of housing
 Question 202 asks whether the respondent is a renter or an owner
 Question 204 asks how the home was acquired (purchased with a mortgage,
privatized, built with a mortgage, etc.)
 Question 205 asks whether the respondent has a mortgage
 Question 225b asks whether the respondent owns a second residence
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in analysis, includ-
ing respondent characteristics of age, income, sources of income, marital status,
and party membership. Age is measured in years. Income is self-reported on
a ladder scale with ten steps. Hence, the income variable is an approximate
measure of the households decile position on the income distribution. Sources
of income include salary, self-employment, farm production, pension, and state
benets. When these income source indicators are used in models, the left-
out category is help from relatives or friends, or other income. Educational
attainment captures the highest level of education completed. The scale used
for this variable ranges from 1 (primary education) to 7 (masters or Ph.D. de-
gree). Country xed e¤ects are included in the models as well, in which case the
left-out country (due to the inclusion of a constant in the model) is Uzbekistan.
Summary statistics in Table 1 indicate that the mean age of respondents is
nearly 52 years, and the mean reported position on the income distribution is
between the fourth and fth rungs of the ten-step income ladder. The majority
of respondents earn income from a salary, 58 percent, with self-employment in-
come reported by 20 percent, farm production income reported by 11 percent,
pension income reported by 43 percent, state benets reported by 10 percent,
and help from friends and relatives or other income reported by 12 percent.
Clearly, these income categories are not exclusive, as respondents may report
more than one source of income. In terms of marital status, 62 percent of
respondents are currently married. Seven percent of respondents are divorced.
Widows account for 12 percent of the respondents. The omitted marital cate-
gories are never married and separated. The mean time respondents have lived
in their current location is 41 years. Only 6 percent of respondents are members
of the Communist Party, but 10 percent have fathers that were Party members.
Occupants of detached houses account for 53 percent of respondents, while
38 percent are living in ats. The remainder live in temporary housing, mobile
homes, or shacks. In terms of how respondents homes were acquired, 21
percent are privatized, 34 percent were purchased or built without a bank loan,
16 percent were purchased or built with a bank mortgage, and 26 percent were
inherited or received as a gift.
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4 Empirical Models
In this section probit model estimates are presented for home ownership, mode
of acquisition, and mortgages. In each case, the dichotomous dependent vari-
able is estimated as a function of survey respondent characteristics. Those
characteristics include age, income, sources of income, marital status, length of
residential tenure, access to credit markets, and measures of social connection
(membership in the Communist Party). Country xed e¤ects are included in
all models. Model estimates are reported in Tables 2-6.
4.1 Home Ownership
Table 2 reports the results of probit model estimation of homeownership of any
type. The explanatory variables in these models include age and income along
with their squared terms to permit nonlinearity in the estimated relationship.
Source of income interaction terms are also included to distinguish ownership
e¤ects which may vary with the type of income the household receives. Marital
status indicators and length of time the household has lived in the city control for
family composition and tenure. Finally, two indictors reecting social capital
or a potential source of favors facilitating homeownership are included: an
indicator of whether the survey respondent is a member of the Communist
Party, and an indictor of whether the respondents father was a Party member.
The three models reported in Table 2 di¤er only in the inclusion of the Party
membership variable.
Estimation results for the three models in Table 2 are virtually identical.
Age inuences homeownership in a positive way, with older respondents having
a higher likelihood of owning a home. The marginal e¤ect of age diminishes
with age, however, as indicated by the negative coe¢ cient for the age squared
terms. The self-reported income level of the respondent has a positive ef-
fect on ownership as well, although the squared terms are not signicant in
this case, indicating a linear e¤ect. Among the ve income source indicators,
self-employment and arm production income have positive e¤ects on home own-
ership, while income from state benets has a negative e¤ect. Married couples
are more likely to own a home, compared to respondents who are divorced or
widowed (and compared to the left-out category of the never married). Finally,
a respondents tenure in a city, or the length of time in the city, has a signicant
positive e¤ect on home ownership.
Testing for the e¤ects of favors, or blat, that may have inuenced home-
ownership in the transition economy setting, the Communist Party membership
variables indicate that only the fathers membership has an impact. Rather
than increasing the likelihood of ownership, however, the fathers membership
variable has a negative coe¢ cient which is marginally signicant. Apparently,
a legacy of family association with the Party has no strong e¤ect on the mere
question of whether the current generation owns a home of any type.
The following subsections report estimation of probit models in Table 3 of
the type of home owned: detached house, at, and second residence. In
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each case the dependent variable is dichotomous, taking the value of one if the
respondent owns that type of house, zero otherwise.
4.1.1 Detached house
About 53 percent of the survey respondents report owning detached homes.
The probit model for detached homes indicates that older citizens are signi-
cantly more likely to own detached homes because the age variable is positive
and signicant. The marginal e¤ect of age declines with age, however, because
the age squared variable is negative and signicant. The e¤ect of the income
variable is negative, however, indicating that citizens with higher income are less
likely to own detached homes. The squared income term is positive and signif-
icant, however, indicating a signicant non-linear e¤ect of income on ownership
of detached homes. When evaluated at the mean income level, the combined
income e¤ects are negative. Not only does income matter, but the source of
income is also important in explaining detached home ownership. If the source
of income is from salary, the e¤ect on ownership is negative. Citizens earning
their income from salaries are less likely to own detached homes. Three other
sources of income have a positive e¤ect on ownership, however. If the source
of income is self-employment, farm production, or pension, the likelihood of
ownership is greater, other things being equal. Marital status is also important
in explaining detached house owning, with married respondents more likely to
own and divorced respondents less likely to own. Finally, the length of time
that a respondent has lived in the city has a strong positive impact on detached
home ownership.
4.1.2 Flat
Flats account for about 38 percent of the survey respondentsownership. The
probit model estimates for at ownership indicate that older respondents are less
likely to own this type of housing. The estimated coe¢ cient for age is negative
and signicant while that for age squared is positive and signicant. So, at
ownership declines with age at a declining rate. The estimated coe¢ cients for
income and its square are signicant and positive and negative, respectively.
Flat ownership rises with income at a decreasing rate. All four source of
income indicators are also signicant. Salaried respondents are more likely to
own ats, but respondents with other sources of income are less likely, holding
the amount of income constant. Marital status has an e¤ect on at ownership
as well, with married respondents less likely and divorced respondents more
likely to own ats, opposite the pattern for detached homes. Finally, the longer
a respondent has lived in a city, the less likely the respondent is to own a at.
Given the opposite e¤ect of length of time in the city for detached home owners,
this result for at owners indicates that residents start by owning a at and later
switch to owning a detached house.
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4.1.3 Second residence
Ownership of a second residence only occurs for about 9% of the survey respon-
dents, but the factors contributing to this form of homeownership are especially
interesting. Age has a positive e¤ect on second residence ownership, with
the marginal impact declining with age. Income has a positive e¤ect which
grows stronger with higher income. Sources of income matter, with salaried,
self-employed, and pensioners more likely to own second residences. Married,
divorced, and widowed respondents are less likely to own second residents rela-
tive to those who are never married.
Because second residences are relatively unlikely to be owned, there is rea-
son to believe that allocation of these residences may be subject to informal
inuences, (cashing-in blat). To test this possibility the rst specication for
second residences in Table 3 includes a dichotomous variable indicating whether
the respondent is a member of the Communist Party. The estimated coe¢ cient
for this variable is positive and signicant indicating that Party members are
more likely to own second residences. The marginal e¤ect is approximately 1.5
percent. The second specication reported in the table exchanges the Party
membership variable for a similar indicator for the respondents father. In this
case the Party membership e¤ect is even stronger. Survey respondents whose
fathers where Party members are signicantly more likely to own second resi-
dences. In this case, the marginal e¤ect is nearly 3 percent. Aside from income,
age, and other factors, the legacy of the informal favors provided in the former
regimes of these transition countries resulted in greater second residence owner-
ship for membership in the Party, or a family legacy of membership. While the
precise nature of these second residences are not knowable based on the survey
data, it is tempting to refer to this as a dacha e¤ecta home away from home.
4.2 Mode of Acquisition
Table 4, panels a and b, report estimates of probit models of house acquisition
mode: privatized, purchased or built with a mortgage from a bank, purchased
or built without a mortgage from a bank, and inherited or gift.
4.2.1 Privatization
Homes acquired through privatization are modeled in the rst two columns of
results in Table 4a. Older survey respondents are more likely to indicate that
they acquired their homes via privatization since the age coe¢ cient in both
models is positive and signicant. The age squared variable is negative and
signicant indicating that the marginal e¤ect of age declines with age. Interest-
ingly, income has no e¤ect although three of the source of income indicators are
signicant. Self-employed respondents and those reliant on state benets are
all less likely to have acquired their homes through privatization. Pensioners
are more likely.
Detached homes are signicantly less likely to have been acquired through
privatization while ats are more likely to have been acquired that way. Mem-
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bership in the Communist Party has no e¤ect on a survey respondents likelihood
of acquiring a home via privatization. But, if the respondents father was a
member of the Party, the likelihood of acquiring a home through privatization
is signicantly reduced.
4.2.2 Purchased or built without a mortgage from a bank
The third and fourth columns of Table 4a report results of probit model estima-
tion for homes that were purchased or built without a mortgage from a bank.
The e¤ect of age on acquisition this way is positive, with a declining marginal
e¤ect. Older respondents are more likely to indicate that they acquired their
homes through purchase or building without a mortgage from a bank. Income
is a signicant factor for this mode of acquisition, in contrast to the privatization
case. The e¤ect of income is positive, with higher income respondents more
likely to indicate that they purchased or built their homes without a mortgage
from a bank. The income e¤ect is nonlinear, however, with the marginal e¤ect
declining with income. Two of the income source indicators are signicant ex-
planatory variables. Respondents with self-employment income and those with
farm production income are more likely to have purchased or built their homes
without a mortgage from a bank.
Detached homes are more likely to be acquired in this manner, while ats
are less likely. Because this mode of acquisition does not use a bank mortgage it
is important to include a control in the model to account for credit worthiness.
While the LITS survey contains little information useful for this purpose, there
is a question in the survey asking whether the respondent has a credit card.
Inclusion of that variable in the model results in a negative and signicant
coe¢ cient, indicating that credit card holders are less likely to have acquired
their homes without bank mortgages.
Respondent Party membership in this case has a negative e¤ect on this
acquisition mode. Party members are less likely to purchase a home or build
without a mortgage, which may indicate they are more likely to do so with a
mortgage. In this case, it may be that blat provides access to credit. A fathers
Party membership has no e¤ect, as indicated in the last column of results in the
table.
4.2.3 Purchased or built with a mortgage from a bank
The rst two columns of Table 4b reports model estimation results for homes
acquired through purchase or building with a mortgage from a bank. For
this mode of acquisition, age has a negative e¤ect. Older respondents are less
likely to have acquired their home through purchase or building with a bank
mortgage. That marginal age e¤ect is nonlinear, declining with age. Notice
that this result is opposite to that for the purchase or building of a home without
a bank mortgage. The e¤ect of income in this acquisition mode is insignicant.
Source of income does matter, however. Salary and state benet income sources
increase the likelihood of home acquisition by this mode. Self-employment,
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farm production, and pension income have the opposite e¤ect, however. While
marital status had no signicant e¤ect for acquisition without a bank mortgage,
in this case married respondents are signicantly more likely to acquire their
home with a bank mortgage. Detached homes are less likely to be acquired in
this manner.
Credit card holders are more likely to have acquired their homes with bank
mortgages. The credit card variable apparently captures their ability to obtain
credit more generally, including a mortgage.
Party membership has a signicant e¤ect, with the respondents member-
ship associated with an increase in the likelihood of acquisition with a bank
mortgage. This result suggests, perhaps, that Party membership plays a role
in loan qualication or credit availability. A fathers membership has no e¤ect
in this case, however.
4.2.4 Inherited or gift
The nal mode of acquisition analyzed is obtaining a house through inheritance
or as a gift. The third and fourth columns of Table 4b report the results of
probit model estimation for this mode of acquisition. Age has a negative and
declining e¤ect, so older respondents are less likely to indicate they acquired
their home through inheritance or as a gift. Income has a negative e¤ect as
well, with higher income associated with a lower likelihood of acquisition by this
mode. Among the source of income indicators, respondents with income from
salary sources have a lower likelihood of inheriting or receiving a home as a gift.
Those with income from farm production sources are signicantly more likely
to acquire their homes this way. Detached houses are more likely to be passed
on this way, while ats are less likely.
A fathers membership in the Communist Party has a positive e¤ect on
passing a home onward through inheritance or as a gift. In this way, the legacy
of the system of favors in the former regime appears to live on.
4.3 Mortgages
The survey data indicate that only about 5% of respondents currently have a
mortgage. Of course, that statistic ignores the possibility that respondents
may have previously had a mortgage. Analysis here begins with the current
mortgage holders only. Table 5 reports model estimates for current mortgage
holders, regardless of the type of home owned. Three estimated models are
reported di¤ering only with the inclusion of Party membership variables.
Across the three models specications, the age coe¢ cient is not signicant,
but its square is negative and signicant indicating that older respondents are
less likely to be current mortgage holders. The income variable has a negative
and signicant coe¢ cient while its squared term has a positive and signicant
coe¢ cient. Hence, higher income respondents are less likely to currently hold
a mortgage, and the e¤ect is nonlinear. Source of income indicators do matter,
with salary, self-employment, and state benet income source coe¢ cients being
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positive while farm production, and pension sources have negative e¤ects on
current mortgage holding. Among the marital status indicators, the married
and divorced variables have positive and signicant coe¢ cients. Married and
divorced respondents are more likely to be current mortgage holders, relative to
widows and the never married.
Two housing type variables are included in the model to control for detached
house and at mortgage e¤ects. The estimated coe¢ cient on the detached house
variable is negative and signicant, indicating that detached home owners are
less likely to currently have a mortgage. Flat owners are also less likely to
currently hold mortgages.
Once again, to control for credit worthiness of the survey respondent the
credit card variable is included in the model. The estimated coe¢ cient for this
variable is positive and statistically signicant in all three models. Respondents
with credit cards are more likely to currently hold a mortgage, reecting their
access and ability to obtain credit.
The Party membership variable has a positive and signicant coe¢ cient
indicating that members are more likely to currently hold mortgages. Party
membership may bring with it social connections that enhance access to credit
and the ability to obtain a mortgage. The e¤ect of a fathers Party membership
has no e¤ect.
Table 6 provides estimates of models of detached home owners who also
have mortgages. The results for these models are quite consistent with those in
Table 5. The age e¤ect is positive and signicant in this case, with a nonlinear
e¤ect. Income has a negative e¤ect, also with a nonlinear pattern. Credit card
holders are more likely to have current mortgages on their detached homes.
Party membership variables are not signicant in these models, however.
5 Summary and Conclusions
This study provides an empirical analysis of homeownership in transition coun-
tries using the EBRD LITS II survey data of 2010. Models of homeownership,
the type of homes owned, mode of acquisition, and use of mortgages are inves-
tigated.
Homeownership in general is more prevalent for older households, married
couples, and those with higher incomes. When specic types of home owner-
ship are analyzed, variations are revealed, however. Detached homes are more
likely to be owned by older households and households that have lived in the
community a longer time, but the income e¤ect in this case is negative with
higher income households less likely to own these homes. Married couples are
more likely to own detached homes while divorced individuals less likely. The
ownership patterns for ats are di¤erent. Older households are less likely to
own ats while higher income households are more likely. Married couples are
less likely to own ats and divorced respondents are more likely. Ownership of
a second residence is less frequent and subject to additional inuences. Older
and higher income households are more likely to own second residences. Be-
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yond those factors, the importance of social capital, informal payments, favors,
or blat, are also evident. Membership in the Communist Party has a signicant
positive e¤ect on second home ownership. Even more important is the survey
respondents fathers Party membership. These results indicate a dacha e¤ect
that accompanies Party membership.
Mode of house acquisition is modeled as well, including acquisition by priva-
tization, purchase or building with or without a bank mortgage, and acquisition
by way of inheritance or gift. Analysis of privatization indicates that detached
homes are less likely to have been acquired through this means while ats are
more likely to have been acquire this way. Homes that are purchased or built
have di¤erent patterns of explanatory variable e¤ects, depending on whether a
mortgage was used or not. for those purchased or built without a mortgage,
age and income both have positive e¤ects. For those purchased or built with
a mortgage, age has a negative e¤ect and income is not signicant. Detached
homes, in particular, are more likely to have been purchased or built without
a mortgage, but less likely to have been acquired with a mortgage. Member-
ship in the Communist Party reduces the likelihood of acquisition without a
mortgage, but increases the likelihood of acquisition with a mortgage. Respon-
dents with credit cards, as a proxy for their credit worthiness, are less likely
to acquire homes without mortgages and more likely to acquire them with a
mortgage. For homes acquired through inheritance or as a gift, age has a pos-
itive e¤ect and income has a negative e¤ect. Most interestingly, the legacy of
family membership in the Communist Party has a positive e¤ect with fathers
membership increasing the likelihood of acquisition by this means.
The prevalence of current mortgages is found to be lower among the elderly
and higher income households, as would be expected. Credit card holders are
found to be more likely to also have mortgages indicating their ability to access
to credit.
Overall, this study has found several predictable patterns of economic and
demographic factors that a¤ect homeownership and mortgages in transition
countries. Further analysis is limited by data availability in the EBRD LITS
II survey, but there are several potential extensions. First, country-specic
e¤ects can be analyzed further. While country xed e¤ects are included in
all of the models reported in this paper, additional attention can be paid to
analysis of varying patterns of homeownership and mortgage reliance across
countries. Second, additional attention should be paid to credit conditions and
their variation across countries in the analysis of mortgages.
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Abstract
The present paper reveals the sources of housing market fluctuations by examining
the interactions of three types of housing market participants: owner-occupiers, rental
investors and flippers. We study their behaviors as a home buyer and as a home seller. It
is found that flippers are the “smartest” group while rental investors outperform owner-
occupiers in terms of fetching buying discounts and selling premiums. It is also found
that, although flippers are able to adopt “good” trading pattern, their trading could
trigger positive feedbacks of owner-occupiers and as a result lead to market over-pricing.
The interactions between owner-occupiers (who dominate the housing market by the
number of participants) and flippers explain why and how flippers, as the smallest group
by the number of participants, could drive the fluctuations of the whole housing mar-
ket. We reiterate that studying the impacts of individual trading patterns on a housing
market but ignoring the interactions among the participants may generate conflicting or
misleading results.
The findings imply that transaction taxes, such as the stamp duties targeted at short-
term sellers, should always be implemented to control flippers’ activities in order to
stabilize housing market.
∗zhangyanjiang@u.nus.edu
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1 Introduction
Financial literature has established several theories to explain the mis-pricing by examining
the impacts of trading patterns on asset markets (Fama, 1965[22]; Gromb & Vayanos, 2010[29];
Rubinstein & Wolinsky, 1987[49]; Yavas¸, 1994[63]; De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann,
1990[19]; Hong & Stein, 1999[33]; Grinblatt, Titman et al. 1995[28]; et al.). However, alternative
theories often give inconsistent implications because of the existence of the interactions among
different trading patterns, and empirical works also offer inconsistent findings (Hau, 2006[30];
Deng, Liu & Wei, 2014[20]). Housing literature directly applies these theories to study mis-pricing
in a housing markets with an objective of understanding the sources of housing market volatilities
(Fu, Qian & Yeung, 2013[27]; Fu & Qian, 2014[26]; Bayer, Geissler & Roberts, 2013[6], et al.). As
a result, the related housing literature demonstrates similar problems.
Our concern, which will be further elaborated in this paper, is motivated by the difference
between financial and housing markets. In a financial market, all participants are investors. Their
trading decision is driven by investment motive, although they may adopt different trading patterns
and have different levels of information. In theory, they are distinguished by flippers and non-
flippers and they are physically unobservable. In a housing market, flippers, rental investors and
owner-occupiers can be physically specified with their trading decisions either driven by investment,
or consumption or both of them. Although their trading patterns and level of information are not
observable, flippers and investors intuitively have more market information and are more likely to
adopt “good” trading patterns than owner-occupiers.
Thus, cautions must be taken when the findings from financial markets are extrapolated to
interpret the sources of housing market mispricing. Finance literature predicts that arbitrage
and intermediary are the two good trading patterns that flippers are likely to adopt. These
flippers are well informed and have “good” behaviors to help stabilize the market (Gromb &
Vayanos, 2010[29]; Rubinstein & Wolinsky, 1987[49]; et al.). It also predicts that positive feedback
(momentum trading) could also be some flippers’ trading pattern. They are typically short term
noise traders who are typically not well informed and mistakenly believe that they can do better
than the average, leading the market to move away from the fundamental (De Long, et al., 1990[19];
Stiglitz, 1989[55]). Inconsistent empirical findings could be due to the adoption of different proxies
to identify trading patterns (Hau, 2006[30]; Deng, Liu & Wei, 2014[20]).
In a housing market, short term noise traders are less informed or less experienced flippers (Fu,
Qian & Yeung, 2013[27]; Fu & Qian, 2014[26]; Bayer, Geissler & Roberts, 2013[6], and Haughwout,
Lee, Tracy & Klaauw, 2011[31];). By using different proxies to identify short term noise traders,
they have found that noise traders adopt positive feedback pattern which destabilizes housing
market. They conclude that these traders lead to housing market crisis by bidding aggressively.
However, unlike financial market, such traders only makes up a small portion of all housing market
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participants (for example, in our sample, all flippers at the buying side only take 12% of total
transaction volume, while less informed flippers are a fraction of it). Our question is how such a
small portion of flippers could have the power to lead the whole market to move away from the
fundamental. The current literature provides limited evidence or argument in this aspect.
In the present paper, we argue that housing flippers are better informed than owner-occupiers
(refer to Subsection 3.1 for identification details). They are more likely to adopt “good” trading
patterns to beat the market, while at the same time leading owner-occupiers and rental investors
to adopt momentum trading pattern. Since owner-occupiers are the dominant market participants,
their momentum behaviors result in the market drifting away from its fundamental.
To illustrate our argument more clearly, we present some observations from the Singapore private
housing market (Refer to Appendix. A for a detail introduction of Singapore housing market).
Firstly, we present the distribution of different participants across one market cycle. Table 1
illustrates that, more flippers bought a housing unit during a trough than during a peak; while
they sold more aggressively during a peak than during a trough. We see otherwise for owner-
occupiers and rental investors. This demonstrates the arbitrage pattern of flippers and partially
justifies our argument that flippers are more likely to take “good” trading strategies compared to
the other two participants.
Table 1: Proportions of Different Participants’ Transaction Volumes during Market Cycle
Participants at buying side
Property Cycle Quarters Owner-occupiers Rental Investors Flippers Unidentified Total
Peak 2007Q3-2008Q1 68.03 21.39 10.58 0 100
Trough 2008Q4-2009Q2 66.89 15.54 17.5 0.07 100
Whole Cycle 2007Q1-2009Q2 67.19 17.25 15.55 0.01 100
Participants at selling side1
Property Cycle Quarters Owner-occupiers Rental Investors Flippers Unidentified Total
Peak 2007Q3-2008Q1 34.36 0.69 20.31 44.64 100
Trough 2008Q4-2009Q2 34.08 1.98 11.59 52.35 100
Whole Cycle 2007Q1-2009Q2 33.54 0.95 15.12 50.39 100
Note: Refer to Subsection 3.1 for the identification of market participants at buying side and at selling side.
Secondly, we present some observations derived from two different yet comparable housing mar-
kets in Singapore: Singapore private housing market and the HDB resale housing market (public
resale housing market). Both markets are exposed to the same social and economic environment.
But Fig 1 demonstrates that the private housing market is more volatile than the public resale hous-
ing market. One major difference between the two markets is that the participants are different.
In the private housing market, flippers, investors and owner-occupiers co-exist, while in the public
resale housing market, all property owners are owner-occupiers due to government regulations.
1Caution must be taken that, around half of the transactions at selling side are not able to be identified, as counted under the
“Unidentified” column. However, the most of the “unidentified” should be sold by housing developers, and only a small part of the
“unidentified” transactions are sold by owner-occupiers and rental investors. Besides, the selling by flippers is well identified. Thus, the
large proportion of the “Unidentified” does not influence our conclusion on flippers’ arbitraging pattern.
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Figure 1: Price Volatility of Private and HDB Market:2006Q1-2013Q42
Thirdly, there exist interactions among the three types of market participants. Between 2009
and 2013, Singapore government issued 8 rounds of anti-speculation police packages to curb the
market. Transaction tax, home loan availability and limitation on foreign buyers are three major
policy instruments. The policies mainly target at short-term property buyers, multiple property
buyers and foreigners in the private housing market. However, Fig 2 shows that owner-occupiers
are also affected, implying that owner-occupiers are likely to have taken positive feedback trading
patterns, acting as followers of flippers.
2The Figure depicts the price volatility of private market and the HDB resale market, where volatility is measured as the quarterly
price index change.
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Figure 2: Transaction Volumes of Owner-occupiers, rental investors and flippers:2006Q1-2013Q43
The above discussion gives rise to the following three research questions. Are flippers the
“smartest”, while rental investors outperform the owner-occupiers in terms of buying at a discount
and selling at a premium? How do flippers lead a housing market to mis-pricing and what are
the roles of rental investors and owner-occupiers in the formation of housing market fluctuations?
How do flippers, rental investors and owner-occupiers interact over a property cycle?
The answers to the above questions make the following contributions to the literature. Firstly, we
reveal the possible trading patterns of an owner-occupier, a rental investor and a flipper in a housing
market after we physically identify them using a unique dataset derived from the Singapore private
housing market. Thus, the source of housing market mis-pricing is clearly uncovered. The current
literature refers flippers or non-flippers as the informed or non-informed buyers, while the latter
is often ambiguously identified. Secondly, we empirically identify the interactions among owner-
occupiers, rental investors and flippers by scrutinizing both their buying and selling behaviors,
which provides an alternative but direct test to the positive feedback theory (De Long, Shleifer,
Summers & Waldmann (1990)[19]). In the existing literature, studying sellers’ behaviors is often
ignored, thus it fails to identify the interactions among them. To our best knowledge, this is the
first paper which has provided direct empirical evidence to the positive feedback theory and has
3Caution must be taken that, the volumes in the Figure 2 only represent those identified transactions, while many transactions are
not identified after 2011Q4, which can also result in a downward trend in volumes of all three identified participants. However, the
figure before 2011Q4 is sufficient to show the momentum of the three types of participants.
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unambiguously explained how flippers spoil a housing market. Thirdly, our study period covers
a completed housing cycle. Therefore the behavioral differences of owner-occupiers, investors and
flippers are explored.
The findings lend empirical support to the theories of Xiong (2013) [60] and Piazzesi & Schneider
(2009)[46]. We provide evidence that the interactions between the heterogeneous trading patterns
are resulted from heterogeneous motivations and different degrees of “smartness”; while the differ-
ent “smartness” can also imply different briefs. We improve the understanding of some empirical
phenomena, for example, we can interpret the findings in Deng, Liu & Wei, 2014[20]. We reconcile
some conflicting arguments and findings, such as literature shows that flippers generally adopt
“good” trading patterns, but they are often blamed for market mis-pricing too (Stiglitz (1989)[55];
Fu, Qian & Yeung, 2013[27]; Fu & Qian, 2014[26]; Bayer, Geissler & Roberts (2013)[6], et al.).
Studying the behaviors of different market participants could help explain financial anomalies
such as excess volatility of asset prices, mean reversion of stock returns and the Mehra-Prescott
equity premium puzzle (De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann, 1990[19]) and could provide
evidence for fund managers help investors avoid loss (Seiler and Seiler, 2010[51]). It can also provide
evidence for public authority to design taxation policies to curb housing market fluctuations (Fu,
Qian & Yeung, 2013[27]; Fu & Qian, 2014[26]; Deng, Liu & Wei, 2014[20]; Anenberg & Bayer,
2013[1]).
Housing policies designed for stabilizing housing markets usually target at certain types of
housing market participants or certain types of trading patterns, for example, turn-over tax targets
at short-term trading (flipping) based on the understanding that flipping leads to market instability
and deterring flippers can stabilize the market. However, the fragmented and conflicting empirical
findings and understanding caused by the unclear and non-comprehensive identification of market
participants or trading patterns may lead governments to make less optimal policy decisions.
Thus, for policy purpose, it is necessary to have a more accurate identification of housing market
participants and to understand their trading patterns and behaviors.
The remaining of the article is as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review and summarizes
the existing problems in both financial and housing literature. Section 3 introduces the data,
the identification of housing market participants, the variable selection and the research design.
Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Literature Review
Two streams of the related literature are reviewed, including the finance literature that at-
tempts to explain financial market mispricing by examining the trading patterns adopted by mar-
ket participants and the housing literature which adopt the above mentioned finance theories to
study housing market mispricing. The review identifies inconsistent theoretical predictions and
the conflicting empirical findings caused by misleading terminologies, poor identification of trading
patterns, and the ignorance of the differences between a housing market and a financial market.
2.1 Trading patterns and mispricing: theories and evidence from financial market
Arbitrage, intermediary, feedback trading (also called as momentum trading) and herding are
the four trading patterns that might be adopted by financial market participants. Arbitrage and
intermediary are often recognized as the “good” trading patterns that can stabilize the market,
while feedback trading and herding may destabilize market.
The efficient market theory ( Fama, 1965[22]) implicitly models the arbitrage as the large num-
ber of arbitrageurs who take infinitesimal positions against the mis-pricing and drive the prices
towards fundamentals. Gromb & Vayanos (2010)[29] summarizes the arbitrage literature as well as
the factors that limit arbitrage. Arbitrage can be either cross-asset arbitrage (arbitrage between
different assets by choosing position in asset A to hedge the position in asset B, essentially it is
a trading behavior to exploit the discrepancies between the prices of different assets at a given
point of time) or inter-temporal arbitrage (arbitrage between different time points of an asset,
which exploits the price discrepancy of an asset across time). The following factors prevent the
arbitrageurs from trading the asset price towards fundamentals and providing liquidity to out-
side investors after an exogenous demand shock: 1) lower liquidity will result in higher price rise
after an exogenous demand shock; 2) non-fundamental risk will reduce the correlation between
the two assets (one asset of different time periods), the arbitrageurs will need to see more price
discrepancy to take his position and as a result the price deviation from the fundamental will be
larger; 3) holding costs (short-selling constraints or costs) stop arbitrage as arbitrageurs have to
see price discrepancies large enough to compensate the holding costs; 4) leverage constraints and
constraints on equity capital lower the ability of arbitrageurs to eliminate price discrepancies. In
addition, Shleifer & Vishny (1997)[52] also mentions the agency problems those large institutional
arbitrageurs face, which make them avoid the “extremely volatile arbitrage positions”.
It is generally agreed in the literature that middlemen (or intermediary) can be market makers or
matchmakers (Yavas¸, 1994[63]). Rubinstein & Wolinsky (1987)[49] builds a searching model where
middlemen (as market makers) buy from sellers and sell to buyers and raise the overall welfare
through correcting the imperfection of time consuming matching between buyers and sellers. In
addition, the middlemen should be at least more patient or have higher searching abilities than
sellers and buyers, and seek to maximize the expected values of the discounted streams of profits
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through buying low selling high which is achieved through shortening their waiting time. In Spulber
(1996)[54], middlemen or intermediary is defined as an agent buys from sellers and sell to buyers
(acting as market makers) or help the match of buyers and sellers to facilitate their transactions
(acting as match makers) and provide availability of goods or liquidity to the market.
Based on the definitions of middlemen mentioned above, middlemen can be those retailers and
wholesalers in terms of commodities as well as financial intermediaries such as security and com-
modity brokers (Spulber, 1996[54]), and improve the market efficiency through their higher ability
in detecting goods’ true value and guaranteeing the goods’ quality (Biglaiser, 1993[9]), decreasing
the equilibrium search intensities (Yavas¸, 1994[63]), correcting the imperfection of time-consuming
matching between the buyers and sellers (Rubinstein & Wolinsky, 1987[49]), raising the quality of
the match between consumers’ preferences and the goods they consume (Johri & Leach,2002[37]).
Feedback trading (also called momentum trading) are commonly defined as the trading pat-
tern of making transaction decisions based on assets’ past returns. It is often blamed for market
mis-pricing. De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann (1990)[19] develops a model of rational
speculators and feedback traders, where speculators are defined as those transact based on infor-
mation obtained, and noise traders do not rely on information while adopt positive feedback trading
patterns: buy when price rises and sell when price falls. The authors argue that with the presence
of positive feedback traders, rational speculators could also destabilize the price as those rational
speculators know that the initial price increase (or down) will stimulate buying (selling) by posi-
tive feedback buyers and therefore they do not necessarily transact towards the price fundamental.
Cutler, Poterba & Summers (1990)[18] assumes that the market has three types of participants:
1) transact based on rational forecasts of future returns; 2) transact based on fundamentals; 3)
feedback traders whose demand depends on the past returns (positive-feedback, buy after mar-
ket price rise; and negative-feedback, buy after price decline). It develops a speculative-dynamic
model with feedback traders. Through model simulation, they find that heavier weight of short-
horizon feedback trading leads prices back towards fundamental while also triggers later feedback
demand and lead to price overreaction, raising price volatility around fundamentals. Hong & Stein
(1999)[33] studies the behaviors of newswatchers and momentum traders. The newswatchers make
forecasts based on private information observed on future fundamentals while not conditional on
past prices. Momentum traders make forecasts conditional on past price changes and their forecast
is the simple function of the past prices. They find that newswatchers create price under-reaction
as information diffuse slowly across the newswatchers; and momentum-style arbitrage behaviors
finally lead to price overreaction.
Herding is another trading pattern blamed for market mispricing. It is theoretically defined as
the behavior of reversing a planned decision due to observing others’ behaviors (Bikhchandani et
al., 1992[10]; Bikhchandani & Sharna, 2000[11]; Avramov, Chordia & Goyal, 2006[5]; Chang &
Dong, 2006[16]; Blasco, Corredor & Ferreruela, 2012[13]; ). Bikhchandani & Sharna (2000)[11]
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summarizes the literature on herding in financial market, indicating that herding should be dis-
tinguished from the “spurious herding” which is not the real herding but the similar decisions
resulted from similar information sets. Herding can be further specified into rational herding and
non-rational herding. Momentum investment pattern (also called positive feedback pattern) is one
type of non-rational herding, and it is defined as buying recent winners (whose prices rose) and
selling recent losers (whose prices dropped)(Grinblatt, Titman et al. 1995[28]). Rational herding
assumes that agents are rational while herding is the result of either imperfect information (in-
formation cascade, for example; Avery & Zemsky, 1998[4]), concern for reputation (Scharfstein &
Stein, 1990[50], for example) or compensation structures (Maug & Naik, 1996[42], for example).
Bikhchandani & Sharna, 2000[11] finds that the empirical analysis of herding in the literature does
not arise from the theoretical models while generally adopt statistical approach to estimate the
clustering of decisions. In this regard, the herding behaviors are not clearly identified empirically.
The studies in this field are theoretical because it is difficult to empirically identify trading
patterns. For a few empirical studies (Hau, 2006[30]; Deng, Liu & Wei, 2014[20]), different proxies
and different terminologies whose definitions are often not exclusive of each other, are used to
identify trading patterns which make it hard to comparing the findings.
For example, “speculators” or “speculative buyers” are used in some studies. They could be
identified as arbitrageurs or non-arbitrageurs (feedback traders, for example). Friedman (1953)[25]
argues that speculators (are informed and rational) can stabilize the market because they buy when
prices are low and sell when prices are high, which counters the deviation of price from fundamental
values. Hau (2006)[30] provides empirical evidence for Friedman’s argument. The two researches
implicitly define the speculators as arbitrageurs, purchasing when a property is under-priced and
selling when a property is over-priced and trade the market towards fundamental.
Delong, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann (1990)[19] defines rational speculators as those who
trade based on information obtained. Stiglitz (1989)[55] divides the stock market traders into
three extremes based on information accessibility: 1) the uninformed, those who understand that
they cannot do better than the market and thus buy indexed mutual funds (buy the market); 2)
the informed, who are insiders that have information advantages; 3) the noise traders, who are not
informed while trade by themselves, who are assumed to create noises. He defines speculators as
short-term traders, and split the speculators into noise speculators and arbitrageurs. The noise
speculators are defined as those short-term traders who mistakenly believe that they can do better
than the average; the noise speculators are assumed to lead the market away from fundamentals
and the arbitrageurs who live off the noise speculators are assumed to smooth out the market.
We can see that in the above two articles, speculators are further split into the informed or
rational speculators who conduct arbitrage behaviors and non-informed or irrational speculators
who conduct non-arbitrage behaviors like feedback trading. Deng, Liu & Wei (2014)[20] follows
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the specification of Stiglitz (1989)[55] and their empirical results indicate that transaction taxes
stabilize the immature market as flippers in the immature market is mostly non-informed and the
tax deters flippers.
In summary, although investors’ trading patterns are well defined in theoretical literature, em-
pirically, different proxies are used to identify them, which has caused inconsistent or conflicting
findings. In addition, both Delong, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann (1990)[19] and Cutler, Poterba
& Summers (1990)[18] imply that the key to understand different market participants’ impacts on
market is to identify the trading patterns of different participants and understand their interac-
tions. However, the latter receives limited attention in the literature, which forms one motivation
of the present paper.
2.2 Trading patterns and mispricing: theories and evidence from housing market
To study the sources of housing market volatility, a parallel stream of housing literature has
been established. They adopt the theories and terminologies from the studies in financial markets.
Thus, their work is more empirical than theoretical. The differences between housing and financial
markets are typically not addressed. As a result, the existing literature from housing market shares
the similar concerns arising from the finance literature.
Fu & Qian (2014)[26] studies the impacts of flippers and momentum traders on Singapore private
housing market. A pre-sale transaction, sold before the construction is completed (excluding those
sold by developers) is identified as the transactions made by the flippers; and momentum trading
is measured by the ratio of number of transactions happened in a high-momentum month to the
project size, where a high momentum month is defined as the 30% highest periods in terms of
3-month benchmark price index growth. It finds that short-term flippers aiming to tap gains from
market price trends generate price overreactions most notably in sub markets with less informative
prices. In other words, the motivation of the flippers is assumed to tap gains from market price
appreciation, and they prefer the locations where market is thin and with less informative prices.
Adopting the similar identification of flippers to Fu & Qian (2014)[26], Fu, Qian & Yeung
(2013)[27] distinguishes the flippers from other housing buyers, tests the impacts of Tobin’s tax
on Singapore housing market and finds that the withdrawal of stamp duty payment deferral raises
price volatility by deterring more informed flippers while relatively less noisy flippers. Flippers
are defined as those who sell properties before project completion. This identification is based on
the institutional background of Singapore: in the pre-sale market, housing units have not been
handed over to the buyers and the buyers have very low holding costs. In addition, the flippers
are further specified into the informed and the non-informed. The authors assume that informed
flipping buyers are more likely to transact in the under-priced projects and the non-informed are
more likely to transact in the over-priced projects. The above identification actually follow the
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literature of arbitrage where informed flippers act as the arbitrageurs who find the under-priced
housing properties. In addition, the authors find that the price volatility of the under-priced
projects are raised after the policy while that of over-priced projects are reduced. Then, based on
the assumption and the above findings, they conclude that when the informed flippers are deterred
by the policy in (the under-priced) projects and therefore the price volatility is raised, and when
the non-informed flippers are deterred by the policy in (the over-priced) projects and therefore the
price volatility is reduced.
Their work gives rise to a new question. Flippers are defined by the sub-sales in the Singapore’s
presale housing market, and the sub-sales represent a very small portion of the whole housing
market transactions (taking a proportion of only 9.33% in our dataset). The non-informed flippers
is a fraction of these sub-sales. Thus, we question on how they could generate an impact on
the whole Singapore private housing market. In addition, the empirical analysis considers the
purchasing behaviors of the flippers, while their selling behaviors are not addressed. Understanding
the selling behaviors is helpful to understand how flippers interact with other types of market
participants.
Chinco & Mayer (2014)[17] more clearly distinguish the informed buyers from the non-informed
buyers in single family housing markets of US Metropolitan Statistical Areas. It distinguishes
the speculators from owner-occupiers, further specifies the speculators into the informed and the
non-informed, and studies the impacts of the two types of speculators on the housing market.
It finds that the increase in the mis-informed speculative buyers predicts the increase in future
house prices and the implied-to-actual rent ratio’s appreciation rate (a higher implied-to-actual
rent ratio implies a higher excess return in addition to rental income, and thus more deviation of
price away from the fundamental). It defines the second-house buyers as speculators; among which,
the local ones are informed and the out-of-town ones are not informed, based on the assumption
that the local have information advantage. In order to justify the specification and the different
impacts of the two types of speculators on the market, the authors raise two difference between
the informed and non-informed: 1) the informed are those local who have more knowledge about
the local housing market and face less difficult principle-agent problem; evidences show that the
misinformed generally fail to time the market and they are not able to fully enjoy the housing
dividends; 2) the non-informed (the out-of-town) treat houses as pure financial asset and want to
make a speculative bet.
Chinco & Mayer (2014)[17] aims to clearly distinguish the informed from the non-informed
speculators. However, the identification of speculators as a second-home buyer may have resulted
in some conflicting findings. For example, the authors claim that out-of-town second-home buyers
treat housing as a pure financial asset, then intuitively they should be more professional. However,
the authors find that they are actually less able to time the market compared to the local because
they are the non-informed. The conflict may be due to an identification issue. The internal
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movers ( defined as those who sell the original homes and buy and live in another home within the
same city, as indicated in Anenberg & Bayer, 2013[1]) who are actually owner-occupiers; similarly,
part of the out-of-town second-home buyers are also owner-occupiers as they buy for occupying
purposes and without selling the previous homes. Intuitively, out-of-town second-home buyers has
weaker bargaining power as they have an urgency to move into the purchased property; while in
comparison, a local second-home buyer would have more bargaining power, as they could live in
their original homes otherwise. The above can be an alternative explanation to why out-of-town
second home buyers obtain less capital gains, the reason is that they are less flexible than the
local internal movers, while both of the two are typically not speculators and instead they buy
for occupying purposes. In addition, the authors does not explain how the non-informed raise the
market price, the cause of which is that the authors cannot clearly tell what kind of (behavioral)
characters of the non-informed that can raise the market prices. Levin & Wright (1997)[39] also
argues that owner-occupiers as home movers can drive up the housing prices. For example. when
home prices are going up, they will buy before selling and therefore add to the market demand of
housing and finally add to the market price rising.
Fisher & LambieHanson (2012)[23] adopts similar identification as that of Chinco & Mayer
(2014)[17] and studies the multi-family housing in Chelsea, Massachusetts US, while their findings
conflict with that of Chinco & Mayer (2014)[17]. They find that local investors sell more quickly
than the non-locals and have a higher propensity to flip. During the market downturn, the mort-
gage foreclosure risk of the local investors is around 1.8 times of owner-occupiers, while that of
the non-locals is not significantly different from that of the owner-occupiers. The above conflict
implies that the non-locals do not necessarily be “bad” guys that harm the market.
Haughwout, Lee, Tracy & Klaauw (2011)[31] studies the mortgage behaviors of different housing
buyers in the US. It distinguishes the speculative investors from the owner-occupiers. It defines the
speculative investors as individuals who at any point in the sample period have more than one first-
lien mortgages and hold the first liens for more than 6 consecutive months. In addition, the authors
further specify the investors based on their leveraging behaviors. The investors are specified into
declared investors (who declare that they will not live in the purchased property when reporting the
occupancy status for taking the loan) and undeclared investors. They take the declared investors as
the informed (or experienced) and the undeclared investors as the non-informed (unexperienced).
They find that the non-informed speculative investors bid more aggressively during the housing
boom and pay a margin higher than that of the non-investors and declared investors; in addition,
the default rate of the investors are much higher than the owner-occupiers in the bust period. In
addition, the authors have mentioned that there are three participants with different purchasing
motivations, i.e. owner-occupiers, rental investors and flippers, but they do not identify them.
Bayer, Geissler & Roberts (2013)[6] distinguishes the flippers from the owner-occupiers and
rental investors and further specifies the flippers into the middlemen (the experienced) and the
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speculator (the inexperienced). With comprehensive housing transaction data with name and
mortgage information for Los Angele, US, the authors identify the flippers as those individuals
who buy and resale more than two housing properties within a short period of time. Further, the
middlemen are those people who have more than 7 flips within the studied period, and speculators
are those who have 2 to 6 flippers. In order to demonstrate the different buyers’ purchasing
motivations, the authors specify the housing returns into buyer’s discount, market price growth
during the holding period and seller’s premium, and carefully remove the influence of housing
renovation (which is not reflected by the data). They find that, compared with the speculator,
middlemen can fetch a higher discount when purchasing, a higher premium when selling, and a
relatively lower revenue from market price growth. In addition, the middlemen hold the properties
for a substantially shorter period of time compared to the speculator. This is consistent with
assumption that middleman’s motivation is to fetch purchasing discount and selling premium
while speculators focus on price appreciation. Thus, the middlemen is characterized as more
experienced, more gifted in finding motivated sellers and buyers, and paying more attention to
buying low & selling high; the speculators are less experienced, paying more attention to market
price growth relative to the middlemen. The specification of the middlemen and the speculators
is consistent with the literature where flippers are specified into the informed and non-informed
(noisy traders): informed flippers buy lower and sell higher and therefore stabilize the market,
while noisy traders create noises; or specified into the informed traders that stabilize the market
and the feedback traders who trigger the later feedback traders. In this regard, the contribution of
this article is explicitly defining the behavioral or trading patterns of different flippers and study
their impact on the market.
Some concerns motivated by Bayer, Geissler & Roberts (2013)[6] are that firstly, it does not
distinguish the group of rental investors who aim to fetch the rental income from owner-occupiers.
Due to the ignorance of the role of rental investors, the paper is not able to reveal the whole
picture of the housing market. Secondly, based on their identification, the article contributes to
the literature that in a housing market, the speculators (who are not experienced) raise the market
dynamics and reduce market efficiency; while the middlemen (who are experienced) can stabilize
the market or at lease do not raise market dynamics. However, ignoring the selling behaviors of
flippers and their interaction with other types of market participants, Bayer, Geissler & Roberts
(2013)[6] is not able to clearly explain how speculators (non-arbitraging flippers), who take a very
small portion of the market, drive the mis-pricing of the whole market.
In summary, researches such as Chinco & Mayer (2014)[17] and Fisher & LambieHanson (2012)[23]
distinguish the housing investors (second-home owners) from owner-occupiers. They further split
the investors into the informed (the local) and the non-informed (the out-of-town). This specifi-
cation is ambiguous and leads to conflicting findings. Chinco & Mayer (2014)[17] argues that the
non-informed (the out-of-town) treat houses as pure financial asset and want to make a specula-
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tive bet; simultaneously, the non-informed generally fail to time the market and they are not able
to fully enjoy the housing dividends. In contrast, Fisher & LambieHanson (2012)[23] finds that
during the market downturn, the mortgage foreclosure risk of the local investors (the informed
as identified by Chinco & Mayer, 2014[17]) is around 1.8 times of owner-occupants, while that of
the non-local is not significantly different from that of the owner-occupants. The above conflict
implies that the non-local do not necessarily be the non-informed speculators, actually they could
be owner-occupiers.
Because the trading patterns of second-home owners are difficult to characterize, many researches
turn their focus to short-term flippers which can be clearly identified. Fu & Qian (2014)[26]
finds that short-term flippers generate price overreactions most notably in sub markets with less
informative prices based on the assumption that flippers’ motivation is to tap gains from market
price trends. In Fu, Qian & Yeung (2013)[27], flippers are further specified into the informed
and the non-informed. The authors assume that the informed are more likely to transact in the
underpriced projects and the non-informed are more likely to transact in the over-priced projects.
The trading patterns of the flippers are assumed and not well justified. As a result, these papers
are not able to solidly connect the trading patterns to flippers’ impacts on housing markets.
Bayer, Geissler & Roberts (2013)[6] is the first article that gives a specific identification of
flippers and simultaneously clearly demonstrates the trading patterns of the informed flippers (the
middlemen) and the non-informed flippers (the speculators). The specification of the middlemen
and the speculators is consistent with the literature where flippers are specified into informed and
non-informed (noisy traders): informed flippers buy low and sell higher, arbitraging the market
and therefore stabilize the market, while noisy traders create price noises.
All existing researches ignore the role of rental investors who aim to fetch the rental income in
housing market. In addition, either investors or flippers only make up a very small part of the
market. How such a small part of transactions can trigger the whole market fluctuations is still a
question. Although Bayer, Geissler & Roberts (2013)[6] clearly demonstrates the trading patterns
of flippers, it is not able to open the black box on how different market participants interact with
each other and then impact on the housing market.
2.3 Understanding the roles of owner-occupiers, rental investors and flippers in hous-
ing market
Financial market has higher liquidity and lower transaction costs, is more transparent than
housing market, and all participants are investors (including both short-term flippers and long-
term investors); while in housing market, the majority of participants are owner-occupiers holding
consumption and investing motivations although there are also short-term flippers and long-term
rental investors. In Singapore, for example, although more than 80% of local residents live in
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public housing (which is also called HDB), the private housing market is also dominated by the
owner-occupiers (who take around 69% of total purchasing transactions according to our dataset).
The three types of housing market participants (owner-occupiers, rental investors and flippers)
are different in motivations, trading patterns, scales in the market and therefore their impacts
on housing market are different. The difference between the three types of housing participants
are well recognized by the government (for example, cooling measures on a housing market target
at those non-owner-occupiers, and property taxes in Singapore are also higher for non-owner-
occupiers), banks (mortgage lenders charge higher interest rates on mortgages to non-owner-
occupiers as indicated by Robinson (2010)[46]) and real estate agents (When a potential buyer
approach a broker, the common question the broker will ask first is whether the property is used
for living or investing).
Table 2 summarizes the trading motivations, decision making and the implied trading patterns of
the three types of market participants. The remaining of this subsection gives a detailed discussion.
Table 2: Trading motivation, decision making and the trading patterns of different market partic-
ipants
Flippers Rental Investors Owner-occupiers
Trading Motivation Short-term capital gain Long-term capital gain Long-term capital gain
Long-term revenues
Consumption
Social & psychological utilities
Decision Making Finance constraint Finance constraint Finance constraint
Holding cost Holding cost Holding cost
Transaction cost Transaction cost Transaction cost
Moving cost
Idiosyncratic preferences
Most experienced Experienced Less experienced
Trading Pattern Arbitrage
Intermediary
Positive Feedback
Role in Market Leader Follower
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Flipper
Flippers motivated by taping short-term capital gains are likely to be the most experienced
and “smartest” group of participants in a housing market. Flippers are commonly defined as
short-term traders. In both Fu & Qian (2014)[26] and Fu, Qian & Yeung, 2013[27], flippers are
defined as those who sell properties before project completion. Fu & Qian (2014)[26] claims that
the motivation of flippers is assumed to tap the gains from market price appreciation. In Fu,
Qian & Yeung, 2013[27], flippers are further specified into the informed and the non-informed.
The motivation of the informed flippers is to purchase the under-priced properties and tap the
purchasing discount. Both papers implicitly assume that some flippers have the trading patterns
as arbitrageurs while others have the trading patterns of positive feedback traders. Bayer, Geissler
& Roberts (2013)[7] clearly distinguishes the flippers from the owner-occupiers and rental investors.
Flippers are identified as those individuals who buy and resale more than two housing properties
within a short period of time, holding the motivation of fetching capital gains from the transacted
housing properties. According to the definition, flippers are more experienced as a whole. In
addition, Bayer, Geissler & Roberts (2013)[7] further specifies the flippers into the middlemen (the
more experienced) and the speculator (the less inexperienced). The middleman’s motivation is
to fetch purchasing discount and selling premium while speculators focus on price appreciation.
Thus, the middlemen is characterized as more experienced, more gifted in finding motivated sellers
and buyers, and paying more attention to buying low & selling high; the speculators are less
experienced, paying more attention to market price growth relative to the middlemen.
As a short summary, flippers are short-term traders and respond fast to external shocks, more
experienced, holding the motivation of taping short-term gains either through housing price appre-
ciation or through buying low & selling high. As indicated in the literature, the flippers are more
likely to take the trading patterns of arbitrage, intermediary and less like to positive feedback,
compared to the other two types of participants, and flippers are more flexible and more likely to
lead the market.
Rental Investor
Purchasing houses for renting is mostly an investment decision (Brown, Schwann & Scott,
2008[14]). Few literature has addressed the behaviors of landlords, while there are still some
manifesting the incentives and characteristics of landlords. Obtaining a secure and long-term rev-
enue stream as well as capital gains (house price rising) is the prominent motivation for being a
rental investor. Australian Bureau of Statistics (1994)[45] carried out a survey on the incentives
of investors in rental housing in Australia, finding that obtaining a secure long-term investment is
the prominent attraction. In other words, as summarized by Yates (1996)[62] and Beer (1999)[8],
capital gains, rental income as well as tax benefits make investment in rental housing a long-term
investment and investors believe house prices will go up. In addition to that, saving for retirement,
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reducing taxable income, or renting houses out when owners live elsewhere are also important in-
centives. Thus, Yates (1996)[62] and Beer (1999)[8] argue that those part of investors are less likely
to respond quickly to market condition changes.
Rental investors should face both risk in housing prices and rents. Sinai (2011)[53] indicates
that both renters and homeowners are subscribed to financial uncertainty. Renters face volatility
in future costs of housing services (rents). Homeowners face the uncertainty in housing costs, such
as property taxes and maintenance costs. In addition, if the homeowner will move out and sell the
house, it will also face volatility in asset value. The above findings imply that rental investors will
face both risk in housing prices and rents. This is because housing prices and rents do not have
to be consistent with each other (Blackley & Follain, 1996[12]). In addition, financial constraint is
an important consideration of rental investors. Brown, Schwann & Scott (2008)[14] find that the
accessibility to mortgage has significant influence on investing in private housing.
As a summary, rental investors are motivated by obtaining long-term capital gains, long term
and stable revenues, and subject to the holding costs and financial constraint. In the literature, the
trading patterns of rental investors are not discussed, while their motivations and decision making
constraints imply that they should be less experienced and less flexible than flippers. Thus they
are less likely to carry out arbitrage and intermediary trading patterns.
Owner-occupier
The motivations and decision making process of owner-occupiers are the most complicated among
the three participants. Driven by both consumption and investment motivations, an owner oc-
cupied property is an illiquid and indivisible asset in the household asset portfolio (Arrondel &
Lefebvre, 2001[2]; Yang, 2005[61]; Flavin & Yamashita,2008[24]; Lustig & Van, 2005[41];).
Owner-occupiers may face different budget constraints and housing transaction opportunities,
transaction costs and the borrowing constraints compared to other participants (Ioannides &
Rosenthal, 1994[36]). In addition, being an owner-occupier has a direct utility, which comes
from the social, political and psychological values associated with owning a home (Arrondel and
Lefebvre (2001)[3]; Megbolugbe & Linneman (1993)[43]). Hung and So (2012) [34] argues that
home buyers with both occupying and investment motivations are willing to pay a higher price as
a call (option) premium, which is generated from the fact that the home buyers are loss averse:
they can hold the property and consume the housing services if house price is low and sell the
property when house price is high. Flavin & Nakagawa (2008)[24] states that every adjustment of
owner-occupied housing asset in household portfolio incurs an adjustment cost; when choosing a
new house, the consumer takes into account the fact that the consumption of housing services will
be constant at the new level until the subsequent stopping time, when it is again worthwhile to
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incur the adjustment cost. The fees associated with purchasing and selling a home also make up
a source of transaction costs influencing house transaction decisions (Muth, 1974[44]).
In summary, owner-occupiers are motivated by long-term capital gain, obtaining consumption
utility and social & psychological utilities. When making trading decisions, they would consider
finance constraints, holding cost, transaction costs and the additional moving costs. In addition,
they have idiosyncratic preferences for property attributes to satisfy their consumption. The above
facts imply that most owner-occupiers trade less, are less flexible when trading, and they should be
less experienced, and therefore they are less likely able to take arbitrage and intermediary trading
pattern while more likely to take positive feedback pattern (as implied by Anenberg & Bayer,
2013[1]).
2.4 A Summary of the Literature Review
The related housing and finance literatures illustrate four fallacies: the misleading or conflicting
definitions of the terminologies (especially when speculator, rational vs non-rational, the informed
vs non-informed, are alternatively used), isolated and exclusive topics (such as arbitrage, interme-
diary, and positive feedback), the problematic empirical identifications in trading patterns and the
ignorance on the interactions among different trading patterns in empirical works. These fallacies
may have led to the conflicting or fragmented understanding on both markets. The related hous-
ing literature not only shares the same problems but also fails to address the difference between
financial and housing markets, which motivates us to study housing market while taking housing
markets’ characters into consideration.
In addition, the literature for both financial and housing markets have already formed some
understanding about trading patterns such as arbitrage, intermediary and positive feedback; and
at the same time, numerous studies in housing literature have examined the characters of the
three physically different participants, i.e. owner-occupiers, rental investors and flippers. The
above motivate us to summarize the related literature and to link housing market participants’
characters to their trading patterns.
Unlike in a financial market, flippers, rental investors and owner-occupiers in a housing market
can be empirically well identified both as a buyer and as a seller, if data permits. Their roles in a
housing market are also well recognized by governments, real estate agents and banks, etc, which
allows us to study their interaction in terms of trading patterns. This may shed some light to the
interactions of different trading patterns in a financial market.
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3 Data, Identification of Housing Market Participants, Variable Selec-
tion and Research Design
This section includes two Subsections: 3.1 introduces the data sources as well as the identification
of the three types of market participants; 3.2 presents the research design and variable selection
for the empirical analysis.
3.1 Data and Identification of Housing Market Participants
We construct our working dataset based on six data sources: StreetSine, PowerSearch, REALIS
and Datastream, Bloomberg and URA4 and HDB5 News Release. Datastream and Bloomberg
provide the time series data for Singapore, such as GDP growth rate and CPI, and the URA and
HDB NEWs Release provide the information about Singapore housing-related policies (which are
summarized in Appendix. B& C).
Table 3 reports the three housing transaction related databases, including their data sources and
coverage. StreetSine is the fundamental database we use. It provides almost all sale’s transactions
of private housing, more than 80% of rental transactions in the private housing market as well as the
rental and sale transactions in the public HDB housing market during the investigation period.
POWERSEARCH and REALIS are used to provide additional information and to increase the
accuracy of data from StreetSine.
Table 3: The Three Housing Databases
Database Name: StreetSine
Data Sources and Owner:
Transaction records reported by real estate agents, combined with records from URA and HDB.
Owned by StreetSine Technology Group
Coverage:
Records for all sale transactions of private housing cover the period of 1995Q1 -2014Q1.
Records for rental transactions of private housing cover the period of 2006Q1 -2014Q1.
Records for resale transactions of HDB cover the period of 2001Q1 -2014Q1.
Records for rental transactions of HDB cover the period of 2006Q1 -2014Q1.
Database Name: Powersearch
Data Sources and Owner:
Transaction records collected from records revealed by URA and HDB.
Owned by Hiwire Data & Security Pte Ltd
Coverage:
Records for the sale and rental tansactions of both private housing and HDB cover the period of 2002Q1-2014Q2.
Database Name: REALIS
Data Sources and Owner:
It is a database of URA.
Coverage:
Recods for all the sale transactions of private housing, from 1995Q1-present, updated regularly.
Note: The data bases we use may have more contents in which those not available to us
or not used in this article are not listed in the table.
4The Urban Development Board of Authority of Singapore, which provides mainly the private housing information:
http://www.ura.gov.sg/
5Housing & Development Board, which is Singapore’s public housing authority, mainly provides information on public housing:
http://www.hdb.gov.sg/
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The dataset includes both the sale and rental transaction records for the private housing market.
There are generally 5 types of private housing properties in Singapore, condominium, apartment,
the detached, the semi-detached and terrace, while transactions of condominiums and apartments
are very active due to their relatively low total price and higher liquidity, and the two account
for around 90% of total private housing transactions. Thus, in our dataset, we only include the
condominiums and the apartments. Table 4 reports the variables in our cleaned dataset. The
variables are for sale transaction records, while the rental transaction records are not reported as
we only use them for identifying market participants.
Table 4: The Main Variables in the Composed Dataset
Variables:
Transaction ID: To distinguish each transaction record;
Full Address: The address of each house unit, including street, block, floor and room no;
Postal Code: Each building has one identical postal code;
Transaction Price : Price of the traded housing unit (current price);
Contract Date: Date when the transaction takes place;
Size: Size of housing unit, in Square foot;
Floor Storey level of each housing unit;
TOP The Year when construction of the Building is finished (buyer can move in);
Property Age The age of house when it is transacted (contract year minus TOP)
Purchaser Address Indicator
0 for HDB (The buyer previously lives in a Public house unit);
1 for Private (Lives in Private house before);
District In Singapore, there are 28 districts;
Property Type Dummy: 1 for Condo; 0 for Apartment;
Property Tenure Dummy: 1 if the tenure is around 99 years, 0 if it is Freehold or around 999=0;
Type of Sale
New Sale (sold by developer before TOP); Sub sale (sold by house buyer before TOP);
Resale (sold after TOP);
Project Name The name of each project ;
Project Units Total units within the project;
Singapore time series Quarterly GDP rate; Quarterly CPI; Monthly interest rate (10 year government bond rate);
Housing Policies The date when each policy takes effect;
Based on the constructed dataset, we identify owner-occupiers, rental investors and flippers from
both the selling and buying sides. The constructed dataset includes the history of rental and sale
transactions for each property unit within the investigation period. It is noted that although the
sale’s transaction records are comprehensive, the dataset only covers more than 80% of the rental
transactions in the private housing market. Thus, rental investors are possibly under-represented
as compared to owner-occupiers, but the identification of flippers is not influenced.
The identification strategy is developed based on the comprehensiveness of the transaction his-
tory of each particular unit, and it includes two parts: identification of participants as buyers
and as sellers. On the buying side, we identify a transaction record as bought by a flipper if the
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property was then sold within a short period of time (we use 1 year as a threshold) or sold as a
sub-sale6. We assume that within 1 year of holding period, the property owner is not likely to
move into the property due to the cost of relocation. We identify a transaction record as bought
by a rental investor if the property was then rented out within one year (after TOP); and the
rest were bought by owner-occupiers. On the selling side, we look at any two consecutive sale’s
transaction records (ignoring the rental transactions), if a buyer in the first record is a flipper, then
in the second record, the property was sold by the flipper. The identification of rental investor
and owner-occupiers follows the same strategy. The strategy details are provided in the Appendix.
D. It is noted that for both buying and selling identifications, there are sale’s transactions which
buyers or sellers are not able to be identified. This is because the original databases only covers a
limited time period.
Table 5 presents the transaction history of a private housing unit. Taking transaction record
No. 1 as an example, the property was transacted in August 2003 while it was transacted again
in September 2006 as a sub-sale. It means that the buyer in record No.1 sold the property before
moving into it, and therefore he or she was identified as a flipper. At the same time, in record No.2,
the seller was previously a flipper. Let’s take record No.5 as another example. The property was
transacted in September 2009 and then sub-let within 1 year in Jan 2010, which means the buyer
in record No.5 is a rental investor. As the buyer in the previous sale transaction (record No.2) is
identified as a rental investor, then in record No.5, the property was sold by the rental investor.
In addition, in record No.9, as the previous transaction is beyond our investigation period, we are
not able to identify it.7
Table 5: Examples of Identification
No. Full Address Rent/Sale Type of Sale TOP Contract date Identi Buyer Identi Seller
1 1 ESSEX * #**-02 Sale NEW SALE 2006 8/29/2003 Flipper N.A.
2 1 ESSEX * #**-02 Sale SUB SALE 2006 9/25/2006 Rental Investor Flipper
3 1 ESSEX * #**-02 Rent 2006 12/26/2007
4 1 ESSEX * #**-02 Rent 2006 12/16/2008
5 1 ESSEX * #**-02 Sale RESALE 2006 9/28/2009 Rental Investor Rental Investor
6 1 ESSEX * #**-02 Rent 2006 1/4/2010
7 1 ESSEX * #**-02 Rent 2006 6/18/2010
8 50 LOR*** #**-33 Rent 1998 4/29/2011
9 50 LOR*** #**-33 Sale RESALE 1998 9/25/2013 Rental Investor N.A.
10 50 LOR*** #**-33 Rent 1998 11/22/2013
Note: For the Full Address of the records, we have the address inform while cover it for confidentiality consideration.
We construct two sub-datasets for sale’s transactions at buying side (buying dataset) and selling
side (selling Dataset), respectively. The two sub-datasets provide the studied period from 2006Q1
to 2013Q4, which covers a complete property cycle. The following table briefly describes the two
sub-datasets and the whole dataset during the studied period. The identified transactions as buyers
6A subsale is a sale transaction before TOP, when home buyers cannot move into or sublet the property.
7In addition, if the selling of a property was sold by developer (or “New Sale”), we treat the seller as unidentified as this article does
not consider the behavior of housing developers.
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account for 81.2% of all transactions while the rest are not able to be identified, out of which, 12%
are flippers, 20% are rental investors and the rest is owner occupiers. At the selling side, the
identified transactions as sellers account for 44.9% of all transactions, out of which, 25.19% are
flippers, 7.08% are rental investors, the rest is owner occupiers. In this regard, sample selection
bias exist, and more serious in the selling side. However, due to the data constraint, we are not
able to correct sample selection bias.
Table 6 also reports the mean values and the standard deviations (which is in parentheses) of
several key housing attributes. While the mean value of other housing attributes of the three
participants are close, the mean house age of properties which flippers buy and sell is substantially
lower than that of the other players. This is because flippers have preference for presale properties
in order to lower holding costs.
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3.2 Research design and variable selection
The empirical work takes two steps: firstly, we construct empirical hedonic models to find out
if flippers are the “smartest” traders in a housing market, followed by rental investors and owner
occupiers in terms of fetching price premiums at selling and obtaining price discount at buying.
Secondly, we identify the leadership of flippers in directing the movement of transaction volume in
a housing market using Poisson Dynamic Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) model. We
then test the positive feedback hypothesis by investigating the interactions of the three types of
market participants both as a buyer and as a seller over a property cycle using both the GMM
and hedonic models.
3.2.1 Identifying the “smartest” traders
We construct a hedonic model, which flippers, rental investors and owner occupiers are brought
in as dummy variables. Hedonic models do not include property traders’ characters while assume
that market information is perfect and housing price is determined by a bundle of shadow prices
of attributes of each housing property (Rosen, 1974[48]; Epple, 1987[21]). Turnbull & Sirmans
(1993)[56] and Watkins (1998)[58] bring housing traders’ characters into traditional hedonic models
(by including character dummies) to see the characters’ impacts on final transaction prices. This is
despite that Lambson, McQueen& Slade (2004) [38] and Ihlanfeldt & Mayock (2012)[35] raise the
concern that directly adding property traders’ characters into hedonic models may generate biased
results because the factors influencing bargaining powers might also influences their valuation for
different housing attributes. In the present paper, we assume that all participants have the same
valuation for housing attributes.
In terms of the buying discounts, we bring two dummies, Rinvest b and Flip b, into a hedonic
model, using the Buying Dataset (as shown in Equation 1). For the selling premiums, similarly, we
bring Rinvest s and Flip s into a hedonic model using the Selling Dataset (as shown in Equation
2). (Refer to Subsection 3.1 for the two sub-datasets). The regression models are specified as
follows:
ln(pricej) =Conj + α1Rinvest bj + α2Flip bj
+ β1Sizej + β2Size sqj + β3Floorj + β4Floor sqj + β5 Property Tenurej
+ β6 Property Typej + β7 PropertyAgej + Dj ∗ θ + εj
(1)
ln(pricej) =Conj + α1Rinvest sj + α2Flip sj
+ β1Sizej + β2Size sqj + β3Floorj + β4Floor sqj + β5 Property Tenurej
+ β6 Property Typej + β7 PropertyAgej + Dj ∗ θ + εj
(2)
where Rinvest bj and Flip bj are the dummies denoting the buyer of the transaction is rental
investor and flipper, respectively; Rinvest sj and Flip bj are the dummies denoting the seller of
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the transaction is rental investor and flipper, respectively.
Table 7 summarizes the dependent variable, key explanatory variables which manifest the buying
discount and selling premium of the two non-owner-occupier participants (with owner-occupier
dummy omitted as base group), and the hedonic and controlled variables. In addition, we further
divide the whole market cycle into booming, bust, and policy periods to see the influences of
different market conditions on the relative “smartness” of the participants. It is important to note
that, the booming period is defined as the period from 2006Q1 to 2007Q4, when the price index of
Singapore private market rises consistently; the bust period is defined to be the period from 2008Q1
to 2008Q4, when private housing price index goes down consistently; since 2009Q1, the price index
picks up again and a series of cooling measures are carried out by Singapore government since
June 2009, we define the period after 2009Q1 as the policy period. Besides, the later empirical
discussion will focus on the booming and bust periods, the same definitions will be adopted.
A concern may arise that flippers would probably tend to buy properties with poor maintenance
and sell the property after renovation (Bayer, Geissler & Roberts, 2013[6]). By dividing the private
housing market into resale sub-market and presale-submarket where every property is new and no
renovating is allowed, we can test whether this concern matters.
Table 7: For testing the the “smartness” of the three participants when buying and selling
Dependent Variable ln(price): the log of transaction price of each housing unit.
The key explanatory variables
Rinvest b Dummy variable, 1 if the buyer is rental investor, 0 otherwise;
Flip b Dummy variable, 1 if the buyer is flipper, 0 otherwise;
Rinvest s Dummy variable, 1 if the seller is rental investor, 0 otherwise;
Flip s Dummy variable, 1 if the seller is flipper, 0 otherwise;
Hedonic Variables
Size The size of the transacted property, in sqft;
Size sq The square of the size;
Floor The floor level of each transacted unit;
Floor sq The square of the floor;
Property Tenure Dummy variable, 1 if the property’s tenure is around 99 years, 0 if the property’s tenure is more than
900 years or freehold; 0 if the property’s tenure is more than 900 years or freehold;
Prooperty Type Dummy variable, 1 if the property is condominium, 0 if it is an apartment;
Property Age The age of the proeprty, calculated as the gap between contract year of the transaction and the TOP;
Controlled Variables
District Dummies Each District dummy indicates one district, 1 if it is in that district, otherwise 0;
Project Dummies Each project dummy indicates one project, 1 if it is in thatproject, otherwise 0;
Quarter Dummies Each quarter dummy indicates one quarter, 1 if it is in that quarter, otherwise 0;
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3.2.2 Testing positive feedback hypothesis
Firstly, we adopt the Poisson Dynamic Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) model intro-
duced by Hausman, Hall & Griliches (1984)[32], Windmeijer (2006)[59] and Cameron & Trivedi
(2013)[15] to identify the leadership of flippers in a housing market.
Based on the buying dataset (refer to Subsection 3.1), we examine how the number of trans-
actions done by the flippers in an apartment or condominium project at time t− k (V flip bit−k,
with k indicating the lag of the monthly total number of transactions where flippers as buyers,
for project i in period tk), influences on the number of transactions done by owner occupiers in
the same development at time t (V occupier bit, the monthly total number of transactions where
owner-occupiers are as buyers, for project i in the current month t), to see how owner-occupiers’
buying transactions can be explained by flippers’ past buying transactions and to demonstrate
the leading role of flippers in relative to owner-occupiers. This is motivated by the literature
which imply that flippers tend to be leaders and owner-occupiers follow the flippers when making
purchasing decisions (As summarized in Table 2).
We use poison model because the dependent variable (V occupier bit) and the key explanatory
variables (V flip bit−k) are count data which are commonly assumed to follow Poisson distribution.
An exponential feedback process is included to manifest the autocorrelation pattern of owner-
occupiers’ trading patterns and to confront the zero (count number) problem. The conditional
mean is specified as follows:
E [yit |yit−1, yit−2, . . . ,xit,xit−1, . . . ] = αi exp
(
ρ1yit−1 + ρ2yit−2 + . . .+ x
′
itβ
)
(3)
where yit denotes the dependent variable, αi is the constant, xit is a vector of explanatory
variables, and β is the vector of parameters for xit. By applying the conditional mean specification
(1) into our empirical framework, the regression model can be specified as:
V occupier bit = exp(ρ1V occupier bit−1 + ρ2V occupier bit−2 + ρ3V occupier bit−3 + ρ4V occupier bit−4
+ β1V flip bit−1 + β2V flip bit−2 + β3V flip bit−3 + β4V flip bit−4
+ P
′
it ∗ δ +GDPt + Coni) + εit
(4)
In the regression model, we include the 1st to 4th lags of owner-occupiers’ monthly trad-
ing volumes at project level (V occupier bit−1, ..., V occupier bit−4) to control the possible auto-
correlation pattern, include the 1st to 4th lags of flippers’ monthly trading volumes at project level
(V flip bit−1, ..., V flip bit−4) as the key explanatory variables to see the relative roles of owner-
occupiers and flippers. In addition, a vector of housing projects’ stylized characters (including
ProjectUnitsi, Project Typei, ProjectAgeit, Locationi) as control variables and GDPt is also
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included for controlling the economic condition in Singapore. All the related variables used in this
part as well as their definitions are introduced in detail in Table 8.
Table 8: For testing the relative role of the three types of market participants
The key explanatory variables
V occupier bit The number of puschsing trading by owner-occupiers in project i in period t;
Rinvest bit The number of puschsing trading by rental investors in project i in period t;
Flip bit The number of puschsing trading by flippersin project i in period t;
V occupier sit The number of selling trading by owner-occupiers in project i in period t;
Rinvest sit The number of selling trading by rental investors in project i in period t;
Flip sit The number of selling trading by flippers in project i in period t;
The lags of the three variables mentioned above are presented as t-k, for example, Flip sit−2 means two-stage lag of Flip sit.
Project stylized characters
ProjectTenurei Dummy variable, 1 if the project’s tenure is around 99 years, 0 if the project’s tenure is more than
900 years or freehold; 0 if the project’s tenure is more than 900 years or freehold;
ProjectUnitsi The total units in the project;
Project Typei Dummy variable, 1 if the project is condominium, 0 if it is an apartment;
ProjectAgeit The age of the proeprty, calculated as the gap between contract year of the transaction and the TOP;
Locationi Dummy variable, 1 if the project is located in the central area, 0 otherwise;
Other controlled variables
GDPt Quarterly GDP growth; we assign same GDP rate (quarterly change) to all three months within that quarter.
It is important to note that we select the 1 to 4 stages of autocorrelation of V occupier bit and
include the 1-4th lagged V flip bit considering the fact that housing search is a slow process and the
backward scope of the potential buyers and sellers is around one quarter. Besides, our dataset for
the two periods of market cycle (booming period: 2006Q1-2007Q4; bust period: 2008Q1-2008Q4)
only covers a limited time spread, including too high stages of lags will result in sample loss.
For robustness consideration, we repeat the regressions where 1 to 3 stages of autocorrelation
of V occupier bit and 1-3rd lagged V flip bit are included. In addition, the project fixed effect is
considered.
In addition to testing the influence of flippers on owner-occupiers’ buying (as shown in Equation
4), we will further test: 1) the influence of flippers on rental investors’ buying (Equation 5); 2) the
influence of rental investors on owner-occupiers’ buying (Equation 6).
V rinvest bit = exp(ρ1V rinvest bit−1 + ρ2V rinvest bit−2 + ρ3V rinvest bit−3 + ρ4V rinvest bit−4
+ β1V flip bit−1 + β2V flip bit−2 + β3V flip bit−3 + β4V flip bit−4
+ P
′
it ∗ δ +GDPt + Coni) + εit
(5)
V occupier bit = exp(ρ1V occupier bit−1 + ρ2V occupier bit−2 + ρ3V occupier bit−3 + ρ4V occupier bit−4
+ β1V rinvest bit−1 + β2V rinvest bit−2 + β3V rinvest bit−3 + β4V rinvest bit−4
+ P
′
it ∗ δ +GDPt + Coni) + εit
(6)
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Based on the selling database, we repeat the same procedure to further identify the trading
patterns. We investigate 1) the influence of flippers on owner occupiers’ selling (as shown in
Equation 7); 2) the influence of flippers on rental investors’ selling (Equation 8); 3) the influence
of rental investors on owner-occupiers’ selling (Equation 9). It is important to note that, the selling
behaviors of owner-occupiers and rental investors can only happen in the resale market. Therefore,
we focus only on the resale records of the Selling Dataset to investigate their selling behaviors.
V occupier sit = exp(ρ1V occupier sit−1 + ρ2V occupier sit−2 + ρ3V occupier sit−3 + ρ4V occupier sit−4
+ β1V flip sit−1 + β2V flip sit−2 + β3V flip sit−3 + β4V flip sit−4
+ P
′
it ∗ δ +GDPt + Coni) + εit
(7)
V rinvest sit = exp(ρ1V rinvest sit−1 + ρ2V rinvest sit−2 + ρ3V rinvest sit−3 + ρ4V rinvest sit−4
+ β1V flip sit−1 + β2V flip sit−2 + β3V flip sit−3 + β4V flip sit−4
+ P
′
it ∗ δ +GDPt + Coni) + εit
(8)
V occupier sit = exp(ρ1V occupier sit−1 + ρ2V occupier sit−2 + ρ3V occupier sit−3 + ρ4V occupier sit−4
+ β1V rinvest sit−1 + β2V rinvest sit−2 + β3V rinvest sit−3 + β4V rinvest sit−4
+ P
′
it ∗ δ +GDPt + Coni) + εit
(9)
The above tests are motivated by the implications from literature on different participants’
behavioral patterns and their relative roles. While some may raise the concern on whether the
owner-occupiers or rental investors have any influence on flippers. Thus, we carry out the similar
testing procedure and will report the results in Appendix. F.
Secondly, we investigate the positive feedback process by looking into the interactions among
flippers, rental investors and owner occupiers as buyers and as sellers. De Long, Shleifer, Summers
& Waldmann (1990)[19] develops a model of “rational speculators” and “feedback traders” (or
noise traders). The authors argue that with the presence of positive feedback traders, rational
speculators could also destabilize the price as those rational speculators know that the initial price
increase (or down) will stimulate buying (selling) by positive feedback buyers and therefore they do
not necessarily transact towards the price fundamental. In other words, the interaction between the
“rational speculators” and “feedback traders” will add to the mis-pricing. Besides, as implied by
Bayer, Geissler & Roberts, 2013[6], the less experienced tend to be the noise traders or feedback
traders while the experienced tend to carry out intermediary trading patterns. In this regard,
in our framework, the flippers are more experienced and should behave more like the “rational
speculators” in De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann (1990)[19], while the owner-occupiers
are more likely to act as the feedback traders.
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What is the positive feedback process? According to De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann
(1990)[19], the positive feedback process is defined as buying in response to previous price rise
and selling in response to previous price decreasing. In housing market, it is more flexible for a
potential owner-occupier to change the buying plan than for a potential seller to change the selling
plan which is subscribed to his or her living demand and moving costs. Therefore, we test the
positive feedback process in terms of the buying behaviors of owner-occupiers.
Following the definition of De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann (1990)[19], the ideal empir-
ical strategy for testing the positive-feedback process should reveal the procedure that the flippers
raise the market prices and the owner-occupiers buy more in facing with market price rising. While
directly testing this procedure have the following problems: 1) the price index cannot be precisely
estimated due to the sparse contracts within a same project; 2) it is difficult for owner-occupiers
to directly see the price index changes of the target project; 3) the price rise of a project may
under-represent the flippers’ impact on project price index rise8; 5) the observation of price rise
does not necessarily happen after when the previous transactions have been closed, it happens
even during the bargaining and bidding process9.
Thus, we take an alternative way. As we focus on the interaction between flippers and owner-
occupiers and the positive feedback process that adds to the market over-pricing, we would like to
see the positive feedback behaviors of owner-occupiers when flippers have cashed out, namely, how
owner-occupiers take over the stick from the flippers. As discussed above, the project price index
change may not be a good indicator representing the source of positive feedback buying, instead we
take the average quarterlized realized return of flippers Flip Realized Rit (the quarterly average
return rate of flippers at project level, refer to Table 9 for definition details). This is because
flippers’ returns is a very strong signal that can be sensed by the owner-occupiers: 1) flippers buy
and sell within a short period of time and therefore their return rate can be clearly seen by the
owner-occupiers; 2) even during the bargaining process before the deal is closed, the flippers tend
to be “smarter” and show more bargaining power.
Therefore, if owner-occupiers take a positive feedback trading pattern when facing flippers’
realized returns, we will be able to see the following two phenomena: 1) the flippers’ selling will
trigger the buying of owner-occupiers; 2) owner-occupiers would like to pay a higher price when
seeing a higher realized return rate of flippers within the same project. The empirical analysis
here includes the following two steps. Firstly, we will test how the purchasing behaviors of owner
occupiers will respond to the selling of flippers. Secondly, we will test how flippers’ realized return
will influence the owner-occupiers’ buying prices.
8As demonstrated in Bayer, Geissler & Roberts, 2013[6], flippers are able to fetch a price discount when buying and price premium
when selling, which means that the flippers’ returns should be higher than the market price index.
9For example, when many potential buyers are bidding for property A but the deal is closed yet, another potential owner-occupier
buyer can sense the market and price condition as soon as he or she approaches the seller of property A and learn about the bidding
situation.
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In the first step, we will adopt the Poisson Dynamic GMM model as introduced above. In order
to test the influences of flippers’ selling behaviors on owner-occupiers’ buying behaviors, we merge
the Selling Dataset and the Buying Dataset. Considering the fact that, while the presale market
only has flipper sellers, the resale market has owner-occupier sellers and rental investor sellers in
addition to flipper sellers, we also investigate the resale market in addition to the whole market.
The regression model is specified as follows (Refer to Table 8 under part 3.2.2 for the explanations
of the variables in the model):
V occupier bit = exp(ρ1V occupier bit−1 + ρ2V occupier bit−2 + ρ3V occupier bit−3 + ρ4V occupier bit−4
+ β1V flip sit−1 + β2V flip sit−2 + β3V flip sit−3 + β4V flip sit−4
+ P
′
it ∗ δ +GDPt + Coni) + εit
(10)
In the second step, we adopt a hedonic method by bringing in the average realized return rate
of flippers at project level Flip Realized Rit (in project i quarter period t) as the key explanatory
variable, to see its impacts on owner-occupiers’ purchasing prices.
We combine the Buying Dataset with Selling Dataset to calculate the Flip Realized Rit at
quarter project level, and then merge the variable into the Buying Dataset. In this way, all the
buying owner-occupiers within project i in quarter period t face the same average flippers’ realized
return rate Flip Realized Rit. In addition, we only keep the buying records of owner-occupiers for
hedonic regressions. We fail to build up a panel dataset to see the influence of the lagged effects
of Flip Realized Rit due to the fact that co-occurrence of the selling of flippers and the buying
of owner-occupiers do not happen in every quarter for a particular project. However, the cross-
sectional relation is able to demonstrate the feedback relationship well, as it takes a relatively
long period for closing a deal (at least 2-3 months). In a particular quarter project, even the
owner-occupier buy before when the return of the flipper is realized (the deal of the flipper seller
is closed), the owner-occupier can be well informed about how much return that flipper can realize
when during the searching and bidding process.
The regression model can be specified as in Equation 11, where ln(priceojit) denotes the log
of transaction price of owner-occupier buying property j under project i in quarter period t;
Flip Realized Rit represents the quarterlized average realized return rate of flippers in project i
(where property j is under project i); Djit is a vector of dummy variables for property j under
project i in quarter t, including DistrictDummies, ProjectDummies and QuarterDummies,
and θ is the vector of corresponding parameters. The explanation of the variables are presented
in Table 9.
30
ln(priceojit) =Conji + α1Flip Realized Rit + β1Sizejit + β2Size sqjit + β3Floorjit + β4Floor sqjit
+ β5 Property Tenurejit + β6 Property Typejit + β7 PropertyAgejit
+ D
′
jit ∗ θ + εji
(11)
Table 9: For testing the the positive feedback trading process
The key explanatory variables
Existence Flip b Dummy variable, 1 if there are flippers purchasing in the particular
project at particular quarter, otherwise 0;
Existence Flip s Dummy variable, 1 if there is are flippers selling in the particular
project at particular quarter, otherwise 0;
Flip Realized R The average nominal realized return rate of flippers who sell the properties at the particular
project in the particular quarter; where the nominal realized return rate is calculated as the ratio
of the quaterlized realized nominal return of a flipper to the purchasing price.
Hedonic Variables
Size The size of the transacted property, in sqft;
Size sq The square of the size;
Floor The floor level of each transacted unit;
Floor sq The square of the floor;
Property Tenure Dummy variable, 1 if the property’s tenure is around 99 years, 0 if the property’s tenure is more
than 900 years or freehold; 0 if the property’s tenure is more than 900 years or freehold;
Prooperty Type Dummy variable, 1 if the property is condominium, 0 if it is an apartment;
Property Age Age of the proeprty, calculated as the gap between contract year of the transaction and TOP;
Controlled Variables
District Dummies Each District dummy indicates one district, 1 if it is in that district, otherwise 0;
Project Dummies Each project dummy indicates one project, 1 if it is in thatproject, otherwise 0;
Quarter Dummies Each quarter dummy indicates one quarter, 1 if it is in that quarter, otherwise 0;
In addition, in order to make a comparison between the response of different participants, we
will report the responses of flippers and rental investors to flippers’ realized return rate in terms
of their purchasing prices. The similar regression models will be adopted, which are specified
as follows, where ln(pricerijt) is the price of rental investor buying property j under project i in
quarter t, and ln(pricefijt) is the the price of rental investor buying property j under project i in
quarter t. 10
ln(pricerjit) =Conji + α1Flip Realized Rit + β1Sizejit + β2Size sqjit + β3Floorjit + β4Floor sqjit
+ β5 Property Tenurejit + β6 Property Typejit + β7 PropertyAgejit
+ D
′
jit ∗ θ + εji
(12)
ln(pricefjit) =Conji + α1Flip Realized Rit + β1Sizejit + β2Size sqjit + β3Floorjit + β4Floor sqjit
+ β5 Property Tenurejit + β6 Property Typejit + β7 PropertyAgejit
+ D
′
jit ∗ θ + εji
(13)
10It is important to note again that we will run the cross-sectional regressions by controlling the quarter dummies as the dataset is
insufficient for panel regressions.
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4 Empirical Results
4.1 Flippers are the “Smartest” while Rental Investors Outperform Owner-occupiers
Existing housing literature has fragmentally provided a rough picture on the relative “smartness”
of the three types of housing market participants. As summarized in Subsection 2.3, the flippers
should be the “smartest” and more likely to take “good” trading strategies, and is seconded by
rental investors then the owner-occupiers, which is implied from their different trading motivations
and trading experiences. Bayer, Geissler & Roberts, 2013[6] has shown the relative “smartness”
of flippers to the rest of the market by examining flippers’ buying discount and selling premium.
In our framework, we further distinguish the rental investors from the owner-occupiers to give a
more comprehensive picture of the housing market.
Price discounts when purchasing
The results here suggest that both flippers and rental investors are able to fetch a price discount
compared to owner occupiers when buying, while flippers substantially outperform the rental
investors. There is a concern that flippers tend to buy poorly maintained properties and sell the
property after renovating, which cannot be captured by our model while might be an alternative
explanation instead of flippers’ “smartness” for how flippers can buy at lower prices while sell
at higher prices. Holding this concern, we split the market into presale market (where housing
construction is not finished and no renovation is allowed, and the resale market). Results are
consistent in both sub markets.
Column (1) and (5) of Table 10 present the result for the whole studied period (2006Q1 to
2013Q4). We can see that in both the presale market and resale market, flipper buyers pay around
3% (3.16% in presale market and 2.94% in resale market) lower than owner-occupier buyers, and
the rental investors can fetch a less discount than flippers while still fetch a discount of 1.05% in
the presale market and 0.665% in the resale market compared to owner-occupiers. All the results
above are statistically significant at 1% level. We further divide the studied period into booming
period (06Q1-07Q4), bust period (08Q1-08Q4) and the booming&policy period (09Q1-13Q411).
In the booming periods of 06Q1-07Q4 and 09Q1-13Q4, as shown in Column (2), (4), (6) and (8)
of Table 10, flippers can generally get a price discount at more than 2% compared to the owner-
occupiers, while rental investors can fetch a less discount at lower than 1%. However, in the bust
period as shown in Colume (3) and (7) of Table 10, the rental investors can fetch a higher discount
at more than 1% although the figure is still lower than the flippers. The above results indicate
that, compared to owner-occupiers, the flippers can fetch a higher discount than rental investors,
and both flippers and rental investors are more cautious when making purchasing decisions in the
bust period than in booming period.
11 When the market is picking up fast while the government carries out 8 rounds of anti-speculation policies to deter flippers and
then rental investors.
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We further divide the presale market into newsale submarket where all properties are sold by
developers, and the subsale submarket where all properties are sold by individuals before they
are completed (before TOP), to address the concern that developers might give some discounts
to home buyers and more flippers buy from the developers and therefore enjoy lower prices. The
results are reported in Table 11. The results suggest that flippers can fetch a higher discount than
rental investors when comparing to owner-occupier buyers, and the two are more cautious when
buying during the bust period than in the booming period, which is consistent with that reported
in Table 10.
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Price premium when selling
We compare the selling prices of rental investors and flippers to that of the owner-occupiers
(what we call price premium), to see the relative “smartness” of the three types of participants.
During the whole studied period (Column 1 of Table 11), flippers can sell at a price premium of
4.18% which is statistically significant at 1% level, while rental investors sell slightly lower (0.35%)
than owner-occupiers. During the booming and bust periods as shown in Column (2) and (3),
flippers can fetch a premium of over 3% while rental investors fail to do so. Besides, During the
booming period, both flippers and rental investors are able to secure a price premium higher than
that in the bust period (although the figures for rental investors in both periods are not statistically
significant), which indicates that flippers and rental investors during the booming period take well
advantage of the market sentiment to sell at higher prices than owner-occupiers. It is important to
note that during the period between 2009Q1 and 2013Q4, the market is booming while intervened
by intense government policies, therefore the results of this period is not our focus.
We only consider the resale market here in order to make the selling transactions by the three
types of participants comparable. As we have mentioned before, in the presale market, all the
sellers are identified as flippers as they sell while without living in the properties. Some common
concerns arise for the resale market due to the fact that indoor maintenance of properties are
unobservable by our data. As a result, one explanation for why rental investors can not fetch
a price premium when selling is that the sublet properties are usually poorly maintained by the
renters Wang and Grissom, et al (1991)[57]; and one alternative explanation for why flippers can
fetch a price premium when selling is that flippers usually renovate the properties before selling for
fetch a good price. While both concerns do not influence our results much. For the rental investors,
it is true that properties that have been sublet are not easy to be sold at a price comparable to
owner-occupied properties. According to the empirical result, the rental investors are still able to
fetch a selling price only slightly lower than or even same as properties sold by owner-occupiers,
which indicate the relative “smartness” of rental investors. For the flippers, we do observe some
flippers buy poorly maintained properties, while it is unlikely that the flippers renovate more than
owner-occupiers before selling.
A Summary
As a summary, we can see that flippers are able to fetch a higher price discount when buying
and higher premium when selling compared to rental investors who also outperform the owner-
occupiers. The results suggest that flippers is the “smartest” group second by rental investors.
This is consistent with the implications from the literature as summarized in Subsection 2.3. In
addition, we can see that the relative trading prices of the three participants during the booming
and bust periods are different. Compared to owner-occupiers, the flippers and rental investors are
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Table 12: Price Difference of Different Sellers: Resale Market
Dependent VARIABLE: ln(Price)
Price Difference of Different Sellers: Resale Market
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole Period Booming Bust Booming & Policy
06Q1-13Q4 06Q1-07Q4 08Q1-08Q4 09Q1-13Q4
Rinvest s -0.00350** 0.00883 -0.00171 -0.00613***
(0.00167) (0.0151) (0.00999) (0.00155)
Flip s 0.0418*** 0.0435*** 0.0315*** 0.0254***
(0.0019) (0.00344) (0.00636) (0.00221)
Size 0.000759*** 0.000743*** 0.000843*** 0.000764***
(0.0000115) (0.0000147) (0.0000268) (0.0000182)
Size sq -6.28e-08*** -5.84e-08*** -8.23e-08*** -6.47e-08***
(0.00000000306) (0.0000000035) (0.00000000699) (0.00000000504)
Floor 0.00488*** 0.00695*** 0.00630*** 0.00442***
(0.000257) (0.000602) (0.000891) (0.00028)
Floor sq -2.61e-05*** -8.23e-05*** -8.26e-05** -1.65E-05
(0.00000956) (0.0000241) (0.0000332) (0.0000105)
Property Tenure 0.721*** -0.023 0.168 0.258***
(0.067) (0.129) (0.358) (0.0237)
Property Type 0.0218** -0.0625 -0.011 0.0172*
(0.00917) (0.0556) (0.266) (0.00887)
Property Age -0.00227 -0.00325 0.00272 -0.00202
(0.00185) (0.00401) (0.00673) (0.00204)
Controlled Quarter dummies, project dummies and district dummies
Constant 12.65*** 12.48*** 12.79*** 13.20***
(0.0403) (0.058) (0.268) (0.0411)
Observations 61,269 14,861 4,235 42,173
R-squared 0.961 0.965 0.971 0.965
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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more able to take advantage of the market sentiment during the booming period than during the
bust period, which justifies the necessity to treat the booming period and bust period differently.
4.2 Test the positive feedback hypothesis
In this Subsection we demonstrate the leadership of flippers in a housing market as well as test
the positive feedback process as an interaction among flippers, rental investors and owner-occupiers.
The findings well explain how flippers who take account of a very small part of the market share
can trigger the mis-pricing of a whole housing market, and also provide a new understanding on
how the cooling measures in Singapore which mainly targets at the flippers in the Singapore private
housing market, has eventually frozen both the private and the public resale housing markets.
The results reconcile a conflict why flippers, as the “smartest” participants who are more likely
to take good trading patterns such as arbitrage and intermediary, are often blamed for market mis-
pricing by existing literature (Fu, Qian & Yeung, 2013[27]; Fu & Qian, 2014[26]; Bayer, Geissler
& Roberts, 2013[6], et al.). The answer is that flippers trigger the positive feedback trading of
owner-occupiers who are not that “smart” but dominate a housing market. As a result flippers’
trading can lead to the mispricing of the whole market, and policy which attempts to deter flippers,
can therefore freeze the whole market.
4.2.1 Identifying the leadership of flippers in a housing market
Table 13 reports the different roles of the participants in terms of buying behaviors. Column
(1) of Panel A shows that, during the booming period, 1 more buying transaction of flippers are
associated with 4.7% of more buying transactions of owner-occupiers in the next month within
the same project (with parameter of V flip b− 1 at 0.0477766 with statistical significance at 1%);
while for four months later (V flip b − 4) 1 more flippers’ buying is associated with 0.9% less
buying transactions of owner-occupiers. The results suggest that, during the booming period,
flippers buying immediately heat the market sentiment of owner-occupiers and lead them to bring
forward the purchasing decision while overdraw their later demand for housing. Results in Column
(2) of Panel A suggest that the flippers buying transactions have long-lasting influences on rental
investors’ purchasing decisions: 1 more flippers’ buying is associated with around 6.17% more
rental investors’ buying transactions next month while the figure for the later months is around
2%. Column (3) of Panel A shows that the rental investors’ buying generally has little influences
on owner-occupiers’ buying decisions, while 1 more buying of rental investors is associated with
2% less buying of owner-occupiers four months later.
Panel B of Table 13 reports the results during the bust period. The results in the bust period
are consistent with that during the booming period. However, we can see that the influence of
flippers on rental investors’ on owner-occupiers’ buying decisions is stronger during the bust period.
For example, 1 more flippers’ buying transaction is associated with 17.9% more owner-occupiers’
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buying next month in the bust period (as shown in Column 1 Panel B) while the figure is 4.78%
in the booming period (as shown in Column 1 Panel A).
One possible explanation is that in the bust period, owner-occupiers’ buying transactions is
relatively more sparse compared to that in the booming period, as a result, flippers buying lead to
more owner-occupiers buying which shows a higher figure in terms of percentage volume increases.
Another explanation for this difference is that the purchasing of flippers and rental investors are
more cautious and can more precisely reveal the under-priced projects which also attract the
owner-occupiers. The third but the more probable explanation is that during the bust period,
the whole market is going down, while the flippers’ buying raises the market sentiment of certain
projects which attract the hesitating rental investors and owner-occupiers otherwise they have no
where to go. The last two explanations are consistent with the finding in Subsection 4.1 which
suggest that flippers and rental investors are “smarter” and they out-perform the owner-occupiers
more in the bust period.
Table 14 reports the different roles of participants in terms of selling behaviors during the
booming and bust periods. During both the booming and bust periods, the selling of flippers has
no influence on the selling of rental investors (as shown in Column 2 of Panel A&B), and the selling
of rental investors have no influences on the selling of owner-occupiers (as shown in Column 3 of
Panel A&B). Particularly, the selling of flippers is associated with less owner-occupierselling. As
shown in Column (1) of Panel A&B, 1 more selling by flippers is associated with 11.2% less of
owner-occupiers’ selling transactions 2 months later during the booming period and the figure for
the bust period is 8.10%.
One reason for the insignificant relationship between selling behaviors of different participants
is that owner-occupiers and rental investors are not flexible in selling their owned properties: for
owner-occupiers, they are living in the properties for housing services and moving home generates
high costs; for rental investors, their selling behaviors are restricted by tenancies. There do exist
another type of owner-occupiers, which is the internal movers as studied by Anenberg & Bayer,
2013[1]. The internal movers are defined as those who sell the original homes and buy and live
in another home within the same city. Due to the limitation of our dataset, we cannot identify
and study how flippers selling can influence the selling of those internal movers’ original homes.
While based on our identification framework, buyers as owner-occupiers buy and live in the bought
properties, they are owner-occupiers. We do not consider whether they already have a home before
buying or how they sell their original homes.
In addition, the selling of flippers is associated with less owner-occupier selling. This cannot be
explained by the inflexibility of owner-occupiers in selling. We argue that this is due to owner-
occupiers’ positive feedback trading patterns: they hold and stop selling while buy more in face with
flippers’ realized returns. Besides, the association between flippers’ selling and owner-occupiers’
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Table 13: The relative roles of different participants when buying during the booming and bust
periods
Panel A- Booming Period: 2006Q1-2007Q4
Dependent VARIABLE:
Voccupier b Vrinvest b Voccupier b
(1) (2) (3)
Voccupier b-1 -0.0026533 Vrinvest b-1 0.0718668*** Voccupier b-1 0.0097988**
(0.004367) (0.0210043) (0.004257)
Voccupier b-2 0.005371 Vrinvest b-2 0.0601103*** Voccupier b-2 0.0080345**
(0.0036953) (0.0150633) (0.0039212)
Voccupier b-3 0.0100548*** Vrinvest b-3 -0.0022403 Voccupier b-3 0.009217***
(0.0019499) (0.0053072) (0.0021087)
Voccupier b-4 0.0135213*** Vrinvest b-4 -0.0260861*** Voccupier b-4 0.0115665***
(0.0030894) (0.0082136) (0.0018949)
Vflip b-1 0.0477766*** Vflip b-1 0.061722*** Vrinvest b-1 0.0122925
(0.0075433) (0.013935) (0.0131206)
Vflip b-2 0.0000637 Vflip b-2 -0.0275802** Vrinvest b-2 0.0096404
(0.0059562) (0.0131395) (0.0095235)
Vflip b-3 -0.0061309 Vflip b-3 0.0151112*** Vrinvest b-3 0.0000935
(0.0040743) (0.0044042) (0.0047407)
Vflip b-4 -0.0094717** Vflip b-4 0.0276708*** Vrinvest b-4 -0.0208092***
(0.0046708) (0.0050866) (0.0085811)
Observations 19024 Observations 19024 Observations 19024
Panel B- Bust Period: 2008Q1-2008Q4
Dependent VARIABLE:
Voccupier b Vrinvest b Voccupier b
(1) (2) (3)
Voccupier b-1 0.0758868*** Vrinvest b-1 0.2076247*** Voccupier b-1 0.0795524***
(0.0105691) (0.0496505) (0.011023)
Voccupier b-2 0.036164*** Vrinvest b-2 0.0339073 Voccupier b-2 0.0472561***
(0.0094031) (0.0289577) (0.0084986)
Voccupier b-3 0.0165316 Vrinvest b-3 0.0100341 Voccupier b-3 0.0050661
(0.0113094) (0.021572) (0.0053101)
Voccupier b-4 0.0051274 Vrinvest b-4 0.0642888*** Voccupier b-4 0.0048072
(0.0036226) (0.0231807) (0.0038441)
Vflip b-1 0.1789179*** Vflip b-1 0.2962647*** Vrinvest b-1 0.0986428***
(0.0344959) (0.0751026) (0.0305025)
Vflip b-2 0.0316666 Vflip b-2 0.1436522*** Vrinvest b-2 -0.0349108
(0.0426669) (0.0440523) (0.0330453)
Vflip b-3 -0.0570243** Vflip b-3 -0.0109955 Vrinvest b-3 -0.0452652**
(0.0252304) (0.0141206) (0.0214254)
Vflip b-4 -0.0140683 Vflip b-4 -0.0544347*** Vrinvest b-4 -0.0203276
(0.012007) (0.0192614) (0.0155262)
Observations 16115 Observations 16115 Observations 16115
Controlled Variables Project stylized factors including Project Tenure, Total units of project, Location,
Project type and project age; GDP rate
Standard errors in parentheses and adjusted for clusters in Project
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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less selling is stronger during the booming period than that during the bust period, which indicates
that the positive feedback trading pattern of owner-occupiers should be weaker during the bust
period and owner-occupiers are also more cautious in the bust period than in the booming period.
We will further test this positive feedback trading pattern of owner-occupiers in part 4.2.2.
Table 14: The relative roles of different participants when selling during the booming and bust
periods
Panel A- Booming Period: 2006Q1-2007Q4
Dependent VARIABLE:
Voccupier s Vrinvest s Voccupier s
(1) (2) (3)
Voccupier s-1 0.1057648*** Vrinvest s-1 0.4997749 Voccupier s-1 0.1032278***
(0.0084968) (0.3756623) (0.0082312)
Voccupier s-2 0.0419441*** Vrinvest s-2 0.8476314*** Voccupier s-2 0.0361579***
(0.0073752) (0.3012402) (0.0084219)
Voccupier s-3 0.0105486 Vrinvest s-3 0.9120471*** Voccupier s-3 0.00757
(0.0094957) (0.3278582) (0.0081712)
Voccupier s-4 0.0270021*** Vrinvest s-4 0.3635928 Voccupier s-4 0.0144582
(0.0100813) (0.5915732) (0.0094536)
Vflip s-1 -0.0270248 Vflip s-1 0.0245732 Vrinvest s-1 0.1074124
(0.0172219) (0.1044337) (0.1278171)
Vflip s-2 -0.112123** Vflip s-2 -0.0885457 Vrinvest s-2 -0.1135248
(0.0438942) (0.0784624) (0.0730521)
Vflip s-3 -0.0242505 Vflip s-3 0.1714802 Vrinvest s-3 -0.150717*
(0.0225692) (0.135295) (0.0853478)
Vflip s-4 -0.0112471 Vflip s-4 -0.0022432 Vrinvest s-4 -0.1461665
(0.0359357) (0.1343788) (0.1613528)
Observations 12965 Observations 12965 Observations 12965
Panel B-Bust Period: 2008Q1-2008Q4
Dependent VARIABLE:
Voccupier s Vrinvest s Voccupier s
(1) (2) (3)
Voccupier s-1 0.1355227*** Vrinvest s-1 -0.3103807 Voccupier s-1 0.1369515***
(0.0166534) (0.4323555) (0.0166413)
Voccupier s-2 0.060987*** Vrinvest s-2 -0.4359969 Voccupier s-2 0.0583188***
(0.0166756) (0.8459105) (0.0156635)
Voccupier s-3 0.0437159*** Vrinvest s-3 0.5544198 Voccupier s-3 0.0411807***
(0.0157497) (0.3588693) (0.0158489)
Voccupier s-4 0.064496*** Vrinvest s-4 0.3232824 Voccupier s-4 0.0693307***
(0.0148022) (0.4221929) (0.0150054)
Vflip s-1 0.0127284 Vflip s-1 0.0444674 Vrinvest s-1 -0.1117139
(0.0422637) (0.2205419) (0.1204886)
Vflip s-2 -0.0809931** Vflip s-2 -0.0260109 Vrinvest s-2 0.0973726
(0.0344884) (0.2764172) (0.0874079)
Vflip s-3 0.0002299 Vflip s-3 0.0622927 Vrinvest s-3 -0.007412
(0.0254199) (0.1381126) (0.1206306)
Vflip s-4 0.0438133 Vflip s-4 -0.0779019 Vrinvest s-4 0.1281754
(0.0271107) (0.1474593) (0.1114611)
Observations 12063 Observations 12063 Observations 12063
Controlled Variables Project stylized factors including Project Tenure, Total units of project, Location,
Project type and project age; GDP rate
Standard errors in parentheses and adjusted for clusters in Project
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.2.2 The positive feedback process
In the previous section, the result suggests the positive feedback trading pattern of owner-
occupiers. This section further demonstrates the positive feedback trading pattern of owner-
occupiers as an interaction with flippers. Our argument is that, the selling behaviors of flippers
will trigger the buying of owner-occupiers, thus the owner-occupiers take the positive feedback
trading patterns (as defined by Delong, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann, 1990[40]). Specifically,
owner-occupiers are more eager to buy when observing the realized return of flippers (when flippers
cash out): 1) the selling of flippers is associated with more buying of owner-occupiers; 2) a higher
realized return of flippers is associated with a higher price paid by owner-occupiers when buying.
Results in Table 15 show that the selling of flippers is associated with more buying of owner
occupiers in the booming market, while this relationship does not hold during the bust period.
As shown in Column (1) of Table 15, 1 more flippers’ selling is associated with 23.75% more of
owner occupiers’ buying 2 months later which is statistically significant at 1% level, while it is
correlated with less buying of owner-occupiers after 3 months. This indicates that, during the
booming period, the selling of flippers trigger the later more buying of owner-occupiers while this
influence does not last long. While during the bust period, as shown in Column (2) of Table 15,
more selling of flippers is associated with less later buying of owner-occupiers. By comparing the
situation in the booming and bust period, we can see that the owner-occupiers are less cautious
when buying in the booming period and show the positive feedback trading pattern.
Table 15: The association between flippers’ selling and owner-occupiers’ buying in the booming
and bust periods
Dependent VARIABLE: Voccupier b
(1) (2)
Booming Period: 2006Q1-2007Q4 Bust Period: 2008Q1-2008Q4
Voccupier b-1 -0.0621585 0.0779129***
(0.0879794) (0.0148385)
Voccupier b-2 0.0020304 0.0560446***
(0.0070935) (0.0115007)
Voccupier b-3 0.0145293* 0.0606355***
(0.0084613) (0.0123955)
Voccupier b-4 0.0293248** 0.0513281***
(0.0116455) (0.0094572)
Vflip s-1 0.1378488 0.0059915
(0.1120601) (0.0439808)
Vflip s-2 0.2375498*** -0.0749738**
(0.0556742) (0.0296795)
Vflip s-3 -0.3987605* -0.047311*
(0.1922033) (0.0283268)
Vflip s-4 -0.2794386*** -0.013795
(0.0945622) (0.0206199)
Observations 15903 13379
Controlled Variables Project stylized factors including Project Tenure, Total units of project,
Location, Project type and project age; GDP rate
Standard errors in parentheses and adjusted for clusters in Project
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 16 demonstrates how the buying prices of owner-occupiers respond to the existence of
flippers’ selling. For a particular quarter within a particular project, 1 more flippers’ selling is
associated with 0.5% increase in owner-occupiers’ buying prices in the booming period; while this
association during the bust period is not significant.
Table 16: The existence of flippers’ selling on owner-occupiers’ buying price
Dependent VARIABLE: ln(Price), the purchasing price
Booming Period Bust Period
2006Q1-2007Q4 2008Q1-2008Q4
Flippers’ Existence 0.00564** 0.00427
(-0.00224) (-0.0048)
Controlled Quarter, project , district dummies, hedonic variables and constant.
Observations 29,266 6,542
R-squared 0.968 0.971
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 17 further shows how owner-occupiers respond to flippers’ realized return rate in terms
of their buying prices. For the purpose of comparison, we also test the price response of flippers
and rental investors. Comparing the results in Column (1) to that in Column (4), we can see that,
when seeing 100% of owner-occupiers quarterlized nominal return rate would like to pay 2.27%
higher price when buying in the booming period (which is statistically significant at 1% level),
while owner-occupiers show no price response during the bust period. In comparison, both rental
investors and flippers show no significant price response to flippers’ realized return when buying
in the booming period; while in the bust period, rental investors are more cautious and even pay
a lower price in response to flippers’ higher realized returns. This makes up another evidence that
flippers are less likely to take the positive-feedback trading patterns than owner-occupiers.
Although the scale of the responses of owner-occupiers’ buying prices to flippers’ selling as well
as the realized return rate is small, it together with the more buying behavior associated with
the selling of flippers in the booming period can well demonstrate the positive feedback trading
pattern of owner-occupiers as interaction with the flippers. While this interaction does not exist
during the bust period.
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Table 17: The response of the three types of participants’ buying prices to flippers’ realized return
over the market cycle
Dependent VARIABLE: ln(Price), the purchasing price of the three participants
Booming Period: 2006Q1-2007Q4 Bust Period: 2008Q1-2008Q4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Occupier RInvestor Flipper Occupier RInvestor Flipper
Flip Realized R 0.0227*** 0.00392 -0.00246 0.00218 -0.0746*** -0.00352
(0.00732) (0.00275) (0.00315) (0.0341) (0.00514) (0.044)
Size 0.000775*** 0.00113*** 0.00115*** 0.00104*** 0.00113*** 0.00152***
(0.0000233) (0.0000571) (0.0000225) (0.0000552) (0.0000672) (0.000117)
Size sq -4.94e-08*** -1.18e-07*** -1.30e-07*** -1.09e-07*** -1.19e-07*** -3.23e-07***
(0.00000000464) (0.0000000162) (0.00000000637) (0.0000000179) (0.0000000204) (0.0000000416)
Floor 0.00555*** 0.00660*** 0.00699*** 0.00199 0.00707** 0.0114***
(0.000735) (0.000823) (0.000744) (0.0018) (0.00282) (0.00279)
Floor sq -0.0000119 -0.0000188 -4.07e-05** 0.0000681 -0.0000548 -0.000120**
(0.0000188) (0.0000178) (0.0000166) (0.0000464) (0.0000546) (0.0000544)
Property Tenure 0.202* 0.140** 0.066 0.191* 0.159*** 0.143*
(0.107) (0.0645) (0.0499) (0.116) (0.0496) (0.0763)
Property Type 0.000752 0.122 -0.00584 -0.323*** -0.0463 -0.214
(0.0667) (0.0754) (0.0128) (0.101) (0.109) (0.218)
Property Age -0.0743*** -0.0453*** -0.0735*** -0.0168 -0.0406 0.0178
(0.013) (0.0157) (0.02) (0.0493) (0.0251) (0.0611)
Controlled Quarter dummies, project dummies, district dummies and constant.
Observations 5636 3155 3775 1078 353 205
R-squared 0.965 0.965 0.974 0.969 0.967 0.976
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4.3 Summary of Empirical Results
The empirical results suggest that flippers are the “smartest” group second by rental investors
(As shown in Panel A of Table 18), which is consistent with the implications of the existing
literature on different participants’ motivations and experiences. We also see strong evidence that
more flippers’ buying generates more buying of rental investors and owner-occupiers, and in this
regard, the buying of flippers lead the market (Panel B of Table 18). Due to the inflexibility in
selling of rental investors and owner-occupiers, the selling of flippers has no positive influence on
the selling decisions of rental investors and owner-occupiers; besides, due to the positive feedback
trading pattern of owner-occupiers, the owner-occupiers even sell less facing flippers’ selling (Panel
C of Table 18). The positive feedback process is that: flippers cash out and fetch returns, when
seeing flippers’ realized returns the owner-occupiers are eager to buy and pay a higher price (as
shown in Panel D of Table 18), which is consistent with the theory of De Long, Shleifer, Summers
& Waldmann, 1990[19].
Besides, the influence of flippers’ buying on owner-occupiers’ buying decisions is stronger during
the bust period than the booming period, and simultaneously the buying discount of the flippers
in the bust period is higher. In terms of selling, the flippers are able to fetch a higher price
premium in the booming period than in the bust period, and this is because positive feedback
trading of owner-occupiers only happen in the booming periods. In this article, we focus on the
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interaction between flippers and owner-occupiers, the behaviors of rental investors are very like
that of owner-occupiers and we do not discuss the rental investors in detail.
Table 18: Summary of empirical results
Booming Period Bust Period
Panel A: Relative Smartness of Participants
Discount of flip & Rinvest when buying + + +
Premium of flip & Rinvest when selling + + +
Panel B: Relative roles when buying
Buying of Occupier Buying of Rinvest Buying of Occupier Buying of Rinvest
Buying of flippers + + + + + +
Buying of rental investors +
Panel c: Relative roles when selling
Sellinging of Occupier Selling of Rinvest Sellinging of Occupier Selling of Rinvest
Selling of flippers - - -
Sellinging of rental investors
Panel D: feedback of Occupier to flip
Occupier’s buying behavior +
Occupier’s buying prices +
Note: ”+” indicates positive effects and ”-” is negative; number of ”+” or ”-” indicates the scale of the influence,
e.g. the strength of ”+ +” is stronger than ”+”; No sign meand no influences.
As indicated by De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann, 1990[19], the positive feedback pro-
cess includes two sides: one is buying when seeing price up, the other is selling when seeing price
down. It is important to note that, here we only demonstrate that the owner-occupiers take
the positive feedback trading pattern as buying when seeing market price up; while we cannot
demonstrate the other side which is selling when market price down. This is due to the stylized
characters of housing market which are different from financial markets. In housing market, indi-
viduals cannot take short positions. In addition, owner-occupiers as property owners also hold the
consumption motivations and need to face high home moving costs which stop them from selling
their properties. As a result, if owner-occupiers take positive feedback trading pattern, the most
they can do is that they do not buy when seeing the price drop. This is why during the bust pe-
riod the market freezes with much less transactions, and also can explain why less owner-occupiers
choose to execute the mortgage default during the bust period (Haughwout, Lee, Tracy & Klaauw,
2011[31]).
The empirical results well explain the housing market cycle as well as the conflict how flippers
as the the “smartest” group who are more likely to take “good” behaviors while add to the market
mispricing. As shown in Figure 3. during the first trough period (left of the Figure), flippers buy
more and sell less. The buying behaviors of flippers trigger the buying of owner-occupiers. Market
price picks up during the booming period and then flippers begin to sell. Flippers’ selling does not
lead to the selling of owner-occupiers, instead the owner-occupiers positively feedback to flippers’
realized return the push the market price up further towards the peak although at that time the
flippers sell more buy less. When the market freezes and go into the bust period and again towards
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the trough (right part of the Figure), flippers again boost up the market by leading the buying of
owner-occupiers.
Figure 3: The interaction between flippers and owner-occupiers and the market cycle
One concern is that, our findings seem to conflict with some of the empirical findings in the
US market. For example, we argue that flippers are the “smartest” who take “good” trading
behaviors (arbitrage and intermediary) while owner-occupiers are relatively not “smart” and tend
to take “bad” trading behaviors (positive feedback). While in Haughwout, Lee, Tracy & Klaauw
(2011)[31] which studies the US market during the 2008 financial crisis, they find that the default
rate of investors (including both the rental investors and flippers) is much higher than that of the
owner-occupiers, which could imply that the investors are more noisy. While this is actually not
the case. Firstly, default rate might not be an indicator of “smartness”. For example, owner-
occupiers are mostly motivated by consumption needs when making purchasing decisions, and
moving home incurs high costs. Besides,home owners can hold the property and consume the
housing services if house price is low and sell the property when house price is high (Hung and
So, 2012 [34]). That is to say, “smartness” is not the cause of owner-occupiers’ low default rate.
Secondly, we do not deny the identification of the informed and non-informed flippers as well as the
corresponding findings, while we argue that owner-occupiers’ interaction with the flippers should
also be considered. Thirdly, the Singapore private housing market and the US housing market are
different. Private housing in Singapore can only be afford by the relatively high-income, while the
flippers and rental investors there are even richer which imply that this group of people tend to be
even “smarter”. While in the US housing market, homes are affordable to average people. Thus,
not all flippers and rental investors in the US housing market are the high income and the “smart”.
Besides, the unique feature of Singapore private housing market (high-income dominated) does not
harm the applicability of our findings. As owner-occupiers dominate almost every market and the
relative difference between the owner-occupiers and other participants always exist due to their
different motivations.
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5 Robustness Considerations
Some existing researches such as Fu, Qian & Yeung (2013)[27], Fu & Qian (2014)[26] and Bayer,
Geissler & Roberts (2013)[6] argue that flippers take the feedback trading patterns. We argue
that this is less likely, at least the flippers are less likely to take feedback-trading pattern than the
owner-occupiers. In addition to the evidence provided in Table 17 (as discussed in 4.2.2), we can
see that owner-occupiers are the dominant buyers of the properties sold by flippers, accounting for
more than 67.8% of total properties sold by flippers, and rental investors take more than 20.85%
(As shown in Appendix. E). If flippers are more likely to take positive feedback trading strategies,
the dominant buyers from the flippers should be another group of flippers.
When comparing the “smartness” of the three participants in terms of selling premiums with
Selling Dataset, a possible concern is that indoor maintenance is an unobservable factor that
influences the transaction prices. To address this concern, we test the relative “smartness” of
participants in alternative ways to consolidate the conclusions in Subsection 4.1. The results are
consistent and are shown in Appendix. E. In addition, some may raise the concern that the
properties bought by owner-occupiers, rental investors and flippers may be different, not only
different in indoor qualities, but also different in neighbors. This is true in the US, but this is
not true in Singapore private housing markets, it is common that within a same project, indoor
quality the housing units is identical, and the three types of participants co-exist.
When studying the relative roles of different participants, we only report the results about how
flippers influence rental investors and owner-occupiers which is suggested by the literature, while
one may concern whether flippers are influenced by rental investors and owner-occupiers. The
answer is generally no. We repeat the similar Poisson Dynamic GMM models and report the
results in Appendix. F. The results suggest that flippers buying are not influenced by the buying
of owner-occupiers and rental investors in the bust period while the influence is very small in scale
during the booming period.
In addition, when studying the relative roles of different participants, we include the 1st to
4th stage of autocorrelations and 1st to 4th lagged key independent explanatory variables in the
Poisson Dynamic GMM model, which is based on the consideration of sample time spread as well
as the housing market characters. For robustness consideration, we repeat the regression with 1st
to 3rd stage of autocorrelations and 1st to 3rd lagged key independent explanatory variables, and
get the generally consistent results12.
12Limited by the length of the article, we will not report in the appendix, please ask for it when you need to see it.
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6 Conclusions and Implications
We physically specify housing market participants as owner-occupiers, rental investors and flip-
pers. The three types of participants are physically distinguished from each other and their dif-
ference is well recognized by the literature, governments and the social public. We summarize the
different motivations, decision making processes as well as the implied different trading patterns
of the three types of participants with a comprehensive literature review. Consistent with the lit-
erature, we demonstrate that flippers are the “smartest” group while rental investors outperform
owner occupiers in terms of fetching buying discounts and selling premiums.
While both literature and our findings from the Singapore private housing market suggest that
the flippers are the “smartest” participant group and as a result tend to take “good” trading
patterns such as arbitrage and intermediary (Bayer, Geissler & Roberts, 2013[6]), they are usually
blamed for market mis-pricing (Fu, Qian & Yeung, 2013[27]; Fu & Qian, 2014[26], et al.). We justify
the leadership of flippers in terms of buying behaviors in both the boom period and bust period
of a property market cycle, and justify the positive feedback trading patterns (De Long, Shleifer,
Summers & Waldmann, 1990[19], et al.) of owner-occupiers facing flippers’ realized return during
the boom market period. These findings reconcile the conflict mentioned above by showing that
although flippers take “good” trading patterns while their trading triggers the positive feedback of
owner-occupiers and as a result lead to market over-pricing. In addition, the interaction between
owner-occupiers (who dominate the housing market) and flippers explains how flippers as a small
group can drive the fluctuations of the whole housing market.
By investigating the interactions between flippers, rental investors and owner-occupiers across
the market cycle, taking housing market character into consideration (consumption need and
high home moving cost of owner-occupiers), as well as specifying the demand (buying) and supply
(selling) sides across the market cycle, we can see how these different housing participants together
drive the market fluctuation. In terms of rental investors, we find their “smartness” as well as
behaviors are between the flippers and owner-occupiers while closer to the owner-occupiers. As
rental investors is not the focus of this article, we leave the discussion in future research.
Taking advantage of the several housing markets’ stylized characters which are different from
financial markets, we avoid the problems of ambiguous identification of market participants in
the financial literature as well as the existing housing literature. In addition, our findings have
clear implications on the financial market. For example, we empirically justify how the interaction
of different trading patterns influences the whole market while it is difficult to be empirically
demonstrated in financial markets, we argue that studying the impacts of simple trading patterns
while ignore the interaction with other patterns will generate misleading results.
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Our findings shed light to or provide empirical evidences for several theoretical works. For
example, Xiong (2013) [60] builds up a model of heterogeneous briefs of market participants which
result in market mispricing; Piazzesi and Schneider (2009)[46] models that the housing market
players with different beliefs have different valuations for the property, and the price dynamic is
caused by their heterogeneous valuations about the housing properties. In our paper, we study
the interaction between the heterogeneous trading patterns which are resulted from heterogeneous
motivations and different degrees of “smartness”; while the different “smartness” can also imply
different beliefs. In addition, this article adds to the understanding of some empirical phenomena.
For example, Deng, Liu & Wei (2014)[20] finds that transaction tax stabilizes the immature market
as flippers in the immature market is mostly non-informed and the tax deters flippers. Our findings
can provide a more specific explanation for their empirical phenomenon: in mature market, more
flippers are informed and therefore the “good” effect of arbitrage surpasses the “bad” effect of
positive feedback trading pattern by the non-informed, and policies deterring flippers are not able
to reduce market volatility; while in the immature market, more flippers are non-informed, the
“good” effect of arbitrage cannot surpass the “bad” effect of positive feedback trading pattern
by the non-informed, therefore deterring the flippers as a whole can stabilize the market. In this
sense, the housing market is more like an immature stock market.
Our findings have strong policy implications. Anti-speculation policies deterring flippers and
then later all the second-property buyers in Singapore are successful in terms of its effects. We
propose that transaction taxes, especially the stamp duties for the short-term sellers, should always
be there to deter the flippers. Despite the flippers are “smart” and take good trading patterns such
as arbitrage and intermediary, their trading triggers the positive feedback of owner-occupiers which
add to the market over-fluctuation. The “bad” effect of positive feedback surpass the “good” effects
of “arbitrage” of flippers at least in residential housing market, where the majority of participants
are owner-occupiers rather than professional investors. We anticipate that although the stamp
duties as transaction taxes cannot remove the housing cycle, they can help avoid market over-
fluctuation and add to the stability of the private housing market in Singapore, or even make it as
stable as the HDB market (As shown in Figure 1). While in terms of financial markets, we echo
the findings of Deng, Liu & Wei (2014)[20] that whether it is “good” to deter flippers depends on
the proportion of the informed relative to the non-informed in the market. The difference between
our study and that of Deng, Liu & Wei (2014)[20] lies in: 1) we clearly specify the flippers and
owner-occupiers, while theirs only implicit assumes the institutional investors are informed and
individual investors are non-informed; 2) we clearly demonstrate that flippers take good trading
pattern (arbitrage) while owner-occupiers take positive feedback trading pattern, while theirs does
not specify the trading patterns and just implicitly assume that the informed stabilize the market
and the non-informed destabilize the market; 3) we clearly justify the interaction of the flippers and
owner-occupiers as positive feedback process while theirs takes the informed and the non-informed
as two parallel groups of participants.
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Appendices
Appendix .A An Overview of Singapore Housing Mmarket
In Singapore, private residential properties are homes to around 20% of Singaporeans as well
as most of the foreigners, and condominium and apartment are the two dominant property types.
Different from public housing (which is called HDB), the private properties are characterized as high
quality and high price, which only can be afford by middle-to-high-income families and foreigners.
Private housing market is a relatively free market, compared to the HDB housing market which are
strictly regulated by the government for owner-occupying purposes. For example, HDBs bought
either through BTO (Built to order or newsale) or resale are subscribed to a minimum of occupation
period which is now 5 years before the owner can resale or sublet the property. In addition, only
citizens and PR (permanent residents) are allowed to by HDBs, while private housing market is
open to citizens, PRs as well as other foreigners.
New constructed properties are often launched for presale before the construction is completed
(TOP). TOP is the Temporary Occupation Permit which is granted when the property project is
completed and home buyers can move in. As shown in the table below, before TOP, if the property
is sold by the developer, the type of the sale is called new sale; and it is called sub sale if the seller
is individual home owners. In addition, before TOP, the buyer only needs to pay part of the total
contract price. Shortly after the sales contract is signed, the buyer needs to pay a total of 20%
of the contract price as deposit, stamp duty of (3% to 15% to the government, which depends on
home buyers’ characters required by government policies), and they should pay the rest of 80%
based on the process of the completion of the project. Differently, in the resale market, which
means a buyer buys a property from an individual home owner after TOP, 100% of the contract
price as well as the stamp duty should be paid. It is important to mention that properties are
usually newly launched around TOP (2 to 4 years in average), and that both buyer and developer
defaults in Singapore are very rare.
Types of Sale Sellers Completed or not Payment
New Sale Developers Before TOP (Most) 20%+c*Price+Stamp duty
Subsale Individual owners Before TOP 20%+c*Price+Stamp duty
Resale Individual owners After TOP 100%+Stamp duty
Figure A1 shows the quarterly price indexes (up panel) and the rental price indexes (down
panel) of both the private housing and HDBs. We can see that the price index of the private
fluctuates more than that of the HDBs, although the two go up consistently. In addition, the
rental price indexes of the two also go up consistently while that of HDB rises faster when a series
of anti-speculation policies are carried out since 2009.
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Figure A1: Rental and Price Index for Private and HDB Residential Housing Market:2002Q1-
2014Q1
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Appendix .B Cooling Measures
1: Dec 15, 2006 A concession to defer stamp duty payment (which was imposed in Jun 1998).
2: 14 Sep 2009 Abolishing the Interest Absorption Scheme (IAS) and Interest-Only Housing
Loans (IOL).
Table A1: Table for 3.
1) SSD for selling within 1 year after buying
1% for the first $180,000 of the consideration;
2% for the next $180,000;
3% for the balance.
2) LTV lowered from 90% to 80%;
3: Announced on 19 Feb 2010 and take effect on 20 February 2010
Table A2: Table for 4.
1) Increasing holding period for SSD from 1 year to 3 years.
1.1 for within 1 year:
1% for the first $180,000 of the consideration;
2% for the next $180,000;
3% for the balance.
1.2 for sold within 2 years: 2/3 of the full SSD;
1.3 for sold within 2-3 years: 1/3 of the full SSD;
2) LTV lowered from 80% to 70% for whom have 1 or more outstanding housing loans;
3) mimum cash paryment raised from 5% to 10% for whom have 1 or more outstanding housing loans.
4. 30th Aug 2010
Table A3: Table for 5.
1) Increasing holding period for SSD from 3 year to 4 years.
16% Sold with 1 year after buying;
12% Sold in the second year after buying;
8% Sold in the third year after buying;
4% Sold in the fourth year after buying.
2) LTV of 50% for housing loand to non-individual buyers;
3) LTV lowered from 70% to 60% for whom have 1 or more outstanding housing loans;
5. 14 January 2011
6. 7 Dec 2011, Take effect on 8 Dec 2011
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Table A4: Table for 6.
1) ABSD
10% for foreigners and non-individuals;
3% for Singaporeans and PRs buying second residential property;
Note: the existing BSD is:
1\% on first \$180,000 of purchase consideration;
2\% on the next \$180,000;
3\% for the remainder.
7. On 6th Oct 2012
The maximum tenure of all new residential property loans will be capped at 35 years. For
those Loan tenure exceeds 30 years, or the loan period extends beyond the retirement age of 65
years, 40% for a borrower with one or more outstanding residential property loans3; and 60% for
a borrower with no outstanding residential property loan.
MAS will also lower the LTV ratio for residential property loans to non-individual borrowers
from 50% to 40%.
Table A5: Table for 8.
1) LTV lowered and mimum cash paryment raised
1st housing loan 2nd housing loan 3rd and more housing loan
LTV no change 50% or 30% for extend age 65 40% or 20% for extend age 65
mimum cash paryment no change 25% 25%
2) mimum cash paryment raised from 10% to 25% for whom have 1 or more outstanding housing loans.
3) ABSD
1st buyer 2nd buyer 3rd and more
Citizen 7% 10%
PR 5% 10% 10%
Foreigner & non-individual 15% 15% 15%
8. On 12th Jan 2013
9. On 29th Jun 2013
1. Total Debt Servicing Ratio (TDSR) capped at 60% of borrower’s income; The coverage of the
TDSR framework will be more comprehensive than current practice. The TDSR will apply to
loans for the purchase of all types of property, loans secured on property, and the re-financing
of all such loans.
2. Loan tenure based on income weighted average age;
3. Interest rate of 3.5% used; When calculating a borrower’s ability to repay using the total debt
servicing ratio, banks will have to apply the prevailing market rate or 3.5 percent for housing
loans and 4.5 percent on non-residential property loans, whichever is higher.
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Appendix .C Other housing related policies like Property Tax Adjustments
.C.1 Property Taxes
1. 2006-2007 The Property Tax (Surcharge) Act was firstly enacted in 1974 to impose a
surcharge, in addition to the property tax payable, for certain classes of properties held by foreign
owners before 1 January 1974.
The Act and states that it will be in effect from 1 July 2006. On 22 January 2007, MOF repeals
the Property Tax (Surcharge) Act.
2. Before Jan 2011
1. Owner-occupiers concessionary tax rate of 4%.
2. Non owner-occupied residential properties and other properties are taxed at 10%.
Table A6: For 3.
1) Progressive Property Tax Regime (PPTR) for owner-occupied properties
0 First 6,000
4% Next 59,000
6% Above 65,000
2) Non owner-occupied residential properties and other properties are still taxed at 10\%
3) Cessation of the 1994 GST Rebate
3. After Jan 2011 and Before Jan 2014
Table A7: for 4.
1) Progressive Property Tax Rates For Non-Owner-Occupied Residential Properties
Annual Value Since Jan 1st 2014 Since Jan 1st 2015
First 30,000 10% 10%
Next 15,000 11% 12%
Next 15,000 13% 14%
Next 15,000 15% 16%
Next 15,000 17% 18%
Excess 90,000 19% 20%
Annual Value Since Jan 1st 2014 Since Jan 1st 2015
First 8,000 0% 0%
Next 47,000 4% 4%
Next 5,000 5% 5%
Next 10,000 6% 6%
Next 15,000 7% 8%
Next 15,000 9% 10%
Next 15,000 11% 12%
Next 15,000 13% 14%
In excess of 130,000 15% 16%
2) Property tax refunds for unoccupied residential and non-residential properties will cease with effect from 1 January 2014.
4. From Jan 2014
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.C.2 HDB MOP
Table A8: Minimum Occupation Period Requirement for Resale \ Sublitting of HDB Flatsa
Before March 5th 2010 Before Aug 30th 2010 Aug 30th 2010 Onwards
Subsidized HDB Flatsb 5 Years 5 Years 5 Years
Non-subsidized HDB Flatsctaking Concessionary loan 2.5 Years 3 Years 5 Years
Non-subsidized HDB Flats with no Concessionary loan 1 Year 3 Years 5 Years
a The MOP is applicable to both sale and subletting.
b Subsidized HDB Flats include: 1) HDB flats bought directly from HDB; 2) DBSS flats bought from private developers; 3) resale
flats bought with CPF Housing Grant.
c Non-subsidized HDB flats are those resale flats bought without CPF Housing Grant.
Table A9: Disallow Concurrently Owning An HDB flat and Private Residential Property
Before Aug 30th 2010 Aug 30th 2010 Onwards
Investment in Private Residential Property After Purchase of Non-Subsidised Flat No Restriction 5 Years
Disposal of Existing Private Residential Property After Purchase of Non-Subsidised Flat Not Applicable Within 6 months from Date of Purchase
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Appendix .D Identification of different market participants
This identification strategy is developed based on the buying and selling of a particular unit
with which the buying behaviors is identified as bought by a flipper, landlord or an investor. The
identification is structured as follows.
.D.1 Identification Part1: Participants as Buyer
1. Flipper as buyer
1.1 For a particular house unit, two consecutive trades are observed, if the 2nd trade is SUBSALE,
then the 1st trade is carried out by a Flipper.
1.2 For a particular house unit, two consecutive trades are observed. The first transaction is
NEW SALE or SUB SALE, the second transaction is RESALE. There is no rental transaction
between the two trades. Then if the interval between the second trade and TOP is smaller than
or equal to 1 year, then the first trade is carried out by a Flipper.
1.3 For a particular house unit, two consecutive trades are observed, both of which are RESALE,
the time interval between the two trades is shorter than or equal to 365 days and there is no rental
transaction between the two trades. Then the first trade is the purchase by a Flipper.
2. Rental investor as buyer
2.1 For a particular house unit, two consecutive transactions are observed. The first transaction
is NEW SALE or SUB SALE, the second transaction is rental transaction. If the interval between
the rental transaction and TOP is smaller than or equal to 1 year, then the first trade is the
purchase by a Rental Investor.
2.2 For a particular house unit, two consecutive transactions are observed, the interval between
the first trade and the subsequent rental transaction is shorter than or equal to 365 days, then the
first trade is the purchase carried out by a Rental Investor.
3. Owner-occupier as buyer
3.1 For a particular house unit, two consecutive trades are observed. The first transaction is
NEW SALE or SUB SALE, the second transaction is RESALE. There is no rental transaction
between the two trades. Then if the interval between the second trade and TOP is larger than 1
year, then the first purchase is carried out by an Owner-occupier.
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3.2 For a particular house unit, two consecutive transactions are observed. The first transaction
is NEW SALE or SUB SALE, the second transaction is rental transaction. If the interval between
the rental transaction and TOP is larger than 1 year, then the first trade is the purchase by an
Owner-occupier.
3.3 For a particular house unit, this is the last transaction observed and it is sale transaction.
The transaction is NEW SALE or SUB SALE. If the interval between 2014 and TOP is larger
than 1 year, the trade is the purchase by an Owner-occupier.
3.4 For a particular house unit, two consecutive trades are observed. The first trade is RESALE,
there is no rental transaction between the two trades, and the interval between the two trades is
longer than 365 days. Then the first trade is the purchase by an Owner-occupier.
3.5 For a particular house unit, two consecutive transactions are observed, the interval between
the first trade and the subsequent rental transaction is longer than 365 days, then the first trade
is the purchase by an Owner-occupier.
3.6 For the last trade of a house unit, if it is RESALE, and the interval between 31 April 2014 and
the trade is longer than 365 days. Then the trade is the purchase carried out by an Owner-occupier.
4. Unidentified transaction records
4.1 For a particular house unit, this is the last transaction observed and it is sale transaction.
The transaction is NEW SALE or SUB SALE. If the interval between 2014 and TOP is shorter
than or equal to 1 year, then the trader carrying out the purchase cannot be identified.
4.2 For the last trade of a house unit, if it is RESALE, and the interval between 31 April 2014
and the trade is shorter than or equal to 365 days. Then the trader who bought this house cannot
be identified.
.D.2 Identification Part2: Participants as Sellers
The identification of participants as sellers is very straightforward. With two consecutive sale
transactions (the rental ones are ignored), if the buyer in the previous transaction is identified as
a flipper, then the seller in the latter transaction is flipper. Identification of Owner-occupiers and
rental investors follows the same strategy, and the rest are those cannot be identified.
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Appendix .E Robustness test: flippers are the “smartest” while rental investors
outperform the owner-occupiers
To more clearly see the “smartness” of the different participants, we further specify the trans-
actions into three types: 1) the transactions where flippers are the sellers while owner-occupiers
are the buyers (fto); 2) the transactions where flippers are sellers and rental investors are buyers
(identiDD2); 3) the transactions where flippers are sellers and also sold to flippers (identiDD3).
The identification is based on the combination of identification of participants as buyers and par-
ticipants as sellers. For example, for a sales transaction record, if the seller in the transaction is
identified as flippers, and the buyer in the transaction is identified as owner-occupiers, then this
transaction is identified as flipper sells to owner-occupier.
The Table below shows distribution of buyers from flippers. Among the identified transactions,
we can see that most properties of flippers are sold to owner-occupiers, which accounts for 67.5% of
total properties sold by flippers. Caution must be taken that only a small part of the transactions
are identified due to the limited period the sample data cover. However, as flippers buy and sell
within a short period of time, the flippers are better identified than owner-occupiers and rental
investors. In this regard, the large number of unidentified sample does not influence our conclusion
that owner-occupiers are the dominant buyers from flippers.
Table A10: The distribution of buyers of properties from flippers: 2006Q1-2013Q4
Freq. Percent. (%)
Flip To Occupier 12399 67.5
Flip To Rinvest 3829 20.85
Flip To Flip 2140 11.65
Total 18368 100
We repeat the regressions as in 3.2.1, we can see that, face with flipper sellers, buyers as flippers
are more able to fetch a lower price than rental investors and then owner-occupiers. In addition,
flippers selling to owner-occupiers generally can fetch a price premium compared to the general
transactions.
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Table A11: Flippers Selling to Owner-occupiers, Rental Investors and Flippers
Dependent VARIABLE: ln(Price)
Presale Market Resale Market
06Q1-13Q4 06Q1-07Q4 08Q1-08Q4 09Q1-13Q4 06Q1-13Q4 06Q1-07Q4 08Q1-08Q4 09Q1-13Q4
identiDD2 -0.00708*** -0.00101 -0.0203** -0.00850*** -0.0116** 0.00158 -0.0505* -0.00796
-0.00246 -0.00505 -0.00932 -0.00254 -0.00482 -0.00954 -0.0283 -0.0061
identiDD3 -0.0449*** -0.0361*** -0.0527*** -0.0302*** -0.0225*** -0.0302*** 0.0149 0.00419
-0.00342 -0.00503 -0.0116 -0.00459 -0.00849 -0.00994 -0.0453 -0.0158
Controlled Quarter dummies, project dummies and district dummies, as well as hedonic factors
Constant 12.41*** 11.76*** 13.31*** 13.23*** 13.35*** 12.25*** 13.40*** 13.82***
-0.151 -0.0632 -0.0508 -0.0453 -0.178 -0.218 -0.916 -0.288
Observations 12,700 3,956 1,110 7,634 5,589 2,324 500 2,765
R-squared 0.967 0.967 0.972 0.975 0.971 0.976 0.983 0.976
identiDD2=1 if in the trading, flippers are sellers and rental investors are buyers; identiDD3=1 if flippers sell to flippers;
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A12: Flippers Selling to Owner-occupiers and Others
Dependent VARIABLE: ln(Price)
Presale Market Resale Market
06Q1-13Q4 06Q1-07Q4 08Q1-08Q4 09Q1-13Q4 06Q1-13Q4 06Q1-07Q4 08Q1-08Q4 09Q1-13Q4
fto 0.0145*** 0.0129* 0.0395 0.00556 0.0206*** 0.0183*** 0.0299*** 0.0142***
-0.00438 -0.00737 -0.0258 -0.00596 -0.00223 -0.00417 -0.00819 -0.00243
Controlled Quarter dummies, project dummies and district dummies, as well as hedonic factors
Constant 13.28*** 12.22*** 13.36*** 12.93*** 11.96*** 11.74*** 13.29*** 13.41***
-0.176 -0.218 -0.91 -0.21 -0.164 -0.0634 -0.0481 -0.0759
Observations 5,605 2,324 500 2,781 13,137 3,956 1,110 8,071
R-squared 0.971 0.976 0.983 0.976 0.966 0.966 0.972 0.974
fto=1 if in the trading flippers are sellers and owner-occupiers are buyers, otherwise fto=0
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix .F Flippers Lead the Market in Terms of Trading Volume
.F.1 Robustness: Influences of other participants on flippers
When seeing the results on how flippers’ buying and selling behaviors influences the buying and
selling of other participants, many may eager to see the reverse: how flippers buying behaviors are
influenced by other participants. We run the regressions with Poisson Dynamic GMM as discussed
in 3.2.2, and the regression models are specified as follows.
V flip bit = exp(ρ1V flip bit−1 + ρ2V flip bit−2 + ρ3V flip bit−3 + ρ4V flip bit−4
+ β1V occupier bit−1 + β2V occupier bit−2 + β3V occupier bit−3 + β4V occupier bit−4
+ P
′
it ∗ δ +GDPt) + εit
(14)
V flip bit = exp(ρ1V flip bit−1 + ρ2V flip bit−2 + ρ3V flip bit−3 + ρ4V flip bit−4
+ β1V rinvest bit−1 + β2V rinvest bit−2 + β3V rinvest bit−3 + β4V rinvest bit−4
+ P
′
it ∗ δ +GDPt) + εit
(15)
V flip sit = exp(ρ1V flip sit−1 + ρ2V flip sit−2 + ρ3V flip sit−3 + ρ4V flip sit−4
+ β1V occupier sit−1 + β2V occupier sit−2 + β3V occupier sit−3 + β4V occupier sit−4
+ P
′
it ∗ δ +GDPt) + εit
(16)
V flip sit = exp(ρ1V flip sit−1 + ρ2V flip sit−2 + ρ3V flip sit−3 + ρ4V flip sit−4
+ β1V rinvest sit−1 + β2V rinvest sit−2 + β3V rinvest sit−3 + β4V rinvest sit−4
+ P
′
it ∗ δ +GDPt) + εit
(17)
The results indicate that, flippers’ buying transactions are not influenced by the buying behaviors
of owner-occupiers and rental investors during the bust period, and the influence from owner-
occupiers buying in the booming period is very small in scale. While in terms of selling, we see
both the selling of owner-occupiers and rental investors are significantly and positively associated
with the later selling of flippers. While this should not be explained as that the flippers selling
decision is influenced by the selling behaviors of owner-occupiers and rental investors. One reason
is the the selling of owner-occupiers and rental investors may not reflect the market condition, they
sell just because they do not want to hold the properties probably due to non investment-related
reasons. Instead, we see they succeed their transactions is a signal that the market has more
liquidity or more potential buyers are coming to buy, and as a result more flipper sellers can close
their deals.
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Table A13: Flippers are less influenced by owner-occupiers and rental investors when buying
Booming Period: 2006Q1-2007Q4
Dependent VARIABLE: Vflip b
Vflip b-1 0.1054375*** Vflip b-1 0.0871872***
(0.0143937) (0.0119453)
Vflip b-2 0.0204105*** Vflip b-2 0.0123808
(0.0070187) (0.0089498)
Vflip b-3 0.0089818** Vflip b-3 0.0199562***
(0.0045636) (0.005008)
Vflip b-4 0.0072453* Vflip b-4 0.0237917***
(0.0044096) (0.0049289)
Voccupier b-1 -0.0100059 Vrinvest b-1 0.0187953
(0.0072831) (0.0162717)
Voccupier b-2 -0.0031795 Vrinvest b-2 0.0068212
(0.012052) (0.0146007)
Voccupier b-3 0.0083091** Vrinvest b-3 -0.0105398
(0.0038682) (0.009141)
Voccupier b-4 0.0092969** Vrinvest b-4 -0.020869**
(0.0045906) (0.0089894)
Observations 19024 Observations 19024
Bust Period: 2008Q1-2008Q4
Dependent VARIABLE: Vflip b
Vflip b-1 0.3900199*** Vflip b-1 0.40237***
(0.0526304) (0.0600741)
Vflip b-2 0.2049791*** Vflip b-2 0.2270856***
(0.0359155) (0.039336)
Vflip b-3 0.0066188 Vflip b-3 -0.0265804
(0.0446795) (0.0232915)
Vflip b-4 0.0310787*** Vflip b-4 0.0205855
(0.0114233) (0.0277624)
Voccupier b-1 0.0302479 Vrinvest b-1 0.158487**
(0.0308857) (0.0801525)
Voccupier b-2 0.0200412 Vrinvest b-2 0.014595
(0.0208371) (0.0409063)
Voccupier b-3 -0.0268668 Vrinvest b-3 -0.0266618
(0.02983) (0.0435188)
Voccupier b-4 -0.0164194 Vrinvest b-4 -0.0032354
(0.0101703) (0.0337487)
Observations 16115 Observations 16115
Controlled Variables Project stylized factors including Project Tenure, Total units of project,
Location, Project type and project age; GDP rate
Standard errors in parentheses and adjusted for clusters in Project
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A14: Influence of owner-occupiers and rental investors on flippers when selling
Booming Period: 2006Q1-2007Q4
Dependent VARIABLE: Vflip s
Vflip s-1 0.1060813*** Vflip s-1 0.1301259***
(0.0303922) (0.0379166)
Vflip s-2 0.1553269*** Vflip s-2 0.150927***
(0.0291482) (0.0188302)
Vflip s-3 -0.0739521* Vflip s-3 -0.0457945
(0.043909) (0.0414251)
Vflip s-4 0.0323049 Vflip s-4 0.0364743
(0.0347165) (0.031591)
Voccupier s-1 0.0458119*** Vrinvest s-1 0.2219828
(0.0166565) (0.1772689)
Voccupier s-2 0.0646707*** Vrinvest s-2 0.350593**
(0.0169986) (0.1410811)
Voccupier s-3 0.0407161*** Vrinvest s-3 -0.312084
(0.0137903) (0.193164)
Voccupier s-4 -0.018011 Vrinvest s-4 0.4752162***
(0.0270886) (0.1399116)
Observations 12965 Observations 12965
Bust Period: 2008Q1-2008Q4
Dependent VARIABLE: Vflip s
Vflip s-1 -0.1937974* Vflip s-1 -0.2073137*
(0.1024275) (0.1111763)
Vflip s-2 0.2584929** Vflip s-2 0.301044***
(0.103285) (0.1020335)
Vflip s-3 0.1593141*** Vflip s-3 0.1822481***
(0.0575283) (0.0644761)
Vflip s-4 -0.1326649 Vflip s-4 -0.176751**
(0.0819103) (0.0873722)
Voccupier s-1 0.0367282 Vrinvest s-1 0.1445283
(0.0428332) (0.2406768)
Voccupier s-2 0.0205133 Vrinvest s-2 -0.2223592
(0.0318206) (0.2716785)
Voccupier s-3 0.046466 Vrinvest s-3 0.4798476**
(0.037793) (0.2088182)
Voccupier s-4 0.0785697** Vrinvest s-4 -0.0275126
(0.0352953) (0.3032067)
Observations 12063 Observations 12063
Controlled Variables Project stylized factors including Project Tenure, Total units
of project, Location, Project type and project age; GDP rate
Standard errors in parentheses and adjusted for clusters in Project
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Abstract 
The international business literature documents that higher quality corporate governance, at both 
the national level and the firm level, is associated with a greater likelihood to invest abroad and 
to take larger stakes when investing abroad. We examine a unique set of international real estate 
holdings and corporate governance data to evaluate the comparability of real estate investment to 
foreign direct investment (FDI) more broadly. Our results at both the national and firm level 
indicate that real estate transactions differ fundamentally from other types of FDI. Specifically, 
property nation governance, real estate firm headquarter nation governance, and firm level 
governance are negatively associated with the propensity to invest across borders. Further, firm 
level corporate governance is negatively related to the stake acquired in foreign property 
investment. These results are counter to the FDI literature.  
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Introduction 
The foreign direct investment (FDI) literature documents a positive relation between both 
national and firm level corporate governance and the propensity to invest across borders. This is 
not surprising given that much of this investment is designed to lower production costs and/or 
take advantage of less restrictive regulatory environments (e.g. cheaper labor in the textile 
industry), or obtain access to natural resources (e.g. exploration in the oil and gas industry) while 
companies continue to sell their products in countries where they can command a relatively 
higher price.  However, the positive relation may not necessarily apply to foreign investments 
that lack such obvious operational benefits. Foreign real estate investment, for example, faces 
operational disadvantages as it is more costly to build and operate income property outside 
established networks of known suppliers, consultants, contractors, and regulatory regimes 
without an offsetting rent premium for doing so. Rents are a function of supply and demand in 
the local space market. Yet, even though the industry has traditionally been considered a ‘local 
business,’ real estate ranks as the top industry for FDI in 2014 with $81 billion in investment 
announced; representing a 12% share of all FDI globally (fDi Report, 2015).
1
 Real Capital 
Analytics reports $91 billion in property acquisitions in the U.S. alone by foreign investors in 
2015, more than double that which was observed in 2014.
2
 
In this paper we examine the role of national and firm level governance in the industry 
with the largest single portion of FDI market share, real estate investment. We compare the 
                                                 
1 The report notes that this real estate investment is being driven by developers (i.e. companies whose business 
model is to profit from the real estate itself and not firms looking to establish industrial production operations in a 
given country.) 
Financial Times, “Real estate and China dominate FDI flows”, Jun. 4, 2015.  
http://on.ft.com/1Qt9fA8. Accessed 8/21/15. 
2
 National Real Estate Investor, “Foreign Buyers of U.S. Assets Show No Signs of Slowing Down”, Mar. 16, 2016. 
http://nreionline.com/finance-investment/foreign-buyers-us-assets-show-no-signs-slowing-down. Accessed 3/25/16. 
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likelihood of investing abroad relative to the domestic case using a large global sample of 
commercial real estate investment portfolios with over 70,000 property observations, where 
roughly 12% are owned by real estate companies with headquarters located in a different country 
than the assets themselves. We are able to determine the nature of the relation between 
governance and foreign investment for an asset class that represents an unquestionably large 
percentage of the world’s wealth. 
Florance et al. (2010) provide a helpful illustration of the magnitude of this asset class.  
In 2009 there was 24 billion square feet of industrial space, nearly 23 billion square feet of multi-
family space (excluding single-family homes and condos in the rental pool), more than 17 billion 
square feet of retail space, and over 12 billion square feet of office space in the U.S.  Without 
counting things like specialty sports and entertainment venues, but including flex, health care, 
hospitality, and mixed use property, there was more than 84 billion square feet of commercial 
real estate space; whereas including sports and entertainment spaces places the number in excess 
of 100 billion square feet dedicated to commercial use in the U.S. alone. 
Using 2009 data, industry and academic researchers estimate the value of U.S. 
commercial real estate at over $9 trillion (more if you include land and parking lots), or 
somewhere between $90 to $110 per square foot, on average.  For some property types these 
values are only about half of replacement cost following a loss of at least $4 trillion from 2007 
values.  This compares to a total value for the New York Stock Exchange of $12.5 trillion in 
May of 2010 (Florance et al. 2010).  Indeed, real estate as a whole makes up more than one third 
of the U.S. investable capital market; where stocks account for roughly 26%, bonds 24%, private 
debt 9%, and real estate represents approximately 41% (Geltner et al. 2014).  “Evidence suggests 
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that these proportions are typical of most other advanced economies, with real estate and private 
market shares being larger in less developed countries” (Geltner et al. 2014, p.14).  
Given that much of commercial real estate is privately held, we utilize the observable 
portfolios of publicly listed real estate companies from across the globe. This includes firm 
headquarters in 38 separate countries with properties located in 84 different nations. This allows 
us to examine governance variables at the firm headquarter nation level in addition to the 
property nation level. Moreover, the publicly traded nature of the companies enables us to 
incorporate firm level governance measures as well. 
 Governance is of particular importance within the realm of publicly traded firms in the 
business of buying/building, operating, and selling institutional-grade real estate assets. 
Structurally, there is greater risk of manager self-dealing with such firms because the market for 
corporate control is virtually nonexistent. For example, the real estate investment trust form of 
incorporation in the U.S. prevents any five or fewer investors from collectively owning 50% or 
more of the firm.
3
 Thus, it becomes very difficult to amass enough shares to exert control. 
Consequently, there has never been a successful hostile takeover attempt of such a firm in the 
U.S. since the structure was introduced in 1960. Given the lack of market discipline in the form 
of takeover threats, other governance mechanisms increase in importance and their effect can be 
more easily isolated with publicly listed real estate companies.   
Related to expropriation risk more generally, Rossi and Volpin (2004) find that 
blockholders are more likely to choose publicly traded firms over privately held firms when 
investing abroad. The risk of expropriation to investment in real estate is arguably greater from 
                                                 
3
 Over the past two decades many countries have adopted/adapted the U.S. REIT model.  While slight variation 
exists with respect to specific regulatory provisions across countries, the core REIT concept remains the same. 
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both the perspective of national government level expropriation and firm level self-dealing. As a 
result, the Rossi and Volpin (2004) results suggest that foreign real estate investment will be 
more likely when the threat of expropriation is lower. Johan et al. (2013) examine this in the 
context of a unique type of foreign investment, sovereign wealth funds, and find the opposite 
result concluding that sovereign wealth fund investment differs from other foreign investment. 
The international business literature reaches a similar conclusion in the case of FDI. For instance, 
Filatotchev et al. (2007) find that institutions that improve firm level governance are positively 
related to the size of the FDI stake. In related work, a link has been established between board 
characteristics and various strategic choices which include internationalization (e.g., Carpenter 
and Fredrickson, 2001 and Hoskisson et al., 2002). The literature notes that managers have 
shorter time horizons than institutions (Priem, 1990) and manager equity ownership means that 
their wealth is largely tied to the company. This view contends that managers are more risk-
averse than investors. In the absence of appropriate corporate governance mechanisms, this may 
mean that managers avoid international investment due to risk-aversion. However, this argument 
seems somewhat ad-hoc insofar as it is also possible that risk seeking managers may look to 
foreign investment as a channel through which to engage in self-dealing in order to maximize the 
value of their stock-based compensation.   
In our empirical analysis the null hypothesis is that the determinants of international real 
estate investment are similar to the determinants of international FDI with respect to governance. 
Specifically, given that corporate governance mechanisms can mitigate the risk of expropriation 
and align the risk-aversion of managers to their investors it may be that countries with relatively 
better governance will be more likely to attract and seek foreign investment. A rejection of this 
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null would suggest that real estate investment is fundamentally different than other international 
investment types. 
Our results indicate that property nation governance is negatively related to foreign 
investment. This suggests that foreign investment is actually less likely in nations with better 
corporate governance. Similarly, firm headquarter nation governance is negatively related to 
foreign investment as well. Finally, firm level corporate governance is negatively related to 
foreign investment and the size of the stake acquired in foreign transactions. Collectively and 
individually this is counter to the literature indicating a positive relation between foreign 
investment and governance and indicates that real estate is unique. Greater levels of governance 
quality, in any form, are associated with lower levels of foreign direct commercial real estate 
investment. The evidence suggests that good governance limits exposure to the operational 
disadvantages of foreign property holdings. 
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss related 
literature and state our general hypotheses. We subsequently describe our sample, detail the 
empirical methods employed, and follow with a discussion of the results. The final section 
concludes. 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Most academic work in international real estate utilizes returns data in a mean-variance 
framework to examine performance and diversification benefits to investor portfolios.
4 
Liow et 
al. (2014) use stock returns indices from various developed countries to examine the correlation 
                                                 
4
 See Worzala and Sirmans (2003) and Sirmans and Worzala (2003) for an extensive review of studies up through 
2002. For the most part, the evidence up through 2002 suggests that international real estate provides diversification 
benefits which should be considered when making asset allocation decisions. 
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dynamics between securitized real estate markets. Similarly, Hoesli and Reka (2013) analyze the 
relations between local and global securitized real estate markets in terms of market 
comovement, volatility spillovers, and contagion using data for the U.S., the U.K., and Australia. 
Both studies find some evidence of correlation dependencies and spillover effects across 
markets.   
Bardhan et al. (2008) estimate the impact of global financial integration on returns to 
local publicly traded real estate firms. They show that a country’s economic openness is 
negatively related to a country’s real estate security excess returns. From an asset price modeling 
perspective, Bond et al. (2003) examine the risk and return characteristics of publicly traded real 
estate companies from 14 countries and find that an orthogonalized country-specific market risk 
factor is highly significant in explaining returns. Pavlov et al. (2015) expand the international 
real estate asset pricing framework and find that various macroeconomic factors and credit 
market conditions help explain returns to real estate investment firms. 
Eichholtz et al. (2011) look at the performance of firms engaged in international real 
estate investment relative to domestically focused firms.  They outline the potential challenges of 
operating assets in a foreign country such as political risks, liquidity problems, informational 
disadvantages, and a loss of corporate focus. They further argue that the quintessential 
characteristic of real estate, its immobility, renders it especially vulnerable to expropriation in a 
foreign setting. They find evidence of underperformance to international real estate portfolios 
relative to domestic portfolios, but show that such differences have decreased over time for 
foreign property investors. Perhaps most relevant to our study, they further “show that the 
underperformance in the early years is driven by the institutional environment, the level of 
economic integration, and the real estate market transparency of the countries that the 
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international companies invest in” (p. 171) and argue that improvements in these areas may have 
contributed to the dramatic rise in foreign real estate investment in recent years.  This suggests 
that country level governance characteristics may be an important driver in international real 
estate investment decision making.  However, no studies specifically investigate the governance 
aspects of foreign real estate investment. 
More directly related to our investigation, recent work moves beyond portfolio 
performance and diversification benefits to examine international investment determinants. 
Lieser and Groh (2014) explore theoretically and empirically the characteristics that make 
commercial real estate investment relatively attractive within various countries using aggregated 
national commercial real estate investment activity level data. They examine over 60 
determinants which broadly fall into six separate categories; (i) economic activity, (ii) real estate 
investment opportunities, (iii) depth and sophistication of capital markets, (iv) investor 
protection and legal framework, (v) administrative burdens and regulatory limitations, and (vi) 
the socio-cultural and political environment. Mauck and Price (2015) control for these same 
country specific characteristic determinants as they examine what makes investing in 
commercial real estate assets located in foreign countries different than investing in such assets 
domestically.  They find strong evidence that real estate investment companies are more likely to 
take a smaller stake in larger properties when investing abroad.  However, neither Leiser and 
Groh (2014) nor Mauck and Price (2015) consider the influence of governance on the inclusion 
of foreign properties in portfolio composition. 
More generally, Filatotchev et al. (2007) examine the role of governance in FDI. 
Particularly relevant to our study, they note that “FDI strategy is thus driven by the interplay 
between the formal governance characteristics of the firm and its informal networks associated 
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with FDI location.” Thus, it is not only the governance of the firm that is of interest, but also the 
governance of the host and target nation. The authors further suggest that parent company share 
ownership in overseas affiliates is negatively related to insider ownership. This is based on upper 
echelon theory (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996) which suggests that directors influence 
strategic decisions such as investing across borders. Other work focusing on the agency 
perspective suggests a link between corporate governance (board characteristics in particular) 
and various strategic choices which include internationalization (e.g., Carpenter and Fredrickson, 
2001 and Hoskisson et al., 2002). Managers have shorter time horizons than institutions (Priem, 
1990). Manager equity ownership means that their wealth is largely tied to the company. This, it 
is argued, makes them more risk-averse than investors. High-commitment entry modes (i.e., 
foreign holdings and/or a large stake) increase the risk of adverse selection. Insiders are likely 
less able to monitor overseas ventures which increases the moral hazard problems of high-
commitment entry. Higher quality governance may provide superior monitoring abilities and 
may therefore encourage high-commitment FDI such as cross-border investment.   
 The finance literature also examines the role of foreign investment in corporate 
governance. For instance, Aggarwal et al. (2011) find that increased foreign institutional 
ownership improves firm level corporate governance. In particular, institutions in nations with 
higher quality corporate governance influence the governance of firms in nations with relatively 
lower quality corporate governance. In short, higher quality national and firm level corporate 
governance have been shown to positively influence FDI. Thus, consistent with the extant FDI 
literature we form the following hypotheses: 
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H1) Properties located in nations with relatively higher corporate governance are more likely to 
attract foreign investment due to the decreased risks associated with adverse selection in foreign 
ownership.  
H2) Firms located in nations with relatively higher corporate governance are more likely to seek 
foreign investment due to the relatively lower risk aversion associated with higher quality 
governance. 
H3) Firm corporate governance is positively related to the propensity to invest across borders. 
H4) National and firm corporate governance are positively related to the size of the stake owned 
in foreign assets.  
Sample Characteristics 
We obtain property level holding information from SNL Financial. This data is not dynamic and 
as such reflects only the holdings of publicly listed real estate investment companies across the 
globe as of the end of Q1 2014. This cross-sectional data includes asset type (e.g., office, retail, 
industrial, etc.), location details, and ownership percentage for each property within a given firm 
portfolio in addition to owner headquarters location information. We begin with a sample of all 
properties in the SNL database. Table 1 indicates that the sample includes 84 property nations 
and 38 real estate investment company headquarter nations. When we focus on only those firms 
with at least one foreign holding we still have a sample of 83 property nations and 30 firm 
headquarter nations. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
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Table 1, Panel A, shows that the proportion of foreign properties by property nation 
varies from the full sample. In particular, 55.3% of all properties are in the U.S. with Canada 
(8.6%) and Japan (5.1%) as a distant second and third, respectively. However, in the foreign only 
sample Germany is the most represented nation with just over 25% of all foreign owned 
properties. The U.S. is second at 10.4% and all other nations each make up less than 10% of the 
foreign only sample individually.  
Similarly, Table 1, Panel B, shows that over half of the full sample (55.5%) of property 
holdings involves U.S. headquartered firms. However, a much smaller proportion of the sample 
containing only foreign owned properties is held by these U.S. companies (12.1%).
5
 Canada, 
Japan, and the U.K. are the next most common firm headquarter nations, collectively making up 
approximately 19% of the full sample. In the sample of foreign holdings only, the most common 
firm headquarter nations are (in order): Austria (18.26% of the sample), Singapore (13.85%), 
Hong Kong (12.84%), U.S. (12.11%) and Canada (11.03%). Collectively, the summary statistics 
in Table 1 indicate that nations which attract and/or invest heavily in real estate domestically 
differ from those which attract and/or invest heavily abroad.  
Empirical Specification 
Given that our hypotheses involve both the likelihood of foreign investment and the size of stake 
when investing abroad, we have two different censored dependent variables. Specifically, we 
have a binary indicator for whether a property is foreign owned in addition to the percent stake 
acquired in foreign investment. Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) suggest that the international 
investment decision should be modeled as a two-stage decision: 1) in which country to invest 
                                                 
5 To examine whether this group of firms is driving the results we run regressions which exclude the U.S in 
untabulated results and find that the results are generally consistent. 
11 
 
and 2) relatively how much to invest. A simple probit (binary dependent variable) or tobit (left 
censored dependent variable) ignores the two-stage nature of the investment decision and 
assumes that the independent variables have the same impact in both stages. A more general and 
flexible approach is the Cragg model (Cragg, 1971). The Cragg model specifies that the 
probability that the dependent variable is zero takes the form of a probit model, defined in 
equation (1), while positive observations of the dependent variable are defined as the truncated 
regression model specified in Equation (2) with a lower limit of zero. The Cragg model is used in 
the foreign investment literature in Knill et al. (2012). This nested approach is preferable because 
we can test all four hypotheses using a flexible model that does not impose restrictions on the 
variables included in each stage (i.e., each stage can have the same or completely different 
variables). Our Cragg model takes the general form: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑌𝑖
1 = 0|𝑋) = 𝛷(−𝑋𝛽1)
−1                                                                      (1) 
𝑓(𝑌𝑖
2|𝑌𝑖
2 > 0) =  
1
Φ(
𝑋𝛽2
𝜎
)
1
√2𝜋𝜎
∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {
−1
2𝜎2
(𝑌𝑖
2 − 𝑋𝛽2)2}                                  (2) 
where i = property and we incorporate the following variables, 
FI  = binary for foreign investment; 
% OWNED = percentage ownership in a given property; 
GOV  = national level governance; 
FIRMGOV = firm level corporate governance; 
PROP   = property level variables; 
ECON  = economic activity; 
IPLEGAL = investor protection and legal framework; 
REIO  = real estate investment opportunities; 
ADMIN = administrative burdens and regulatory limitations; 
CAPMKT = depth and sophistication of capital markets; 
SOCIO = socio-cultural and political environment. 
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 For the first stage dependent variable, 𝑌𝑗
1, we use FI to capture whether a given property 
is a foreign holding. The indicator takes the value of one if the property is owned by a listed real 
estate investment company not domiciled in the same nation as the property and zero otherwise. 
We use % OWNED as the second stage dependent variable, 𝑌𝑖
2, which is the percent of the asset 
owned by the firm. Thus, our regressions at both stages are at the property level, where the first 
stage includes all properties in each of the portfolios and the second stage includes only foreign 
owned properties. We cluster standard errors at the firm level and include property nation fixed 
effects in all specifications.
6
  
 GOV is the national level corporate governance based on data from Aggarwal et al. 
(2011). Aggarwal et al. (2011) gather firm level corporate governance data covering 41 
governance attributes for 23 countries. They aggregate the data by firm based on how many of 
the 41 provisions a firm has adopted and then aggregate by country based on the average 
percentage adoption for firms in the country. The inclusion of this variable reduces our sample 
size from that reported in Table 1 from just over 70,000 observations to a little over 65,000 
observations. 
 FIRMGOV is our proxy for firm level corporate governance. This includes one variable, 
INST OWN % which is the percent of the firm owned by institutions. The inclusion of this 
variable follows Filatotchev et al. (2007) and Price et al. (2015) who note that a higher 
percentage of institutional ownership corresponds to relatively better corporate governance. Of 
practical importance, this variable is the only firm level corporate governance indicator we have 
                                                 
6 Results are robust to including headquarter nation fixed effects instead of property nation fixed effects as well as 
using robust standard errors with no clustering or fixed effects. 
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available for real estate firms outside the U.S. This data is gathered from the Thomson 13F 
database. 
 PROP is a vector of property specific variables and the inclusion of these indicators is 
motivated by their significance in Mauck and Price (2015).  For the remaining explanatory 
variable vectors we follow Lieser and Groh (2014) and Mauck and Price (2015). For brevity, we 
do not specifically define each particular variable within the different vectors here. Rather, 
detailed information on the 65 variables considered in the analysis and their respective data 
sources can be found in Appendix A. Each variable is available at both the property nation level 
and the firm headquarter nation level. Additionally, we follow the empirical techniques of Lieser 
and Groh (2011, 2014) and Groh et al. (2010) in our construction of indices for each vector of 
determinants. By combining each multivariable vector into a single variable, we are able to avoid 
multicollinearity issues within the vector. While we refer to the above mentioned papers for the 
specifics on our index construction, we note that each variable is scaled such that it ranges from 
1-100 and is based on the distance of that variable to a relative index.
7
 In our case, the relative 
index is the maximum and minimum of the variable for all countries in our sample. The scaled 
variables within each vector are then equal-weighted to form a single index value. While Lieser 
and Groh (2011) note, “the composite presented here is the result of much structuring and 
optimization effort that probably does not leave room for significant improvement,” (pp.195-
196) we nonetheless seek to replicate their approach with updated data as closely as we are able.  
ECON is a vector of variables related to the economic activity in the nation in which the 
property is located. This vector includes: GDP, GDP PER CAPITA, GDP GROWTH, 
UNEMPLOYMENT, and INFLATION. 
                                                 
7
 The formula used for scaling is (Variable ‘X’ – Min of Variable ‘X’)/(Max of Variable ‘X’ – Min of Variable ‘X’).  
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IPLEGAL is a vector of variables related to investor protection and legal framework in 
the property nation. This vector includes: RE TRANSPARENCY, DISCLOSURE IND, 
SHAREHOLDER SUITS, LEGAL RIGHTS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, RULE OF LAW, and REG 
QUALITY. 
REIO is a vector of variables related to the real estate investment opportunities in the 
property nation. This vector includes: INST PROPERTY, HOUSING STOCK, 
AGGLOMERATIONS, URBAN POP, URBAN POP GROWTH, TELECOMM and SERVICES 
TOTAL.   
ADMIN is a vector of variables related to administrative burdens and regulatory 
limitations in the property nation. This vector includes: MARGINAL TAX, PROFIT TAX, CONST 
PERMITS PROC, CONST PERMITS TIME, CONST PERMITS COST, REG PROPERTY PROC, 
REG PROPERTY TIME, REG PROPERTY COST, START BUS PROC, START BUS TIME, 
START BUS COST, START BUS PAID IN, RESOLVE INSOLV TIME, RESOLVE INSOLV 
COST, and RECOVERY RATE.  
CAPMKT is a vector of variables related to the depth and sophistication of capital 
markets in the property nation. This vector includes: MARKET CAP, TRADING VOL, IPO 
VOLUME, IPO COUNT, M&A VOLUME, M&A COUNT, CREDIT, CREDIT INF, BANK NON 
PERFORM, FDI, and REIT VOLUME. SOCIO is a vector of variables related to the socio-
cultural and political environment in the property nation. This vector includes: HDI INDEX, 
CORRUPTION INDEX, CONT CORRUPTION, VOICE, POLITICAL STABILITY and GOV 
EFFECTIVENESS. All of the above indices have been examined in the context of determinants 
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of foreign real estate investment in Mauck and Price (2015) and are included as controls in this 
analysis. Summary statistics and correlations are reported in Table 2.  
The summary statistics in Table 2 indicate that 11.5% of all properties in the sample are 
foreign owned. Additionally, the majority of properties are wholly owned by the firm as the 
median percent stake is 100%. The correlations in Panel B of Table 2 indicate a negative relation 
between a property being foreign owned and national governance at both the property and firm 
nation level as well as firm level corporate governance (i.e., the percentage of institutional 
ownership). This provides preliminary evidence against hypotheses 1-3.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 Cronbach’s (1951) alpha is frequently used to determine if forming an index is 
reasonable, where a value greater than 0.70 indicates that an index is appropriate. In Table 3, we 
report the Cronbach alpha for each vector of variables. For all vectors except the property level 
variables, alpha is greater than 0.70. As such, we move forward with index construction for all 
vectors except the property level variables, which are left as is.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 While index construction eliminates multicollinearity within vectors, it is not possible for 
us to estimate the full model due to multicollinearity across vectors. For instance, the ECON, 
REIO and CAPMKT indexes are all correlated with each other at or above the 95% level. 
Similarly, IPLEGAL, ADMIN, and SOCIO all have an absolute value of correlation of 75% or 
greater. As such, we follow Mauck and Price (2015) and include pairs of these variables that are, 
in most cases, not so highly correlated. In this manner the separate specifications function as 
robustness checks.   
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Results 
Our results are based on the Cragg model in Equations (1) and (2). Specifically, we conduct 
property level regressions in which the dependent variable is an indicator of foreign investment 
in the first stage. The indicator takes the value of one if the property is owned by a real estate 
investment firm not domiciled in the same nation as the property and zero otherwise. The second 
stage is a truncated regression in which the dependent variable is the percentage of the property 
owned by the firm. Explanatory variables are intended to identify if the determinants for foreign 
real estate investment differ from the determinants of foreign FDI. Given that many of the 
explanatory variables are related, multicollinearity is a potential issue (see Table 2, Panel B for 
unconditional correlations). We take several steps to address any such concerns. We incorporate 
a multivariate framework where we reduce each vector to a common component in the spirit of 
Lieser and Groh (2011, 2014), Groh et al. (2010), and Mauck and Price (2015).  We also check 
(i) for sign consistency among the vector categories between the univariate and multivariate 
regressions, and (ii) to ensure that variance inflation factors are less than 10 in the multivariate 
regressions. While it would be preferable to examine property nation and firm headquarter nation 
variables simultaneously, it is not desirable to do so. Given that roughly 88.5% (11.5%) of the 
observations in the sample are domestic (foreign) holdings (see Panel A of Table 2), including 
property nation and firm nation variables in the same regression would result in a vast majority 
of observations where multiple explanatory variables would be identical and perfectly correlated. 
Consequently, we examine property nation determinants and firm headquarter nation 
determinants separately. 
Property nation governance  
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We start by examining differences between foreign and domestic investment relative to property 
nation governance while controlling for the other dimensions in equation (1) (i.e. measures 
which capture economic activity, real estate investment opportunities, depth and sophistication 
of the capital markets, investor protection and the legal framework, administrative burdens and 
regulatory limitations, and the socio-cultural and political environment). Table 4 presents results 
with property nation level governance and either property nation or firm nation variables, 
depending on the specification.  
 In all 7 specifications of Panel A of Table 4 GOV is negatively related to the dependent 
variable (significant at the 1% level). Thus, the probit results indicate that property nations with 
relatively higher quality corporate governance are less likely to attract foreign investment. This is 
counter to hypothesis (1) based on the international business and finance literatures which 
predict a positive relation between governance and foreign investment. The national corporate 
governance measure from Aggarwal et al. (2011) is a percentage based on the number of 
provisions the average firm in a nation has adopted. In unreported results, we find that the 
average property nation governance proxy is 59.63% in domestic deals and 50.64% in foreign 
deals. The economic magnitude of our results suggest that a one standard deviation increase in 
property nation corporate governance is associated with between a 1% and 5% reduction in the 
likelihood of a property being foreign owned.  
 The unreported property type variables are generally consistent with Mauck and Price 
(2015). In addition to the property type variables, we include pairs of other dimensions related to 
real estate investment in Equation (1). The results are consistent with Mauck and Price (2015) 
and neither the inclusion of property level variables nor the inclusion of country level controls 
impacts the significance of the relation between GOV and the dependent variable.  
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 In the truncated second stage of the regression in Panel B of Table 4, where the 
dependent variable is the percentage of the property owned by the firm, we find that GOV is not 
statistically significant. Thus, while property nation governance influences the decision to invest 
abroad, it is unrelated to the stake when doing so.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Acquirer nation governance 
 Our analysis in Table 5 mirrors that of Table 4 except that Table 5 focuses on firm 
headquarter nation level governance. In all 7 specifications of Panel A of Table 5 GOV HQ is 
negatively related to the dependent variable (significant at the 1% level in 5 specifications and 
the 5% level in 2 specifications). Thus, the probit results indicate that firm headquarter nations 
with relatively higher quality corporate governance are less likely to pursue foreign investment. 
This is counter to hypothesis (2) based on the international business and finance literatures which 
predict a positive relation between governance and foreign investment. In unreported results, we 
find that the average firm headquarter nation governance proxy is 59.63% in domestic deals and 
53.63% in foreign deals. The economic magnitude of our results suggest that a one standard 
deviation increase in firm headquarter nation corporate governance is associated with between 
about 1% and 6% reduction in the likelihood of a property being foreign owned. The inclusion of 
property and nation level controls does not impact the statistical significance of GOV ACQ. 
 In Panel B of Table 5 we find that GOV ACQ is statistically insignificant in all but the 
univariate regression. Thus, consistent with Table 4 the results indicate that firm national 
governance matters for the selection of a property but not for the size of the stake taken in a 
foreign property.  
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 [Insert Table 5 Here] 
Firm level corporate governance results 
 In Table 6 we switch our focus to firm level corporate governance. Our firm level 
corporate governance data is based on the percentage of the firm owned by institutions. INST 
OWN % is negatively (significant at the 1% level in 6 specifications and 5% level in 1 
specification) related to likelihood of foreign ownership in Panel A of Table 6. This indicates 
that higher quality firm level corporate governance is negatively related to the propensity to 
invest across borders. This is inconsistent with hypothesis (3) and the international business and 
finance literatures.  The economic significance of this result is such that a one standard deviation 
increase in the percentage of the firm owned by institutions is associated with between a 2.6% 
and 7.6% decrease in the likelihood of a property being foreign owned. This result holds when 
controlling for property and index controls as well as for national governance.  
 In Panel B of Table 6 we find that INST OWN % is negatively related to the size of the 
stake owned in the property in all 7 specifications (significant at the 5% level). This is counter to 
hypothesis (4) which suggests that the percent stake will be positively related to firm level 
corporate governance. The economic significance of this result indicates that a one standard 
deviation increase in the percentage of the firm owned by institutions is associated with between 
a 3.4% and 5.2% lower stake in foreign held properties.  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
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Conclusion  
 The literature has provided theory and evidence suggesting a positive relation between 
national and firm level corporate governance and the propensity to invest across borders. 
However, little is known about the role of corporate governance in foreign real estate 
transactions. Given that as of at least 2014 real estate was the single biggest area of foreign direct 
investment, filling this knowledge gap appears to be a worthwhile endeavor which we attempt in 
this paper. 
 On one hand, it may be that foreign real estate investment is not different than other types 
of FDI in meaningful ways and the examination of real estate only transactions serves as a 
robustness check of established relations. On the other hand, real estate may differ in meaningful 
ways from other forms of FDI. For instance, many of the motivations for FDI (i.e., lower 
production costs, access to natural resources, etc.) do not apply to real estate. Consistent with this 
latter explanation, we find a negative relation between national and firm corporate governance 
and the propensity to invest abroad. Similarly, firm corporate governance is negatively related to 
the stake acquired in foreign properties. Both results indicate that the relation between corporate 
governance and international real estate differs from other forms of FDI.   
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Appendix A  Description of the variables 
Variable Description Source 
FI The dependent variable. An indicator variable equal to one if the 
investment is from a firm domiciled in a different nation than 
the property and zero otherwise. 
SNL Financial 
% OWNED The level of ownership in the property. SNL Financial 
GOV National corporate governance index. Aggarwal et al. (2011) 
INST OWN % The percentage of firm shares outstanding owned by 
institutions.  
SNL Financial 
SIZE The size of the firm measured as the log of the prior year’s total 
assets. 
Hartzell et al. (2014) 
LEVERAGE The prior year’s total debt scaled by one year lagged total assets. Hartzell et al. (2014) 
PROFIT The prior year’s EBITDA divided by one year lagged total 
assets. 
Hartzell et al. (2014) 
USA An indicator equal to one if the property is located in the U.S. 
and zero otherwise. 
SNL Financial 
PROPERTY SIZE The size of the property in square feet. SNL Financial 
HEALTH An indicator equal to one if the property is classified as health 
care and zero otherwise. 
SNL Financial 
HOTEL An indicator equal to one if the property is classified as hotel 
and zero otherwise. 
SNL Financial 
INDUSTRIAL An indicator equal to one if the property is classified as 
industrial and zero otherwise. 
SNL Financial 
MAN-HOME An indicator equal to one if the property is classified as 
manufactured home and zero otherwise. 
SNL Financial 
MULTI-FAM An indicator equal to one if the property is classified as multi-
family and zero otherwise. 
SNL Financial 
MULTI-USE An indicator equal to one if the property is classified as multi-
use and zero otherwise. 
SNL Financial 
OFFICE An indicator equal to one if the property is classified as office 
and zero otherwise. 
SNL Financial 
RESIDENTIAL An indicator equal to one if the property is classified as 
residential, single-family, or student housing and zero 
otherwise. 
SNL Financial 
RETAIL  An indicator equal to one if the property is classified as regional 
mall, shopping center, casino, cineplex theater, dockside casino, 
recreation, restaurant, track-affiliated casino or retail:other and 
zero otherwise. 
SNL Financial 
SELF-STORAGE An indicator equal to one if the property is classified as self-
storage and zero otherwise. 
SNL Financial 
SPECIALTY An indicator equal to one if the property is classified as 
specialized (includes land, parking facility, prison, and timber) 
and zero otherwise. 
SNL Financial 
GDP The GDP in millions of the nation in which the property is 
located. 
World Bank (World 
Development Indicators) 
GDP PER CAPITA The GDP in millions divided by the population in millions of 
the nation in which the property is located. 
World Bank (World 
Development Indicators) 
GDP GROWTH The average growth in GDP over the previous five years for the 
nation in which the property is located. 
Heritage Foundation 
UNEMPLOYMENT The unemployment rate as a percent for the nation in which the 
property is located. 
World Bank (World 
Development Indicators) 
Variable Description Source 
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INFLATION The annual average inflation rate as a percent for the nation in 
which the property is located. 
Heritage Foundation 
INST PROPERTY Measured according to Liang and Gordon (2003) as equal to 
45% * GDP. 
World Bank (World 
Development Indicators) 
HOUSING STOCK Refers to the stock of permanent dwellings in the nation in 
which the property is located. 
United Nations 
AGGLOMERATIONS The number of urban agglomerations with more than 1 million 
inhabitants. 
United Nations 
URBAN POP The percent of the population living in areas defined as urban.  United Nations 
URBAN POP GROWTH The three-year geometric mean of urban population growth. United Nations 
TELECOMM Telephone lines per capita. World Bank (World 
Development Indicators) 
SERVICES TOTAL Services value added. World Bank (World 
Development Indicators) 
MARKET CAP The capitalization of the nation’s stock market. International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) 
TRADING VOL The total trading volume of the domestic stock market for the 
year as a percent of GDP. 
World Bank (World 
Development Indicators) 
IPO VOLUME The total proceeds amount of IPOs for the property nation in the 
year. 
SDC Platinum 
IPO COUNT The number of IPOs for the property nation in the year. SDC Platinum 
M&A VOLUME The total merger and acquisition deal value for the property 
nation for the year. 
SDC Platinum 
M&A COUNT The number of merger and acquisition deals for the property 
nation for the year. 
SDC Platinum 
CREDIT The domestic credit provided by the banking sector. World Bank (World 
Development Indicators) 
CREDIT INF INDEX The credit information index which is ranges from 0 to 6 with 
higher values indicating more available credit information for 
the nation. 
World Bank (Doing Business) 
BANK NON PERFORM The ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans. World Bank (World 
Development Indicators) 
FDI Net inflows of foreign direct investment.  Heritage Foundation 
REIT VOLUME The market volume of real estate investment trusts listed in the 
nation. 
FTSE EPRA NAREIT Series 
RE TRANSPARENCY The real estate transparency index with lower values indicating 
greater transparency. 
Jones Lang LaSalle 
DISCLOSURE IND The disclosure index ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values 
indicating greater disclosure. 
World Bank (Doing Business) 
SHAREHOLDER SUITS The ease of shareholder suits index ranges from 0 to 10 with 
higher values indicating greater ease for shareholders to 
challenge transactions. 
World Bank (Doing Business) 
LEGAL RIGHTS The index of legal rights ranges from 0 to 10 with higher scores 
indicating better designed collateral and bankruptcy laws. 
World Bank (Doing Business) 
PROPERTY RIGHTS The property rights index provides a measure of the ability of 
individuals to accumulate private property. 
Heritage Foundation 
RULE OF LAW The extent to which economic agents have confidence in the 
rules of society. 
World Bank (Doing Business) 
REG QUALITY Regulator quality measures the ability of the government to 
function in way that promotes private sector development. 
World Bank (Doing Business) 
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Variable Description Source 
MARGINAL TAX The highest marginal corporate tax rates. World Bank (World 
Development Indicators) 
PROFIT TAX The tax rate on income. World Bank (World 
Development Indicators) 
CONST PERMITS PROC The number of procedures needed to obtain a construction 
permit. 
World Bank (Doing Business) 
CONST PERMITS TIME The time in calendar days needed to obtain a construction 
permit 
World Bank (Doing Business) 
CONST PERMITS COST The cost as a percent of GDP to obtain a construction permit. World Bank (Doing Business) 
REG PROPERTY PROC The number of procedures needed to register a property. World Bank (Doing Business) 
REG PROPERTY TIME The time in calendar days needed to register a property. World Bank (Doing Business) 
REG PROPERTY COST The cost as a percent of GDP to register a property. World Bank (Doing Business) 
START BUS PROC The number of procedures needed to start a business. World Bank (Doing Business) 
START BUS TIME The time in calendar days needed to start a business. World Bank (Doing Business) 
START BUS COST The cost as a percent of GDP to start a business. World Bank (Doing Business) 
START BUS PAID IN The paid-in minimum capital requirement an owner must 
deposit up to three months following incorporation. 
World Bank (Doing Business) 
RESOLVE INSOLV TIME The number of years needed to close a business. World Bank (Doing Business) 
RESOLVE INSOLV COST The cost of closing a business as a percent of the estate's value. World Bank (Doing Business) 
RECOVERY RATE Cents on the dollar recovered by creditors through bankruptcy 
or insolvency. 
World Bank (Doing Business) 
HDI INDEX The human development index is a measure of three dimensions 
of human development including: long and health life, being 
educated, and standard of living where higher scores indicate 
better human development. 
Human Development Index 
CORRUPTION INDEX An index of the extent of corruption in the public and political 
sectors where countries with more frequent corruption score 
lower. 
Transparency International 
CONT CORRUPTION A measure of the perception of the use of public power to be 
used for private gain where countries with more frequent 
corruption receive a lower score. 
World Bank (Worldwide 
Governance Indicators) 
VOICE  The extent to which citizens are able to participate in the 
selection of their government. 
World Bank (Worldwide 
Governance Indicators) 
POLITICAL STABILITY The likelihood of government destabilization. World Bank (Worldwide 
Governance Indicators) 
GOV EFFECTIVENESS The quality of public services and the independence of civil 
service from political pressure. 
World Bank (Worldwide 
Governance Indicators) 
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Table 1  Number of properties by nation 
Panel A – Number of properties by property nation 
Property Nation Obs. Full Full % Obs. Foreign Foreign % 
Argentina 4 0.01 4 0.05 
Aruba 1 0 1 0.01 
Australia 1,831 2.59 209 2.57 
Austria 404 0.57 9 0.11 
Azerbaijan 2 0 2 0.02 
Belgium 948 1.34 193 2.38 
Brazil 398 0.56 31 0.38 
Bulgaria 13 0.02 13 0.16 
Burma 5 0.01 5 0.06 
Cambodia 3 0 3 0.04 
Canada 6,049 8.55 206 2.54 
Chile 4 0.01 4 0.05 
China 1,340 1.89 1,177 14.5 
Colombia 1 0 1 0.01 
Croatia 15 0.02 15 0.18 
Cyprus 2 0 2 0.02 
Czech Republic 157 0.22 157 1.93 
Denmark 52 0.07 47 0.58 
Egypt 1 0 1 0.01 
Estonia 7 0.01 7 0.09 
Fiji 3 0 3 0.04 
Finland 294 0.42 39 0.48 
France 1,984 2.81 560 6.9 
Georgia 2 0 2 0.02 
Germany 2,798 3.96 2,044 25.18 
Ghana 1 0 1 0.01 
Greece 76 0.11 6 0.07 
Hong Kong 977 1.38 39 0.48 
Hungary 86 0.12 86 1.06 
India 256 0.36 61 0.75 
Indonesia 60 0.08 60 0.74 
Ireland 45 0.06 18 0.22 
Israel 18 0.03 0 0 
Italy 171 0.24 109 1.34 
Japan 3,591 5.08 422 5.2 
Jordan 1 0 1 0.01 
Kuwait 2 0 2 0.02 
Kyrgyzstan 1 0 1 0.01 
Laos 1 0 1 0.01 
Latvia 3 0 3 0.04 
Lithuania 6 0.01 6 0.07 
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Luxembourg 25 0.04 24 0.3 
Macau 6 0.01 6 0.07 
Malaysia 112 0.16 110 1.36 
Maldives 15 0.02 15 0.18 
Mauritius 1 0 1 0.01 
Mexico 410 0.58 114 1.4 
Mongolia 1 0 1 0.01 
Morocco 1 0 1 0.01 
Namibia 8 0.01 8 0.1 
Netherlands 672 0.95 148 1.82 
New Zealand 163 0.23 104 1.28 
Norway 81 0.11 16 0.2 
Oman 2 0 2 0.02 
Peru 7 0.01 7 0.09 
Philippines 23 0.03 23 0.28 
Poland 157 0.22 112 1.38 
Portugal 22 0.03 22 0.27 
Romania 101 0.14 101 1.24 
Russia 85 0.12 75 0.92 
Saudi Arabia 1 0 1 0.01 
Serbia 9 0.01 9 0.11 
Seychelles 2 0 2 0.02 
Singapore 687 0.97 45 0.55 
Slovakia 43 0.06 43 0.53 
Slovenia 2 0 2 0.02 
South Africa 1,436 2.03 6 0.07 
South Korea 15 0.02 15 0.18 
Spain 218 0.31 161 1.98 
Sri Lanka 2 0 2 0.02 
Sweden 2,273 3.21 86 1.06 
Switzerland 543 0.77 7 0.09 
Taiwan 7 0.01 7 0.09 
Tanzania 1 0 1 0.01 
Thailand 41 0.06 41 0.51 
Turkey 81 0.11 19 0.23 
USA 39,108 55.3 846 10.42 
Ukraine 15 0.02 14 0.17 
United Arab Emirates 1 0 1 0.01 
United Kingdom 2,684 3.8 327 4.03 
Uruguay 3 0 3 0.04 
Vanuatu 1 0 1 0.01 
Vietnam 40 0.06 35 0.43 
Zambia 2 0 2 0.02 
Total 70,720 100 8,117 100 
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Panel B – Number of properties by firm headquarter nation 
Firm Nation Obs. Full Full % Obs. Foreign Foreign % 
Australia 1,893 2.68 271 3.34 
Austria 1,877 2.65 1,482 18.26 
BVI 7 0.01 7 0.09 
Belgium 987 1.4 232 2.86 
Bermuda 243 0.34 243 2.99 
Brazil 368 0.52 1 0.01 
Canada 6,738 9.53 895 11.03 
China 163 0.23 0 0.00 
Cyprus 7 0.01 7 0.09 
Denmark 14 0.02 9 0.11 
Finland 286 0.4 31 0.38 
France 1,714 2.42 290 3.57 
Germany 804 1.14 50 0.62 
Greece 80 0.11 10 0.12 
Hong Kong 1,980 2.8 1,042 12.84 
India 208 0.29 13 0.16 
Ireland 28 0.04 1 0.01 
Israel 45 0.06 27 0.33 
Italy 78 0.11 16 0.20 
Japan 3,203 4.53 34 0.42 
Luxembourg 96 0.14 95 1.17 
Malaysia 2 0 0 0.00 
Mexico 296 0.42 0 0.00 
Netherlands 947 1.34 423 5.21 
New Zealand 59 0.08 0 0.00 
Norway 65 0.09 0 0.00 
Poland 65 0.09 20 0.25 
Russia 10 0.01 0 0.00 
Singapore 1,766 2.5 1,124 13.85 
South Africa 1,488 2.1 58 0.71 
Spain 102 0.14 45 0.55 
Sweden 2,225 3.15 38 0.47 
Switzerland 573 0.81 37 0.46 
Turkey 67 0.09 5 0.06 
USA 39,245 55.49 983 12.11 
Ukraine 1 0 0 0.00 
United Kingdom 2,985 4.22 628 7.74 
Vietnam 5 0.01 0 0.00 
Total 70,720 100 8,117 100 
This table reports the number of properties in the sample by property nation (Panel A) and firm headquarter nation (Panel B) for 
both the full sample and foreign owned property sample. 
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Table 2  Summary Statistics and Correlation 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  Mean Median Min Max Std dev N 
FI 0.115 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.319 70720 
% OWNED 93.730 100.000 0.000 100.000 18.838 69312 
GOV  58.857 62.200 35.900 72.800 8.435 65671 
GOV HQ 58.954 62.200 35.900 72.800 8.428 67638 
INST OWN % 60.565 65.400 0.000 100.000 31.108 70720 
SIZE 15.323 15.534 7.261 20.287 1.433 69409 
LEVERAGE 0.574 0.525 0.000 7.979 0.352 66123 
PROFIT 0.075 0.078 -0.303 1.620 0.057 65294 
USA 0.553 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.497 70720 
ECON 64.276 72.705 37.188 72.705 9.963 70642 
IPLEGAL 71.505 72.768 42.728 86.047 6.017 69573 
REIO 56.395 67.071 17.303 67.071 15.796 69549 
ADMIN 15.964 16.143 8.183 37.327 3.511 69549 
CAPMKT 62.517 85.402 14.361 85.402 26.634 69711 
SOCIO 81.323 81.916 30.853 95.049 9.807 69595 
ECON HQ 64.165 72.705 26.411 79.203 9.874 70579 
IPLEGAL HQ 72.469 72.768 41.988 86.047 5.054 68419 
REIO HQ 56.821 67.071 16.396 67.071 16.017 69642 
ADMIN HQ 15.512 16.143 8.183 37.673 3.227 68543 
CAPMKT HQ 62.660 85.402 14.361 85.402 26.549 70141 
SOCIO HQ 82.500 81.916 10.698 95.049 7.637 68573 
This table displays the summary statistics for the sample. Detailed variable definitions can be found in Appendix A. 
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Panel B: Correlation 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1 FI 1 
                    
2 % OWNED -0.15 1 
                   
3 GOV  -0.30 0.05 1 
                  
4 GOV HQ -0.23 0.05 0.93 1 
                 
5 INST OWN % -0.26 0.00 0.34 0.35 1 
                
6 SIZE 0.07 -0.07 0.17 0.10 0.18 1 
               
7 LEVERAGE -0.09 0.11 0.17 0.19 0.01 -0.07 1 
              
8 PROFIT -0.09 0.01 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.17 -0.22 1 
             
9 USA -0.33 0.09 0.48 0.46 0.70 0.10 0.19 0.12 1 
            
10 ECON -0.25 0.06 0.47 0.42 0.62 0.12 0.18 0.12 0.94 1 
           
11 IPLEGAL -0.40 0.07 0.36 0.35 0.22 -0.19 0.10 0.02 0.24 0.19 1 
          
12 REIO -0.28 0.08 0.30 0.26 0.56 0.31 0.09 0.16 0.77 0.69 0.00 1 
         
13 ADMIN 0.25 -0.07 -0.36 -0.36 0.01 0.16 -0.10 0.02 0.06 0.08 -0.80 0.20 1 
        
14 CAPMKT -0.32 0.07 0.55 0.51 0.67 0.10 0.18 0.14 0.97 0.96 0.28 0.71 0.02 1 
       
15 SOCIO -0.28 0.09 0.00 0.16 0.05 -0.26 0.12 -0.09 0.07 0.04 0.76 -0.13 -0.84 0.06 1 
      
16 ECON HQ -0.28 0.04 0.45 0.44 0.69 0.09 0.17 0.12 0.92 0.93 0.25 0.67 0.02 0.92 0.10 1 
     
17 IPLEGAL HQ 0.06 -0.05 0.26 0.27 0.05 -0.11 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.17 0.72 -0.12 -0.57 0.17 0.44 0.17 1 
    
18 REIO HQ -0.20 0.02 0.25 0.23 0.57 0.38 0.04 0.15 0.68 0.64 -0.06 0.87 0.25 0.63 -0.21 0.69 -0.09 1 
   
19 ADMIN HQ -0.13 0.02 -0.27 -0.32 0.20 0.11 -0.04 0.02 0.19 0.11 -0.55 0.28 0.78 0.13 -0.57 0.13 -0.78 0.26 1 
  
20 CAPMKT HQ -0.30 0.04 0.53 0.52 0.71 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.92 0.91 0.25 0.66 0.03 0.95 0.04 0.96 0.15 0.68 0.16 1 
 
21 SOCIO HQ 0.08 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.13 -0.19 0.06 -0.14 -0.07 0.02 0.51 -0.24 -0.69 -0.04 0.80 0.03 0.62 -0.23 -0.79 -0.05 1 
This table displays the correlation table for the variables used in the sample. Detailed variable definitions can be found in Appendix A.
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Table 3  Consistency analysis 
Driver N Cronbach Alpha 
1. Property 13 0.18 
2. Economic Activity 5 0.88 
3. Real Estate Investment Opportunities 7 0.87 
4. Depth and Sophistication of Capital Markets 11 0.97 
5. Investor Protection and Legal Framework 7 0.86 
6. Administrative Burdens and Regulatory Limitations 15 0.93 
7. Socio-cultural and Political Environment 6 0.93 
This table displays the results for Cronbach’s (1951) alpha, which measures if it is appropriate to combine variables into an 
index. 
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Table 4  Cragg regressions, property nation governance, and property, firm and national controls 
Panel A: First Stage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
GOV -0.007** -0.002** -0.004** -0.005** -0.004** -0.005** -0.004** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SIZE 
 
0.017** 0.023** 0.018** 0.016* 0.017** 0.015* 
  
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.005 0.014 0.014 -0.003 -0.014 0.002 
  
(0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.034) (0.030) (0.035) 
PROFIT 
 
-0.054 -0.097 -0.135 -0.183 -0.273 -0.149 
  
(0.088) (0.115) (0.132) (0.168) (0.182) (0.175) 
USA 
 
-0.148 -0.025 -0.160* -0.033 0.053 -0.039 
  
(0.091) (0.098) (0.077) (0.103) (0.084) (0.086) 
ECON 
 
-0.004** 
     
  
(0.001) 
     IPLEGAL 
 
-0.006* 
     
  
(0.002) 
     REIO 
  
-0.003** 
    
   
(0.000) 
    ADMIN 
  
0.001 
    
   
(0.003) 
    CAPMKT 
   
-0.002** 
   
    
(0.000) 
   SOCIO 
   
-0.006** 
   
    
(0.002) 
   ECON HQ 
    
-0.003** 
  
     
(0.001) 
  IPLEGAL HQ 
    
0.001 
  
     
(0.002) 
  REIO HQ 
     
-0.002** 
 
      
(0.001) 
 ADMIN HQ 
     
-0.008* 
 
      
(0.003) 
 CAPMKT HQ 
      
-0.001* 
       
(0.001) 
SOCIO HQ 
      
-0.001 
       
(0.002) 
PROPERTY VARS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OBS 65,671 59,871 59,871 59,581 59,734 59,751 59,588 
PSEUDO R^2 0.139 0.311 0.302 0.302 0.256 0.292 0.255 
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Panel B: Second Stage 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
GOV -0.189 -0.066 -0.096 -0.187 0.141 -0.019 0.241 
 
(0.251) (0.276) (0.234) (0.378) (0.228) (0.224) (0.226) 
SIZE 
 
-2.638* -2.208 -2.312 -3.544* -3.391* -2.831* 
  
(1.120) (1.224) (1.247) (1.378) (1.392) (1.400) 
LEVERAGE 
 
15.462* 21.173** 21.755** 18.041* 16.458 24.637** 
  
(7.031) (7.384) (7.218) (7.511) (8.999) (8.377) 
PROFIT 
 
-55.987 -66.060 -63.037 14.464 -51.891 -24.273 
  
(46.008) (44.527) (47.748) (58.169) (47.163) (41.895) 
USA 
 
2.042 -6.800 -7.423 -1.770 7.069 0.018 
  
(11.290) (11.246) (17.831) (10.180) (9.445) (9.518) 
ECON 
 
0.543* 
     
  
(0.250) 
     IPLEGAL 
 
-0.659* 
     
  
(0.264) 
     REIO 
  
0.174 
    
   
(0.109) 
    ADMIN 
  
1.636** 
    
   
(0.610) 
    CAPMKT 
   
0.111 
   
    
(0.108) 
   SOCIO 
   
-0.309 
   
    
(0.407) 
   ECON HQ 
    
-0.666* 
  
     
(0.332) 
  IPLEGAL HQ 
    
-0.309 
  
     
(0.342) 
  REIO HQ 
     
-0.225* 
 
      
(0.095) 
 ADMIN HQ
     
0.055 
 
      
(0.539) 
 CAPMKT HQ 
      
-0.292* 
       
(0.113) 
SOCIO HQ 
      
0.114 
       
(0.264) 
PROPERTY VARS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OBS 5,372 4,770 4,770 4,615 4,635 4,653 4,619 
This table displays the results for Cragg regressions for which FI is the dependent variable in the first stage probit and % 
OWNED is the dependent variable in the second stage truncated regression. Detailed variable definitions can be found in 
Appendix A. The marginal effects are reported with standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. Property nation fixed effects 
are included in all specifications.  **, and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5  Cragg regressions, firm nation governance, and property, firm and national controls 
Panel A: First Stage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
GOV HQ -0.007** -0.003** -0.003* -0.005* -0.005** -0.006** -0.004** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
SIZE 
 
0.016* 0.021** 0.024** 0.015 0.016 0.017* 
  
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
LEVERAGE 
 
-0.016 -0.016 0.002 -0.050 -0.058 -0.040 
  
(0.032) (0.038) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) 
PROFIT 
 
-0.006 -0.303 -0.305 -0.361 -0.473 -0.256 
  
(0.129) (0.220) (0.205) (0.223) (0.265) (0.211) 
USA 
 
-0.165* -0.064 -0.283* -0.032 0.061 -0.041 
  
(0.070) (0.123) (0.119) (0.070) (0.063) (0.053) 
ECON 
 
-0.007** 
     
  
(0.001) 
     IPLEGAL 
 
-0.010** 
     
  
(0.003) 
     REIO 
  
-0.004** 
    
   
(0.001) 
    ADMIN 
  
0.006 
    
   
(0.005) 
    CAPMKT 
   
-0.004** 
   
    
(0.001) 
   SOCIO 
   
-0.012** 
   
    
(0.003) 
   ECON HQ 
    
-0.006** 
  
     
(0.002) 
  IPLEGAL HQ 
    
0.003 
  
     
(0.002) 
  REIO HQ 
     
-0.002** 
 
      
(0.001) 
 ADMIN HQ
     
-0.016** 
 
      
(0.004) 
 CAPMKT HQ 
      
-0.003** 
       
(0.001) 
SOCIO HQ 
      
-0.006* 
       
(0.003) 
PROPERTY VARS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OBS 67,637 61,816 59,735 61,162 60,901 60,901 60,763 
PSEUDO R^2 0.0654 0.420 0.229 0.452 0.185 0.203 0.222 
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Panel B: Second Stage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
GOV HQ -0.049 -0.076 -0.273 -0.231 0.237 -0.030 -0.166 
 
(0.283) (0.165) (0.156) (0.173) (0.181) (0.182) (0.180) 
SIZE 
 
-2.295* -2.411* -2.035* -2.957* -3.486** -2.666 
  
(1.018) (1.093) (1.028) (1.335) (1.350) (1.404) 
LEVERAGE 
 
27.127** 27.399** 29.639** 7.594 10.566 21.065** 
  
(7.088) (8.737) (7.838) (7.636) (7.798) (7.705) 
PROFIT 
 
-66.584* -73.869 -46.491 4.437 -49.013 -62.917 
  
(32.238) (42.493) (41.337) (41.774) (31.393) (34.235) 
USA 
 
12.464* -7.372 -0.096 6.122 9.453 13.086* 
  
(6.251) (10.015) (5.240) (5.223) (5.379) (5.947) 
ECON 
 
0.547* 
     
  
(0.221) 
     IPLEGAL 
 
-0.084 
     
  
(0.151) 
     REIO 
  
0.220* 
    
   
(0.100) 
    ADMIN 
  
1.634** 
    
   
(0.595) 
    CAPMKT 
   
0.140 
   
    
(0.078) 
   SOCIO 
   
0.111 
   
    
(0.093) 
   ECON HQ 
    
-0.760** 
  
     
(0.268) 
  IPLEGAL HQ 
    
-0.532 
  
     
(0.336) 
  REIO HQ 
     
-0.294** 
 
      
(0.101) 
 ADMIN HQ
     
0.133 
 
      
(0.677) 
 CAPMKT HQ 
      
-0.235 
       
(0.121) 
SOCIO HQ 
      
-0.365 
       
(0.352) 
PROPERTY VARS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OBS 7,383 6,611 4,638 6,102 5,703 5,703 5,694 
This table displays the results for Cragg regressions for which FI is the dependent variable in the first stage probit and % 
OWNED is the dependent variable in the second stage truncated regression. Detailed variable definitions can be found in 
Appendix A. The marginal effects are reported with standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. Property nation fixed effects 
are included in all specifications.  **, and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6  Logit regressions, firm governance, and property and national controls 
Panel A: First Stage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
INST OWN % -0.246** -0.085** -0.124** -0.127** -0.095* -0.142** -0.155** 
 
(0.048) (0.022) (0.031) (0.029) (0.038) (0.044) (0.035) 
GOV  
 
-0.004** -0.003** -0.003** 
   
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
   GOV HQ 
    
-0.004* -0.003** -0.003* 
     
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
SIZE 
 
0.017** 0.023** 0.020** 0.019* 0.020* 0.018* 
  
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
LEVERAGE 
 
-0.005 0.004 0.005 -0.066 -0.034 -0.047 
  
(0.018) (0.027) (0.029) (0.041) (0.035) (0.040) 
PROFIT 
 
-0.024 -0.119 -0.163 -0.443 -0.326 -0.290 
  
(0.084) (0.157) (0.154) (0.232) (0.209) (0.215) 
USA 
 
-0.162* -0.025 -0.147* -0.009 0.064 -0.038 
  
(0.070) (0.087) (0.073) (0.069) (0.057) (0.054) 
ECON 
 
-0.003** 
     
  
(0.001) 
     IPLEGAL 
 
-0.005** 
     
  
(0.002) 
     REIO 
  
-0.002** 
    
   
(0.000) 
    ADMIN 
  
0.003 
    
   
(0.004) 
    CAPMKT 
   
-0.002** 
   
    
(0.000) 
   SOCIO 
   
-0.006** 
   
    
(0.002) 
   ECON HQ 
    
-0.004** 
  
     
(0.002) 
  IPLEGAL HQ 
    
0.002 
  
     
(0.002) 
  REIO HQ 
     
-0.002** 
 
      
(0.001) 
 ADMIN HQ
     
-0.010** 
 
      
(0.004) 
 CAPMKT HQ 
      
-0.003** 
       
(0.001) 
SOCIO HQ 
      
-0.006* 
       
(0.003) 
PROPERTY VARS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OBS 70,706 59,735 59,871 59,581 60,901 60,797 60,763 
PSEUDO R^2 0.103 0.360 0.315 0.309 0.196 0.232 0.224 
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Panel B: Second Stage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
INST OWN % -16.653* -15.794* -14.854* -15.099* -13.853* -10.972* -11.485* 
 
(7.654) (6.508) (6.469) (6.528) (6.806) (5.487) (5.317) 
GOV  
 
-0.065 0.108 0.144 
   
  
(0.247) (0.220) (0.255) 
   GOV HQ 
    
0.190 0.145 0.179 
     
(0.198) (0.122) (0.171) 
SIZE 
 
-2.462* -1.921 -2.034 -2.751* -3.119* -2.718* 
  
(1.199) (1.185) (1.284) (1.275) (1.295) (1.361) 
LEVERAGE 
 
15.586 19.211* 24.930* 5.603 16.648* 23.336** 
  
(8.746) (8.117) (9.856) (8.605) (8.139) (7.792) 
PROFIT 
 
-80.899 -65.677 -81.850 5.857 -89.293** -61.692 
  
(44.684) (43.900) (48.340) (41.086) (32.709) (33.870) 
USA 
 
8.155 -6.155 -8.289 6.119 8.833 13.024* 
  
(9.439) (10.944) (17.062) (5.290) (5.454) (6.072) 
ECON 
 
0.652** 
     
  
(0.227) 
     IPLEGAL 
 
-0.506* 
     
  
(0.254) 
     REIO 
  
0.143 
    
   
(0.101) 
    ADMIN 
  
1.584** 
    
   
(0.613) 
    CAPMKT 
   
0.133 
   
    
(0.105) 
   SOCIO 
   
-0.261 
   
    
(0.404) 
   ECON HQ 
    
-0.654* 
  
     
(0.262) 
  IPLEGAL HQ 
    
-0.630 
  
     
(0.368) 
  REIO HQ 
     
-0.269** 
 
      
(0.101) 
 ADMIN HQ
     
0.068 
 
      
(0.815) 
 CAPMKT HQ 
      
-0.248 
       
(0.141) 
SOCIO HQ 
      
-0.369 
       
(0.356) 
PROPERTY VARS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
OBS 7,684 4,638 4,770 4,484 5,703 5,647 5,694 
This table displays the results for Cragg regressions for which FI is the dependent variable in the first stage probit and % 
OWNED is the dependent variable in the second stage truncated regression. Detailed variable definitions can be found in 
Appendix A. The marginal effects are reported with standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. Property nation fixed effects 
are included in all specifications.  **, and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Abstract
The German Energy Savings Act (Energieeinsparverordnung) requires sellers on the housing market to provide detailed
information on yearly energy consumption per square meter (energy performance, EP). This paper uses variation of
energy use and heating costs from local fuel prices, climatic conditions, and fuel types to analyze the relationship
between expected energy cost savings from energy efficient building structure and house prices in a data set of listing
prices from all regions of Germany. Furthermore, the role of building age for the value of energy efficiency is consid-
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1. Introduction
In the past years, concerns about growing political dependency on energy exporters and global warning
have led policy makers and researchers to discuss an increase in energy efficiency as an integral part of
the solution. In particular, an increase in the energy efficiency of the housing stock might pay off simply
because the share of total final energy consumption is large. For example, in the year 2013 28.1% of total
final energy consumption in Germany fell to households. Residential heating and warm water accounted for
23.5%. Virtually no energy was used for air conditioning in residential houses.1. Arguably, the potential
for improvement is large, given the technological progress in building construction and materials. Some
commentators argue that there is a lack of investment in retro-fitting (Bardhan et al., 2014; Dubin, 1992).
In theory, the willingness to pay (WTP) for energy efficiency equals the present discounted value of
expected savings from energy expenditures. Existing literature that deals with energy efficiency in build-
ings has focussed on the question whether there is a correlation between house prices or rents and energy
efficiency labels (Brounen and Kok, 2011; Deng et al., 2012; Fuerst et al., 2015; Harjunen and Liski, 2014;
Högberg, 2013; Hyland et al., 2013; Walls et al., 2013, and Chapter 4 of this dissertation). To date, the
channels that are responsible for this correlation have not been studied intensively. It is therefore difficult
to assess whether said correlation stems from a marketing effect, unobserved quality bias, or the present
discounted value of expected energy cost savings. This paper presents some stylised facts that might help
answering this question.
The issue is closely related to the so-called “energy paradox” (Hausman, 1979; Jaffe and Stavins, 1994):
Price differences do not fully reflect expected savings on energy costs for home appliances, automobiles,
and other products. Up to date, there is an open debate about the interpretation of such results. In principle,
inattention to energy costs could be rational if information acquisition is sufficiently costly or potential
savings are small (Sallee, 2013), but it could also be a sign of consumer myopia (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006).
In this respect, housing and auto-mobile markets are interesting objects to study because inattention to energy
consumption can be relatively costly. However, two recent attempts to settle the issue interpret their results
in fundamentally different ways (Allcott and Wozny, 2014; Busse et al., 2013). Without doubt, the answer
depends on expectations about the future that are formed by the marginal buyer. Typically, papers in the
area attempt to estimate reasonable discount rates, lifetime expectancies of goods, and expectations about
future fuel prices in order to calculate a “true” value of expected energy cost savings that can be compared
to the difference in product prices. This procedure involves several deliberate decisions to be made by the
researcher. Altogether, this weakens any conclusions derived from estimation results.2
Since May 2014, the German “Energy Performance of Buildings Directive” (Energieeinsparverordnung,
EnEV) requires that energy performance scores (EPS) have to be provided when residential dwellings are
sold or rented out (§16ff EnEV). The EPS gives very detailed information about energy consumption per
square metre and year. It can be calculated as energy requirement certificate (Energiebedarfsausweis, §18
EnEV) or energy consumption certificate (Energieverbrauchsausweis, §19 EnEV). The energy requirement
certificate is based on the characteristics of the property (insulation, heating technology) and predicts energy
use under standardised climatic conditions. The consumption certificate is calculated as mean past energy
use normalised to the climatic conditions in Würzburg (before May 2014) and Potsdam (since May 2014)3
and may be used only for existing buildings. The two variants are intended to be comparable. Beginning
1Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, see http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/
Energiedaten-und-analysen/Energiedaten/energiegewinnung-energieverbrauch.html
2Table 9 in Busse et al. (2013, p. 245) exemplifies this dilemma. It displays a range of plausible assumptions about discount
rates and demand elasticities. As interpreted by the authors, this table supports their conclusion that myopia are absent. Allcott and
Wozny (2014, p. 782, Fn. 9) use the same table to show that their own results and the results of Busse et al. (2013) support the
presence of myopia.
3See EnEV and http://www.dwd.de/klimafaktoren.
2
in May 2014, sellers and landlords are obliged to provide EPS in advertisements and when the contract is
concluded.
The present paper analyses a large and detailed data set of residential houses offered for sale on German
online real estate market places from April to November 2015. The focus lies on sub-samples and functional
forms that are best suited to address the question whether the correlation between house prices and EPS
stems from expected energy cost savings. This allows to learn about the behaviour of agents in the housing
market in complementary ways that are not subject to the present value dilemma. The value of saving one
kilowatt hour per year and square metre (kWh/[m2 ·a]) depends on the price of heating fuel. Hence, if buyers
care about cost differences, they should take into account (persistent) differences in fuel costs. Furthermore,
it is relatively easy to understand this mechanism. Fuel price differences can be quite large across fuel types,
but are rather small across space. This makes rational inattention less likely in the first case and more likely
in the second. Additionally, local climate influences heating costs, but EPS are climate-standardised. Hence,
the Euro value of a unit change in EPS is higher in cold regions and lower in warm regions. Arguably,
even though all information required (including explanations) is available online and free of charge, this
mechanism is less simple: Local and reference climate have to be compared in a specific way. Finally,
building age influences the net present value of energy cost savings through the building’s remaining lifetime
(i.e. time until retrofitting becomes optimal). This channel is closely related to the investment character of
energy efficiency improvements.
As will be laid out below, exploiting these mechanisms allows to discuss the channels through which EPS
influence prices. This identifies more precisely potential problems that hinder consumers from making more
informed choices. If house sellers and buyers are fully informed, expected energy costs should be capitalised
into house prices independently of the source of these costs. The results suggest that the investment character
of energy efficiency improvements is well understood by agents on the market for residential real estate, but
not all important aspects that influence potential energy costs are taken into account. Typically, these aspects
are less salient to the house buyer/seller.
The next section briefly summarises related literature that deals with the valuation of energy efficiency
in real estate and auto-mobile markets. Section 3 develops the theoretical relationship between the WTP
for energy efficiency and prices or rents and discusses issues of identification. A description of the data is
provided in section 4, followed by an exposition of the empirical strategy (section 5). Empirical results are
presented, interpreted and compared to previous estimates in section 6. The paper closes with a discussion
of implications for future research and policy.
2. Related literature
2.1. Capitalisation of energy performance certificates
The emerging strand of literature on capitalisation of energy efficiency labels into property prices follows
up on an earlier series of papers that started in the 1980s (cf. Dinan and Miranowski, 1989; Halvorsen and
Pollakowski, 1981, inter alia). For instance, Halvorsen and Pollakowski (1981) find significant responses of
house prices with oil-fired heating systems to the 1973 oil price shock. More recently, the impact of Energy
Star R©and Leadership in Energy & Environmental Design eco-labels on prices of office buildings has been
studied by Eichholtz et al. (2010, 2013) and Fuerst and McAllister (2011). For instance, a building needs to
consume 15 to 30% less energy than a comparable building in order to be eligible for an Energy Star R©label.
For that label, all three studies report a premium for eco-labelled office space of 13 to 30% or approx. 1% per
1% reduction in energy costs. Eichholtz et al. (2013) show that the regression errors of labelled buildings are
correlated with actual energy consumption, but it remains unclear what part of the premium can be attributed
to potential energy savings. Furthermore, identification is based on observed housing characteristics.
Eco labels for residential housing markets have been studied in Australia, the US, Singapore, and Europe
(Brounen and Kok, 2011; Cajias and Piazolo, 2013; Deng et al., 2012; Fuerst et al., 2015; Högberg, 2013;
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Hyland et al., 2013; Kahn and Kok, 2014; Soriano, 2008). The type of labels differs across studies, but all
authors find positive relationships. Again, identification is based on observables in ordinary least squares
(OLS) or Heckman selection regressions and on propensity score weighting techniques. Kahn and Kok
(2014) study 4321 eco-rated buildings in California and find a price difference to non-rated homes of approx.
2%. The authors find weak evidence that climate influences the size of the premium. Compared to that, Prius
registrations (i.e. attitudes toward the environment) seem to be much more important. This suggests that part
of the effect can be attributed to “green” marketing. However, only a tiny share of houses (4321 of approx.
1.6 million observations, or 0.3%) is eco-labelled in the sample. This makes it difficult to assess the external
validity of the results.
The European Union’s Directive on the Energy Performance of Building of 2010 obliges member states
to adopt an energy efficiency certification scheme for residential buildings.4 Ireland, England, and The
Netherlands have introduced efficiency bands that typically rate buildings on a scale (e.g., from A to G). The
Irish scheme has been studied by Hyland et al. (2013). The authors rely on OLS regressions and find a price
discount for a regular house (rated E) of about 9.3% when compared to the most efficient buildings (rated A).
Similar results were reported for The Netherlands (Brounen and Kok, 2011), England (Fuerst et al., 2015),
and Wales (?).
In contrast to binary labels, efficiency bands have the considerable advantage that both efficient and
inefficient homes are labelled. This changes the “default” from non-labelled to some intermediary grade
which in itself might influence consumer choices (Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010). Even more information
is provided by the German scheme of EPS that give an assessment of energy use in kilowatt hours per square
metre and year (kWh/[m2 · a]). One goal of this paper is to show that participants in the market for real
estate rely on such fine-grained information in calculating their willingness to pay for a house. In that case,
’notched’ policies, i.e. binary labels, should be dismissed because they can lead to product design distortions
(Newell and Siikamäki, 2013; Sallee, 2013, p. 32). EPS thus provide an opportunity to test more rigorously
to what extent agents in the real estate market value energy efficiency because of reduced heating costs. Thus
far, the German scheme has been studied by Cajias and Piazolo (2013), with a focus on returns of portfolios
of green buildings, and in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. A comparable scheme was introduced in Sweden
(Högberg, 2013).
With the exception of Eichholtz et al. (2013) and Harjunen and Liski (2014), existing studies have in
common that they neglect the role of fuel types and local prices. To some extent, the effect of local climate
has been studied by Kahn and Kok (2014), but in an ad-hoc fashion that does not allow to interpret estimates
in the way intended in this paper. None of the papers has considered the role of building age. Another
issue that is acknowledged but addressed only partly in other papers is identification of relevant coefficients.
The identification problem is especially difficult to solve for at least two reasons: i) Properties observed
before and after retrofits are not useful because it is very likely (but difficult to observe) that interior or
structural quality increase as well. ii) Instrumental variables are problematic because most predictors of
energy efficiency are either unobserved or related to the general quality of the house. The present paper
seeks to exploit exogenous sources of variation that allow to identify coefficients if market participants react
to to these sources.
2.2. Fuel economy on auto-mobile markets and consumer myopia
Comparable identification strategies have been applied in another strand of literature that is closely re-
lated to the present paper. It originates from the seminal contribution of Hausman (1979) and deals with the
valuation of energy efficiency in consumer decisions more generally. Recently, the great potential of more
energy-efficient technology coupled with an extraordinarily low cost-benefit ratio of information provision
4Directive 2010/31/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the energy performance of buildings
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has aroused interest in the issue (Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010; ?). To design optimal policies, it is crucial
to understand whether observed choices are the outcomes of irrational or rational inattention (Allcott and
Mullainathan, 2010; Gerarden et al., 2015; Sallee, 2013, inter alia). In other words: Are consumers myopic
even in high-cost situations such as house or car purchases, or are they not?5
As noted in the introduction, three recent papers that study car sales on the auto-mobile market come up
with conflicting answers: While Busse et al. (2013, p. 221) “find little evidence that consumers ’undervalue’
future gasoline costs when purchasing cars”, Allcott and Wozny (2014, p. 780) report that "auto consumers
appear to be willing to pay only $0.76 in purchase price to reduce discounted future gasoline costs by $1.00."
Besides differences in the identification strategy, these interpretations are based on assumptions about dis-
count rates and expectations of consumers with respect to changes in gasoline prices, lifetime of the car, and
travel distances. In a recent working paper, Sallee et al. (2015) use the relationship between (remaining)
auto-mobile mileage and the present value of fuel cost savings as identification strategy. The authors argue
that their results support the views of Busse et al. (2013). These mechanisms have analoga in the housing
market and are studied in this paper.
3. Theoretical considerations
3.1. Economic theory
This paper relies on the hedonic pricing framework (Rosen, 1974). The per-period WTP for one square
metre of a specific dwelling can be seen as a function of its structural (s) and locational (l) characteristics:
WTP =W (s, l) (1)
Note that s may include energy performance as a characteristic of the house that has a specific value
to the buyer. Previous authors have indeed included EPS in s and have estimated the WTP for EPS as a
characteristic of the house. In that interpretation, EPS is a value-increasing factor that provides utility to
the buyer of the house, e.g. because he or she cares about the environment and enjoys living in an efficient,
modern home. On the other hand, EPS is cost-reducing: Arguably, it is possible to have a warm living room
in any modern house, no matter how inefficient the insulation, but costs vary with energy efficiency. In this
sense, the price of the warm living room is higher for inefficient homes, not its utility.
Assume that the WTP is constant over time. Furthermore, time is discounted by a factor r > 0. Since
the individual cares about total expenditures, the monthly payment she is willing to make for the dwelling
at time t can be decomposed as Rt = R¯t +Ct × (1−LC)×EPS, where Ct are energy prices, LC is a climate
factor that reflects energy requirements due to a difference between local climate and the baseline (LC = 0)
and R¯t is net (implicit) rent. If net rents and the yearly growth rate of energy prices e are constant (R¯t = R¯;
Ct = (1+ e)tC), the willingness to pay given a remaining lifetime of the building T can be expressed as
follows:
T
∑
t=1
W (s, l)
(1+ r)t
=
T
∑
t=1
Rt
(1+ r)t
=
T
∑
t=1
R¯+(1+ e)tC× (1−LC)×EPS
(1+ r)t
. (2)
The expression for prices can be obtained easily from (2) by assuming that buyers care about the net
present value of the dwelling so that P = NPV := ∑Tt=1(1+ r)−t R¯, with reservation price P. From (2), this
5For instance, there is evidence of uninformed consumer choices in low-cost situations if part of the price information is visible
and part of it is hidden (see Chetty et al., 2009, inter alia).
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leads to
P =
T
∑
t=1
W (s, l)
(1+ r)t
−C× (1−LC)×EPS
T
∑
t=1
(
1+ e
1+ r
)t
=
T
∑
t=1
W (s, l)
(1+ r)t
−δ (T )×C× (1−LC)×EPS. (3)
where δ (T ) := ∑Tt=1(1+ e)t(1+ r)−t . Very importantly, (3) suggests that a log-log or semi-log specifi-
cation will not capture price differences that are related to energy cost savings adequately. More precisely,
rents or prices per square metre are linear in expected energy costs C× (1−LC)×EPS. Furthermore, previ-
ous studies have estimated δ (T )×C× (1−LC) rather than δ , which clearly depends on heating types, fuel
costs, local climatic conditions, and the building age distribution in the sample.
It has been argued that a simple regression of P on EPS suffers from endogeneity if structural or locational
attributes of the dwelling are correlated with EPS, but not captured adequately by the available variables. In
particular, interior and structural quality might be correlated with EPS because newer homes tend to have
higher EPS and better building materials; retro-fitting that aims at improving EPS might at the same time
improve quality, an so on. Similar arguments have been made by Brounen and Kok (2011); Deng et al.
(2012); Fuerst et al. (2015); Högberg (2013); ?, inter alia. Observable quality characteristics from different
data sets suggest that the issue should be taken seriously: Energy efficient buildings are younger and of
higher quality (Deng et al., 2012; Eichholtz et al., 2013; Kahn and Kok, 2014).
Because e, r and T are not known, it is difficult to decide to what extent an estimate for δ falls short
of (or exceeds) energy cost savings for the dwelling’s residents. However, under the assumption that prices
of different fuel types are expected to increase with the same rate, δ should be equal across fuel types in a
regression of prices on expected energy costs, as long as building age is taken into account. Similarly, price
variation over space and, because EPS is normalised, variation in local climate can be exploited in order
to test whether participants in the market are aware of the relationship stated in Eq. (3). One obstacle in
this way is the dependence of δ on T . Hence, in order to be able to compare estimates for δ from different
sources of variation it is necessary to balance the building age structure of the sample. The functional form
of δ is interesting in itself (cf. Sallee et al., 2015). According to its definition, δ should be greatest for young
buildings and decrease strictly with building age, up to the point where buildings are retro-fitted.
3.2. Sources of variation
The theoretical argument laid out above explicitly takes into account that energy costs are related to
fuel costs via C. Variations in fuel prices over time and space have been exploited by Allcott and Wozny
(2014) and Busse et al. (2013) in their studies of the auto-mobile market. Note that in the present context
time variation is less useful because it strengthens the reliance of the results on discount rates and remaining
lifetimes, but the immobility of houses allows to use variation over space more effectively. Figure 1a shows
substantial spatial variation of gas prices in Germany in October 2015.6 To the extent that these differences
are permanent, the implied heating cost differences are considerable.
6Local prices were calculated based on contract offers from a website for price comparison, tarife.de. All fixed payments were
excluded and average prices on the ZIP code level were calculated as a weighted average of the five contracts most similar to the
contract most common in the data set. This contract (i) does not pay a bonus upon signing, (ii) triggers an automatic contribution to
“green” projects by the provider (“climate rate” [Klimatarif]), (iii) guarantees that prices are stable for at least 12 months, (iv) has
a duration of 12 months, and (v) is not offered by a default provider. The results reported in the paper are robust to changing the
calculation of local gas prices to the price of the default provider’s default contract in each ZIP code, but this information is only
available for a sub-set of approx. 4000 ZIP codes.
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Table 1: Heating costs and local deviations
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
Gas: global 0.00 6.24 9.49 10.09 13.26 27.85
Gas: local prices -5.25 -0.80 -0.14 -0.04 0.59 8.02
Gas: local climate -4.16 -0.73 -0.28 -0.36 0.05 5.58
Variation in climatic conditions (LC, see Figure 1b) over space is useful in the present context because
EPS are climate-standardised. Obviously, energy use depends on local climatic conditions via EPS.7 In
terms of the model, LC is one factor that influences l in Eq. (1) (cf. Potepan, 1996, inter alia). Similarly, the
normalised energy performance of a building could be one of the determinants of s, the structural quality of
the building. In other words, a cross-sectional comparison of EPS across buildings might capture differences
in building design, but EPS is related only indirectly to energy consumption. If other quality characteristics
correlated with EPS are not controlled for adequately, this term will also reflect general building quality.
Table 1 summarises the distributions of projected yearly energy costs per square metre for gas-heated
houses in the sample (excluding fixed payments). Local gas prices were calculated from a large data set of
contracts for gas delivery offered via tarife.de in 2015Q4. Each contract is specific to a ZIP code area (see
also Figure 1 and Footnote 6).
In gas-heated houses, residents have to spend 9.49 Euro/[m2 · a] for heating at the median (EPS =167
kWh/[m2 · a]). In houses at the first and fourth quartiles of the EPS distribution (109 kWh/[m2 · a] and 233
kWh/[m2 · a], respectively), energy costs differ substantially (6.24 Euro/[m2 · a] and 13.26 Euro/[m2 · a]).
Looking at variation over space (local prices), the interquartile range is 1.39 Euro/[m2 ·a]. If differences in
climate are taken into account, the interquartile range of energy costs for gas-heated houses is half as large
(0.78 Euro/[m2 ·a]). In a typical house of 156 m2, this still implies yearly cost differences across ZIP codes
of 216.8 and 121.7 Euro per year.
Four main fuel types are used in Germany8 gas (49.3%, including liquid gas and bio-gas), light heating
oil (26.8%), district heating (13.5%), and electricity (2.9%). There are other forms such as wood pellet
combustion, solar heating, geothermal heating and heat pumps, but these are not discussed further in the
paper. Table 7 gives an overview of heating types in the full sample. The relatively large shares of "green"
heating systems reflect the over-representation of newer buildings in real estate sales offers. Furthermore,
7The German Weather Service provides climate factors (CF) for the 8,208 postal delivery zones of Germany, see http://www.
dwd.de/klimafaktoren. Climate factors are defined as
CFi =
Gr
Gi
with Gi the number of heating degree days at location i and Gr the number of heating degree days at the reference location in the
test reference years. The climate factors are designed to normalise EPS that were calculated from past energy use. EPS calculated
from engineering projections are also normalised and thus do not reflect differences in climate over time or space. Since May 1,
2014, the reference location is Potsdam.
Define
LCi = 1− 1CFi ,
i.e. average energy use at location i is equal to (1−LC)×EPS. LC can be interpreted as the deviation from base climate where
positive values indicate that the location has a milder climate during the winter.
8Figures reported by the German Association of Energy and Water Industries (BDEW), “Beheizungsstruktur des Wohnungsbe-
standes in Deutschland 2014”
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district-heated houses seem to be under-represented in the sample.
Denote the costs per kWh of these four fuel types by Cg, Co, Ce, and Cd . Taking gas as the baseline,
Figure 2 plots the relative costs per kWh of each of these four fuel types. Whereas the price of light heating
oil increased relative to the price of natural gas, the cost ratios of electricity and district heating to natural
gas have been quite stable over the past 24 years. If consumers rely on this type of information to form
their beliefs about the cost relationship between the four fuel types, this justifies imposing the restrictions
Ce = 3.88×Cg and Cd = 1.22×Cg, where 3.88 and 1.22 are the means of the cost-ratios over the 24-year
period. These ratios should be reflected in the valuation of EPS if consumers expect them to be stable in the
future.
Figure 2: Costs of different fuel types, relative to natural gas
Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy; own calculations
3.3. Coherent behaviour
These numbers show that potential cost differences are large enough so that potential buyers should
consider them in their decisions. The analysis of different sources of variation allows to take a different
approach than previous papers because it is possible to test the coherence of individual behaviour with respect
to the valuation of energy efficiency. Previous authors have attempted to directly answer the question whether
present values of energy cost differences match price differences on the market. This presupposes that
individuals calculate energy cost differences correctly even if cost differences stem from different sources
(such as climate versus local prices). Eq. (3) shows that – if energy costs are calculated correctly and the
age structure is accounted for – regression estimates of the “present value coefficient” δ (T ) should be equal
for different sources of variation. This can be seen as a test of the preconditions for correct present value
calculations. If the data allow to reject the Null of equal coefficients, this allows to reject the hypothesis that
home sellers take into account cost differences across space or heating types.
Note that this approach has at least three advantages over the “standard” approach: (i) It is not neces-
sary to estimate or guess discount rates and remaining lifetimes. (ii) It is possible to test statistically the
hypothesis of interest. This has not been done by any of the papers named in Section 2. Additionally, the
Null corresponds to conventional economic theory. A departure from that theory should be justified on the
basis of a strong result, not by acceptance of the Null. (iii) More generally, the assumptions made here differ
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from those in other papers; this allow to take a second look at the problem. The most important underlying
assumption is stability over time of the geographical pattern of prices and local climate and of the price
relationship between heating types.
The comparison of different sources of variation brings in another aspect that is highly relevant for the
design of EPS certificates: Including climatic conditions into the present value calculation is relatively dif-
ficult because the relationship between climate and heating costs is highly technical. Similarly, information
on local fuel prices is not necessarily salient to the house buyer because the local default provider will send
a default contract to the house owner automatically. In contrast to local climatic variation the relationship
between energy costs and prices is linear in the EPS. Finally, if market participants consider the impact of
building age on the value of EPS, it is very likely that they understand the investment character of energy
efficiency improvements. This can be the case even if they do not take into account more subtle variation
(local fuel prices or climate) because it is relatively easy to understand that heating cost savings will not
materialise instantaneously.
4. Data
The data analysed in this study come from all regions of Germany. National data sets have been stud-
ied by Brounen and Kok (2011, The Netherlands), Hyland et al. (2013, Ireland), and Fuerst et al. (2015,
England).
This study uses listing prices of houses offered for sale on three large online real estate websites, Immo-
net.de, ImmobilienScout24.de, and Immowelt.de. The data were collected from April to November 2015.
Due to the approach taken in this paper, it is important to use a short time window in order to rule out
changes in price expectations within the sample period. Naturally, this reduces the number of observations,
but the sample is still large enough to study separately sub-groups such as gas- and electricity-heated houses.
Listing price data have been used to study EPS certificates before (Hyland et al., 2013), with results
comparable to other studies that rely on similar estimation methods and transaction prices (Fuerst et al.,
2015). While transaction data are preferable, listing prices seem to be a very good substitute (Dinkel and
Kurzrock, 2012; Henger and Voigtländer, 2014; Knight, 2002; Knight et al., 1994; Malpezzi, 2003; Merlo
and Ortalo-Magné, 2004; Semeraro and Fregonara, 2013). One result that emerges from this literature is that
mis-pricing houses systematically is quite costly for house sellers because it increases time on the market
and decreases the final price (Knight, 2002; Knight et al., 1994; Merlo and Ortalo-Magné, 2004).
Two papers report hedonic regressions of matched listing and transaction data. In Knight et al. (1994),
only one of four coefficients of housing characteristics is significantly different across regressions, even
though t-values are very large (6.68 to 99.2). Coefficients in Semeraro and Fregonara (2013) hardly differ
across regressions.9 Closely related, three papers regress the relative difference between listing and trans-
action prices on covariates, but find no to marginal explanatory power of housing characteristics (Dinkel
and Kurzrock, 2012; Henger and Voigtländer, 2014; Semeraro and Fregonara, 2013). Taken as a whole,
this suggests that potential sellers – on average – do not systematically mis-price housing characteristics. If
the reader is willing to accept this reasoning, results can be interpreted as being close to market outcomes.
Otherwise, the regressions are still informative about seller behaviour.
The data contain information on offered prices, the ZIP code, EPS and type (projection or past use),
and a long list of quality and structural attributes. The year of construction (YC) variable was used to form
categories.10 Additionally, a dummy variable was constructed that indicates whether retro-fitting had taken
9It is not possible to decide whether there are statistically significant differences because the authors only report significance
levels and also do not indicate the type of covariance matrix that was used in their calculation.
10The youngest category (year of construction 2011 or later) was used as base category. For instance, category YC_1945 includes
years of construction 1919 to 1945.
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place within the last ten years (RETROFIT_LAST10).
Other attributes are LOT_SIZE, FLOOR_SIZE, number of ROOMS and TYPE of house (SEMIDE-
TACHED, TOWNHOUSE_M (middle), TOWNHOUSE_E (end), OTHER, reference DETACHED) as well
as HEATING technology (CENTRAL, SELF_CONT, FLOOR, reference OTHER or NA). Quality indica-
tors are CONDITION (GOOD, NEW, POOR, reference REGULAR or NA), and QUALITY (HIGH, MED,
SIMPLE, reference REGULAR or NA). Additional dummy variables are presence of a BASEMENT, a
FITTED_KITCHEN, a TERRACE, a FIREPLACE, PARQUET_FLOORING, or a SAUNA. BROKERAGE
indicates the rate (% of total sales price) the buyer has to pay to a real estate agent. Information on air
conditioning is available as well, but the share of houses with air conditioning is negligible.
The data set was matched with with LC and local gas prices (GAS_PRICE), one of 409 districts (Kreise
und kreisfreie Städte, and to one of 11,091 counties (Gemeinden) via the ZIP code information. The latter
matching was ambiguous: In rural areas, some ZIP codes were mapped to to several municipalities. In these
cases, one municipality was chosen randomly. Three variables on the level of municipalities were added: The
share of unemployed in the year 2014 among people younger than 25 years of age (UNEMP_YOUTH_2014),
living space completed between 2008 and 2013 per inhabitant (LIVING_SP_COMPL_2008_2013_INH),
and population density in the year 2013 (POP_DENSITY_2013).
Summary statistics for different sub-samples are reported in Tables 2 and 3. The first column, labelled gas
(a), refers to the sub-sample of gas-heated houses that are available to use (not rented out), are not in a poor
condition, have a projection type EPS and do not use a combination of fuel types. Buildings that have a poor
condition were excluded from the analysis because this might reduce the value of energy efficiency greatly in
case retrofitting is necessary in the near future. The other restrictions were imposed in order to homogenise
the sample. Columns (2) to (4) refer to sub-samples of gas-, electricity-, and district heated houses and are
restricted to ZIP codes with observations from at least two out of the three sub-samples. Furthermore, the
samples were restricted to observations with EPS lower than 250, the threshold for efficiency band H (the
lowest category). Whereas the two sub-samples for gas-heated houses are very similar (sub-sample (b) being
part of sub-sample (a)), there are some substantial differences across the three groups: On average, district-
heated houses in the sample are more expensive, more energy efficient, younger, and of slightly higher
quality. Additionally, they are built on smaller lots – most likely because district heating is available only in
larger agglomerations whereas electricity and gas heating is available in most parts of Germany. Gas- and
electricity-heated houses seem to be more comparable, even though the latter are somewhat less expensive
and older.
Sample sizes also differ considerably: Given the restrictions, 21,022 (5,532) houses are gas-heated,
1,846 are electricity-heated, and 971 are connected to district-heating.
5. Empirical strategy
As noted above, identification of the main coefficient is not straightforward because unobserved quality
characteristics of the houses might correlate with energy efficiency. This paper therefore focuses on fuel
price and climate variation across space and across heating types which–in interaction with EPS–can be
considered exogenous to house prices.
The fundamental dilemma of the strategy is this: If market participants take into account this type of
variation, it is useful for the identification of coefficients and allows to decide whether quality bias is present
in the data. However, said if depends on the answer to the core question this paper tries to address. In a world
where market participants do not care about e.g. geographical variation in prices, the strategy is not able to
bring up an estimate for quality bias. Nevertheless, a comparison of the estimates from different sources of
variation will help understand how market participants value energy efficiency.
Previous authors have identified another problem that is related to the availability of information on EPS.
In the sample, 57.4% of all observations include this type of information, even though it is mandated by law
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Table 2: Summary statistics of housing characteristics
Sample:
gas (a) gas (b) electricity district
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PRICE_SQM 1946.096 2124.133 1782.535 2360.222
(1127.814) (1133.379) (1165.825) (1068.983)
EPS 177.396 143.006 137.376 117.240
(88.399) (57.351) (71.394) (62.625)
TYPE_SEMIDETACHED 0.194 0.211 0.192 0.185
(0.396) (0.408) (0.394) (0.389)
TYPE_TOWNHOUSE_M 0.097 0.110 0.070 0.275
(0.297) (0.313) (0.256) (0.447)
TYPE_TOWNHOUSE_E 0.049 0.056 0.030 0.140
(0.217) (0.229) (0.170) (0.347)
TYPE_OTHER 0.085 0.078 0.102 0.073
(0.279) (0.269) (0.303) (0.260)
YC_1918 0.112 0.076 0.127 0.018
(0.315) (0.265) (0.333) (0.131)
YC_1945 0.123 0.098 0.107 0.033
(0.329) (0.297) (0.310) (0.179)
YC_1960 0.142 0.111 0.113 0.128
(0.349) (0.314) (0.317) (0.334)
YC_1970 0.127 0.121 0.111 0.124
(0.333) (0.326) (0.314) (0.329)
YC_1980 0.122 0.141 0.192 0.107
(0.327) (0.348) (0.394) (0.309)
YC_1990 0.059 0.078 0.084 0.023
(0.236) (0.268) (0.277) (0.149)
YC_2000 0.110 0.135 0.040 0.087
(0.313) (0.341) (0.195) (0.281)
YC_2010 0.104 0.113 0.078 0.183
(0.305) (0.316) (0.268) (0.387)
RETROFIT_LAST10 0.136 0.163 0.088 0.132
(0.343) (0.369) (0.284) (0.338)
LOT_SIZE 756.427 696.474 783.698 460.014
(790.585) (701.571) (887.714) (484.647)
SIZE_SQM 156.869 160.738 152.165 147.013
(60.930) (62.910) (56.622) (53.071)
ROOMS 5.607 5.622 5.633 5.118
(1.881) (1.892) (1.869) (1.503)
SELF_CONT_HEATING 0.020 0.014 0.085 0.001
(0.141) (0.116) (0.279) (0.032)
CENTRAL_HEATING 0.664 0.646 0.308 0.615
(0.472) (0.478) (0.462) (0.487)
FLOOR_HEATING 0.077 0.101 0.111 0.059
(0.267) (0.302) (0.314) (0.235)
QUAL_HIGH 0.014 0.019 0.008 0.023
(0.116) (0.136) (0.087) (0.149)
QUAL_MED 0.123 0.156 0.068 0.159
(0.328) (0.363) (0.252) (0.365)
QUAL_SIMPLE 0.009 0.006 0.008 0.002
(0.094) (0.075) (0.087) (0.045)
CONDITION_GOOD 0.230 0.255 0.155 0.273
(0.421) (0.436) (0.362) (0.446)
CONDITION_NEW 0.041 0.049 0.029 0.100
(0.198) (0.216) (0.167) (0.300)
SECOND_BATHROOM 0.499 0.567 0.349 0.635
(0.500) (0.496) (0.477) (0.482)
BASEMENT 0.495 0.507 0.401 0.469
(0.500) (0.500) (0.490) (0.499)
FITTED_KITCHEN 0.180 0.195 0.135 0.203
(0.384) (0.396) (0.342) (0.402)
SAUNA 0.048 0.066 0.042 0.046
(0.214) (0.249) (0.200) (0.210)
PARQUET_FLOORING 0.030 0.030 0.021 0.033
(0.170) (0.171) (0.144) (0.179)
FIREPLACE 0.113 0.127 0.098 0.080
(0.316) (0.332) (0.297) (0.272)
BROKERAGE 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.026
(0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.024)
N 21022 5532 1846 971
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 3: Summary statistics of locality variables
Sample:
gas (a) gas (b) electricity district
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GAS_PRICE 5.678 5.671 5.717 5.930
(0.614) (0.604) (0.634) (0.644)
LC -0.035 -0.043 -0.015 -0.036
(0.066) (0.067) (0.082) (0.070)
POP_DENSITY_2013 775.279 824.798 533.713 1189.911
(849.141) (779.996) (674.992) (844.844)
UNEMP_YOUTH_2014 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
LIVING_SP_COMPL_2008_2013_INH 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 21022 5532 1846 971
Standard deviations in parentheses.
to display EPS in online real estate offers. Part of the defiers might have included an EPS certificate in their
offers, but without using the forms provided by the websites–in these cases, the certificate does not appear
in the data. Others chose to hide it.
It has been argued that dwellings offered without information on energy efficiency are systematically
different from other dwellings. These objects might have higher EPS and lower quality than comparable
buildings. For example, an estate agent could suppress EPS information if it negatively affects the selling
price. Drawing inferences from results based on the (fully) observed part of the sample to the unobserved
part would not be possible if self-selection is driven by unobserved characteristics that also influence the
selling price (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, pp. 547–553). For that reason, use of a Heckman selection model
is advocated (cf. Brounen and Kok, 2011; Hyland et al., 2013, and Chapter 4 of this dissertation). Hyland
et al. (2013) and the paper in Chapter 4 exploit the regime change from voluntary to obligatory provision of
EPS information, but only the latter study finds evidence of selection bias. Brounen and Kok (2011) develop
a news indicator that measures the sentiment towards “energy label" and related terms in newspaper articles
as an exogenous predictor for the selection process. They find a significantly negative coefficient for the
inverse Mills ratio. However, the shares of observations with EPS information provided was much smaller
in these papers (18% in Brounen and Kok (2011), 5% in Hyland et al. (2013), and 18% in Chapter 4).
This paper does not estimate a selection model for the following reason: If EPS information influences
prices, it will be more likely that non-reporters are forced to re-negotiate the price once EPS information is
presented. The strategy would thus lead to longer time on the market and the need for price re-negotiation
(Knight, 2002) because potential buyers will have a chance to check the EPS certificate even if it is not
presented in the offer. This suggests that there are other (more banal) reasons why some offers do not contain
EPS information. For example, it can be hidden in the text below the offer that describes the property; some
real estate agents might believe that EPS information is not important to the seller. Finally, data entries that
do not contain EPS information might have other defects such as wrong or missing information. It would
then bring in new problems if a selection model was built around these observations. In any case the results
will be representative for the relatively high share of 57.4%.
6. Estimation results
Eq. (3) was estimated by OLS. The functional form of W has to be selected based on prior knowledge
and intuition. More precisely, for an observation i from ZIP code z(i), district d(i) and heating type h(i),
Pi = Xiβ + γ1Ch(i),z(i)+ γ2LCz(i)+δ1Ch(i)×EPSi+δ2Ch(i),z(i)×EPSi+δ3LCz(i)×EPSi. (4)
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Table 4: Local gas price regressions
Dependent Variable:
PRICE_SQM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GAS_PRICE 10.095 32.620 13.864
(33.480) (42.601) (74.040)
EPS_GAS_P -0.235*** -0.239*** -0.239*** -0.262***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.078)
EPS_GAS_LOCAL_P -0.329** -0.386* -0.016 -0.040
(0.122) (0.155) (0.163) (0.345)
EPS_GAS_P:POP_DENSITY_2013 0.064** 0.080** 0.070* 0.133
(0.020) (0.023) (0.027) (0.068)
LAND_PRICE 0.289**
(0.098)
LAND_PRICE_NA 13.489
(117.869)
District-FE yes yes no -
ZIP code-FE no no yes -
N 21022 15853 11420 2516
adj. R2 0.687 0.684 0.812 0.289
residual SE 630.9 636.6 463.5 740.7
p-value EPS_GAS_P = EPS_GAS_LOCAL_P 0.438 0.173 0.084 0.545
Detailed results for models (1) and (4) can be found in Table 8 in the Appendix; the same set of covariates was used for all models. Model (4) regresses price
differences of matched observations on differences in covariates. ZIP-code cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; p-values: ***: < .001, **: < .01, *:
< .05.
Pi is the square metre price of house i, EPSi is its energy performance score, and Xi is a vector of
covariates (housing and locality characteristics). Ch(i) is mean fuel price for heating type h(i), and Cz(i),h(i) is
the deviation in ZIP code z(i) from that mean. Similarly, LCz(i) captures deviation of local climate from the
reference climate.
The coefficients of main interest are δ1, δ2, and δ3. δ1 measures the reaction of the price per square metre
to a change in EPS due to an improvement of the house or a change of heating type (holding constant LC
and local heating prices) while δ2 and δ3 capture the reaction to a change in EPS due to a change of location
of the house (holding constant EPS). Subsequent sections will concentrate on variation in Ch(i),z(i) (Section
6.1), in LCz(i) (Section 6.2), and in Ch(i) (Section 6.3). Finally, Section 6.4 focusses on variation in remaining
lifetimes of buildings. To that end, Eq. (4) will be enhanced to allow δ to vary across building age groups,
holding constant heating type. In theory, δ decreases with building age because the present value of energy
efficiency depends on the remaining lifetime T of the building (see Eq. 3).
6.1. Local variation in gas prices
Results for the sub-sample of gas-heated houses with a projected EPS are reported in Table 4. Covariates
were included but are not displayed here.11 All models in this section focus on the effects of local gas prices
and do not include main or interaction terms for local climate.
In column (1), Eq. 4 was estimated for the whole sub-sample of 21022 observations. The adjusted
R2 is fairly high, given that a linear model was estimated where fits are usually worse than for log-log
or log-linear functional forms (Goodman, 1978). The coefficients of main interest are EPS_GAS_P and
EPS_GAS_LOCAL_P (δ1 and δ2 in Eq. 4). Both are highly significant and have the expected sign. Further-
more, they are of the same magnitude, with a p-value of 0.438 for the Null of equal coefficients. A one Euro
increase in heating costs due to a change in the average price of gas translates into a decrease of the listing
price of 23.5 Euro (EPS_GAS_P) while the same change in heating costs due to a local price change reduces
11Table 8 displays results including all covariates except district-FE for models (1) and (4) of Table 4.
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Figure 3: Kernel density estimates for Year of Construction and EPS
(a) Year of Construction (b) Energy Performance
listing prices by 32.9 Euro. As an additional control, the model includes an interaction term of EPS_GAS_P
and population density in the year 2013.12 The control was added because the recent construction boom in
Germany was more pronounced in urban areas and might have led to a greater supply of energy efficient
homes in these areas. The results seem to support this argument: A one standard deviation change in popu-
lation density reduces the effect of a one Euro increase in heating costs on prices by 6.4 Euro. Finally, local
gas prices do not seem to have an effect on house prices.
Figures 3a and 3b show kernel density estimates for the year of construction and EPS variables in the
sub-sample analysed in Table 4. While most houses in the sample were constructed after the Second World
War, a substantial share of buildings are older. Secondly, there are two pronounced peaks, around 1960 and
2000. Figure 3b compares the distributions of EPS for the the whole sample and for three vintage groups
separately. Clearly, younger buildings have much higher energy efficiency, and the distribution shifts to
the right from the group of middle- to the group of old-age buildings. This points to a source of bias that
should be accounted for in the analysis: If the vintage structure of buildings across space changes, so will
the distribution of EPS and the value of energy efficiency (via T ). For that reason, the model in column
(2) of Table 4 uses a balanced sample, where balancing was done on the year of construction dummies and
local gas prices.13 The results are robust to that change, with a slight upward shift of the coefficient of
12Population density was re-scaled to have mean zero and a unit standard deviation so that the other EPS coefficients are easier
to interpret.
13More precisely, the range of possible values for local gas prices (GAS_PRICE) was divided into ten bins of equal width,
whereby observations from the 1%- and 99%-quantiles of the GAS_PRICE variable were dropped to avoid sparse fields. Then, one
bin was chosen as the reference. Within each bin, the distribution of the year of construction dummies of the reference bin was
imposed by randomly dropping observations in year of construction categories with too many observations, up to the point where
the year of construction distribution within that bin was the same as the year of construction distribution of the reference bin. This
was repeated for all ten bins. To obtain valid standard errors, the procedure was repeated 250 times. Within each repetition, the
model was estimated by OLS and ZIP-code clustered standard errors were computed. These standard errors were used to make 50
draws from a normal distribution centred at the coefficient estimate with standard deviation equal to the estimated standard errors.
The reported coefficients and standard errors are the empirical means and standard deviations of these 250×50= 12,500 simulated
estimates.
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EPS_GAS_LOCAL_P.
Model (3) repeats this exercise, but with ZIP code FE instead. This further reduces the number of obser-
vations because ZIP codes with less than six observations were dropped. Although it would be possible to
keep all ZIP codes with more than one observation, the higher threshold makes it less likely that in the sim-
ulation procedure all observations from a single ZIP code are dropped. On the upside, the R2 jumps to a re-
markably high value of 0.812. While the main effect remains stable, the coefficient of EPS_GAS_LOCAL_P
is now much smaller and insignificant. However, the relatively large standard error leads to acceptance of the
Null of equal coefficients, just as in models (1) and (2), but at a much smaller p-value (0.084). Unfortunately,
it is impossible to tell whether the change in the coefficient stems from better control of local prices or the
difference in the sample.
As a second potential solution to the problem of building age distribution, model (4) uses a matching
approach. One reason behind the missing significance of EPS_GAS_LOCAL_P in model (3) might be that
in many cases local gas price differences are very small and/or not stable over time. For that reason, the
sample was restricted to ZIP codes that are adjacent to a ZIP code with gas prices lower by at least one
Eurocent per kWh. Each observation from a high-price ZIP code was then matched to an observation from
the adjacent low-price ZIP code on the year of construction variable (inexact matching, R package Matching,
see ?). For each match, the difference in listing prices was regressed on the differences of all covariates. In
order to capture local land price differences, land prices were proxied by ZIP-code-FE estimates from a
regression similar to model (3) that was run on a sample of observations with heating types other than gas
heating (LAND_PRICE and dummy LAND_PRICE_NA if missing). The procedure ensures that building
age structure is independent of gas prices, so that δ1(T ) and δ2(T ) are indeed estimated for the same T . The
results are similar to model (3), although standard errors are much larger, cf. also Table 8 in Appendix A.
This suggests that local gas price differences are neglected by sellers of gas-heated residential real estate.
6.2. Variation in gas prices and climate
In a second step, the focus lies on local variation in climate. The approach described in Fn. 13 was
applied, but with local climate (LC) instead of local gas prices. Results are displayed in Table 5.
Table 5: Climate and local gas price regressions
Dependent Variable:
PRICE_SQM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LC -1426.438* -1381.087* -1091.623
(565.823) (579.421) (1067.778)
EPS_GAS_P -0.239*** -0.222*** -0.243*** -0.453***
(0.025) (0.029) (0.026) (0.078)
EPS_GAS_LC_P -0.578 -0.053 -0.461 -1.668
(0.290) (0.375) (0.317) (1.140)
EPS_GAS_P:POP_DENSITY_2013 0.056* 0.070* 0.074** -0.114
(0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.085)
GAS_PRICE -14.331
(47.403)
EPS_GAS_LOCAL_P -0.223
(0.179)
District-FE yes no yes yes
ZIP code-FE no yes no no
N 15607 11327 14856 5150
adj. R2 0.682 0.812 0.683 0.668
standard error 621.2 458.2 613.0 641.2
p-value EPS_GAS_P = EPS_GAS_LC_P 0.120 0.327 0.247 0.140
p-value EPS_GAS_P = EPS_GAS_LOCAL_P - - 0.459 -
ZIP-code cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; see the description in the text. The set of control variables that is displayed in Table 8 in the appendix
are included; full results available upon request; p-values: ***: < .001, **: < .01, *: < .05.
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Model (1) in Table 5 reproduces model (2) from Table 4. The coefficient on the interaction of average
heating costs with local deviations from the reference climate (EPS_GAS_LOCAL_P) is more than twice
as large in magnitude as the main effect, but its standard error error is much higher. It is only marginally
significant and the Null of equal coefficients is not rejected (p-value 0.12). Furthermore, a cooler local
climate significantly decreases listing prices (higher LC). Similarly to model (3) from Table 4, the use of
ZIP code FE in model (2) of Table 5 shrinks the coefficient of the climate interaction effect. It is now much
smaller and insignificant. However, the number of observations is reduced substantially. It is thus possible
that the effect observed in model (1) is due to insufficient control of local land prices.
In order to compare more directly the effects of local climate and gas prices, both interaction terms
were included in model (3). The balancing procedure thus has to take into account both dimensions (LC
and GAS_PRICE). For that reason, a more coarse partitioning of 4× 4 bins was used, leading to a total
of 16 bins within which the building age distribution had to be made equal to the reference bin’s building
age distribution. Compared to model (1), this reduces the number of observations slightly, from 15,607 to
14,856. Since there is a moderate bivariate correlation between LC and GAS_PRICE of 0.419, identifying
variation is lower and standard errors on both coefficients increase. Nevertheless, both coefficients remain
relatively stable in terms of magnitude.
Finally, model (4) re-estimates model (1), but for the sub-sample of buildings constructed in the years
1991 or later. The idea behind this is that year of construction is only an imperfect predictor of remaining
lifetime. Even though there is one variable that indicates the year of the last retro-fitting or reconstruc-
tion, this information is missing for many of the older buildings in the sample. As a consequence, there
is considerable unobserved variation of building condition for (very) old buildings. This is reflected in the
much wider range of EPS for older buildings, see Figure 3b. Conversely, it is unlikely that buildings con-
structed within the last 25 years had been retro-fitted already. The technical lifetime of an energy efficiency
investment in Germany is 30 to 55 years, depending on the building part (Hoier and Erhorn, 2013, p. 32). In-
stead of the year of construction dummies from model (1) in Table 8, five dummies (five-year periods) were
included as controls instead and these dummies were used in the balancing procedure of the conditional
year-of-construction distribution. As a result, the coefficient of EPS_GAS_P almost doubles in size, and a
quick comparison with the other models shows that this difference is significant at least on the 5%-level.
The coefficient of EPS_GAS_LOCAL_P also increases substantially, but remains insignificant. Taken as a
whole, this result suggests that EPS information is more valuable in newer buildings, most likely because of
the longer investment horizon – the time until refurbishments become necessary and EPS can be altered. A
second reason might be that there is a higher likelihood that older houses with very high EPS are improved
if energy prices increase, which also reduces the expected investment horizon.
6.3. Fuel types
Variation in heating costs that was exploited in sections 6.1 and 6.2 is relatively subtle. For an average
house in the sample, yearly cost savings amount to approximately 100 to 200 Euro if these differences are
considered (interquartile ranges). More pronounced differences exist across different fuel types. Compared
to gas heating (gas combustion on-site), district heating (waste heat delivered through a local network) was
22% more expensive on average in the last 24 years. Electricity heating is almost four times as expensive as
gas heating (see Figure 2).
In this section, a sub-sample of gas-, district-, and electricity-heated houses is analysed. The sample
was restricted to ZIP codes for which there were observations of at least two of the three heating types. In
total, there are 11,367 observations (gas: 8,050, electricity: 2,050, district: 1,067). In order to make the sub-
groups more comparable in terms of EPS, the sample was restricted further to observations with EPS lower
than 250, reducing sample size to 8,349 (gas: 5,532, electricity: 1,846, district: 971). 250 is the threshold
for grade H efficiency, see Figure 4 in Appendix B. The rationale behind this restriction is as follows: On
a per-unit basis, the value of energy efficiency in a building with a very high EPS should be lower because
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Table 6: Fuel type regressions
Dependent Variable:
PRICE_SQM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FUEL_GAS_EPS -1.855*** -1.747** -2.437*
(0.337) (0.600) (0.966)
FUEL_ELECTRIC_EPS -1.853*** -2.684** -2.717
(0.428) (0.888) (1.904)
FUEL_DISTRICT_EPS -0.610 -0.665 -2.393
(0.902) (0.842) (1.917)
FUEL_ELECTRIC -55.578 649.888 972.201
(622.637) (1058.074) (1919.083)
FUEL_DISTRICT 206.273 608.017 1954.334
(817.809) (944.938) (1269.961)
EPS_GAS_P:YC_1992_1999 -0.196
(0.134)
EPS_GAS_P:YC_2000_2007 -0.404**
(0.135)
EPS_GAS_P:YC_2008_2015 -0.479*
(0.195)
N 8349 4094 2188 4112
adj. R2 0.705 0.709 0.702 0.676
residual SE 623.0 629.0 630.8 659.6
p-value Z = 0 0.192 0.1252 0.48544 -
ZIP-code cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; see the description in the text. The set of control variables that is displayed in Table
8 in the appendix are included; full results are available upon request. All models include district fixed effects. p-values: ***: < .001, **:
< .01, *: < .05.
the gains of improving energy efficiency of that building are relatively high, reducing average fixed costs
of an investment in energy efficiency. Consequently, the time remaining until the next investment in energy
efficiency should be much lower than for low-EPS buildings of the same vintage.
Summary statistics can be found in columns (2) to (4) of Tables 2 and 3. There are some pronounced dif-
ferences between the types: Prices per square metre are highest for district-heated and lowest for electricity-
heated homes. EPS and the age structure also differ substantially, as well as quality indicators. For that
reason, a flexible functional form was chosen where coefficients of all housing characteristics were esti-
mated separately for each fuel type.
Results for the most important variables are displayed in columns (1) to (3) of Table 6. Model (1) includes
the same set of controls as model (1) of Table 8. The main effects for having district or electricity heating
installed (instead of gas) are insignificant. Most likely, this is due to the large number of controls included
that are interacted with these two dummies.14 Instead of focussing on expected heating costs, the regression
includes EPS separately for the three fuel types. The estimated coefficients are the sample analogues of
δ (T )×C in Eq. (3). While the coefficients for EPS are highly significant for gas and electricity-heated
houses, this does not hold for district-heating. It is much smaller in magnitude and insignificant. When
comparing the EPS coefficient of gas-heated houses divided by the average gas price (−1.855/5.69= 0.326)
to estimates for the coefficient of EPS_GAS_P in the full sample (e.g. Table 4, −0.235), it turns out that the
former is considerably larger in absolute value, which is in line with expectations. This difference disappears
when adding observations with EPS greater than 250 to the sample (not displayed here).
As described in Section 3.1, long-run relationships between fuel costs suggest that (Ce−Cg)δ = 2.88Cgδ
and (Cd −Cg)δ = 0.22Cgδ . Dividing the first by the second term implies that the ratio of these estimated
differences equals 2.88/0.22≈ 13.1 which is a linear restriction that can be tested in a standard Wald test. In
contrast to testing ratios of coefficients directly, this has the advantage that (quality) biases of the estimated
14There are several substantial differences in the valuation of housing characteristics across fuel types. These are not discussed
here for brevity.
18
EPS coefficients cancel out if the relationship between the omitted variables and EPS are the same across
heating types.15 In the table, the test statistic is denoted by Z, and the Null of Z = 0 is tested against the
alternative of Z 6= 0. The p-value of 0.192 shows that it is quite difficult to rule out coherent valuation of
EPS in a statistically sound way, even although the pattern of EPS coefficients does not seem to match the
pattern of relative fuel prices.
Pronounced difference in the building age distributions of the three types might be responsible for this
result. For that reason, the same procedure as described in Fn. 13 was applied. The distribution of the
year-of-construction dummies in the sub-sample of district-heated houses was imposed on the other two
groups by randomly dropping observations in year-of-construction groups with too many observations. The
resulting sample consists of 2,344 gas-, 779 electricity- and 971 district-heated houses. Column (2) reports
(simulated) coefficients and standard errors. Compared to model (1), the number of observations is halved, a
consequence of the strong differences in building age structures. EPS coefficients of gas and district heated
houses remain unchanged (the latter for obvious reasons), but the value of energy efficiency increases in
electricity-heated houses, from−1.853 in model (1) to−2.684 in model (2). This points to the direction that
higher costs of electricity (per kWh) translate into a higher value of EPS. Consequently, the Null of coherent
valuation cannot be ruled out.
Taking this idea one step further, model (3) focusses on buildings constructed in the years 1991 to 2015.
The building age structure is balanced using the same procedure as in model (2), for five year-of-construction
dummies (1991–1995, 1996–2000, etc.). This reduces the sample to 1,332 gas-, 304 electricity-, and 552
district-heated houses. Unfortunately, the smaller number of observations and the balancing procedure re-
duce estimation precision considerably, leaving statistically significant only the EPS coefficient of gas-heated
houses. However, the three coefficients are now strikingly similar in terms of magnitude. This suggests that
older buildings suppress EPS substantially, as had been found earlier for the sub-sample of gas-heated houses
alone (see model (4) in Table 5). Furthermore, part of this effect seems to stem from buildings with very high
EPS. At first glance, the results do not support the idea that heating fuel type influences the capitalised value
of energy efficiency as measured by EPS. When looking at the test results for Z = 0, this impression cannot
be confirmed. It will thus be necessary to add more observations in order to obtain more precise estimates.
6.4. Remaining lifetime of buildings
Thus far, the results make it difficult to see clearly whether the valuation of energy efficiency follows
reasonable patterns. This section adds one further dimension by focussing on the investment motive behind
energy efficiency improvements. Clearly, if retro-fitting becomes necessary for some reason other than an
improvement in energy efficiency, the latter can be done incidentally. This splits fixed costs of the investment
and therefore increases its profitability. As already discussed above, investors will therefore care for T , the
remaining lifetime of the building.
In order to be able to use variation in T while reducing data errors as much as possible, estimation
focusses on the sub-sample of gas-heated houses constructed in one of the three eight-year periods 1992–
1999, 2000–2007, and 2008–2015. EPS coefficients are then estimated for each of these three periods
separately. In Appendix C, it is shown that these three coefficients are made comparable by imposing a
uniform distribution of years of construction within each age group.16 Under this condition, it is possible
to obtain estimates for T and d = (1+ e)/(1+ r) from the data. It must be noted that data requirements
are enormous–and much higher than what is available for this paper–because coefficient standard errors
15More precisely, let EPS = γ0 + γ1Q+ ν for all three fuel types, with an omitted variable Q. Denote fuel type by f . If P =
δ0 + (δ1C f )EPS+ δ2Q+ η , and P is regressed on EPS, testing ratios of differences is valid, but testing ratios directly is not:
E[δ̂1C f ] = δ1C f +δ2γ1, and the second term cancels out when differencing.
16This is done in a procedure similar to the one described in Fn. 13.
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are inflated strongly in the calculation of T and d. Estimates for these two parameters are presented for
expositional purposes, but should be interpreted cautiously.
Column (4) of Table 6 contains coefficient estimates for the linear regression. The three EPS_GAS_P
coefficients are in the correct order, pointing to a strong decline of EPS as remaining lifetimes become
shorter. In the youngest group , an increase of energy costs by one Euro/[m2 · a] reduces listing price per
square metre by 48 Euro/m2. This number drops to 41 Euro/m2 in the middle group and declines further to
20 Euro/m2 (insignificant) in the oldest group. The corresponding estimate for T , 45 years, is remarkably
close to the average lifetime of energy efficiency investments in Germany (30–55 years, see Hoier and Erhorn
2013). The estimated value for d, 0.882, implies an interest rate r of 13.4% if gas prices are expected to be
constant (e = 0). This is a low value, given that interest rates for construction loans were around 2% in
2015.17. Nevertheless, this is a common result: In a meta-study, ? reports internal discount rates of 5–35%
for energy efficiency investments (see also Jaffe and Stavins, 1994, p. 122 and Fn. 17) It might be related to
financing constraints of house buyers.
6.5. Discussion of results
Taken as a whole, the results suggest that energy efficiency is taken into account in an economically
meaningful way by sellers of residential houses in Germany. This does not mean that the value of potential
cost savings is always and everywhere calculated correctly, providing support for the idea of “rational inat-
tention” (Sallee, 2013). After controlling for local house prices more rigorously, variation in gas prices or
local climate did not influence the value of EPS (sections 6.1 and 6.2). However, from a statistical point of
view, the estimates are not precise enough to rule out correct valuation with respect to local conditions.
One important finding of this paper is that building age alters the value of EPS considerably. Earlier
papers have estimated one single coefficient for samples that typically include buildings of all vintages and
heating fuel types – although some have looked at sub-samples of different house types (Fuerst et al., 2015;
Hyland et al., 2013). The coefficients that are most comparable to estimates from earlier studies are the
estimates for EPS_GAS_P in Table 4, indicating that a one Euro increase in expected yearly heating costs
per square metre decreases listing prices by approx. 23.5 Euro/m2. At sample means, a change from an A-
rated building (30≤ EPS < 50) to an E-rated building (160≤ EPS < 200) increases expected heating costs
by approximately 7.95 Euro/[m2 · a]. The decrease in prices amounts to 186.8 Euro, or 9.6% of the sample
mean. This is very close to the values reported in other studies, e.g. 9.3% in Hyland et al. (2013) or 10.2%
in Brounen and Kok (2011).18 Note that both studies use a selection model because EPS is not reported in
all observations. The suspected upward bias of EPS in OLS estimation does not seem to be great.
Once the sample is restricted to younger buildings, the estimated coefficient doubles in size, cf. model
(4) in Table 5. More precisely, for buildings constructed within the last eight years, the premium of A- over
E-rated buildings increases to 19.6%, cf. model (4) in Table 6. Clearly, from the perspective of an investor
or construction company, this latter figure is much more important than how EPS is capitalised on average,
i.e. in the whole sample. If a house owner wants to improve energy efficiency of the building substantially,
it is very likely that the building is re-constructed rather than renovated. The results presented here suggest
that the premium will be much higher in that case. They are thus much closer to the policy-relevant question
of how to foster energy efficiency investments in an efficient manner.
It must be noted that this paper faces the same quality bias as other studies (e.g. Brounen and Kok, 2011;
Fuerst et al., 2015; Hyland et al., 2013; Kahn and Kok, 2014). Exogenous variation from local climate or gas
prices does not seem to be important to house sellers and can thus not be used to identify the EPS coefficient.
17Interest rates on construction loans with a duration of 1 to 5 years to private households (new customers) were below 2%
throughout the year 2015, see the interest rate statistic of Deutsche Bundesbank from February 3, 2016.
18Fuerst et al. (2015) report coefficient estimates for A or B rated buildings and find a premium over E-rated buildings of 5.7%
for the full sample.
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However, part of the analysis relies on differences of potentially biased coefficients. Under the assumption
that quality bias is equally strong for houses of different vintages, differences of the estimates in column
(4) of Table 6 are identified. These were used to calculate estimates for the investment horizon, T , and the
discounting factor, d. T and d can be used to calculate the present value of saving one Euro on energy costs
per year and square metre – 100× the EPS coefficient of a building from the youngest group. Setting T = 41
and d = 0.882, it is 7.4 Euro/m2, which is much lower than the coefficient estimate of 47.9 Euro/m2. This
is only suggestive of positive quality bias because of high uncertainty in the calculation of T and d, but it
calls for a more rigorous identification of the capitalisation of energy efficiency in future work.19
7. Conclusion
This paper has investigated several channels that influence how sellers on the housing market value
energy efficiency in residential buildings. The results have shown that agents are able to consistently use
very precise information such as EPS instead of labels or efficiency bands. Agents also seem to be aware of
the investment horizon of energy efficiency investments. Overall, the investment dimension of EPS seems to
be understood quite well.
The results are less clear about more subtle differences such as local gas prices or climatic conditions.
Furthermore, regressions that relied on different fuel types did not produce a consistent pattern with respect to
EPS coefficients. Whether this is a sign of irrational or rational inattention cannot be answered conclusively
at this point. Anyhow, if there are problems of correct valuation in these dimensions, they could easily be
tackled by including estimates of expected heating costs in EPS certificates. These estimates should be based
on local fuel prices and climate.
Future research should provide other ways of identifying the EPS coefficient. Given the difficulties to
assess whether estimated premia reflect energy cost savings, survey evidence would help greatly to further
understanding in this area. A second shortcoming of this study is its use of listing instead of transaction
prices. There are sound theories and empirical evidence showing that systematically mis-pricing housing
characteristics is very costly to house sellers and should thus be avoided. Nevertheless, the use of listing
prices is a source of potential bias. It would thus be very interesting to see whether the results are robust to
using transaction data such as in Fuerst et al. (2015).
The results add to the body of literature and corroborate conclusions drawn in earlier studies. Despite
unresolved difficulties related to identification, it seems clear that EPS certificates in principle help to in-
crease transparency in and are valued by real estate markets. In that sense, it would be desirable to refine
existing EPS schemes and establish a tighter connection between EPS and energy cost savings. This is of
prime importance if the goal is to reduce energy use (and CO2 emissions) in residential buildings. If premia
are related to “green” marketing alone, simple (binary) labels are not very useful because this will spur in-
vestment in marketing and pseudo-efficient rather than truly efficient design (Newell and Siikamäki, 2013;
Sallee, 2013). For instance, taxation of energy consumption will be more effective if heating cost savings
translate into an increase in the value of energy efficient houses.
The Ukraine crisis has put Europe in mind of its dependency on resource imports. Besides its implica-
tions for climate change, an energy efficient building stock is thus critical for Europe’s political independence
in the future. For this reason alone, it is worth while to study more thoroughly how markets react to the ex-
isting policy instruments.
19As an example for the sensitivity of T and d consider a change of the coefficient of the youngest group from 0.48 to 0.52 (1/5
standard error). This yields T = 73 and d = 0.938 and a present value of 15.0 Euro/m2.
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Appendix A Additional tables
Table 7: Heating types in the sample
GAS LIQUID_GAS BIOGAS OIL GEOTHERMAL
PROJECTION 24751 200 70 14343 1015
PAST_USE 25940 248 29 9733 471
TOTAL 50691 448 99 24076 1486
HEAT_PUMP DISTRICT ELECTRIC NIGHT_STORAGE SOLAR
PROJECTION 1477 1231 3522 419 1377
PAST_USE 441 1020 1772 158 785
TOTAL 1918 2251 5294 577 2162
PELLETS COAL MULTI
PROJECTION 1489 211 1612
PAST_USE 939 122 1016
TOTAL 2428 333 2628
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Table 8: Local gas price regressions, extended results
Dependent Variable:
PRICE_SQM
(1) (2)
TIME 6.582** 0.861
(2.468) (9.015)
YC_1918 -579.160*** -365.737
(45.327) (215.952)
YC_1945 -464.579*** -568.723**
(44.393) (187.010)
YC_1960 -465.985*** -544.617**
(41.752) (167.214)
YC_1970 -402.248*** -518.493**
(41.641) (172.321)
YC_1980 -397.912*** -449.309**
(41.438) (161.846)
YC_1990 -325.582*** -437.808**
(44.437) (163.918)
YC_2000 -263.901*** -348.634*
(39.237) (168.342)
YC_2010 -107.955** -10.965
(39.005) (192.605)
RETROFIT_LAST10 22.197 -26.226
(17.785) (62.181)
TYPE_SEMIDETACHED -154.624*** -228.629***
(18.320) (68.522)
TYPE_TOWNHOUSE_M -176.928*** -473.944***
(28.595) (76.046)
TYPE_TOWNHOUSE_E -198.212*** -15.969
(33.581) (123.289)
TYPE_OTHER -26.531 -113.542
(21.807) (76.187)
LOT_SIZE 0.067** 0.109
(0.023) (0.062)
log(LOT_SIZE) 186.198***
(24.154)
log(SIZE_SQM) -465.196***
(42.513)
ROOMS -21.380** 6.953
(6.740) (33.260)
SELF_CONT_HEATING -51.142 280.246
(41.494) (169.543)
CENTRAL_HEATING -57.670*** 49.052
(14.006) (53.273)
FLOOR_HEATING 80.747* 128.457
(31.503) (113.868)
QUAL_HIGH 657.162*** 1310.517
(92.783) (942.285)
QUAL_MED 153.846*** 242.668***
(23.263) (63.314)
QUAL_SIMPLE -194.874*** 35.145
(43.324) (144.015)
CONDITION_GOOD 138.249*** 64.620
(16.735) (61.202)
CONDITION_NEW 100.339* -167.473
(41.189) (175.070)
SECOND_BATHROOM 40.509** -33.686
(13.587) (48.049)
BASEMENT 58.605*** 106.817
(13.181) (62.076)
FITTED_KITCHEN 92.543*** 81.762
(16.187) (50.515)
SAUNA 183.704*** 603.691***
(35.012) (167.231)
PARQUET_FLOORING 180.833*** 103.554
(54.460) (207.708)
Continued on next page
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Table 8 – Continued from previous page
(1) (2)
FIREPLACE 97.882*** 206.728*
(21.703) (84.841)
BROKERAGE 363.658 1816.049
(367.522) (1171.355)
UNEMP_YOUTH_2014 -56273.831*** 39363.159
(8829.115) (20957.093)
LIVING_SP_COMPL_2008_2013_INH 170166.140*** 30620.203
(25993.719) (60151.629)
LOT_SIZE:POP_DENSITY_2013 0.118*** -0.038
(0.025) (0.044)
log(LOT_SIZE):POP_DENSITY_2013 48.998***
(6.893)
LAND_PRICE 0.289**
(0.098)
LAND_PRICE_NA 13.489
(117.869)
SIZE_SQM -3.095**
(1.039)
GAS_PRICE 10.095 13.864
(33.480) (74.040)
EPS_GAS_P -0.235*** -0.262***
(0.019) (0.078)
EPS_GAS_LOCAL_P -0.329** -0.040
(0.122) (0.345)
EPS_GAS_P:POP_DENSITY_2013 0.064** 0.133
(0.020) (0.068)
N 21022 2516
adj. R2 0.687 0.289
ZIP-code cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. District-FE are included in model (1). Model (2) is a regression
of matched differences, where (inexact) matching is on year of construction and EPS across zip code areas with large
gas price differences to a neighbouring zip code area. p-values: ***: < .001, **: < .01, *: < .05.
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Appendix B German energy efficiency certificates
Figure 4: Energy labels for real estate offers in Germany
Source: BBSR/Energieeinsparverordnunga
aThe label in the background (“Endenergiebedarf”) is based on a standardised projection of energy use. It containts a scale (A+
to H) that indicates EPS in steps of 25, and the exact EPS (see the blue label “Endenergiekennwerte”). Additionally, information
on energy-related building characteristics is provided below the scale; this information is not available in the data set. The label up
front is based on past use. It is structured similarly, but does not contain additional information.
Appendix C Notes on the estimation of T and d from the data
For k,m,T ∈ N0, T > mk, define
δ (m,k) :=
(m+1)k−1
∑
i=mk
pi
T−i
∑
t=1
dt , (5)
where d > 0, pi ≥ 0∀i, and ∑(m+1)ki=mk pi = 1. Think of δ (m,k) as the absolute value of the slope coefficient in
a regression of house prices per square metre on expected energy costs if the sample consists of houses with
remaining lifetimes T −mk,T −mk−1, ...,T − (m+1)+1k at shares pi (i = mk, ...,(m+1)k−1).
Assume that the sample is balanced, i.e. pi = 1/k ∀i. Then, for m > 0,
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δ (m−1,k)−δ (m,k) =1
k
(
mk−1
∑
i=(m−1)k
T−i
∑
t=1
dt −
(m+1)k−1
∑
i=mk
T−i
∑
t=1
dt
)
=
1
k
(m+1)k−1
∑
i=mk
(
T+k−i
∑
t=1
dt −
T−i
∑
t=1
dt
)
=
1
k
(m+1)k−1
∑
i=mk
T−i+k
∑
t=T−i+1
dt (6)
=
dk
k
(m+1)k−1
∑
i=mk
T−i+k
∑
t=T−i+1
dt−k
=
dk
k
(m+1)k−1
∑
i=mk
T−i
∑
t=T−i+1−k
dt
=
dk
k
(m+2)k−1
∑
i=(m+1)k
T−i+k
∑
t=T−i+1
dt (7)
From (6) and (7), it follows that δ (m−1,k)−δ (m,k) = dk(δ (m,k)−δ (m+1,k)), and hence
δ (m−1,k)−δ (m,k)
δ (m,k)−δ (m+1,k) = d
k (8)
and, from (6),
δ (m−1,k)−δ (m,k) =d
T
k
(m+1)k−1
∑
i=mk
T−i+k
∑
t=T−i+1
dt−T
=
dT
k
(m+1)k−1
∑
i=mk
k
∑
t=1
dt−i
which can be solved for T easily if d and the left hand side are known.
Under the assumptions that (i) participants in the market are aware of the present value concept and (ii)
buildings can be categorised by remaining lifetimes–e.g. by year of construction–, this allows to calculate
d, and then T directly from the data. Even though this does not identify r and e, it at least yields the ratio
d = (1+ e)/(1+ r) of expected cost changes (1+ e) to the discounting factor (1+ r), and the expected
remaining lifetime of a new building.
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Abstract 
Junior lien mortgage debt proliferated during the housing market run up as borrowers used 
piggyback loans to buy homes or extract home equity. Defaulted second liens now trade in the 
distressed debt market at large discounts. In this paper, we examine the previously unstudied 
second lien cure rate topic and find that the size and status of the associated senior mortgage are  
important cure rate predictors as are other borrower debt usage characteristics revealed in credit 
bureau data. We link our results to the finance literature on informed, and uninformed, investors.  
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1. Introduction 
Second mortgage liens proliferated during the housing market run-up from 2000-2007. In the 
case of non-agency first mortgage loans originated during this time period, Goodman et al. 
(2010) finds that 50% of first mortgage borrowers also had a second lien. Second liens have also 
been implicated as a contributing factor to the severity of the recent financial crisis (Jagtiani & 
Lang 2010; LaCour-Little et al. 2011). Furthermore, borrowers with second mortgage liens are 
more likely to make lower down payments when purchasing their homes (Lee et al. 2012). In 
light of the large role that second liens play in the mortgage landscape, understanding these loans 
is an important topic in financial research. Most previous literature has focused on the 
determinants of second loans default. Here we are interested in a different but related issue – the 
recovery, or cure, rates on loans secured by second liens once borrowers have defaulted. The 
goal of this study is to understand the factors, both in terms of magnitude and direction, that lead 
to a cure on a previously defaulted on second mortgage loan. To the best of our knowledge this is 
the first study to examine this important topic. 
 
In an earlier version of this paper we characterized defaulted, but unresolved, mortgage debt as 
”zombie loans”, defined as mortgages more than 60 days past due (“dpd”), but which have yet to 
enter the foreclosure process1. In varying contexts, such loans have received much media 
attention over the years (Fackler 2004; Brown 2011; Colchester & Margot 2012; Curan 2014). In 
our study here, after controlling for state- and loan vintage-specific factors, we find strong 
evidence that the single most important indicator that a borrower will cure a junior lien default is 
                                                            
1 Others have characterized such loans as “limbo loans”, see for example, Allen et al. (2015) 
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that the borrower cures the senior lien. We also find that lower amounts of outstanding revolving 
debt and senior mortgage debt lead to a higher likelihood of a second lien cure. This result seems 
intuitive, as borrowers with smaller amounts of other outstanding debt may have more funds 
available with which to cure defaulted junior lien debt. On the other hand, we also find that 
borrowers with larger loan sizes, measured by the junior mortgage debt, are more likely to cure 
the junior loan defaults. These borrowers may be both wealthier and more motivated to pay off 
higher loan amounts, particularly in recourse environments. 
 
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we use a unique, proprietary dataset that 
contains detailed account information for all forms of consumer debt, including installment, 
revolving, junior and senior mortgage liens. Second, we contribute to the mortgage literature by 
investigating the determinants of junior lien cure rates – an area with little, if any, research to 
date. Third, we provide evidence suggesting that informed investors, using the study's main 
model to guide loan purchases, can dramatically increase investment returns. Finally, we provide 
valuable information for investors and practitioners that may help direct costly loan modification 
efforts to borrowers most likely to successfully cure their defaulted junior lien debt.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows: We briefly discuss the limited literature in Section 2. We then 
discuss the creation of the dataset and describe our methodology in Section 3. Results are 
reported in Section 4, including some rough calculations of potential investor returns, with 
concluding remarks in Section 5. 
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2. Literature Review  
The literature on second loans is relatively nascent. The research most closely related to ours 
focuses on two main areas: the determinants of second lien defaults and the relation between first 
and second lien defaults. 
The first strand of research on second liens examines the causes of second loan defaults. Agarwal 
et al. (2006) shows that first and second liens have differential default rates. Goodman et al. 
(2010) examines the growth of the market and finds that approximately 50% of non-agency first 
mortgages also had a second loan. Also included in this strand are papers that examine so-called 
piggyback loans - a subcategory of second loans where both a first and second lien are originated 
simultaneously2. Goodman et al. (2010) finds that piggybacks have higher default rates than 
loans not originated concurrently with the senior loan. LaCour-Little et al. (2011) finds that 
subprime piggyback loans are associated with higher foreclosure and default rates. 
 
The other strand of second loan research investigates the relation between defaults of first and 
second liens. In a study of strategic default, Jagtiani and Lang (2010) find that borrowers 
approach the decision to strategically default differently for first versus second liens. 
Specifically, some borrowers choose to default on the first mortgage, but continue to make 
timely payments on second loans. This strategy recognizes the “blocking power” of the second 
lien holder to stall a foreclosure by the senior lien holder. To explain, if the combined (first plus 
                                                            
2 Piggyback loans, also referred to as “simultaneous close” loans were typically used to allow a borrower to afford a 
larger loan than would not otherwise be possible. For example, an “80/10/10” loan required only a 10% down 
payment by the borrower. But a second lien of another 10% could be applied to the 20% “down payment” 
requirement to avoid paying private mortgage insurance (PMI) on a conforming conventional first mortgage. 
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second liens) loan-to-value ratio exceeds 100%, the second lien holder is effectively holding a 
naked position in the asset. At the same time, the second lien hold retains a title claim. Before the 
property can change ownership, the second must release their lien or the title will not clear. As 
such, while the negative equity position leaves the second lien holder without a valuable claim 
on the asset, the ability to “block” the senior lien holder from clearing title represents its own 
value. Hence, the “blocking power” of the second can be used to compel an otherwise 
unmotivated first lien holder to the bargaining table3. 
 
Using a dataset of loans originated from 2002-2007, Eriksen et al. (2013) investigates whether 
second liens play a role in first mortgage defaults. They find evidence suggesting that second lien 
lenders are hesitant to pursue foreclosure. This allows borrowers to make separate default 
decisions for primary and secondary debt. Similarly, Lee et al. (2012) finds that 20-30% of 
borrowers will choose to keep current on their second liens, even while their first lien is 
delinquent.  
There is also a broad literature in finance on returns realized by informed, and uninformed, 
investors.   Generally, informed investors are characterized as institutional professionals while 
uninformed investors are households, sometimes called retail investors4.  
Although related to the existing literature, our study here looks at loans secured by second liens 
from a different perspective. Instead of examining the reasons for default, we identify the factors 
                                                            
3 In many of the loan modification and short sale programs promoted by the federal government starting in the 2009 
time period, junior lien holders were provided with modest payoffs in return for releasing their lien claim to allow 
the first loan to be modified or the collateral property to be sold. 
4 While acquiring a portfolio of distressed debt is unquestionably an institutional trade, it is possible today for retail 
investors to acquire individual defaulted mortgage debt, see, for example, www.loanmarket.net . 
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that are predictive of cures. We believe we are the first to study this topic. The results of our 
analysis should be helpful to policymakers, investors, and financial institutions.  
Data and Methodology 
To address the question of cure rates on previously defaulted junior lien we employ a unique, 
proprietary dataset that is comprised of the loan characteristics for borrowers who have defaulted 
on their second loan. By focusing on a sample in which all borrowers have previously defaulted 
on the junior lien, we are able to analyze the factors that contribute to cure rates. We define 
default to mean the second mortgage loan was at least 60 days delinquent. Details concerning the 
construction of this dataset are discussed next.  
 
We begin with a large dataset from the credit bureau Equifax extracted at three distinct points in 
time, 2009, 2011, and 2013. All data extracts are as of March 31 of the individual year. Because 
the credit bureau data reports loan performance data over the previous two years, we have 
information covering six loan performance years. After a set of data cleaning routines to deal 
with missing values and the like, we have an intermediate data set with total of 135,575 
observations. To this, we combine the loan performance data by zip code to geographic data by 
zip code from CoreLogic and the Home Price Index (HPI) by core based statistical area (CBSA) 
from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). We delete 3,152 observations because of 
difficulties matching zip code to CBSA, resulting in 132,423 observations. After conversations 
with Equifax executives, we also delete 20 observations because the automated valuation model 
(AVM) confidence score was less than 0.6, deemed less than reliable. Finally, we delete 83 
observations with a vintage greater than 30 years. Therefore, our final sample has 132,320 
observations. These data are nationally representative, including all fifty states and the District 
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Columbia, with the largest numbers coming from the largest states (California, Florida, and New 
York). 
Insert Table 1 
 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for our sample. Jr Cure Flag and Sr Cure Flag are 
dichotomous variables assigned the value of one if the junior or senior mortgage lien, 
respectively, is cured as of the observation date, and zero otherwise. Recall that all of the sample 
borrowers have previously defaulted on their second mortgage loans, and many have defaulted 
on their senior mortgage as well. Table 1 shows that 46% of our sample borrowers have cured 
their junior mortgage liens and 38% have cured their senior mortgage liens over the two year 
time windows examined. 
 
To understand the factors that influence the likelihood of a cure, we perform logistic regressions 
with Jr Cure Flag as the dependent variable using right-hand side variables that have been 
shown in previous studies to be related to mortgage cures. Since much of the literature 
concentrates on the senior mortgages, it is interesting to see how these variables relate to 
previously defaulted junior liens. Our primary regression specification is as follows: 
ܬݎ	ܥݑݎ݁	ܨ݈ܽ݃௧
ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܤ݈ܽܽ݊ܿ݁	ܱ݌݁݊	ܫ݊ݏݐ݈݈ܽ݉݁݊ݐ	௧ ൅		ߚଶܤ݈ܽܽ݊ܿ݁	ܱ݌݁݊	ܴ݁ݒ݋݈ݒ݅݊݃௧
൅	ߚଷܤ݈ܽܽ݊ܿ݁	ܵݎ	ܯ݋ݎݐ݃ܽ݃݁௧
൅	ߚସܤ݈ܽܽ݊ܿ݁	ܬݎ	ܯ݋ݎݐ݃ܽ݃݁௧൅	ߚହܯ݋ݎݐ݃ܽ݃݁	30	݀݌݀௧൅	ߚ଺ܯ݋ݎݐ݃ܽ݃݁	60	݀݌݀௧൅	ߚ଻ܯ݋ݎݐ݃ܽ݃݁	120	݀݌݀௧ 
൅	ߚ଼ܨ݋ݎ݈݁ܿ݋ݏݑݎ݁	ݎܽݐ݁൅	ߚଽܲ݅݃݃ݕܾܽܿ݇ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܥܮܶ ௧ܸ ൅ ߚଵଵܹ݈݁ܽݐ݄௧	 
൅	ߚଵଶܹ݈݁ܽݐ݄ ∗ ܴ݁ܿ݋ݑݎݏ݁௧ ൅	ߝ	௧																	ሺ1ሻ 
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Recent literature suggests that debt other than the primary mortgage influences borrower 
liquidity and repayment behavior (Elul et al. 2010; Jagtiani & Lang 2010; Eriksen et al. 2013). 
Since our dataset includes the complete debt portfolio of the sample borrowers, we are able to 
observe the effect of outstanding debt on the borrower's ability to cure the junior lien. Balance 
Open Installment and Balance Open Revolving are the natural logarithms of all unpaid 
installment loans and revolving debt, respectively, for each borrower–year observation. We 
expect a negative relation between other outstanding debt obligations and the likelihood of 
curing the junior lien.  
 
Similarly, Balance Sr Mortgage and Balance Jr Mortgage are the natural logarithms of senior 
and junior mortgage, respectively. Since senior mortgage debt would typically be the 
homeowner’s largest liability, we expect a large outstanding senior mortgage balance to be 
negatively associated with a junior lien cure. However, we do not have an expectation about the 
relation between the junior mortgage balance and junior mortgage cure rates. On the one hand, 
borrowers may be more motivated to repay a larger junior loan amount to avoid action by 
creditors in a recourse environment. On the other hand, a larger outstanding junior lien balance 
may seem more difficult to repay after controlling for wealth or liquid assets.  
 
Mortgage 30 dpd, Mortgage 60 dpd, and Mortgage 120 dpd are dichotomous variables assuming 
the value of one if the senior mortgage is between 30 and 59 days past due, between 60 and 119 
days past due, or more than 120 days past due, respectively5. We expect borrowers to be 
motivated to cure their junior liens that are delinquent for longer periods of time. Accordingly, 
we expect a positive relation between Mortgage 30 dpd, Mortgage 60 dpd, and Mortgage 120 
                                                            
5 State law specifies mortgage foreclosure process and timelines. 
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dpd and Jr Cure Flag. From Table 1, we see that 13.5% of the senior liens are 30-59 days past 
due, 5.2% are 60-119 days past due, and 18.4% are 120 or more days past due. 
 
Foreclosure rate is the natural logarithm of the rate of foreclosures for mortgages of the zip code 
in which the borrower’s property is located for 2009, obtained from CoreLogic. Piggyback is a 
dichotomous variable assigned the value of one if the junior lien and senior lien were issued 
within 30 days of each other. Because senior loans with associated piggybacks tend to perform 
worse than loans without a simultaneous close second (LaCour-Little et al. 2011; Lee et al. 
2012; Eriksen et al. 2013), we expect a negative relation between Piggyback and Jr Cure Flag. 
 
CLTV represents three different levels of combined loan to value (CLTV) amounts in separate 
models. CLTV100up, CLTV150up, and CLTV200up take the value of one if the ratio of original 
loan amount of the junior lien plus the original loan amount of the senior lien to AVM6 is at least 
100%, 150%, and 200%, respectively. CLTV is widely used in the literature to correctly account 
for the impact of negative equity (Elul et al. 2010; LaCour-Little et al. 2011; Eriksen et al. 2013; 
Bond et al. 2015). Bond et al. (2015) find that CLTV and state-specific subrogation laws 
influence the borrower's ability to refinance mortgage loans. We expect a positive coefficient for 
lower CLTV values and a negative or insignificant coefficient for higher CLTV values since 
borrowers have less incentive to cure the loan if their combined outstanding loan balances are 
considerably higher than the value of their property.  
 
Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) find that being in a recourse state lowers borrowers’ sensitivity to 
negative equity, suggesting that borrowers are more likely to default in nonrecourse states. 
                                                            
6 The credit bureau data provided an AVM value for the collateral property at each point in time. 
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However, this result is only significant for high wealth borrowers, with AVM as the proxy for 
wealth. The positive association between AVM and default in nonrecourse states is significant in 
observations with AVM of $300,000 and greater. Accordingly, we include variables representing 
both wealth and wealth interacted with a recourse state dichotomous variable. In our main model, 
Wealth is represented by AVM300up, a dichotomous variable assigned the value of one if the 
AVM is at least $300,000 and zero otherwise. Recourse is not included in the model as a stand-
alone variable because we include state fixed effects and recourse laws are state-specific. We 
also use several alternate definitions of wealth, including a continuous variable AVM, the natural 
logarithm of AVM, and HighPrice a dichotomous variable assuming the value of one if the sum 
of the senior and junior liens’ original balances is greater than two times the average home sale 
price for the zip code and year, and zero otherwise. 
 
To control for differences in state bankruptcy and foreclosure laws, we also include state fixed 
effects. Beyond house price movements captured by our estimate of CLTV, unobserved time-
varying factors such as differences in the market conditions are controlled for by using loan 
vintage fixed effects (i.e. mortgage origination year dummy variables).  
 
3. Results 
Insert Table 2 
Before any multivariate analysis, we first consider the univariate relations among our main study 
variables via the correlation matrices reported in Table 2. The results show Spearman’s 
correlations above the diagonal and Pearson’s below. At a univariate level, we find that larger 
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amounts of debt are negatively related to the cure on a second mortgage lien. All four loan 
balance variables (Balance Open Installment, Balance Open Revolving, Balance Sr Mortgage, 
and Balance Jr Mortgage) are negatively correlated with Jr Cure Flag. We also see positive 
relations between the length of time the senior mortgage payment is overdue and curing the 
junior lien. Mortgage 30 dpd, Mortgage 60 dpd, and Mortgage 120 dpd are all positively 
correlated with Jr Cure Flag. Although these results confirm our a priori expectations, they must 
be interpreted with caution since they are only univariate correlations. Our logistic regression 
analysis that follows should provide a clearer understanding of the factors associated with junior 
lien cure rates. 
 
Insert Table 3 
 
 
Our main model, examining the factors that influence the cure of a second mortgage lien, is 
reported in Table 3. Coefficients and standard errors are presented in Panel A. Average marginal 
effects of highly significant (1%) variables in the main model are presented in Panel B. We 
estimate three specifications of the logistic regression model. In all models, wealth is proxied by 
the AVM300up dichotomous variable. We change the variables controlling for the degree to 
which the combined loan amount is underwater in Models 1, 2, and 3. The first model includes 
the CLTV100up dichotomous variable. Since research has shown that the degree of negative 
equity matters (Wyman 2010; Seiler et al. 2012; Guiso et al. 2013), Models 2 and 3 increase the 
threshold for a borrower to be deemed “underwater” to 150% and 200%, respectively. As 
expected, we see significant negative coefficients on Balance Open Revolving and Balance Sr 
Mortgage. These results suggest that borrowers with higher amounts of outstanding revolving 
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debt and a higher outstanding balance on the senior mortgage are less likely to cure their junior 
mortgage lien. More specifically, a 1% increase in Balance Open Revolving and Balance Sr 
Mortgage results in reducing the probability of curing the junior lien by 0.012 and 0.002, 
respectively. Although our main interest here is cure rates on defaulted second loans, these 
results are consistent with prior research on causes of mortgage default showing that borrowers 
with larger senior mortgage balances are more likely to default on the senior mortgage (Eriksen 
et al. 2013)7. Interestingly, we find a positive relation between Balance Jr Mortgage and Jr Cure 
Flag. In other words, borrowers with a higher outstanding balance on their junior mortgage debt 
are more likely to cure them.  
 
Moving on to the variables representing the amount of time that the senior mortgage payments 
are overdue, we find increasing levels of significance for the positive coefficients as the days 
past due increases. All coefficients are highly significant at the 1% level. This result is consistent 
with expectations as borrowers may be more motivated to take corrective actions to cure a 
defaulted junior lien, as lenders get closer to initiating foreclosure action. 
 
We find little to no significance for the coefficient on the wealth variable, but a strong negative 
coefficient for the interacted variable, AVM300up*Recourse, as evidenced in all three models of 
Table 3. Although we are looking at curing the junior lien, this result is somewhat counter to the 
Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) finding of a positive association between wealth and likelihood to 
default on senior mortgage in recourse states. Our results suggest that wealthy borrowers are less 
likely to cure their junior liens in a recourse state, which is consistent with the “blocking power” 
                                                            
7 This result differs from much of the pre-crisis literature which tended to show smaller first mortgage loans bore 
greater default risk and may be connected with the phenomenon of riskier borrowers taking on excessive debt via 
reduced the documentation programs that proliferated during the 2004-2006 time period. 
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argument made in other studies. Specifically, wealthier individuals have the resources to hire 
attorneys to encourage a long and drawn out standoff between the first and second lien holder. 
The result is an increased willingness to negotiate an eventual settlement at an amount below the 
unpaid balance (UPB) of the loan.  
 
When looking at the degree to which the loan is underwater, there is a positive and highly 
significant coefficient of CLTV100up in Model 1, indicating that if the borrower has any amount 
of negative equity (a CLTV of at least 100%) he is more likely to cure the junior loan. From the 
average marginal effects calculations shown in Panel B, borrowers with negative equity have a 
1.5% higher chance of curing their junior liens than borrowers without negative equity. 
However, this result does not hold for Models 2 and 3, when the degree the loan is underwater 
increases to 150% (CLTV150up) and 200% (CLTV200up), respectively. Neither coefficient is 
significantly different from zero, possibly reflecting the fact that borrowers have less incentive to 
cure their second liens when their mortgages are severely underwater and, presumably, lenders 
have reduced incentives to pursue foreclosure. It seems that when borrowers have a large amount 
of negative equity, curing the junior lien is a less attractive choice, perhaps because the most 
important contributor to the negative is the first, not the second. However, the single most 
important factor in determining which borrowers will cure their junior mortgage loans is 
identifying which ones have cured their senior lien. The coefficient on Sr Cure Flag is positive 
and highly significant in all three models. If a borrower has cured his senior mortgage, then he is 
42% more likely to cure the junior lien than those who have not.  
 
Insert Table 4 
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In Table 4, we use an alternative wealth measure that is continuous instead of the dichotomous 
variable used in Table 3. The results of the new specification are very similar to previous results. 
We find positive coefficients on Balance Open Revolving and Balance Sr Mortgage, again 
suggesting that higher levels of revolving debt and large senior liens reduce the likelihood the 
junior mortgage lien will be cured. We also find that the longer the senior mortgage payments 
are past due, the more likely the junior lien will be cured. In all, the results are very consistent 
with Table 3, with one exception. When we interact the continuous AVM wealth measure with 
the Recourse dummy, the coefficient is not significant (although it is still negative). That is, by 
changing the wealth measure from a dichotomous variable to a continuous metric, we find results 
suggesting that being a wealthy borrower in a recourse state does not change the likelihood of the 
junior lien being cured. Since this result is in conflict with our results from Table 3, we perform 
an additional analysis with a different wealth measure that may be informative. 
 
Insert Table 5 
 
In Table 5, we introduce an alternative wealth measure, to help resolve the disagreement in our 
models presented in Tables 3 and 4. AVM may not be the best measure of wealth, since different 
locations have different average property values. To explain, a borrower with a $300,000 
property in Kansas may not have the same level of wealth as a borrower with a $300,000 
property in New York City. Accordingly, we create a measure of wealth based on average 
property sale price in the borrowers’ zip code and year. This measure, HighPrice, takes the value 
of 1 if the borrower’s AVM is greater than twice the average sales price in the zip code, and zero 
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otherwise. We also interact this wealth measure with the Recourse dummy. Our previous results 
for outstanding loan balance, time the senior mortgage payment is past due, degree to which the 
mortgage is underwater, are robust to this alternative specification. We now find highly 
significant results for both the HighPrice wealth measure and the HighPrice*Recourse interacted 
variable. Our results suggest that wealthy borrowers are more likely to cure their junior liens, but 
that effect is diminished if the borrower is in a recourse state. 
 
Insert Table 6 
 
Next, we consider the possibility that our results may be sensitive to the accuracy of the AVM in 
Table 6. At the suggestion of Equifax executives, we limit our sample to observations that have 
an AVM confidence score greater than 0.6. Since AVM plays an important role in all of our 
wealth measures, we now conduct a robustness check for sensitivity to AVM confidence score. 
We use our main model, Table 3, Model 1, by confidence score quartile. We find that our results 
are not related to AVM confidence score, discounting AVM heteroskedasticity as a deterministic 
explanatory variable in our model. 
 
Insert Table 7 
 
In Table 7, Model 14, we allow for a non-linear relation between debt balances and junior lien 
cure, by including the squared terms of Balance Open Installment, Balance Open Revolving, 
Balance Sr Mortgage, and Balance Jr Mortgage, represented as Balance Open Installment^2, 
Balance Open Revolving^2, Balance Sr Mortgage^2, and Balance Jr Mortgage^2, respectively. 
All the squared terms are significant except for Balance Open Installment^2, which provides 
further confirmation that installment debt does not contribute to the cure of a junior lien. In the 
16 
 
original model (Table 3, Model 1), Balance Open Revolving had a negative coefficient. As in the 
main model, Balance Sr Mortgage has a significant negative coefficient, but its squared term has 
a positive coefficient, which implies that the negative relation between the senior lien balance 
and the junior lien cure is at a decreasing rate. Although Balance Jr Mortgage is no longer 
significant, it is still positive. Furthermore, the squared term for Balance Jr Mortgage is positive 
and significant, confirming the results of the original model. In Model 15, we also interact the 
wealth term, AVM300up with Sr Cure Flag. Both Sr Cure Flag and the interacted term are 
positive and highly significant, suggesting that wealth magnifies the positive contribution of 
curing the senior mortgage to curing the junior lien.  
 
Insert Table 8 
 
As a final robustness check, we winsorize all continuous variables at 1% and 99%. The results, 
presented in Table 8, remain unchanged. 
 
Insert Table 9 
Applying the Model 
 
Having determined the factors that influence cure rates of second liens, we now seek to evaluate 
the economic value of the model.  Loutskina and Strahan (2011) finds that informed investors are 
better able to evaluate risk and therefore generate higher profits. Accordingly, they argue that 
informed investors tend to focus on the jumbo mortgage market and on higher-risk borrowers. 
The current sample of previously defaulted, second liens certainly qualifies as a high-risk 
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segment of the secondary loan market. Since there is some evidence that low-quality loans are 
more likely than high-quality loans to be sold on the secondary market (Keys et al., 2010), 
having a model to provide information about which loans to purchase, should be especially 
valuable for any distressed debt investor.  So, in this simple setup, investors with our model 
results are informed, while those without are not. 
 
Table 9 illustrates returns for informed and uninformed investors using the loan cohort of 2009, 
in both tabular and graphical form. Estimated payoffs per loan are calculated by multiplying the 
balance of the junior lien as of March 31, 2009 by the probability of cure from the main model 
(Model 1 of Table 3) multiplied by 0.80, to reflect that the full loan balance may not be 
recovered8. Estimated returns are calculated by subtracting 1 from the estimated payoff divided 
by the estimated loan cost. The estimated loan cost is calculated by multiplying the loan cost per 
dollar (ranging from 0.05 to 0.40) by the March 2009 loan balance. We assume that uninformed 
investors are unable to discern loan quality and buy all loans in the 2009 cohort, while informed 
investors use the information from the model to choose only the 2009 cohort loans that have 
either a 50% or 80% probability of curing, depending on their risk appetite.  
 
We find that if the investor buys loans for five cents on the dollar, both uninformed and informed 
investors are able to earn very large positive returns, although informed investors outperform 
uninformed investors by a wide margin. At this low price, uninformed investors earn an average 
return of 482%, but informed investors who purchase loans with greater than 50% chance of 
curing earn an average return of 1111%. If the investor only buys loans with greater than 80% 
                                                            
8 So, for example, an investor could provide some amount of principal reduction for the borrower (here we assume 
20%) as an inducement to bring the loan current. 
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probability of curing, the return increases to 1336%. During the 2008 financial crisis, investors 
were fleeing any sort of mortgage risk but since the recovery in the real estate markets, we have 
been told by market participants that prices are closer to 0.40 on the dollar. Using this higher 
cost, uninformed investors would experiences losses with an average return of -27%, while 
informed investors would still have healthy 51% and 80% returns using loan cure probabilities 
greater than 50% and 80%, respectively. Although we are focusing on second liens, these results 
are similar to the Jiang et al. (2014) finding that investors in the secondary mortgage market 
have better performance than banks in the primary market due to increased information. Using 
superior information, the investors in the secondary mortgage market are more able to select 
better credits.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Loans in default remain a great concern for borrowers, lenders, and policymakers alike. 
Understanding the factors that contribute to cure rates on defaulted junior lien is, therefore, an 
important issue. Using a unique and proprietary dataset of borrowers who have defaulted on their 
junior liens, we find strong evidence that borrowers who cured the senior loan are significantly 
more likely to cure their junior liens than those who have not. Since resources attempting to cure 
second loans in default may be limited, efforts aimed at curing these loans may most efficiently 
be directed toward borrowers who have already cured their senior liens. Additionally, those that 
have lower balances on revolving debt and higher outstanding junior lien balances are more 
likely to cure their loans. Consistent with previous literature, our results also demonstrate the 
value of information in distressed debt markets.  As expected, application of a predictive model 
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such as we present, increases investment returns. We reserve the topic of senior loan cure rates 
for a subsequent research project.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides descriptive statistics for study variables. Jr Cure Flag and Sr Cure Flag are dichotomous 
variables that take the value of one if the junior or senior mortgage lien, respectively is cured as of the observation 
date and zero otherwise. Balance Open Installment and Balance Open Revolving are the natural logarithms of all 
unpaid installment loans and revolving debt, respectively for each borrower – year observation. Balance Sr 
Mortgage and Balance Jr Mortgage are the natural logarithms of senior and junior mortgage, respectively. 
Mortgage 30 dpd, Mortgage 60 dpd, and Mortgage 120 dpd are dichotomous variables that take the value of one if 
the senior mortgage is between 30 and 59 days past due, between 60 and 119 days past due or 120 and over days 
past due, respectively. Foreclosure rate is the natural logarithm of the rate of foreclosures for mortgages of the zip 
code in which the borrower’s property is located for 2009, obtained from CoreLogic. Piggyback is a dichotomous 
variable that takes the value of one if the junior lien and senior lien were issued within 30 days of each other. 
AVM300up is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the AVM is at least $300,000 and zero otherwise. 
CLTV100up, CLTV150up, and CLTV200up take the value of one if the ratio of original loan amount of the junior 
lien plus the original loan amount of the senior lien to AVM is at least 100%, 150%, or 200%, respectively. There 
are 132,320 observations for all variables. 
 
     
Variables Mean SD Min Max 
     
Jr Cure Flag 0.460 0.498 0 1.000 
Sr Cure Flag 0.380 0.485 0 1.000 
Balance Open Installment 6.409 4.978 0 15.590 
Balance Open Revolving 7.478 3.810 0 13.970 
Balance Sr Mortgage 11.650 1.475 0 16.120 
Balance Jr Mortgage 10.620 1.373 0 16.120 
Mortgage 30 dpd 0.135 0.342 0 1.000 
Mortgage 60 dpd 0.052 0.222 0 1.000 
Mortgage 120 dpd 0.184 0.388 0 1.000 
Foreclosure rate 0.031 0.029 0 0.259 
Piggyback 0.031 0.172 0 1.000 
AVM300up 0.218 0.413 0 1.000 
CLTV100up 0.597 0.490 0 1.000 
CLTV150up 0.203 0.402 0 1.000 
CLTV200up 0.081 0.273 0 1.000 
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Table 2: Pearson/Spearman correlation matrix 
 
This table provides correlations for study variables with Spearman's correlations reported above the diagonal and Pearson's correlations reported below the diagonal. Jr Cure Flag 
and Sr Cure Flag are dichotomous variables that take the value of one if the junior or senior mortgage lien, respectively is cured as of the observation date and zero otherwise. 
Balance Open Installment and Balance Open Revolving are the natural logarithms of all unpaid installment loans and revolving debt, respectively for each borrower – year 
observation. Balance Sr Mortgage and Balance Jr Mortgage are the natural logarithms of senior and junior mortgage, respectively. Mortgage 30 dpd, Mortgage 60 dpd, and 
Mortgage 120 dpd are dichotomous variables that take the value of one if the senior mortgage is between 30 and 59 days past due, between 60 and 119 days past due or 120 and 
over days past due, respectively. Foreclosure rate is the natural logarithm of the rate of foreclosures for mortgages of the zip code in which the borrower’s property is located for 
2009, obtained from CoreLogic. Piggyback is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the junior lien and senior lien were issued within 30 days of each other. 
AVM300up is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the AVM is at least $300,000 and zero otherwise. CLTV100up, CLTV150up, and CLTV200up take the value of 
one if the ratio of original loan amount of the junior lien plus the original loan amount of the senior lien to AVM is at least 100%, 150%, or 200%, respectively. There are 132,320 
observations for all variables. 
 
 
Jr Cure 
Flag 
Sr Cure 
Flag 
Balance 
Open 
Installment 
Balance 
Open 
Revolving 
Balance 
Sr 
Mortgage 
Balance Jr 
Mortgage 
Mortgage 
30 dpd 
Mortgage 
60 dpd 
Mortgage 
120 dpd 
Foreclosure 
rate Piggyback 
AVM300
up CLTV100up CLTV150up CLTV200up 
Jr Cure Flag 1 0.5058 -0.0462 -0.2573 0.0034 -0.0292 0.1287 0.1185 0.209 0.0128 0.0041 -0.0158 0.0178 0.0191 0.018 
Sr Cure Flag 0.5058 1 -0.0047 -0.1024 -0.0157 -0.0375 -0.0013 0.026 -0.0159 -0.028 -0.014 -0.0032 -0.0341 -0.0337 -0.0245 
Balance Open 
Installment -0.0387 -0.002 1 0.1896 0.0847 0.0564 0.0246 0.0036 -0.133 -0.057 -0.0064 0.0219 0.0675 -0.0114 -0.0264 
Balance Open Revolving -0.2019 -0.062 0.1591 1 0.1856 0.2767 -0.0969 -0.0801 -0.2867 -0.0795 -0.0194 0.2022 -0.0332 -0.0666 -0.066 
Balance Sr Mortgage -0.012 -0.0072 0.0245 0.1008 1 0.3827 -0.0204 0.004 0.0746 -0.0504 -0.0095 0.4987 0.1812 0.0784 0.0302 
Balance Jr Mortgage -0.0025 0.0054 0.0194 0.1799 0.1038 1 -0.0342 -0.0134 0.0269 -0.0124 0.0274 0.4368 0.1221 0.0753 0.0262 
Mortgage 30 days past 
due 0.1287 -0.0013 0.028 -0.0652 -0.0033 -0.0217 1 0.0523 -0.0837 -0.0194 -0.0061 -0.0196 -0.0047 -0.0141 -0.0118 
Mortgage 60 dpd 0.1185 0.026 0.0065 -0.0613 0.0077 -0.0131 0.0523 1 -0.0239 -0.0013 0.0093 -0.0066 0.0084 0.0007 -0.0004 
Mortgage 120 dpd 0.209 -0.0159 -0.1273 -0.2822 0.0045 -0.0013 -0.0837 -0.0239 1 0.1177 0.0713 0.0023 0.1131 0.1511 0.126 
Foreclosure rate 0.0038 -0.0318 -0.0465 -0.0555 -0.0346 -0.002 -0.0257 -0.003 0.1153 1 0.0058 -0.1686 0.2515 0.3213 0.2379 
Piggyback 0.0041 -0.014 -0.0083 -0.0195 -0.0449 -0.0021 -0.0061 0.0093 0.0713 0.0062 1 0.0191 0.0118 0.0368 0.032 
AVM300up -0.0158 -0.0032 -0.0162 0.1575 0.248 0.3033 -0.0196 -0.0066 0.0023 -0.1545 0.0191 1 -0.2044 -0.1791 -0.1318 
CLTV100up 0.0178 -0.0341 0.0591 -0.0256 0.1408 0.125 -0.0047 0.0084 0.1131 0.2032 0.0118 -0.2044 1 0.4149 0.2442 
CLTV150up 0.0191 -0.0337 -0.0123 -0.0621 0.0637 0.0686 -0.0141 0.0007 0.1511 0.3097 0.0368 -0.1791 0.4149 1 0.5887 
CLTV200up 0.018 -0.0245 -0.0252 -0.0629 0.0371 0.0293 -0.0118 -0.0004 0.126 0.2523 0.032 -0.1318 0.2442 0.5887 1 
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Table 3: Determinants of Jr Cure - Main Model 
This table reports the results of logistic regressions with Jr Cure Flag as the dependent variable and wealth measured by AVM300up. Panel A 
reports the coefficients and standard errors. Panel B reports average marginal effects for highly significant (1%) variables..Jr Cure Flag and Sr 
Cure Flag are dichotomous variables that take the value of one if the junior or senior mortgage lien, respectively is cured as of the observation 
date and zero otherwise. Balance Open Installment and Balance Open Revolving are the natural logarithms of all unpaid installment loans and 
revolving debt, respectively for each borrower – year observation. Balance Sr Mortgage and Balance Jr Mortgage are the natural logarithms of 
senior and junior mortgage, respectively. Mortgage 30 dpd, Mortgage 60 dpd, and Mortgage 120 dpd are dichotomous variables that take the 
value of one if the senior mortgage is between 30 and 59 days past due, between 60 and 119 days past due or 120 and over days past due, 
respectively. Foreclosure rate is the natural logarithm of the rate of foreclosures for mortgages of the zip code in which the borrower’s property 
is located for 2009, obtained from CoreLogic. Piggyback is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the junior lien and senior lien 
were issued within 30 days of each other. AVM300up is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the AVM is at least $300,000 and 
zero otherwise. CLTV100up, CLTV150up, and CLTV200up take the value of one if the ratio of original loan amount of the junior lien plus the 
original loan amount of the senior lien to AVM is at least 100%, 150%, or 200%, respectively. Recourse is a dichotomous variable that takes the 
value of one if the loan is in a recourse state and zero otherwise. State and loan vintage fixed effects are included. Standard errors in parentheses; 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Panel A: Coefficients and standard errors 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable CLTV 100% AVM dummy CLTV 150% AVM dummy CLTV 200% AVM dummy 
    
Balance Open Installment -0.000401 9.61e-05 0.000128 
 (0.00142) (0.00141) (0.00141) 
Balance Open Revolving -0.0772*** -0.0773*** -0.0773*** 
 (0.00196) (0.00196) (0.00196) 
Balance Sr Mortgage -0.0154*** -0.0108** -0.0103** 
 (0.00504) (0.00498) (0.00496) 
Balance Jr Mortgage 0.0400*** 0.0448*** 0.0454*** 
 (0.00554) (0.00550) (0.00547) 
Mortgage 30 dpd 1.175*** 1.176*** 1.176*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) 
Mortgage 60 dpd 1.350*** 1.352*** 1.352*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0321) 
Mortgage 120 dpd 1.531*** 1.535*** 1.536*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0194) (0.0194) 
Foreclosure rate 0.350 0.502 0.548 
 (0.359) (0.363) (0.362) 
Piggyback -0.0605 -0.0652 -0.0650 
 (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0405) 
AVM300up 0.0570* 0.0398 0.0359 
 (0.0334) (0.0335) (0.0333) 
AVM300up*Recourse -0.0983** -0.105*** -0.104*** 
 (0.0396) (0.0397) (0.0397) 
CLTV100up 0.0919***   
 (0.0163)   
CLTV150up  0.0295  
  (0.0195)  
CLTV200up   0.0265 
   (0.0270) 
Sr Cure Flag 2.616*** 2.615*** 2.614*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151) 
Constant -2.517** -2.603** -2.614** 
 (1.053) (1.055) (1.055) 
    
Observations 132,320 132,320 132,320 
State FE YES YES YES 
Vintage FE YES YES YES 
Pseudo R-squared 0.286 0.286 0.286 
Area Under ROC Curve 0.844 0.844 0.844 
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Panel B: Average Marginal Effects for highly significant (1%) variables in the main model 
Variable Model 1 
Balance Open Revolving -0.012 
Balance Sr Mortgage -0.002 
Balance Jr Mortgage 0.006 
Mortgage 30 dpd 0.189 
Mortgage 60 dpd 0.217 
Mortgage 120 dpd 0.246 
CLTV100up 0.015 
Sr Cure Flag 0.420 
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Table 4: Determinants of Jr Cure - Continuous wealth measure 
This table reports the results of logistic regressions with Jr Cure Flag as the dependent variable and wealth measured by AVM. Jr Cure Flag and 
Sr Cure Flag are dichotomous variables that take the value of one if the junior or senior mortgage lien, respectively is cured as of the observation 
date and zero otherwise. Balance Open Installment and Balance Open Revolving are the natural logarithms of all unpaid installment loans and 
revolving debt, respectively for each borrower – year observation. Balance Sr Mortgage and Balance Jr Mortgage are the natural logarithms of 
senior and junior mortgage, respectively. Mortgage 30 dpd, Mortgage 60 dpd, and Mortgage 120 dpd are dichotomous variables that take the 
value of one if the senior mortgage is between 30 and 59 days past due, between 60 and 119 days past due or 120 and over days past due, 
respectively. Foreclosure rate is the natural logarithm of the rate of foreclosures for mortgages of the zip code in which the borrower’s property 
is located for 2009, obtained from CoreLogic. Piggyback is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the junior lien and senior lien 
were issued within 30 days of each other. AVM is the natural logarithm of AVM. CLTV100up, CLTV150up, and CLTV200up take the value of 
one if the ratio of original loan amount of the junior lien plus the original loan amount of the senior lien to AVM is at least 100%, 150%, or 
200%, respectively. Recourse is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the loan is in a recourse state and zero otherwise. State and 
loan vintage fixed effects are included. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES CLTV 100% AVM cont CLTV 150% AVM cont CLTV 200% AVM cont 
    
Balance Open Installment -0.000417 0.000166 0.000199 
 (0.00142) (0.00141) (0.00141) 
Balance Open Revolving -0.0777*** -0.0775*** -0.0775*** 
 (0.00196) (0.00196) (0.00196) 
Balance Sr Mortgage -0.0192*** -0.0123** -0.0114** 
 (0.00522) (0.00514) (0.00511) 
Balance Jr Mortgage 0.0354*** 0.0428*** 0.0439*** 
 (0.00573) (0.00569) (0.00563) 
Mortgage 30 days past due 1.175*** 1.176*** 1.176*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) 
Mortgage 60 dpd 1.350*** 1.352*** 1.352*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0321) 
Mortgage 120 dpd 1.529*** 1.534*** 1.535*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0194) (0.0194) 
Foreclosure rate 0.518 0.554 0.587 
 (0.368) (0.370) (0.369) 
Piggyback -0.0629 -0.0665 -0.0659 
 (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0405) 
AVM 0.0563** 0.0294 0.0241 
 (0.0258) (0.0260) (0.0257) 
AVM*Recourse -0.0380 -0.0392 -0.0386 
 (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0274) 
CLTV100up 0.107***   
 (0.0174)   
CLTV150up  0.0323  
  (0.0211)  
CLTV200up   0.0243 
   (0.0288) 
Sr Cure flag 2.616*** 2.615*** 2.614*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151) 
Constant -3.112*** -2.927*** -2.883*** 
 (1.095) (1.097) (1.097) 
    
Observations 132,320 132,320 132,320 
State FE YES YES YES 
Vintage FE YES YES YES 
Pseudo R-squared 0.286 0.286 0.285 
Area Under ROC Curve 0.844 0.844 0.844 
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Table 5 Determinants of Jr Cure - Zip-code adjusted wealth measure 
This table reports the results of logistic regressions with Jr Cure Flag as the dependent variable and wealth measured by HighPrice. Jr Cure Flag 
and Sr Cure Flag are dichotomous variables that take the value of one if the junior or senior mortgage lien, respectively is cured as of the 
observation date and zero otherwise. Balance Open Installment and Balance Open Revolving are the natural logarithms of all unpaid installment 
loans and revolving debt, respectively for each borrower – year observation. Balance Sr Mortgage and Balance Jr Mortgage are the natural 
logarithms of senior and junior mortgage, respectively. Mortgage 30 dpd, Mortgage 60 dpd, and Mortgage 120 dpd are dichotomous variables 
that take the value of one if the senior mortgage is between 30 and 59 days past due, between 60 and 119 days past due or 120 and over days past 
due, respectively. Foreclosure rate is the natural logarithm of the rate of foreclosures for mortgages of the zip code in which the borrower’s 
property is located for 2009, obtained from CoreLogic. Piggyback is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the junior lien and 
senior lien were issued within 30 days of each other. HighPrice a dichotomous variable takes the value of one if the sum of the senior and junior 
liens’ original balances is greater than two times the average home sale price for the zip code and year, and zero otherwise. CLTV100up, 
CLTV150up, and CLTV200up take the value of one if the ratio of original loan amount of the junior lien plus the original loan amount of the 
senior lien to AVM is at least 100%, 150%, or 200%, respectively. Recourse is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the loan is in 
a recourse state and zero otherwise. State and loan vintage fixed effects are included. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
 
 
 (7) (8) (9) 
Variable CLTV 100% Zip-adj wealth CLTV 150% Zip-adj wealth CLTV 200% Zip-adj wealth 
    
Balance Open Installment -0.000426 0.000113 0.000139 
 (0.00142) (0.00141) (0.00141) 
Balance Open Revolving -0.0772*** -0.0775*** -0.0776*** 
 (0.00195) (0.00195) (0.00195) 
Balance Sr Mortgage -0.0166*** -0.0130*** -0.0128*** 
 (0.00495) (0.00491) (0.00491) 
Balance Jr Mortgage 0.0389*** 0.0424*** 0.0427*** 
 (0.00542) (0.00539) (0.00538) 
Mortgage 30 dpd 1.175*** 1.176*** 1.176*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) 
Mortgage 60 dpd 1.351*** 1.352*** 1.352*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0321) 
Mortgage 120 dpd 1.529*** 1.532*** 1.533*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0194) (0.0194) 
Foreclosure rate 0.220 0.441 0.486 
 (0.362) (0.364) (0.362) 
Piggyback -0.0614 -0.0673* -0.0673* 
 (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0405) 
HighPrice 0.116*** 0.123*** 0.128*** 
 (0.0383) (0.0388) (0.0387) 
HighPrice *Recourse -0.140*** -0.142*** -0.144*** 
 (0.0436) (0.0437) (0.0436) 
CLTV100up 0.0922***   
 (0.0160)   
CLTV150up  0.0242  
  (0.0199)  
CLTV200up   0.0178 
   (0.0276) 
Sr Cure flag 2.616*** 2.615*** 2.615*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151) 
Constant -2.491** -2.564** -2.571** 
 (1.053) (1.054) (1.054) 
    
Observations 132,320 132,320 132,320 
State FE YES YES YES 
Vintage FE YES YES YES 
Pseudo R-squared 0.286 0.286 0.286 
Area Under ROC Curve 0.844 0.844 0.844 
 
  
28 
 
Table 6: Determinants of Jr Cure - Robustness check - Main Model by AVM Confidence Score Quartile 
 
This table reports the results of logistic regressions by AVM confidence score quartile with Jr Cure Flag as the dependent variable and wealth 
measured by AVM300up. Jr Cure Flag and Sr Cure Flag are dichotomous variables that take the value of one if the junior or senior mortgage 
lien, respectively is cured as of the observation date and zero otherwise. Balance Open Installment and Balance Open Revolving are the natural 
logarithms of all unpaid installment loans and revolving debt, respectively for each borrower – year observation. Balance Sr Mortgage and 
Balance Jr Mortgage are the natural logarithms of senior and junior mortgage, respectively. Mortgage 30 dpd, Mortgage 60 dpd, and Mortgage 
120 dpd are dichotomous variables that take the value of one if the senior mortgage is between 30 and 59 days past due, between 60 and 119 days 
past due or 120 and over days past due, respectively. Foreclosure rate is the natural logarithm of the rate of foreclosures for mortgages of the zip 
code in which the borrower’s property is located for 2009, obtained from CoreLogic. Piggyback is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 
one if the junior lien and senior lien were issued within 30 days of each other. AVM300up is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if 
the AVM is at least $300,000 and zero otherwise. CLTV100up, CLTV150up, and CLTV200up take the value of one if the ratio of original loan 
amount of the junior lien plus the original loan amount of the senior lien to AVM is at least 100%, 150%, or 200%, respectively. Recourse is a 
dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the loan is in a recourse state and zero otherwise. State and loan vintage fixed effects are 
included. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) 
VARIABLES cs_quart=1 cs_quart=2 cs_quart=3 cs_quart=4 
     
Balance Open Installment -0.00218 0.00445* -0.00458 -0.00106 
 (0.00267) (0.00270) (0.00325) (0.00285) 
Balance Open Revolving -0.0705*** -0.0850*** -0.0752*** -0.0786*** 
 (0.00359) (0.00376) (0.00456) (0.00398) 
Balance Sr Mortgage -0.0115 -0.00799 -0.0313*** -0.0164 
 (0.00970) (0.00959) (0.0116) (0.00999) 
Balance Jr Mortgage 0.0282*** 0.0567*** 0.0259** 0.0438*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0108) (0.0126) (0.0112) 
Mortgage 30 dpd 1.141*** 1.137*** 1.226*** 1.226*** 
 (0.0372) (0.0390) (0.0469) (0.0412) 
Mortgage 60 dpd 1.370*** 1.325*** 1.344*** 1.370*** 
 (0.0604) (0.0619) (0.0738) (0.0633) 
Mortgage 120 dpd 1.493*** 1.515*** 1.572*** 1.564*** 
 (0.0370) (0.0366) (0.0443) (0.0386) 
Foreclosure rate -0.226 0.137 0.976 1.036 
 (0.650) (0.666) (0.849) (0.812) 
Piggyback -0.0162 -0.0275 -0.0762 -0.119 
 (0.0793) (0.0779) (0.0935) (0.0769) 
AVM300up -0.0496 0.0324 0.0727 0.130** 
 (0.0786) (0.0611) (0.0704) (0.0641) 
AVM300up*Recourse -0.0134 -0.118 -0.0342 -0.151* 
 (0.0893) (0.0728) (0.0851) (0.0775) 
CLTV100up 0.0858*** 0.102*** 0.130*** 0.0675** 
 (0.0309) (0.0315) (0.0376) (0.0328) 
Sr Cure flag 2.624*** 2.630*** 2.663*** 2.582*** 
 (0.0283) (0.0291) (0.0350) (0.0304) 
Constant -1.867 -14.98 -0.791 9.134 
 (1.426) (532.5) (1.631) (637.5) 
     
Observations 37,670 36,364 25,466 32,810 
State FE YES YES YES YES 
Vintage FE YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R-squared 0.285 0.287 0.292 0.285 
Area Under ROC Curve 0.844 0.846 0.846 0.844 
 
 
  
29 
 
Table 7: Determinants of Jr Cure - Robustness check - Non-linear Effects 
This table reports the results of logistic regressions with Jr Cure Flag as the dependent variable and wealth measured by AVM300up. Jr Cure 
Flag and Sr Cure Flag are dichotomous variables that take the value of one if the junior or senior mortgage lien, respectively is cured as of the 
observation date and zero otherwise. Balance Open Installment and Balance Open Revolving are the natural logarithms of all unpaid installment 
loans and revolving debt, respectively for each borrower – year observation. Balance Sr Mortgage and Balance Jr Mortgage are the natural 
logarithms of senior and junior mortgage, respectively. The squared terms of Balance variables are included to allow for non-linearity. Mortgage 
30 dpd, Mortgage 60 dpd, and Mortgage 120 dpd are dichotomous variables that take the value of one if the senior mortgage is between 30 and 
59 days past due, between 60 and 119 days past due or 120 and over days past due, respectively. Foreclosure rate is the natural logarithm of the 
rate of foreclosures for mortgages of the zip code in which the borrower’s property is located for 2009, obtained from CoreLogic. Piggyback is a 
dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the junior lien and senior lien were issued within 30 days of each other. AVM300up is a 
dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the AVM is at least $300,000 and zero otherwise. CLTV100up, CLTV150up, and CLTV200up 
take the value of one if the ratio of original loan amount of the junior lien plus the original loan amount of the senior lien to AVM is at least 
100%, 150%, or 200%, respectively. Recourse is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the loan is in a recourse state and zero 
otherwise. State and loan vintage fixed effects are included. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 (14) (15) 
Variable CLTV 100% AVM dummy CLTV 100% AVM dummy 
Balance Open Installment 0.0139 0.0140 
 (0.0102) (0.0102) 
Balance Open Revolving 0.196*** 0.196*** 
 (0.00709) (0.00710) 
Balance Sr Mortgage -0.101*** -0.101*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0170) 
Balance Jr Mortgage 0.0152 0.0144 
 (0.0167) (0.0167) 
Balance Open Installment^2 -0.00125 -0.00126 
 (0.000962) (0.000963) 
Balance Open Revolving^2 -0.0269*** -0.0270*** 
 (0.000677) (0.000677) 
Balance Sr Mortgage^2 0.00698*** 0.00700*** 
 (0.00120) (0.00120) 
Balance Jr Mortgage^2 0.00298*** 0.00305*** 
 (0.00110) (0.00110) 
Mortgage 30 dpd 1.108*** 1.108*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0204) 
Mortgage 60 dpd 1.282*** 1.282*** 
 (0.0322) (0.0322) 
Mortgage 120 dpd 1.444*** 1.444*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0195) 
Foreclosure rate 0.232 0.223 
 (0.363) (0.362) 
Piggyback -0.0574 -0.0573 
 (0.0407) (0.0408) 
AVM300up 0.0471 -0.00241 
 (0.0352) (0.0375) 
AVM300up*Recourse -0.0778* -0.0835** 
 (0.0401) (0.0404) 
CLTV100up 0.0548*** 0.0551*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0170) 
Sr Cure flag*AVM300up  0.138*** 
  (0.0351) 
Sr Cure flag 2.593*** 2.564*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0170) 
Constant -2.731** -2.730** 
 (1.094) (1.095) 
   
Observations 132,320 132,320 
State FE YES YES 
Vintage FE YES YES 
Pseudo R-squared 0.295 0.295 
Area Under ROC Curve 0.848 0.848 
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Table 8: Determinants of Jr Cure - Robustness check - Continuous variables winsorized at 1% and 99% 
 
This table reports the results of logistic regressions by AVM confidence score quartile with Jr Cure Flag as the dependent variable and wealth 
measured by AVM300up. Jr Cure Flag and Sr Cure Flag are dichotomous variables that take the value of one if the junior or senior mortgage 
lien, respectively is cured as of the observation date and zero otherwise. Balance Open Installment_w and Balance Open Revolving_w are the 
natural logarithms of all unpaid installment loans and revolving debt, respectively for each borrower – year observation, winsorized at 1% and 
99%. Balance Sr Mortgage_w and Balance Jr Mortgage_w are the natural logarithms of senior and junior mortgage, respectively winsorized at 
1% and 99%. Mortgage 30 dpd, Mortgage 60 dpd, and Mortgage 120 dpd are dichotomous variables that take the value of one if the senior 
mortgage is between 30 and 59 days past due, between 60 and 119 days past due or 120 and over days past due, respectively. Foreclosure rate_w 
is the natural logarithm of the rate of foreclosures for mortgages of the zip code in which the borrower’s property is located for 2009, obtained 
from CoreLogic and winsorized at 1% and 99%. Piggyback is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the junior lien and senior lien 
were issued within 30 days of each other. AVM300up is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the AVM is at least $300,000 and 
zero otherwise. CLTV100up, CLTV150up, and CLTV200up take the value of one if the ratio of original loan amount of the junior lien plus the 
original loan amount of the senior lien to AVM is at least 100%, 150%, or 200%, respectively. Recourse is a dichotomous variable that takes the 
value of one if the loan is in a recourse state and zero otherwise. State and loan vintage fixed effects are included. Standard errors in parentheses; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 (16) (17) (18) 
Variable CLTV 100% AVM 
dummy 
CLTV 150% AVM 
dummy 
CLTV 200% AVM 
dummy 
    
Balance Open Installment_w -0.000380 0.000109 0.000139 
 (0.00142) (0.00141) (0.00141) 
Balance Open Revolving_w -0.0772*** -0.0774*** -0.0775*** 
 (0.00197) (0.00197) (0.00197) 
Balance Sr Mortgage_w -0.0140*** -0.00920* -0.00874* 
 (0.00507) (0.00500) (0.00498) 
Balance Jr Mortgage_w 0.0483*** 0.0567*** 0.0578*** 
 (0.00809) (0.00797) (0.00791) 
Mortgage 30 dpd 1.175*** 1.176*** 1.176*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) 
Mortgage 60 dpd 1.349*** 1.351*** 1.351*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0321) 
Mortgage 120 dpd 1.530*** 1.533*** 1.534*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0194) (0.0194) 
Foreclosure Rate_w 0.396 0.582 0.630 
 (0.385) (0.389) (0.387) 
Piggyback -0.0651 -0.0702* -0.0701* 
 (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0405) 
AVM300up 0.0520 0.0327 0.0290 
 (0.0337) (0.0337) (0.0336) 
AVM300up*Recourse -0.101** -0.109*** -0.109*** 
 (0.0397) (0.0397) (0.0397) 
CLTV100up 0.0915***   
 (0.0165)   
CLTV150up  0.0278  
  (0.0196)  
CLTV200up   0.0255 
   (0.0270) 
Sr Cure flag 2.618*** 2.617*** 2.616*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151) 
Constant -2.633** -2.763*** -2.779*** 
 (1.053) (1.054) (1.054) 
    
Observations 132,320 132,320 132,320 
State FE YES YES YES 
Vintage FE YES YES YES 
Pseudo R-squared 0.286 0.285 0.285 
Area Under ROC Curve 0.844 0.844 0.844 
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Table 9: Estimated Returns for Uninformed and Informed Investors 
This table reports the mean estimated returns for uninformed investors and informed investors using the study's main model. The estimated 
payoff for each loan is calculated as the balance of the junior lien as of March 31, 2009, multiplied by the probability of cure (from Model 1 of 
Table 3) multiplied by 0.80 (assuming 80% of the loan balance is recovered). Estimated returns are calculated by subtracting 1 from the estimated 
payoff divided by estimated loan cost. The estimated loan cost is calculated by multiplying the loan cost per dollar (ranging from 0.05 to 0.40) by 
the March 2009 loan balance. The table assumes that uninformed investors buy all loans in the 2009 cohort and that informed investors buy only 
loans in the 2009 cohort that have a higher than 50% or 80% probability of curing.  
Mean Estimated Return   
 Loan Cost per Dollar 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 
Uninformed investor  482% 191% 94%  46%  16%  ‐3%  ‐17%  ‐27% 
Informed investor   
Invests only if prob cure>50% 1111% 506% 304%  203%  142%  102%  73%  51% 
  
Invests only if prob cure>80% 1336% 618% 379%  259%  187%  139%  105%  80% 
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1 Introduction
Over the past ten years, the real amount of student debt owed by American households more
than doubled, from about $450 billion to more than $1.1 trillion, with average real debt per
borrower increasing from about $19,000 to $27,000.1 During the same period, the U.S.
homeownership rate declined markedly amidst the housing market bust and the financial
crisis: from 69 percent in 2005 to 64 percent in 2014.2 The declines in homeownership
have been the largest (both in relative and absolute terms) among young households—a
population segment that owes the preponderance of the outstanding student loan debt. For
example, the homeownership rate for households between ages 24 and 32 declined by 9
percentage points (from 45 to 36 percent) between 2005 and 2014, nearly twice as large
as the 5 percentage point drop in homeownership for the overall population. Against this
backdrop, market commentary has suggested that increases in student loan debt might be a
key factor pushing homeownership rates down in recent years through effects on borrowers’
ability to qualify for a mortgage and their desire to take on more debt.3 Corroborating this
claim, recent surveys have found that many young individuals view student loan debt as a
major impediment to home buying.4
Estimation of the effect of student loan debt on homeownership is complicated by the
presence of other factors that influence both student loan borrowing and homeownership
decisions. Researchers have previously attempted to isolate the effect by controlling for a
set of observable student characteristics (Cooper and Wang (2014) and Houle and Berger
1Figures are based on authors’ calculation from the NYFed CCP/Equifax data set. Nominal amounts are
deflated by CPI-U into constant 2015:Q2 dollars.
2Source: Current Population Survey.
3For some examples, see “CFPB Director: Student Loans Are Killing the Drive to Buy Homes,” Housing
Wire, May 19, 2014; “Denied? The Impact of Student Loan Debt on the Ability to Buy a House” by J.
Mishory and R. O’Sullivan at www.younginvincibles.org.
4See, for example, Stone et al. (2012) or “What Younger Renters Want and the Financial Constraints
They See,” Fannie Mae, May 2014.
2
(2015)). These studies found only very small negative effects. However, the covariates
recorded in available data sets may not adequately control for every important omitted
factor, resulting in biased estimates. For example, students preparing for a career with a
high expected income might borrow more to fund their college educations and also might be
more likely to own a home in the future. To address the endogeneity of student loan debt,
in their study of the effects of student loan debt on the future financial stability of student
loan borrowers Gicheva and Thompson (2014) use the national average levels of student loan
borrowing as an instrument. They find a more meaningful effect size, but identification in
their approach may be confounded by other aggregate trends.5
In the context of the existing literature, this paper makes two key contributions. First,
we use a uniquely constructed administrative data set that combines anonymized individual
credit bureau records with Pell Grant and federal student loan recipient information, records
on college enrollment, graduation and major, and school characteristics. The core credit
bureau data—onto which the other anonymized data sources are merged—are based on a
nationally representative sample of individuals who were 23 to 31 years old in 2004 and span
the period 1997-2010. The administrative nature of our data likely provides us with more
accurate measures of financial variables than self-reported data sets.
Second, we exploit a quasi-natural experiment to estimate the causal effect of changes
in student loan debt on the homeownership rate over the first 60 months after the final
school exit (where observable factors are measured at the time of the school exit). This
eliminates the bias from unobservable factors that might affect estimates identified based
solely on observable characteristics. The experiment is generated by increases in average
5Other studies, which are mostly based on trend analysis, include Brown et al. (2013), Akers (2014),
Mezza et al. (2014); and analyses by TransUnion ( Kuipers and Wise (2016)) and Zillow (http://www.
zillow.com/research/student-debt-homeownership-10563/).
3
in-state tuition at public 4-year universities in subjects’ states of residence prior to enrolling
in post-secondary education (henceforth, home states).6 In particular, increases in in-state
tuition at public 4-year universities increase the amount of student loan borrowing, as a large
fraction of post-secondary students attend public universities in their home states. Moreover,
since home-state tuition changes are not determined by the choices of any individual student,
we claim that these tuition price changes do not affect homeownership decisions through any
channel other than increases in student loan debt. This claim is supported by a number of
validity tests presented in Section 4.4. Mainly, we show that the estimated effect is not due
to endogeneity of the instrument to local economic conditions, and provide evidence that
selection along the extensive margin of college attendance cannot explain the results.
We find that the estimated effect from the procedure based only on observable controls
is negative but very small, similar to the results from existing studies. In contrast, our
estimates based on the quasi-natural experiment indicate a substantially larger reduction in
homeownership due to student loan debt. Namely, a 10 percent increase in student loan debt
causes a decrease of about 1 to 2 percentage points in the homeownership rate of student
loan borrowers immediately upon school exit, relative to a mere 0.1 percentage point decline
derived from the procedure based only on observable controls. The causal effect estimated
using the natural-experiment framework shows little indication of diminishing across the 60
month window, although the precision of the estimates decreases with time.
To be sure, this paper estimates the effect of a ceteris paribus change in debt levels,
rather than the effect of a change in access to student loan debt, on future homeownership.
In particular, if student loans allow individuals to access college education—or, more broadly,
acquire more of it—student loan debt could have a positive effect on homeownership, as long
6Relatedly, Bleemer et al. (2014) use state-level tuition measures to instrument for student debt in the
context of its effect on parental co-residence.
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as the return to this additional education allows individuals to sufficiently increase their
future incomes. Given that changes in access to student loan debt could impact the decision
to go to college, the type or quality of college attended, and the total educational attainment,
such a research question is quite different from the question asked in this paper. Rather,
the question we address is: “All else equal, if one were to obtain a certain level of education
but at a somewhat lower price (and, consequently, with less debt), how would one’s access
to homeownership be affected?” Our exercise is similar in spirit to a thought experiment
in which a small amount of student loan debt is forgiven upon exiting school, without any
effect on individuals’ past decisions on post-secondary education acquisition.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the institutional
background of the student loan market and examines the main theoretical channels through
which student loan debt likely affects access to homeownership. Section 3 gives an overview
of the data set and defines variables used in the analysis. Section 4 analyzes the effect of
changes in student loan debt on homeownership using “selection on observables” as well as
instrumental variable frameworks, and conducts several validity tests for our instrument.
Section 5 interprets and caveats our main findings. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background and Mechanism
2.1 Institutional Background
Student loans are a popular way for Americans to pay the cost of college. Among bachelor’s
degree recipients who graduated in 2012, 70 percent had accumulated some student debt
and 18 percent owed $40,000 or more.7
7SOURCE: College Board, Trends in Higher Education: Student Aid http://trends.collegeboard.
org/student-aid/figures-tables/cumulative-debt-bachelors-recipients-sector-time.
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Every student has access to federal student loans, which generally do not involve un-
derwriting and can charge below market rates8. The amount of such loans students can
borrow is capped by Congress, however. Federal student loans are also not dischargeable
in bankruptcy, reducing the options of borrowers in financial distress.9 Student borrowers
frequently exhaust their available federal loans before moving on to generally more expen-
sive private loans, often with a parent as co-signer.10 Historically, the typical student loan is
fully amortizing over a 10-year term with fixed payments. Deferments and forbearances can
extend this term, as can enrollment in alternative repayment plans, such as the extended
repayment plan (available for borrowers with high balances) and income-driven repayment
plans (which have become more common in recent years and are available for borrowers with
elevated debt-to-income ratios), and through loan consolidation.11
Student loan debt can impose a significant financial burden on some borrowers. Despite
the inability to discharge federal loans through bankruptcy, 14 percent of recipients with
outstanding federal student debt were in default as of October 2015.12 Student borrowers
are often young and at a low point in their life cycle earnings profile. The financial difficulties
may be more severe for students who fail to graduate. Of the federal student loan borrowers
who entered repayment in 2011-12 without a degree, 24 percent defaulted within two years.13
8Graduate students taking PLUS loans—as well as parents taking Parent PLUS loans—must pass a credit
check.
9In 2005 the bankruptcy code was amended, making private student loans also not routinely dischargeable
in bankruptcy.
10The share of loans with a co-signer increased significantly after the financial crisis, from 67 percent in
2008, to over 90 percent in 2011. SOURCE: CFPB, Private Student Loans, August, 2012.
11SOURCE: https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/understand/plans.
12SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Federal Student Aid Data Center, Federal Student Loan
Portfolio.
13SOURCE: U.S. Department of Treasury calculations based on sample data from the National Student
Loan Data System.
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2.2 Theoretical Mechanism
Most young home buyers must borrow the money to buy their first house. We conjecture that
three underwriting factors provide a channel through which student loan debt can affect the
borrower’s ability to obtain a mortgage. First, the individual must meet a minimum down
payment requirement that is proportional to the house value. While a 20 percent down
payment is typical for many buyers, with mortgage insurance (whether purchased from
a private company or a government agency such as the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA)) the down payment can be significantly less.14 Second, the individual must satisfy a
maximum debt-to-income (DTI) ratio requirement, with the ratio of all her debt payments
not to exceed a percentage of her income at the time the loan is originated. Third, the
individual must satisfy a minimum credit score requirement. As these underwriting factors
worsen for any individual (i.e. less cash available for a down payment, higher DTI ratio and
lower credit score), she will be more likely to be rejected for a loan, or face a higher interest
rate or mortgage insurance premium.
It is not hard to see how—all else equal—having more student loan debt can mechanically
affect one’s entry into homeownership through these three channels. First, a higher student
loan debt payment affects the individual’s ability to accumulate financial wealth that can
then be used as a source of down payment. Second, a higher student loan payment increases
the individual’s DTI ratio, potentially making it more difficult for the borrower to qualify
for a mortgage loan. Third, student loan payments can affect borrowers’ credit scores.
On the one hand, the effect can be positive: timely payments of student loan debt may
help borrowers to improve their credit profiles. On the other hand, potential delinquencies
adversely affect credit scores, thereby hampering borrowers’ access to mortgage credit. At
14The FHA requires a down payment as low as 3.5 percent of the purchase value.
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the same time, other non-underwriting factors might have effects as well. For example, from
a behavioral perspective, if individuals exhibit debt aversion and wish to repay at least some
of their existing debt prior to taking on new debt in the form of a mortgage, larger student
loan debt burdens can further delay their entry into homeownership.
Various factors might influence how the effect of student loan debt on homeownership
changes in the years after leaving school. Since cumulative balances are generally the largest
immediately upon entering repayment (see Figure 15 in Looney and Yannelis (2015)), there
are at least three reasons to believe that the ceteris paribus effect of higher student loan
debt on homeownership access might be the largest immediately upon school exit. First,
given that the income profile tends to rise over the life cycle and student loan payments are
fixed, the DTI constraint should ease over time, as should the budget constraint, thereby
allowing the individual to potentially accumulate assets for a down payment at a faster rate.
Second, once all debt is repaid, the student loan debt component of debt payments in the
DTI constraint disappears entirely. Of course, the past effects of student loan payments on
accumulated assets are likely to be more persistent if student loan payments significantly
impaired the individual’s ability to save at a rate comparable to that of an individual with
less student debt for a period of time. Third, any effect of debt aversion induced by a higher
student loan debt burden at school exit should diminish over time as the balance is paid
down.
However, there may also be countervailing effects. In particular, the propensity for
homeownership is generally relatively low among those newly out of school and increases
with age. Hence, the number of marginal home buyers may peak many years after the
final school exit, suggesting that the effect of student loan debt might be increasing as the
debtor ages. Also, individuals may exhibit habit formation in their housing tenure choice.
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A marginal home buyer who is induced into renting by her debts may become accustomed
to renting, in which case the apparent effect of student loan debt on homeownership could
persist for many years.
3 Data
Our data are pooled from several sources.15 Mezza and Sommer (2015) discusses the details
of the data, checks the representativeness of the merged data set against alternative data
sources, and provides caveats relevant for the analysis.
By way of summary, the data set starts with a nationally representative random sample
of credit bureau records picked and provided by TransUnion, LLC, for a cohort of 34,891
young individuals who were between ages 23 and 31 in 2004, and spans the period 1997
through 2010. Individuals are followed biannually between June 1997 and June 2003, and
then in December 2004, June 2007, and December 2008 and 2010. The data contain all
major credit bureau variables, including credit scores, tradeline debt levels, and delinquency
and severe derogatory records. In order to capture information on enrollment spells and
the institutional-level characteristics associated with each spell, in the next step individual
educational records through 2007 are sourced from DegreeVerify (for degrees) and Student
Tracker (for enrollments) programs by the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC). Next,
additional individual-level information on enrollment for spells funded by federal student
loans, the amount of federal student loan borrowed during and the institutions associated
with these enrollment spells, as well as information on Pell Grants received, is sourced from
15All the merges of individual-level information have been performed by TransUnion, LLC, in conjunction
with the National Student Clearinghouse, and the Department of Education. The merges have been done
based on a combination of Social Security number, date of birth, and individuals’ first and last names. None
of the variables used to merge individuals across sources is available in our data set.
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the National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS) and merged onto the data for federal stu-
dent loan and Pell Grant recipients. The NSC and NSLDS educational institution identifiers
allow us to further merge institutional records from the Integrated Postsecondary Education
Data System (IPEDS), such as tuition, sector (e.g., public, private for-profit and not-for-
profit, open admission), and SAT and ACT scores that are summarized at a school level.
Finally, information on the state of permanent residence at the time when individuals took
the SAT standardized test—sourced from the College Board—is merged for the subset of
individuals who took this test between 1994 and 1999, at a time when most of the individuals
in our sample exited high school.16
Since our analysis aims to estimate the effect of a marginal change in cumulative stu-
dent loan debt on future homeownership once all educational and college-funding decisions
have been made, we collapse our panel into a cross-sectional data set where all explanatory
variables are measured approximately at the time of the final school exit, and estimate their
effect on the individuals’ homeownership status observed at different time windows following
school exit. An individual in our sample is thus characterized by variables such as age at the
final school exit, cumulative student loan balance and credit scores at the time of that exit,
highest degree ever obtained, and total days spent in school. Most variables are constructed
using a single data source. However, for some variables we combine information from mul-
tiple data sources to increase measurement accuracy. In what follows, we describe how each
variable used in our analysis is constructed, and discuss the final estimation data set after
any sampling restrictions have been applied.
16The SAT test is not mandatory nor is it required by all institutions and, as such, not all potential college
entrants take it.
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3.1 Dependent Variable
Given that we are not able to observe the individual’s homeownership status, we infer it
from whether the individual has at least one open mortgage account in the TransUnion data
N months following the final school exit. The credit data contains the opening and closing
dates for each mortgage tradeline in a year/month format, meaning that the individual’s
homeownership status is observed at a monthly frequency. In our analysis, we treat the
individual’s homeownership status as an absorbing state, so that if an individual is observed
to be a homeowner at a given point after the final school exit, the individual will be treated
as a homeowner at all future times. For individuals with a mortgage tradeline prior to school
exit, the binary dependent variable takes on a value of one at N = 0.
The obvious limitation of using mortgage tradeline information to infer the individual’s
homeownership status is that we will not be able to identify homeowners who are either cash-
buyers or have already paid off their mortgage loans in full prior to June 1997.17 However,
given that individuals in our sample are between ages 23 and 31 in 2004, the population of
such “unidentified” homeowners in our sample is likely to be small.
3.2 Independent Variables
Student loan balances: Ideally, student loan balances would be measured at the time of the
final school exit. Unfortunately, given that TransUnion data are available only at particular
points in time, generally this will not be the case unless school exit coincides with the exact
dates for which we observe TransUnion records. Theoretically, after the final school exit, the
cumulative student loan balance should increase only if accrued interest on the outstanding
17Individuals who have had a loan between June 1997—the earliest wave of TransUnion data available to
us—and school exit will be treated as homeowners in our analysis.
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balances or penalties (such as debt collection fees) exceed payments.18 Practically, in our
data, the student loan balance observed in the TransUnion wave just after the final school
exit could be higher than that measured in the wave just before school exit because a
borrower might have accumulated more student loan debt between the wave preceding the
school exit and the school exit itself. Thus, to measure the balance at school exit as closely
as possible, we use the maximum level of student loan debt observed in TransUnion in the
waves immediately adjacent to the final school exit.19
Credit scores, credit card debt, and auto debt: Similarly to student loan balances, gener-
ally these variables are not observed at the exact time of the final school exit.20 To avoid
reverse causality, we use their most recent value observed in TransUnion before the final
school exit.
Missing credit score: This indicator variable takes on a value of one if the individual does
not have a credit score reported in TransUnion in the wave preceding the final school exit;
zero otherwise.
Credit lag: This variable measures how many days before the final school exit the lagged
credit variables—credit score, credit card, and auto debts—were measured in TransUnion.
Ever Pell and cumulative Pell Grants received: These variables indicate whether the
individual ever received Pell grants to finance their post-secondary education and the total
amount received, respectively.
Highest degree attained: We construct a set of seven mutually exclusive binary indicators
18For example, student loan borrowers do not have to start repaying their student loans right away after
school exit, in general. The waiting period after school exit and before repayment begins is known as the
grace period, and typically lasts six months. Subsidized Stafford federal loans do not accrue interest over
the grace period, whereas other types of federal student loans do.
19As such, student loan balances are expected to be measured with error. The instrumental variable
approach should deal with this measurement problem. Results are robust to whether we use the maximum
value or a lagged value of student loan balances.
20The credit score used in this analysis is the TU TransRisk AM Score and it ranges from 270 to 900
points
12
for the highest degree ever attained. We group degrees into the following categories: (1)
dropouts (i.e, those with at least some college but no attained degree), (2) associate’s or
certificate degree holders, (3) bachelor’s degree holders, and (4) holders of a master’s degree
or more. Moreover, for some individuals, we observe a certain degree (such as a bachelor’s
degree) that is followed by another degree of unknown type. In such instances, when an
associate’s degree/Certificate or bachelor’s degree are observed and are followed by a degree
of unknown type, we assign individuals into the categories (5) at least an associate’s degree
or a certificate and (6) at least a bachelor’s degree, respectively. Finally, those with just a
degree of unknown type are grouped into a category (7) with a degree of unknown type.21
Majors: College majors are available only for those with completed degrees. We aggregate
them into 15 different categories, described in detail in Mezza and Sommer (2015). If a major
is missing but a degree was received, a “missing major” indicator takes on a value of one;
zero otherwise.
School sectors: We construct a set of five non-mutually exclusive binary indicators cap-
turing all school sectors with which an individual was ever associated while in school: (1)
public 4-year, (2) public 2-year, (3) private 4-year not-for-profit, (4) private 2-year not-for-
profit, and (5) private for-profit. To determine the school sectors in our data set, we need
unique school level identifiers associated with each enrollment spell observed for a given indi-
vidual in the sample. In theory, the NSC enrollment records should be sufficient to identify
all enrollment spells and, consequently, allow us to observe all sectors attended. In practice,
the NSC coverage is not perfect, largely due to school non-participation in the NSC Student
Tracker and DegreeVerify programs (for detailed discussion, see Mezza and Sommer (2015)
21The NSC collects the graduation date and degree information from schools that report into the DegreeV-
erify program. Unfortunately, some graduation dates are reported without the type of degree associated with
it. When a degree of unknown type is observed in the NSC, but borrowing from the federal government for
a subsequent degree is observed in the NSLDS, we use this additional information to infer the degree.
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or Dynarski et al. (2013)). Hence, in order to supplement the NSC enrollment data, we
use enrollment information from the NSLDS for enrollment spells funded by federal student
loans.
Age at final school exit: This variable captures the individual’s age when the person
exited school for the last time. To construct this variable, we use the maximum age at
school exit based on the NSC and the NSLDS data.
Cumulative days in school: This variable counts the total days of enrollment in post-
secondary education. The cumulative time spent in school is derived from enrollment histo-
ries that are constructed using the combined NSC and NSLDS enrollment records.
Pre-college state of residence (or home state): To construct the state of residence prior
to the first postsecondary enrollment spell, we proceed in three steps. First, for individuals
who took the standardized SAT test, we use these individuals’ state of legal residence at
the time when they took the test, reported in the College Board data. In our sample, 31
percent of students have their home state identified in this manner. Second, for individuals
for whom this information is not available, we use the first state of residence observed in
the TransUnion credit records as long as this information is available for the period that
precedes the first college enrollment observed in the sample. An additional 12 percent have
their home state identified this way. Finally, for the remainder of the sample, we impute the
home state using data on the state in which the school associated with the first enrollment
spell is located.
This last step can certainly appear problematic given that it could reflect an endogenous
location choice associated with state-level college cost or college quality. However, a case
can be made for why the state of the first college attended might be highly correlated with
the individuals’ pre-college state of residence. In particular, in the nationally representative
14
2003-04 Beginning Postsecondary Students Longitudinal Study, only 11 percent of first-time,
non-foreign college entrants attended a post-secondary institution not in their state of legal
residence, with the state of legal residence defined as the student’s true, fixed, and permanent
home.22 Under this definition, if the student moved into a state for the sole purpose of
attending a school, that state does not count as the student’s legal residence. In our sample,
26 percent of students whose home state was identified by the SAT or their credit record
attended an out of state school.23 These students represent 11 percent of our total sample,
accounting for the entire expected population of out-of-state students, and suggesting that
among the remaining students the state of first college attendance is extremely likely to
be their home state. We therefore do not believe that misidentification of home state is a
significant issue.
Home state and year fixed effects: The state controls are associated with the home state
described above while the time controls are associated with the year in which the person left
school for the last time.
Unemployment rate, average weekly wages and house prices at the state level: The unem-
ployment rate is sourced from the yearly Local Area Unemployment Statistics series by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and captures the unemployment rate in the individual’s
home state for the year when the person exited school for the last time. The average weekly
wages are sourced from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages by the BLS and
capture the average weekly wages in the home state for the quarter when the person exited
school for the last time. Finally, the house value index is sourced from Zillow and captures
the median house value (measured in dollars) in the home state for the month when the
22Source for the definition: https://fafsa.ed.gov/fotw1415/help/fahelp46.htm.
23While the College Board data for SAT-takers is available only for a subsample of our total population,
its coverage is likely skewed toward higher academically achieving individuals who are more likely to attend
out-of-state selective institutions.
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person exited school for the last time.
3.3 Candidate Instrumental Variable
Our candidate instrument for cumulative student loan balances at the final school exit is
based on the average in-state tuition at public 4-year schools in the state where an individual
lived before enrolling in college for the first time.24 To construct the instrument, we proceed
in three steps. First, we count the number of days that the individual spent enrolled in
school per academic year.25 Second, we assume that individuals pay the average in-state
tuition at public 4-year institutions associated with the state of their pre-college residence
(defined in Section 3.2), proportionally adjusted for the number of days spent in school
in that academic year. Third, we add up these tuition costs across time—up until the
final school exit in the sample—to capture the student loan balance accumulation over the
course of post-secondary studies. Importantly, given that the time spent in school can
also be correlated with omitted variables that might be associated with the homeownership
decisions, we control for cumulative time spent in school separately.26
3.4 Estimation Data Set
In this subsection, we describe the final subsample used in the analysis. First, we focus on
the population of college-going individuals with existing NSC enrollment records: 18,748
individuals. Second, to estimate the effect of student loan debt on homeownership once
24The data on the average in-state tuition at public 4-year school by state and academic year (start-
ing with the academic year 1993-94) are available on the NCES’s Digest of Education Statistics website:
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/. Average in-state tuition reflects the average undergraduate tuition
and required fees.
25The academic year is assumed to start in July of a given year and end in June of the subsequent year.
26To give a concrete example, consider an individual who enrolls in college in July 1995 and stays enrolled
until June 1996, and re-enrolls in school in July 1998 until March 1999. For this individual, the value of
the instrument will be given by the summation of the in-state tuition in the academic years 1995-96 and
1998-99, proportionally adjusted by the fraction of the academic year spent in school each year.
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education decisions have been made, we concentrate on individuals who have likely finished
all of their post-secondary education. Given that enrollment spells sourced from the NSC
and NSLDS are available to us only up to early 2008, we drop 5,383 individuals who were
still in school after 2005.27 Additionally, given that we only observe student loan balances
(as well as other debt holdings and credit scores) starting in June 1997, we drop 1,008
individuals who left school prior to that date. Moreover, we drop 4 individuals who were
not residing in any of the 50 U.S. states or the District of Columbia before starting college,
as well as additional 150 individuals whose home states cannot be determined based on
our methodology described in Section 3.2. Next, we drop 172 individuals whose earliest
enrollment record corresponds to the date a degree was obtained, rather than an actual
enrollment record.28 Furthermore, we drop 403 individuals who had open student loans at
the moment they exited school for the last time but whose balances were missing in their
credit records at that time. Finally, we drop 443 individuals who last exited school in 2005
but whose homeownership status cannot be determined with certainty 60 months after their
final school exit because their credit files are not available to us in 2010. This leaves 11,185
individuals, of whom 5,610 had non-zero student loan balances and comprise our estimation
sample. Summary statistics of this estimation sample are reported in Table 1.
27While individuals who left school during or before 2005 could still go back to school after 2008, we ignore
this possibility.
28Some schools participate in the NSC DegreeVerify program, but not in the Student Tracker program.
Additionally, schools participating in both programs usually report graduation dates retroactively (frequently
reporting back several years prior to their enrollment in the DegreeVerify), but report enrollment spells
starting from the moment they enroll in the Student Tracker program (or just a few months prior).
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4 Estimation
Student loan debt is correlated with homeownership, but this relationship is not stable over
time following school exit. Figure 1 plots the probability of ever having taken on a mortgage
loan against the number of months since school exit for different debt levels. In the top
left panel, we compare students who attended college without taking on debt to those who
did borrow. Debt-free individuals have higher homeownership rates directly out of school,
but are overtaken by students who borrowed within three years after school exit. In the
bottom left panel of Figure 1, we refine student borrowers into three categories based on
amount borrowed: less than $15,000, between $15,000 and $30,000, and between $30,000
and $50,000. Comparing these groups, we can see that students who borrow the most are
always most likely to be homeowners. Students who borrow moderate amounts start off less
likely to own than non-borrowers, but eventually catch up. From these plots one might be
tempted to conclude that, at least in the medium run, higher student loan debt leads to
higher homeownership rates.
Determining how student loan debt affects homeownership is not so straight forward,
however. Individuals with differing amounts of student loan debt may also differ in other
important ways. Notably, they may have different levels of education, which is itself highly
correlated with homeownership (possibly through an effect on income). The top right panel
of Figure 1 restricts the sample to individuals with a bachelor’s degree. Within this group,
those without student loan debt always have higher homeownership rates than borrowers, and
this difference is increasing with time since exiting school. In the bottom right panel, we can
see that splitting the sample of borrowers further into groups by amount borrowed presents a
similar picture. Students who borrowed more than $15,000 had the highest homeownership
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rates among the general college going population five years out of school, but have the lowest
rates among the subset with a bachelor’s degree. As such, simple correlations clearly do not
capture the whole picture.
4.1 Selection on Observables
Further factors that are correlated with both student loan debt and homeownership (and
may be driving the observed relationship between these two variables of primary interest)
include the type of school attended, the use of Pell grants, and the individual’s credit history,
for example. We attempt to identify the causal effect by regressing an indicator for home-
ownership on log student loan debt, controlling for a rich set of credit bureau and education
variables, including state and year fixed effects. Results for the OLS and probit estimators
are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Across both linear probability and probit models—and
in line with results from Cooper and Wang (2014) and Houle and Berger (2015)—we find
a very small but statistically significant effect, with a one percent increase in student loan
debt leading to an approximately 0.02 percentage point decrease in the probability of home-
ownership 24 months out of school. Estimates are similar across the range of specifications
in columns 1-5 in Tables 2 and 3.
Figure 2 plots estimates of the marginal effect of student loan debt against the number of
months since the Final School Exit for the linear probability and probit models, respectively.
These estimates are derived from the regressions using the vector of controls in columns 3
in Tables 2 and 3 for the OLS and probit specifications, respectively. Interestingly, nearly
the full strength of the effect is apparent immediately. A one percent increase in student
loan debt is associated with a reduction of approximately 0.01-0.015 percentage points in the
probability of homeownership in the same month the individual is recorded as leaving school.
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Moreover, the estimated effect is relatively stable within the 60-month window, though the
precision of the estimated effect decreases over time and becomes insignificantly different
from zero 45 months out of school.
4.2 Instrumental Variable Estimation
While the estimators used above control for some important covariates, there may still be
unobservable variables biasing the results. The quality of school the student attended, the
amount of parental contributions, and the individual’s expected future income could all
influence both student loan borrowing and the probability of future homeownership. The
covariates we have may not adequately control for these or other omitted factors. To reliably
identify the causal effect of student loan debt, we need a source of variation that is exogenous
to all other determinants of homeownership.
We propose that the average tuition paid by in-state students at public, 4-year universities
in the subject’s home state provides quasi-experimental variation in eventual student loan
balances. This variable cannot be affected by choices the individual subjects make. Rather,
changes in the tuition rate depend in part on political battles over funding and expenditure
decisions by the state universities. A large fraction of students attend public universities
in their home state, so the loan amounts they require to cover costs vary directly with this
price.29
Changes in tuition are not truly randomly assigned, however. A potential concern with
the validity of this variable as an instrument is correlation with changes in state level eco-
nomic conditions. Demand for secondary education or the supply of government subsidies
may be related to local shocks that influence home purchase decisions. Later we will show
29As discussion in Section 3, 89 percent of first-time, non-foreign college entrants attended a post-secondary
institution in their home state.
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that the results are robust to the inclusion of labor market and housing market controls. We
also test whether the instrument is correlated with homeownership for individuals who did
not attend college, as these individuals should therefore be unaffected by the instrument if
it is valid. We find no evidence of any relationship for this group, suggesting that the main
results are isolating a causal effect of tuition changes.
Another potential concern with the instrument is that it may affect homeownership
through channels other than student loan debt. As the price of education changes, stu-
dents may demand more or less of it. We will show, however, that effects of the instrument
on the extensive margin of college attendance or borrowing are unlikely to be driving the
main results.
4.3 Instrumental Variable Estimation Results
As mentioned in Section 3, we construct the instrument as the log of yearly in-state tuition
at public 4-year universities, weighted by the number of days each academic year the subject
spent attending school. We additionally control for the log of the number of days spent
attending school, so the identifying variation comes entirely from the change in price. First
stage results from regressing log student debt on the instrument and other controls are
presented in Table 4. Across specifications, a one percent increase in the tuition measure is
associated with an approximately 1.3 percent increase in student loan debt. The estimates
are strongly statistically significant.
Turning now to the second stage, we find a considerably stronger effect of student loan
debt on homeownership than in the earlier specifications without the instrument. Results
for the 2-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and IV-Probit estimators are presented in Tables 5
and 6. Across both linear probability and probit models, we find a statistically significant
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effect, with a one percent increase in student loan debt leading to an approximately 0.1-0.2
percentage point decrease in the probability of homeownership 24 months out of school.
Figure 3 plots estimates of the marginal effect of student loan debt against the number
of months since the Final School Exit for the 2SLS and IV-probit models, respectively.
These estimates are derived from the instrumental variable regressions using the vector of
controls reported in columns 3 in Tables 5 and 6. As in the previous estimates, the full effect
is evident immediately upon school exit. A one percent increase in student loan debt is
associated with a reduction of approximately 0.16-0.23 percentage points in the probability
of homeownership in the same month the individual is recorded as leaving school.
4.4 Validity Tests
Our identifying assumption that the instrument is exogenous to unobserved determinants
of homeownership is not directly testable. We can, however, test for some plausible sources
of endogeneity. For example, in-state tuition rates may be correlated with local housing
and labor market conditions, which in turn affect homeownership rates. To see that such
omitted variables are unlikely to bias our estimates, compare columns 4 and 5 in Table 6.
Column 5 includes yearly home-state level economic controls: namely, the unemployment
rate, log of average weekly wages and log median house price from the subject’s home state
measured at the time of the Final School Exit. Column 4 omits these local controls, but
includes only observations for which these variables are available to facilitate comparison.
The estimated coefficient on student loan debt is stable across the two specifications, sug-
gesting that local economic conditions are not driving the results. However, there could be
some other unobserved home state-level variation that is correlated with both homeowner-
ship rates and changes in tuition. In this case, homeownership rates should be correlated
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with tuition changes even among individuals who did not attend college. If the instrument
is valid, in contrast, it should have no estimated effect on the homeownership rates of college
non-attendees.
To test validity along these lines, we estimate the effect of the log of yearly in-state tuition
on the probability of ever having owned a home each year from age 18 to 30 for individuals
who never attended college. The relevant tuition figure is taken from the first academic
year in which the individual had turned 18 by the preceding July. Results are presented in
Table 7. We cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no partial correlation between the
tuition measure and probability of homeownership for this group. Since the instrument only
affects outcomes for college attendees, this rules out a certain class of arguments against
validity.
Another potential challenge to validity comes from the use of a log specification in student
loan debt—students without any debt are excluded from the regressions. If tuition increases
affect the extensive margin of student loan debt and if these marginal borrowers have a
notably different propensity to own than the inframarginal individuals, then the results may
be contaminated by this non-random selection. Data on education variables, including the
instrument itself, is more likely to be mismeasured for students without any loans, so we
cannot estimate a consistent relationship between the instrument and a dummy for the
presence of any student loans.30 However, Table 8 shows that the reduced form effect of the
instrument on homeownership is strongly negative and significant even with the full sample
of college attendees, leading us to conclude that bias due to selection along the extensive
margin of student loans is not driving our findings.
30As described in Section 3.2, records on degrees, school sectors, and enrollment spells are more accurately
measured for student loan borrowers, as their NSC records are augmented with corresponding NSLDS data.
By definition, for those who did not borrow, the NSLDS data do not exist.
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A further issue of sample selection is that tuition rates may affect the relationship be-
tween debt and homeownership through the composition of the student population. Table 9
presents some evidence that college attendance rates fall with increases in tuition in our
data. In particular, the table shows the results of regressing the probability of attending
college against the log of yearly in-state tuition, taken from the fall semester after the in-
dividual turned 18. We find a statistically significant effect, with a one percent increase
in tuition causing a 0.08 percentage point decrease in college attendance. This could be a
concern if the instrument is inducing a compositional shift in the estimation sample—i.e., if
individuals on the margin of college attendance have very different propensities to become
homeowners than inframarginal individuals. However, the estimated effect of the instrument
on attendance is not large enough to explain the main result, no matter the propensities of
the marginal group. As seen in Table 8, a one percent increase in tuition (conservatively)
reduces the homeowning population by approximately 28 individuals per 10,000 college go-
ers two years after exiting school. About 40 percent of the sample population does not
attend college, so this translates to a reduction of approximately 17 individual homeowners
per 10,000 individuals in the general cohort. The same increase in tuition reduces college
attendance by only 8 individuals per 10,000, so even in the most extreme possible scenario
in which all marginal attendees have a 100 percent probability of homeownership (rather
than the 12 percent seen directly out of school in our sample), endogenous sample selection
cannot explain the findings. Rather, because marginal college attendees tend to have lower
ability and socioeconomic status than the average student, we would expect their propensity
to own to be slightly lower than the general population of students. If anything, this suggests
compositional effects may be biasing our estimates toward zero.
We noted previously that the full effect of student loan debt on homeownership was
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apparent immediately upon exiting school. Approximately 10 percent of the sample bought a
home before leaving school, so it is reasonable to expect an effect even while the student is still
attending. If student loan debt poses a credit constraint, however, we would expect to observe
a particular pattern. Whether the main channel is through DTI ratios, credit scores or down
payments, the constraint should become more binding as the student progresses through
her education and debt accumulates. Similarly, the influence of debt aversion should grow.
Therefore, the earlier in a student’s educational career we look, the weaker the estimated
effect of her (eventual) student loan debt on homeownership should be.
To test if this expected pattern holds in the data, we plot the estimated marginal effect of
student loan debt against the number of months prior to Final School Exit for the 2SLS and
IV-probit models in Figure 4. For the period approximately two to three years prior to school
exit, there is not a statistically distinguishable effect of student loan debt on homeownership.
With about a year to go, depending on the model, a significant effect becomes apparent and
continues to strengthen until the student finishes school. This fits the intuitive story that
the effect should be small or zero when debt balances are.
4.5 Additional Outcomes
Student loan borrowers may experience the burden of their debt in other areas than the
binary outcome of homeownership. If DTI ratios or down payment constraints are bind-
ing, borrowers may substitute toward smaller mortgages in response to higher student debt
levels. Alternatively, if student debt delays the home purchase decision to a point in the
life cycle at which the borrower has a greater demand for housing, mortgage balances could
conceivably rise with student debt. In the first column of table 10, we present the results
from regressing the (logged) loan amount of the first mortgage we observe for each individual
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against their student loan debts and the usual vector of controls. Only borrowers who obtain
a mortgage within 5 years of leaving school are included in this regression. The estimated
partial correlation is positive and statistically significant, implying a 10 percent increase in
student loan debt is associated with approximately 0.3 percent higher mortgage balances.
This naive estimate is likely to be biased by omitted variables similar to those that
bias estimates of the effect of student loan debt on homeownership. We apply the same
instrumental variable solution, and present results in the second column of Table 10. This
point estimate suggests that student loan debt causes lower average mortgage balances among
the population of homeowners. The standard errors are very large, however, and the result is
not close to statistically significant. Because mortgages are substantially larger than student
loan balances (approximately 8 times larger in our sample) we cannot rule out meaningful
effect sizes in either the positive or negative direction.
One channel through which we hypothesize student loan debt could affect homeownership
is through the borrower’s credit score. Increased debt balances can worsen credit scores
directly, as well as potentially lead to delinquencies which have a further derogatory effect.
The sign of the effect is ambiguous, however, as taking out and subsequently repaying student
loans may help some borrowers establish a good credit history and thus improve their scores.
Borrowers whose credit scores place them in the subprime category, traditionally defined
as those with a credit score below 620, may be more likely to have their loan applications
denied. However, some subprime borrowers may still be able to obtain credit with FHA or
other mortgage insurance. Prior to 2008, the first percentile of FICO scores was approx-
imately 500 on FHA insured loans.31 Borrowers with a score below this level would have
tremendous difficulty getting approved for a loan (in 2010, the Department of Housing and
31SOURCE: Data provided by McDash Analytics, calculation by authors.
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Urban Development set the minimum credit score for FHA loans at 500 by rule). We there-
fore define a further “deep subprime” category of borrowers whose scores are low enough to
effectively deny them access to FHA loans.
In the first and third columns of Table 11 we present the results of a probit estimation,
regressing borrowers’ probability of falling into the subprime and deep subprime categories
against their student debt and the usual vector of controls. We use cutoffs in the individual’s
TU TransRisk AM Score of 620 and 500 to define the categories. The sample is limited to
observations between 0 and 60 months after school exit, with multiple observations per indi-
vidual included. The second and fourth columns present the results from the IV regression.
In both cases the instrumented estimates are larger than those from the simple regression,
suggesting that a 10 percent increase in student loan debt causes over a 0.6 percentage point
increase in the probability a borrower falls into the subprime category, and over an 0.8 per-
centage point increase in the probability of being deeply subprime. The estimated effect on
becoming subprime is significant only at the 10 percent level, while the effect on becoming
deeply subprime is significant at the traditional 5 percent level. While the effect of student
loan debt on risk category is meaningful in magnitude, it is unlikely to be enough to fully
explain the 1 to 2 percentage point decrease in homeownership the same increase in student
loan debt implies.
The finding that increased student loan debt raises the probability of having very poor
credit suggests that the burden of debt may be causing some borrowers to become delinquent
on their loans. We estimate the effect of student loan debt on the probability the borrower
is reported 90 days or more delinquent on a student loan payment. Results are presented in
Table 12. The simple probit estimate in the first column suggests a 10 percent increase in
debt is associated with a 0.1 percentage point increase in delinquencies, similar in magnitude
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to the probit estimates on credit categories. In the second column, we use the instrument
to deal with endogeneity of student loan debt and find a larger effect—a 10 percent increase
in debt is estimated to raise delinquency rates by over 0.7 percentage points.
A caveat with the findings on risk categories and mortgage amounts is that these out-
comes are not independent of each other or of the homeownership decision. For example,
some of the estimated effect on subprime status may occur through the channel of lowered
homeownership rates. Relatedly, marginal homeowners may demand different sized mort-
gages than homeowners whose tenure choice is insensitive to student loan debt. A single
instrument is not enough to separately identify the direct effect of student debt on multiple
outcomes, all of which could be channels through which the others are influenced.
5 Discussion
The previously presented results indicate that increased student loan debt causes a substan-
tial reduction in the probability of homeownership for any given time frame within a five
year window after exiting school. This negative effect is dominated, however, by the rapid
and steady increase in the probability of homeownership as the individual ages across this
same period. Using the estimates from the IV-probit model, we can simulate the effect of
an increase in debt on the rate of homeownership among our sample population across the
five year post-college window. In Figure 5, we plot the observed homeownership rate profile
over time alongside a counterfactual simulation in which each student loan borrower in our
data is burdened with a 10 percent increase in student loan debt at the Final School Exit.
As previously shown in Figure 3, the marginal probability is nearly constant over the
estimation window, so the simulated counterfactual in Figure 5 looks like a parallel downward
28
shift of the plotted data, decreasing the homeownership rate by approximately one percentage
point at every time period. Because homeownership is increasing almost linearly in time
since school over the five year window, this is equivalent to a parallel shift to the right. A
10 percent increase in student loan debt delays the time it takes the cohort of borrowers to
reach a given homeownership rate by approximately three months.
The data we currently have access to cannot answer the important question of how the
relationship between debt and homeownership changes past the five year window. As bor-
rowers age, their incomes generally increase and student loan balances fall, which may lead us
to expect that the relationship between an individual’s initial debt levels and homeownership
should weaken over time. While our estimates lose precision as the time since school exit
increases, we do not see any indication of an attenuating effect. If former students exhibit
habit formation in their housing tenure decisions, marginal homeowners may be induced to
rent for many years by the effect of student loan debt on their housing decisions immediately
after college.
6 Conclusions
In summary, this paper estimates the effect of student loan debt on subsequent homeown-
ership rates. We instrument for the amount of the individual’s debt using changes to the
in-state tuition rate at public 4-year colleges in the student’s home state. We find that
a 10 percent increase in student loan debt causes a 1 to 2 percentage point drop in the
homeownership rate of student loan borrowers for the first five years after exiting school.
Validity tests suggest that the results are not confounded by local economic conditions or
non-random selection into the estimation sample.
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Our findings have implications for several recent trends and policy proposals. Tuition
rates continue to rise, so the amounts students will need to borrow may increase in the future.
Increased debt levels could continue to depress homeownership rates for future cohorts of
college students. Measures taken to reduce tuition—or to curb borrowing beyond what is
necessary to fund attendance—could fight this trend. Similarly, our results provide a measure
of how effective student loan forgiveness programs could be at increasing the homeownership
rate of young adults. Limiting or expanding students’ access to education loans in general,
however, would have ramifications that are beyond the scope of this study. In particular, if
student loans allow individuals to access college education—or, more broadly, acquire more
of it—student loan debt could have a positive effect on homeownership, as long as the return
to this additional education allows individuals to sufficiently increase their future incomes.
In extrapolating our results to the present day, we also have to consider some significant
recent changes to mortgage market. Students in our sample left school between 1997 and
2005; their first few years post-college took place in a relatively easy environment for mort-
gage credit. Since the housing and financial crisis, underwriting standards have tightened
substantially. It is possible that student loan debt acts as an even greater drag on home-
ownership now that lenders are more sensitive to DTI ratios and low down payments. The
growing popularity of income-driven repayment plans further complicates the picture, as it
is not immediately clear how these plans moderate the link between initial student loan debt
and homeownership. On the one hand, enrollment in income-driven repayment plans reduces
the ratio of student loan payments relative to income, thereby relaxing the DTI constraint.
On the other hand, it can extend the repayment period significantly relative to a 10-year
plan, thereby potentially increasing the total interest paid by the student loan borrower over
the life of the loan. We hope that further studies using even more recent data will be able
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to shine additional light on the issue.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Homeownership Rate
0 Months After School Exit 5,610 0.1
12 Months After School Exit 5,610 0.16
24 Months After School Exit 5,610 0.23
36 Months After School Exit 5,610 0.31
48 Months After School Exit 5,610 0.37
60 Months After School Exit 5,610 0.43
Student Loan Debt and Enrollment Measures
Student Loan Debt (in $1,000 dollars) 5,610 19.1 24.77 0.05 318.88
Instrument: Tuition Measure (in $1,000 dollars) 5,610 14.21 8.27 0.55 87.23
Cumulative Days In School 5,610 1420.84 666.34 56 4,407
Age At Final School Exit 5,610 24.69 2.72 18.29 32.88
Degree Controls
Associate’s/Certificate 5,610 0.06
Bachelor’s 5,610 0.28
Master’s or More 5,610 0.03
At Least Associate’s/Certificate 5,610 0.003
At Least Bachelor’s 5,610 0.15
Degree of Unknown Type 5,610 0.05
Pell Grant Controls
Ever Pell 5,610 0.56
Average Pell (in $1,000) 5,610 1.26 1.34 0 4.31
School Sector Controls
Ever Public 4-Year 5,610 0.65
Ever Public 2-Year 5,610 0.44
Ever Private 4-Year Not-for-profit 5,610 0.35
Ever Private 2-Year Not-for-profit 5,610 0.01
Ever Private For-profit 5,610 0.13
Credit Controls
Lagged Credit Score 5,610 565.6 206.43 0 848
Credit Lag 5,610 390.65 204.97 1 731
Missing Credit Score 5,610 0.06 0.24 0 1
Lagged Auto Debt 5,610 2.15 5.82 0 58.46
Lagged Credit Card Debt 5,610 1.42 3.28 0 63.41
Year of Exit from School
1997 5,610 0.06
1998 5,610 0.08
1999 5,610 0.1
2000 5,610 0.11
2001 5,610 0.13
2002 5,610 0.16
2003 5,610 0.16
2004 5,610 0.14
2005 5,610 0.05
Yearly State Controls*
Unemployment Rate (Home State) 5,610 5.1 1.11 2.3 8.42
Log Avg. Weekly Wages (Home State) 5,610 6.54 0.17 6.02 7.16
Log Median House Price (HomeState) 4,794 11.89 0.43 11.03 13.18
Note*: Yearly home-state controls measured at school exit.
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Table 2: Selection on Observables: OLS
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Student Loan Debt -0.0139** -0.0282*** -0.0200*** -0.0209*** -0.0212***
(0.00661) (0.00723) (0.00654) (0.00724) (0.00718)
Log Cumulative Days In School 0.0606*** 0.0106 -0.000647 0.00665 0.00720
(0.0102) (0.0123) (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0116)
Age At Final School Exit 0.0439*** 0.0406*** 0.0395*** 0.0394*** 0.0395***
(0.00327) (0.00329) (0.00331) (0.00371) (0.00376)
Associate’s/Certificate 0.161*** 0.131*** 0.132** 0.132***
(0.0452) (0.0437) (0.0491) (0.0491)
Bachelor’s 0.150*** 0.112** 0.0997* 0.0996*
(0.0496) (0.0470) (0.0520) (0.0521)
Master’s or More 0.204*** 0.136** 0.130* 0.130*
(0.0647) (0.0651) (0.0759) (0.0762)
At Least Associate’s/Certificate 0.224 0.191 0.173 0.172
(0.139) (0.138) (0.138) (0.136)
At Least Bachelor’s 0.215*** 0.157*** 0.138** 0.138**
(0.0532) (0.0501) (0.0550) (0.0546)
Degree of Unknown Type 0.156** 0.110* 0.0884 0.0877
(0.0610) (0.0566) (0.0613) (0.0610)
Ever Pell 0.0383* 0.0317 0.0300 0.0299
(0.0200) (0.0190) (0.0213) (0.0212)
Average Pell -0.0443*** -0.0270*** -0.0257*** -0.0258***
(0.00689) (0.00675) (0.00738) (0.00735)
Ever Public 4-Year 0.0427*** 0.0336** 0.0258 0.0259
(0.0157) (0.0158) (0.0174) (0.0175)
Ever Public 2-Year 0.0227 0.0228 0.0211 0.0212
(0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0132) (0.0132)
Ever Private 4-Year Not-for-profit 0.0498*** 0.0423** 0.0355* 0.0354*
(0.0167) (0.0159) (0.0179) (0.0179)
Ever Private 2-Year Not-for-profit 0.0125 -0.00837 -0.00398 -0.00446
(0.0431) (0.0416) (0.0434) (0.0432)
Ever Private For-profit -0.00222 0.0164 0.0296* 0.0303*
(0.0176) (0.0164) (0.0168) (0.0170)
Lagged Credit Score 0.000499*** 0.000524*** 0.000523***
(4.70e-05) (5.08e-05) (5.04e-05)
Credit Lag 5.22e-06 1.74e-05 2.13e-05
(5.97e-05) (6.84e-05) (7.01e-05)
Missing Credit Score 0.323*** 0.342*** 0.341***
(0.0335) (0.0383) (0.0380)
Lagged Auto Debt 0.00934*** 0.00913*** 0.00913***
(0.00101) (0.00108) (0.00107)
Lagged Credit Card Debt 0.00404** 0.00448** 0.00448**
(0.00194) (0.00222) (0.00222)
Unemployment Rate (Home State) 0.00212
(0.0136)
Log Avg. Weekly Wages (Home State) -0.132
(0.200)
Log Median House Price (Home State) -0.0161
(0.0591)
Constant -1.289*** -0.929*** -1.162*** -1.232*** -0.182
(0.0930) (0.105) (0.121) (0.123) (1.397)
College Major Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Home State/Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,610 5,610 5,610 4,794 4,794
R-squared 0.110 0.146 0.187 0.181 0.182
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at home-state level).
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Table 3: Selection on Observables: Probit
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Student Loan Debt -0.0132** -0.0259*** -0.0174*** -0.0182** -0.0186**
(0.00630) (0.00687) (0.00671) (0.00767) (0.00763)
Log Cumulative Days In School 0.0758*** 0.0225* 0.00661 0.0136 0.0141
(0.0101) (0.0122) (0.0117) (0.0125) (0.0124)
Age At Final School Exit 0.0431*** 0.0403*** 0.0392*** 0.0395*** 0.0396***
(0.00300) (0.00288) (0.00287) (0.00323) (0.00325)
Degree Controls NO YES YES YES YES
College Major Controls NO YES YES YES YES
School Sector Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Pell Grant Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Credit Controls NO NO YES YES YES
Home State Yearly Controls NO NO NO NO YES
Home State/Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,610 5,610 5,610 4,794 4,794
Pseudo R-squared 0.106 0.140 0.179 0.170 0.170
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at home-state level).
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Table 4: IV Estimation: 1st Stage
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Instrument: Tuition Measure 1.227*** 1.273*** 1.279*** 1.308*** 1.337***
(0.201) (0.167) (0.167) (0.195) (0.198)
Log Cumulative Days In School -0.143 -0.401** -0.418*** -0.435** -0.459**
(0.193) (0.153) (0.152) (0.177) (0.183)
Age At Final School Exit 0.0701*** 0.0387*** 0.0311*** 0.0319*** 0.0330***
(0.00570) (0.00428) (0.00458) (0.00521) (0.00536)
Associate’s/Certificate -0.187* -0.168 -0.166 -0.169
(0.104) (0.103) (0.104) (0.105)
Bachelor’s 0.169 0.188* 0.174 0.169
(0.110) (0.105) (0.111) (0.111)
Master’s or More 0.0211 0.0785 0.0642 0.0521
(0.141) (0.141) (0.152) (0.154)
At Least Associate’s/Certificate -0.381** -0.331* -0.312 -0.326
(0.189) (0.193) (0.204) (0.205)
At Least Bachelor’s 0.758*** 0.798*** 0.800*** 0.787***
(0.110) (0.104) (0.105) (0.107)
Degree of Unknown Type -0.325*** -0.296** -0.274** -0.283**
(0.112) (0.111) (0.113) (0.115)
Ever Pell 0.0811** 0.0731** 0.0894*** 0.0897***
(0.0307) (0.0311) (0.0325) (0.0324)
Average Pell -0.00147 -0.0122 -0.0117 -0.0130
(0.0104) (0.0112) (0.0129) (0.0128)
Ever Public 4-Year -0.0205 -0.0148 -0.0247 -0.0233
(0.0288) (0.0287) (0.0324) (0.0319)
Ever Public 2-Year -0.206*** -0.207*** -0.211*** -0.211***
(0.0250) (0.0244) (0.0282) (0.0286)
Ever Private 4-Year Not-for-profit 0.257*** 0.263*** 0.265*** 0.265***
(0.0325) (0.0315) (0.0358) (0.0365)
Ever Private 2-Year Not-for-profit -0.0304 -0.0186 0.0180 0.0238
(0.0789) (0.0803) (0.0756) (0.0766)
Ever Private For-profit 0.195*** 0.168*** 0.163*** 0.170***
(0.0458) (0.0431) (0.0455) (0.0448)
Lagged Credit Score -0.000565*** -0.000584*** -0.000587***
(9.58e-05) (0.000109) (0.000109)
Credit Lag -4.10e-05 -6.42e-05 -9.94e-05
(8.29e-05) (9.49e-05) (9.76e-05)
Missing Credit Score -0.509*** -0.503*** -0.506***
(0.0641) (0.0733) (0.0743)
Lagged Auto Debt -0.00370** -0.00409* -0.00407*
(0.00182) (0.00205) (0.00202)
Lagged Credit Card Debt 0.0129*** 0.0138*** 0.0138***
(0.00275) (0.00308) (0.00315)
Unemployment Rate (Home State) 0.0493*
(0.0254)
Log Avg. Weekly Wages (Home State) -1.089**
(0.535)
Log Median House Price (Home State) 0.314**
(0.145)
Constant -1.191 0.882 1.518** 1.584* 4.852
(0.860) (0.723) (0.735) (0.865) (4.336)
College Major Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Home State/Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,610 5,610 5,610 4,794 4,794
R-squared 0.370 0.477 0.484 0.482 0.484
Note*: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at home-state level).
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Table 5: IV Estimation: 2nd Stage 2SLS
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Student Loan Debt -0.269*** -0.208*** -0.183*** -0.169*** -0.181***
(0.0590) (0.0523) (0.0506) (0.0531) (0.0585)
Log Cumulative Days In School 0.320*** 0.155*** 0.128*** 0.125*** 0.135***
(0.0621) (0.0441) (0.0438) (0.0463) (0.0508)
Age At Final School Exit 0.0590*** 0.0456*** 0.0429*** 0.0425*** 0.0430***
(0.00473) (0.00324) (0.00308) (0.00346) (0.00360)
Degree Controls NO YES YES YES YES
College Major Controls NO YES YES YES YES
School Sector Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Pell Grant Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Credit Controls NO NO YES YES YES
Home State Yearly Controls NO NO NO NO YES
Home State/Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,610 5,610 5,610 4,794 4,794
R-squared 0.029 0.092 0.104 0.092
Note*: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at home-state level).
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Table 6: IV Estimation: 2nd Stage IV-Probit
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Student Loan Debt -0.187*** -0.154*** -0.130*** -0.113** -0.115**
(0.0327) (0.0391) (0.0402) (0.0444) (0.0473)
Log Cumulative Days In School 0.237*** 0.124*** 0.0957*** 0.0884** 0.0906**
(0.0319) (0.0326) (0.0343) (0.0382) (0.0408)
Age At Final School Exit 0.0440*** 0.0379*** 0.0358*** 0.0361*** 0.0363***
(0.00230) (0.00247) (0.00246) (0.00269) (0.00270)
Degree Controls NO YES YES YES YES
College Major Controls NO YES YES YES YES
School Sector Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Pell Grant Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Credit Controls NO NO YES YES YES
Home State Yearly Controls NO NO NO NO YES
Home State/Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,610 5,610 5,610 4,794 4,794
Note*: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at home-state level).
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Table 8: Reduced Form—All College Goers
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Instrument: Tuition Measure -0.361*** -0.315*** -0.274*** -0.282*** -0.288***
(0.0463) (0.0420) (0.0406) (0.0439) (0.0450)
Log Cumulative Days In School 0.376*** 0.314*** 0.266*** 0.274*** 0.280***
(0.0456) (0.0419) (0.0412) (0.0444) (0.0453)
Age At Final School Exit 0.0361*** 0.0343*** 0.0326*** 0.0325*** 0.0325***
(0.00206) (0.00229) (0.00248) (0.00261) (0.00261)
Degree Controls NO YES YES YES YES
College Major Controls NO YES YES YES YES
School Sector Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Pell Grant Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Credit Controls NO NO YES YES YES
Home State Yearly Controls NO NO NO NO YES
Home State/Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 11,628 11,628 11,628 10,262 10,262
Note*: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at home-state level).
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Table 9: Probability of College Attendance
Variable Coefficient
Instrument: Tuition Measure -0.0839**
(0.0407)
Home State/Year FE YES
Observations 25,790
R-squared 0.035
Note*: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at home-state level).
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Table 10: Log of First Observed Mortgage Balance
Variable (OLS) (IV)
Log Student Loan Debt 0.029** -0.037
(0.013) (0.106)
Log Cumulative Days In School 0.110*** 0.163
(0.040) (0.0419)
Age At Final School Exit -0.020*** -0.020***
(0.006) (0.007)
Degree Controls YES YES
College Major Controls YES YES
School Sector Controls YES YES
Pell Grant Controls YES YES
Credit Controls YES YES
Home State/Year FE YES YES
Observations 2,410 2,410
Note*: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at home-state level).
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Table 11: Risk Categories
Subprime Deep Subprime
Variable (Probit) (IV Probit) (Probit) (IV Probit)
Log Student Loan Debt 0.012*** 0.066* 0.007* 0.085**
(0.004) (0.040) (0.004) (0.035)
Log Cumulative Days In School -0.047*** -0.089*** -0.038*** -0.098***
(0.010) (0.030) (0.009) (0.027)
Age At Final School Exit -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Degree Controls YES
College Major Controls YES
School Sector Controls YES
Pell Grant Controls YES
Credit Controls YES
Home State/Year FE YES
Observations 15,135
Note*: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at home-state level).
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Table 12: Student Loan Delinquencies
Variable (Probit) (IV Probit)
Log Student Loan Debt 0.011*** 0.074***
(0.003) (0.024)
Log Cumulative Days In School -0.007 -0.055***
(0.006) (0.030)
Age At Final School Exit -0.003** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
Degree Controls YES
College Major Controls YES
School Sector Controls YES
Pell Grant Controls YES
Credit Controls YES
Home State/Year FE YES
Observations 15,095
Note*: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at home-state level).
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Figure 1: Homeownership Rates by Months Since Leaving School, Debt Level and Education
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Figure 2: Estimation Coefficients: OLS vs Probit
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Figure 3: Estimation Coefficients: 2SLS vs IV Probit
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Figure 4: Estimation Coefficients Prior to Exiting College: 2SLS vs IV Probit
49
Unobservable characteristics might be biasing
previous results
Natural experiment:
Tuition increases in home state public
universities increase borrowing
Tuition changes do not affect decisions for
homeownership through any channel
other than debt
Addressing Omitted Variable Bias
21.0
21.5
22.0
22.5
23.0
23.5
24.0
Percent
Data With 1% 
More Debt
With 10% 
More Debt
Home Ownership Rate 24 Months After Final 
College Exit - IV Probit Estimates
• •
• •
•
• •
• • • • •
•
• • • • •
• • •
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
• • • • •
0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60
-0.30
-0.25
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Percentage Points
Months Since Final College Exit
Probit
IV Probit
Effect of 1% Increase in Debt on Homeownership 
Rate, 0-60 Months After Final College Exit
0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60
0
10
20
30
40
50
Homeownership Rate (%)
Month Since Last School Exit
Observed
10% More Debt
Effect of 10% Increase in Debt on Homeownership
0 3 6 9
8
11
14
17
Estimated effect of small increases in student loan debt on entry into homeownership 0-60 months after final college exit
For average borrower, 10% increase in debt delays entry by 3 months 
Analogous to 1 percentage point decline in homeownership rate for the borrower population
Effect on overall homeownership rate would be smaller (40% of sample exits with no debt)
Data acquisition underway to determine whether effect permanent or transitory
Paper does not answer how access to student loan debt affects homeownership
If student loans allow individuals to increase education, access to debt could have positive effect on home
ownership (through effect on income)
Summary
Exhibit 2
Figure 5: Simulation of Counterfactual Homeownership Rate
50
    No. 15 Environmental Impacts on Property  
  ERES 2016   8-11 June 2016 Regensburg 
Function Follows Form  
Kristof Dascher IREBS International Real Estate Business School, University of Regensburg  
Urban policy molds urban form. This paper suggests that urban form also molds urban policy. Urban form frames the political economy of whether to relocate the city center's jobs and shops. In that sense, city functions follow urban form. This view rivals the ''form follows function'' that has become proverbial in  architectural theory. Extensions to this analysis of the suburbanization of employment and shopping address the city's topography, the convexity of its skyline, the possibility of sprawl and the effects on jurisdictional merger. 
Keywords: City Shape, City Skyline, City Convexity, City Skewness, Sprawl 
Session: Environmental Impacts on Property H26, June 9, 2016, 11:00am - 12:30pm
Function Follows Form
– May 20th, 2016 –
Kristof Dascher
Abstract: Ever since Victor Gruen opened Northland in a Detroit suburb, thousands of shopping
centers and office parks have sprung up along city peripheries. This paper traces demand for
decentralizing urban shops and jobs (urban “functions”) back to the city’s original shape (urban
“form”). In that sense, function follows form. This view rivals the standard urban paradigm, which
focuses on how policy shapes urban form. This view also rivals the form follows function that has
become proverbial in architectural theory. Extensions to the analysis address the convexity of the
city’s skyline, the possibility of suburban sprawl and the effects of urban form on jurisdictional
merger.
Keywords: Economic Geography, City Shape, City Skyline, City Skewness, Suburban Shopping,
Sprawl
JEL-Classifications: R12, D72, R52
Kristof Dascher
Regensburg University
Department of Business, Economics, Information Systems Management and Real Estate
93 040 Regensburg
Germany
Email: kristof.dascher@wiwi.uni-regensburg.de
1 Introduction
Ever since Victor Gruen opened Northland, the first modern mall, in a Detroit suburb, thousands of
shopping centers and office parks have sprung up along many cities’ peripheries (e.g. Lampugnani
(1985), Garreau (1991), Glaeser/Kahn (2010), Hardwick (2010)). It is tempting to argue that all
these shopping malls and office parks are the inevitable consequence of the car. At the same time,
this decentralization of shops and jobs is not ubiquitous; many cities have not decentralized at all.
Clearly decentralization also depends on whether city voters support it. This paper presents an
analysis of urban demand for decentralization. By this analysis, urban demand for decentralizing
a city’s shops and jobs (i.e. two essential urban “functions”) derives from, and hence can even
be predicted by, the city’s physical shape (i.e. urban “form”). This latter causality motivates the
paper’s title.
A two-paragraph-summary of the paper reads as follows. Consider a city that decides on whether
to decentralize jobs and shops out to the city’s periphery. In principle, any resident’s preference
regarding this decision might be read off her properties’ “average location”. A resident with an
average property near the city center will not easily give up on that center; the opposite must
be true for a resident whose average property is close to the periphery; and a resident with no
property at all might well be indifferent. If we knew city residents’ average properties, then we could
assign residents their policy preferences. We could even go on to predict the city’s decentralization
decision. Unfortunately, only, average properties are not observable. And so neither are residents’
preferences.
But the city form is. The city’s form is reflected by the distribution of commuting distance, sample
data from which often are available. This form puts natural constraints on the properties residents
can possibly own (or combine). After all, resident properties must nest into the city’s given form.
Detailed “nesting constraints” emerge once we inspect the city’s form closer. The most binding
of those happens to vary with a simple index of the city’s physical form, i.e. the commuting
distribution’s skewness, irrespective of the property assignment. Urban skewness literally puts
bounds around resident interests. If urban skewness is positive enough then a majority holding
on to the traditional center is inevitable. Conversely, if this skew is sufficiently negative then
decentralization sets in. The city’s skew reveals urban form’s hidden grip on local politics. Or to
provide yet another window on this theme, one concept that is graphic predicts another that is
political.
And so while urban form is an interesting field in its own right (Lynch (1960), Baranow (1980),
Roeck et al. (2013)), this paper argues that city morphology has uses that go beyond the descrip-
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tive. Besides, reading restrictions on a city’s various political interests off its physical form also
complements a prominent view due to Louis Sullivan. According to Sullivan (1896), “. . . it is the
pervading law of all things organic and inorganic, . . . that the life is recognizable in its expression”.
Among architectural theorists Sullivan’s view has become the proverbial form follows function.
This paper’s suggesting that the built environment impact on the polity’s decision on where to
locate a city’s commerce and business provides an explanation of how instead building contours
(form) determine buildings’ uses (function), or more briefly of how . . . function follows form.
This reversal of ideas conflicts quite fundamentally with the standard urban paradigm. While
understanding the impact of policy on form has been central to urban economics (e.g. Bertaud/
Brueckner (2005), Brueckner (2005), Bento/Franco/Kaffine (2006), Baum-Snow (2006), de Lara
et al. (2013)), the issue of repercussions of urban form on urban policy appears to have attracted
much less attention – even as, say, the role of urban compactness for the viability of urban public
transport (e.g. Bertaud (2003)) or the impact of existing infrastructure on subsequent zoning
(Garcia-López et al. (2015)) have been of interest. In part this is for good reason. A young city’s
policy is unlikely to be informed by its form. But for any mature city this seems more difficult
to justify. It is hard to imagine that structures respond quicker to policy than policy responds to
structures.
Fogelson (2003) devotes an entire chapter of his book on America’s “downtown” to “the specter of
decentralization” during the first half of the 19th century. If traffic congestion was a force behind
the decline of the traditional central business district, “the other phenomenon to which downtown
businessmen and property owners attributed decentralization was residential dispersal.” (p. 231)
Clearly residential dispersal contributes to downtown’s decline if city residents are owner-occupiers
always. With owner-occupiers, the city’s physical form easily reveals the city’s political economy.
More homes at the urban fringe also mean more voters in favor of business decentralization. This
connection between urban form and urban political economy, however, is much less straightforward
once homes no longer map into voters one-to-one. And so this paper may also be seen as an attempt
to understand the impact of form on function in more general property settings.
We extend our analysis to how the city’s form even naturally follows the city’s topography. Let
a city be stretched out on a peninsula, or hemmed in by nearby mountains. Most of that city’s
housing must be near the city’s center. This city’s form is skewed to the periphery. Fitting in
our building block of function following form, voters will turn down any proposal to decentralize.
Metaphorically, New York is compact because its geography discourages (political support for) the
decentralization of its business and shopping. Alternatively, a city that is able to expand in any
direction will naturally find much of its housing on its periphery, and so a majority of its voters will
2
support decentralization. We might want to speculate that it is the difference in topography that
has European cities decentralize less than US cities do (Europe as a whole being more mountainous
than the US).
We will also see that while it is city’s skew that helps us assess the urban political economy of
decentralization, it is the city skyline’s convexity that assists in predicting marginal changes in this
political economy. The urban skyline is our second graphic tool for uncovering the city’s political
economy. Since the urban skyline is a variant of the city’s population gradient, this also assigns
additional weight to the literature on the population density gradient (e.g. McDonald (1989),
Kim (2007)). Quite intuitively, building height restrictions (whether imposed by soil instability
or by urban planning and zoning) take away from the city center’s “resilience”. If the city is not
permitted to add population to its “leading rings”, then anything that adds extra layers of “lagging
rings” at the periphery will always strengthen decentralization supporters’ ranks.
Our framework also indicates applications in the fields of jurisdictional fragmentation and urban
sprawl. If policy makers are aware of urban form’s grip on local politics then urban form feeds
into decisions on jurisdictional merger. Central cities must fear annexing their suburbs if this, by
reducing skew, will make decentralization more probable. For a similar reason central cities may
refrain from imposing building height restrictions, may zone large tracts of the urban periphery for
park use only, or may impose growth controls. Regarding sprawl, if cities differ in their form (which
they do not in the present paper) any form-inspired decision to decentralize business and commerce
in one city begins to attract migrants to that city’s periphery. Original city form becomes another
determinant of urban sprawl, entering the list of determinants identified in the literature (e.g.,
Glaeser/Kahn (2010), Burchfield et al. (2006)).
The paper has seven sections. Section 2 outlines the basic model. Section 3 extracts the political
economy of decentralization from the city’s form, by introducing computable and useful bounds on
urban voter shares (Proposition 1). Section 4 puts these voter shares down to a graphic aspect of
the city’s form. This section finds that we may estimate urban voter shares from the city’s skewness
(Proposition 2). Section 5 offers a comparative statics treatment of the city’s form, analyzing the
effects of variations in topography and technology on urban form, and hence on city functions. For
instance, we find that being linear and exhibiting a convex skyline also makes a city less likely to
decentralize (Proposition 3). Section 6 addresses a number of extensions (on concerns with city
openness, housing ownership, and welfare), and section 7 concludes.
3
2 Model
Consider the following simple variant of the closed city model as developed by Wheaton (1973),
Pines/Sadka (1986) and Brueckner (1987). A monocentric and, for much of the analysis, circular
city extends at most r˜ units of distance out from the center. Each resident occupies one unit
of housing (an “apartment”) and commutes to the city center (CBD) to work and shop. Round
trip commuting costs for a resident living at distance r are tr, so that Ricardian rent becomes
q(r) = t(r˜ − r). Landlords are resident, not absentee, because a closed city’s landlords can hardly
be influential if they are absentee. City population equals 1. There is no agricultural hinterland.1
Apartments are built by profit maximizing investors. One unit of capital k poured into a building
site of unit area yields h(k) units of floor space, where h′ > 0 and h′′ < 0 (Brueckner (1987)).
If p is the price of capital, investors choose k so as to satisfy the q(r)hk(k) = p necessary for
maximum profit. The optimal capital will clearly depend on rent q and capital price p, and so can
be written as k(t(r˜ − r), p). Let h(r) be shorthand for the corresponding optimal building height
h(k(t(r˜ − r), p)). In equilibrium the city boundary r˜ is determined by the requirement that the
urban housing market clear:
1 =
∫ r˜
0
a(r)h(r) dr, (1)
where a(r) is land available at r units of distance away from the CBD.
Since we have set housing consumption equal to 1, building height or (residential) skyline h(r) also
equal the city’s population density. At the same time f(r), as defined by the product of population
density with land,
f(r) = a(r)h(r), (2)
approximates the number of commuters populating the unit-width ring at distance r. I.e., f(r)
is the city’s commuting density function, with F (r) the corresponding cumulative distribution
function.2 We follow Arnott/Stiglitz (1981) in referring to f as the city’s form or shape. To
be sure, both city shape and city skyline are graphic.3 Sections 2 through 4 proceed with the
Arnott/Stiglitz notion of shape; the city’s skyline makes its appearance in section 5.
Believing the impact of shape on policy to outpace the impact of policy on shape, we now freeze
f(r) at what it is in equilibrium (1). Up until section 5, the city shape that the standard closed city
1Our analysis below could also be cast in an open city framework. We briefly explore the open city later (section
6). There we will indicate that an open city is naturally more inclined to decentralize.
2We assume a is continuous in r. As h is (differentiable and hence) continuous in r, so are f and F .
3At the same time, the skyline is more graphic or visual than shape is. In our model, the skyline of residential
structures (i.e. excluding office buildings) reveals itself to the eye of the distant observer while the city’s shape only
reveals itself to the statistician constructing histograms of commuting distance.
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model concludes with is the city shape that our analysis begins with.4 Now, while f(0) = f(r˜) = 0
(because at r = 0 there is no land while at r = r˜ there is no housing), not much is known beyond
this, especially if the city is fully circular. It is true that increasing distance from the CBD has
rent, and hence building height h(r), fall. Yet it is also true that increasing distance from the CBD
has circumference, and hence ring areas, rise. City shape f may be anything, i.e. increasing in r
and/or decreasing in r.5
City apartments are owned by resident landlords. Each landlord owns (no housing or land other
than) two apartments located anywhere in the city. One of these apartments he occupies himself,
the other he rents out to his single tenant.6 Now, to best introduce the model’s various nesting
constraints, we briefly rephrase the model’s key concepts within a discrete framework. We parti-
tion the city into n equidistant rings of width r˜/n each. Let ring i residents travel costlessly to
commuting nodes at ri = (i− 1/2) (r˜/n), from where they go on to the CBD at cost tri. (Soon we
will shrink ring width again so that the costless-within-ring-travel assumption becomes redundant.)
Housing’s stock in ring i, denoted si, approximately equals f(ri).
Now imagine a landlord who resides in ring i himself yet rents out his extra, second property in ring
j. Such an assignment implies a sum of commuting costs and rental income equal to −tri + q(rj),
where q(rj) is rent at distance rj . Let ω subsume any other benefit common to all landlords,
such as the wage or some local public good that does not distance-decay. Then landlord utility
is ω + t(r˜ − ri − rj). Landlord utility is independent of whether the landlord resides in i and his
tenant in j, or vice versa, and so we always will conveniently put the landlord into that of his
properties that suits our exposition best.
The paper’s central policy metaphor is the ring road. A ring road is a rival to the traditional
Central Business District (CBD). Locations along it connect almost as well to one another as
locations in the traditional core do.7 And so let a costless ring road be proposed to city residents,
by some interested party (identified shortly). A ring road would shift the city’s center of attraction
from its inherited position (the CBD) out to the urban boundary r˜ (the ring road), in a single
instant and with t unchanged.8 Instead of travelling ri to the center of the city in order to work
and shop, every resident in ring i now commutes r˜ − ri to the city’s periphery to work and shop,
4Section 6 then includes, and allows for variation in, exogenous (non-policy dependent) determinants of city
shape f in the analysis.
5Only in the two polar cases do we see clearer. In a city that is both linear (e.g. peninsular) and height-control
free, f must be decreasing; while in a city that is circular and single story only, f should be increasing. This
perspective we take up again in section 6.
6Adding an extra group of owner-occupiers would add a group of voters whose incentives vis-à-vis the ring road
proposal introduced below are obvious (those close to the center are against the ring road, those far from the center
vote for it), while adding an extra group of landlords owning three properties each would add a group of voters
whose voting behavior follows a pattern similar to the voting behavior of the two-property-landlords prominent
below. In that sense, the property assignment chosen here spans the paper’s key idea. We briefly return to this
issue later (section 6).
7Vienna provides an early prominent example of a ring road, so much so that its ring road is actually referred to
as the “Ring”. Victor Gruen, inventor of the modern US style shopping mall, appears to have modeled his malls on
Vienna’s ring (Gladwell (2014), Hardwick (2010)).
8While a simultaneous shift of course is unlikely, any shift from the CBD to the city periphery might be helped
along by coordination. Rauch (1993) points to the role of business park developers in coordinating industry re-
location, while the shopping center industry attests to the importance of retail space developers in coordinating
movements in retail (e.g. Brueckner (1993)). Sometimes it is even the city’s government that provides this coor-
dination. For example, Vienna’s ring road was where suddenly one could find “the new exchange, the university,
a civic and national government section around the new town hall and parliament house, a museums section, the
opera house” (Girouard (1989)).
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in those office parks and shopping malls strewn along the ring road that permits its users to circle
the city on it at no cost. The ring road proposal is approved if it captures a majority of the vote.
Implementing the ring road surely must be one of the most fundamental policy decisions a city
can possibly ever take.9 It is important to see why tenants will be indifferent to this proposal, and
hence may be ignored throughout. Tenants’ cost of living, or tr + q(r), equals tr˜. This marginal
commuting cost does not change as long as the distance between center and periphery does not. We
conclude that it is only landlords who will vote. Landlord-voters are divided over which decision to
take, depending on their specific properties’ locations (not known to us). Landlord utility becomes
ω− t(r˜− rj − ri) with the ring road instead of ω+ t(r˜− rj − ri) without it. The attendant change
in utility is 2t(ri + rj − r˜). This change is strictly negative if ri + rj < r˜, or if
i + j ≤ n. (3)
Landlords whose property location indices satisfy inequality (3) will oppose the CBD’s displace-
ment. These we label as (landlord) opponents. All the other landlords can be counted on to
support it, and become the model’s (landlord) proponents as soon as indifferent landlords become
negligible (which they do next).
3 Extracting Bounds from the City’s Shape
We cannot derive landlord opposition to the ring road for the true yet unknown landlord property
portfolios nesting into the city’s shape. Yet we can derive fictitious landlord portfolios from the
exogenous city shape that generate minimum landlord opposition to the ring road. The observable
minimum opposition to the ring road thus computed provides a conservative estimate of the unob-
servable true opposition. Let us briefly preview the steps this section takes. First we identify the
portfolios that give rise to the weakest conceivable opposition for each nesting constraint. Next we
select that nesting constraint that reveals the largest of these minimum opposition figures. Finally
we study the effect changing city’s skewness has on this largest minimum resistance. For example,
there we look for shapes robust enough to withstand the ring road proposal’s temptation.
Consider the stock of apartments in the first ring, s1, first. All of these apartments are tied up in
matches involving landlords who suffer from the ring road – with the exception of those matches
involving a tenant in ring n. Matches involving apartments both in rings i = 1 and j = n fail
necessary condition (3). Apartment stock s1 would be a good first estimate of landlord opponents
were it not for the fact that every resident in ring n could be tenant to a landlord in ring 1 (rather
than to a landlord in any of the remaining rings). Making allowance for this observation, really
only (s1 − sn) apartments may safely be traced back to landlord opponents. Further, these latter
(s1 − sn) units might involve landlords and tenants only ever from the first ring, acting to depress
further the number of landlord opponents we can be sure of. Hence our first lower bound becomes
(s1 − sn)/2.10
9In turning the city’s spatial setup on its head this decision not just is a fundamental one; its underlying political
economy in part also parallels that of introducing a toll or of neglecting radial roads (section 6).
10The smallest number of landlord opponents conceivable obtains if landlords and tenants share equally in (s1−sn),
yielding the (s1 − sn)/2 mentioned above. On the one hand, if (s1 − sn) <
∑n−1
j=2 sj then each of the (s1 − sn)
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Put differently, (s1 − sn)/2 is a lower bound to the set of all conceivable landlord opponent figures
that could involve the first ring. This latter set contains the true number of landlord opponents.
Of course, if the city shape is such that s1 < sn, then (s1 − sn)/2 is negative. In this specific
case (s1 − sn)/2 is not a very good lower bound. A lower bound of zero landlord opponents is an
obviously better choice. Yet this need not bother us. There are many more lower bounds on offer.
For example, apartments in the first two rings, (s1 + s2), give another conservative estimate of
landlord opponents if we allow for (i) all (sn−1+sn) tenants being matched up with some landlord
in the first two rings and (ii) all remaining apartments in the first two rings to be matched up with
one another. Making these two adjustments points to ((s1 + s2)− (sn−1 + sn))/2 as lower bound
to the set of all conceivable landlord opponent figures that could involve the first two rings.11
Already we have identified two nesting constraints that offer some minimum opposition to the ring
road consistent with the city’s shape. This idea can be generalized. Including all j first, as well
as last, rings, any partial sum lo(j) =
∑j
i=1(si − sn+1−i)/2, with j = 1, . . . , n/2, is a lower bound
to the number of landlord opponents. Returning to our initial continuous setup, we refine the
city’s partition into rings by both increasing n and j such that j/n stays constant. The resulting
sequence of partial sums converges to
lo(b) =
(∫ b
0
f(r)dr −
∫ r˜
r˜−b
f(r) dr
)/
2,
where we have adopted b = (j/n) r˜.
Because integrating f(r) over [r˜−b, r˜] is the same as integrating f(r˜−r) over [0, b], we may usefully
rewrite lo(b) as
lo(b) =
∫ b
0
(
f(r)− f(r˜ − r)
)
dr
/
2 =
∫ b
0
D(r)dr
/
2, (4)
with b ∈ [0, r˜/2]. Here the second equation in (4) defines the ring difference at r, D(r) = (f(r)−
f(r˜ − r)). Each such ring difference D(r) juxtaposes commuters living in the “leading ring”, at r,
with commuters living in its antagonist “lagging ring”, at r˜ − r. Equation (4) casts lower bound
lo(b) as a sum of those ring differences.12 It is clear that most we must be interested in the largest
of all these lower bounds lo(b). It is this bound that is the most successful at extracting political
information from the given city shape. To identify it, it remains to maximize lo(b) with respect to
b. This last step is taken shortly, when stating Proposition 1.
A nearly identical argument applies towards bounding from below the number of those landlords
who are certain to strictly benefit from, and hence support, the project. To see this note that all sn
remaining apartments in ring 1 could be occupied by a landlord who is successfully matched up with a tenant in
rings 2, . . . , n − 1. The resulting number of landlord opponents would surely exceed our presumed minimum of
(s1 − sn)/2. On the other hand, if
∑n−1
j=2 sj < (s1 − sn) then only
∑n−1
j=2 sj apartments could be occupied by
landlords in ring 1 matched up with some tenant from rings 2, . . . , n− 1. The remainder would have to be occupied
by both landlords and their tenants. The resulting opponent figure, or (
∑n−1
j=2 sj + (s1 − sn))/2, would also exceed
our (s1 − sn)/2. So it is true that we can be confident of (s1 − sn)/2 landlords to oppose the ring road. – As
an aside, if the n-th ring was populated by owner-occupiers only then the minimum number of landlord opponents
associated with the first ring would be s1/2, and hence larger always. We make use of this observation in section 6.
11It may be helpful to briefly note that the simple (non-cumulative) ring difference (s2 − sn−1)/2 cannot be
another lower bound. Apartments in the second ring may also house landlords who own their second property in
the last, n-th, ring and who hence are strictly better off by adopting the ring road. This disqualifies (s2 − sn−1)/2
as lower bound.
12Our notation for ring difference D surely will not be mistaken for population density, which is written h. Note
that ring differences will resurface when introducing city skewness below (in section 4).
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units are tied up in matches that incite their owners to support the ring road – with the exception
of those involving a tenant in ring 1. Put differently, replacing the inequality in (3) by i+j ≥ n+2
and fixing i at n implies j ≥ 2. To assess minimum conceivable support let every resident in ring 1
be linked to someone in ring n (rather than to someone in any of the other rings). This is another
conservative scenario, and in it only (sn − s1) apartments point to landlords who would benefit
from the policy proposal. Further, suppose, pessimistically, that all of these (sn − s1) apartments
join landlords and tenants from ring n only. Then (sn− s1)/2 emerges as our first lower bound on
the number of landlord proponents.
Here, too, there are many more lower bounds. For example, another lower bound derives from
consulting both the two last and first rings, and comes to ((sn + sn−1)− (s1 + s2))/2. Generally,
if the last, as well as first, j rings are included, the lower bound on landlord proponents can be
written as lp(j) =
∑j
i=1 (sn+1−i−si)/2, where j = 1, . . . , n/2. Casting the partial sum of landlord
proponents extracted from the first b ring differences in terms of arbitrarily small ring width, and
recalling b = (j/n)r˜ as well as the concept of ring difference D, gives
lp(b) =
∫ b
0
(
f(r˜ − r)− f(r)
)
dr
/
2 =
∫ b
0
(
− D(r)
)
dr
/
2, (5)
again where b ∈ [0, r˜/2]. Note that lp(b) = −lo(b). The largest of all these latter lower bounds is
found by maximizing the integral with respect to b. Equivalently we may minimize this integral’s
negative, i.e. lo(b), and proceed with the negative of the minimum value obtained. This final step
also is taken when stating Proposition 1, i.e. now.
Proposition 1: (Extracting Voter Share Estimates from the City’s Shape)
(i) (Lower Bounds, and Existence): Lower bounds on the number of landlord opponents, lo, and
on the number of landlord proponents, lp, are identified as
lo = max
b∈[0, r˜/2]
[∫ b
0
D(r) dr
/
2
]
and lp = − min
b∈[0, r˜/2]
[∫ b
0
D(r) dr
/
2
]
,
respectively, and exist always.
(ii) (Positive Bounds): Both lower bounds lo and lp are nonnegative.
(iii) (Upper Bounds): Opponents’ number lo is bounded as in lo ≤ lo ≤ 1/2 − lp; while proponents’
number, lp, is bounded via lp ≤ lp ≤ 1/2 − lo.
(iv) (Useful Bounds): Lower bounds lo and lp are zero both (i.e. useless) if and only if the density
of commuting distance f is symmetric.
(v) (Sufficient Bounds): If lo > 1/4 (alternatively if lp > 1/4) then a majority of landlord opponents
(landlord proponents) reject (push through) the ring road.
(vi) (Special Bounds): If f is decreasing in r on [0, r˜/2], then lo = F (r˜/2)− 1/2 and lp = 0, while
if f is increasing in r on [0, r˜/2] then lo = 0 and lp = 1/2− F (r˜/2).
Part (i) provides estimates of the impact of the city’s “physical sphere” (differences between housing
stocks in antagonist rings) on its “political sphere” (lower bounds on landlord opposition or landlord
consent), a transmission that operates as silently as it is fundamental. These estimates can always
be computed. Part (ii) notes that lower bounds must be non-negative since the maximizers involved
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in computing either bound equal 0 at worst, reducing the corresponding integral to zero then. Part
(iii) adds that the lower bound on landlord proponents of the ring road also converts into an upper
bound on landlord opponents, and vice versa.13
Part (iv) emphasizes that, with the exception of the improbable case where f is symmetric, at least
one of the two lower bounds must bind. For this reason alone our pair of lower bounds must be
useful. Finally, and most importantly, the ring road proposal is rejected under majority rule with
certainty as soon as lo exceeds one fourth of the housing stock, irrespective of the city’s specific
apartment portfolio assignment (Part (v)). Lower bounds become particularly useful once they
exceed the one-fourth threshold. But they should also be useful even when this is not true. Note
that if we eventually allowed for construction, Part (v) would also point to the possibility of a long
run lock-in. A city with a shape such that lo > 1/4 holds on to its center. Yet this in turn just
affirms that shape.
Fig. (1) illustrates lower bounds lo and lp. In each of the Figure’s panels the horizontal axis
gives commuting distance r from the CBD, while the vertical axis gives commuting density f(r).14
(Axes are not scaled identically across panels.) The vertical line at each panel’s center rises up
above “midtown” r˜/2, about which the graph of f(r) is “folded over” (reflected) in order to obtain,
and illustrate, ring differences D(r) at all distances between 0 and r˜/2. I.e., ring differences are
represented by the vertical distances between the two graphs (lines) shown left of r˜/2. Note how
the commuting density is increasing over at least some subset of the support in most panels. In a
circular city this easily arises whenever the increase in built-up area from adding yet another ring
outweighs the diminishing population density that is typical of many (though not all) cities.
We turn to the stylized city shapes (a) through (c) first. Panel (a) shows what we might dub
a “classical city”. With its true distribution documented by de Lara et al. (2013, cf. Fig. 3),
Paris quite closely (though not perfectly) resembles this “classical city”. Panel (b) depicts a “hat
city” that reflects the fact that the CBD needs land, too. Panel (c) illustrates an “edge city” (if
a monocentric one), across which most commuters travel long distances. We note that panels (a)
and (c) illustrate the special cases set out in Proposition 1’s Part (vi). – Lower bounds can be
inferred from consulting corresponding shaded areas. In panels (a) and (b), the lower bound on
opponents amounts to half the shaded area below the density’s graph (blue on screen); whereas
in panel (c) the lower bound on proponents amounts to half the shaded area above the density’s
graph (in red).
Panel (d) adds an “inverted-U city” to our little city morphology. Moscow, for example, appears
to exhibit just this shape (Bertaud/Renault (1997), cf. Fig. (1b)). The “inverted-U” city is
different from the three preceding stylized city shapes. Neither is one of the two lower bounds
zero, nor are lower bounds just as easily read off the shaded areas. In panel (d), and following the
principles outlined above, the lower bound on opponents is equivalent to half the area obtained
after subtracting the smaller, and doubly, shaded (orange) area from the larger, singly shaded,
(blue) one. While early ring differences are negative, later ring differences are overwhelmingly
13Since the interval [lo, 1/2− lp] contains the true lo for any given city, this interval’s size effectively indicates the
precision of our lower bound lo. (A similar point applies to lp.) For city shapes for which this interval is small our
lower bound supplies a more precise estimate than for city shapes for which this interval is large.
14These commuting densities merely serve to illustrate our lower bounds, rather than simulate equilibrium com-
muting densities obtained from the housing market equilibrium set out in eq. (1).
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Figure 1: Extracting Lower Bounds from City Shape
positive. Including those later, and positive, differences in our lower bound (i.e. a cumulative
sum) is preferable even if that comes at the cost of also including those earlier, and negative,
differences.
Panel (d)’s “inverted-U city” illustrates the principles underlying our lower bound on landlord
proponents, too. Here this latter lower bound occurs where D vanishes, or where f and its reflection
f(r˜ − r) intersect in the Figure.15 The resulting lower bound is half the cumulative sum of all
ring differences from the city center up to the intersection, or half the panel’s doubly shaded (or
orange) area above the density’s graph.16 Generally we should expect city shapes to be the more
informative the more asymmetric they are. A city of symmetric shape, i.e. in which ring differences
are zero always, reveals next to nothing of its politics to the observer. The following section will
revisit this idea, replacing asymmetry with skew. Also, note how in panels (a) through (d) there
always is at least one of the two lower bounds that is active (i.e. strictly positive), as predicted by
Proposition 1’s Part (iv).
Figure 1’s panel (a) also illustrates one scenario where landlord opponents are decisive. Its shaded
area is well in excess of half the area below the graph of commuting density. This city cannot
help but turn down the ring road proposal. Not a single constellation of landlord portfolios exists
that could collapse the anti-ring-road majority that is the inescapable consequence of that city’s
15Minimizing
∫ b
0 D(r)dr/2 requires an interior solution, denoted b
∗, to satisfy f(b∗) = f(r˜ − b∗).
16In their policy simulation, Bertaud/Brueckner (2005) show how the introduction of a floor-to-area restriction
(FAR) reduces that city’s skew. The city shape observed prior to the policy’s implementation (Fig. 7) resembles
our “inverted-U city”.
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shape.17 The same cannot be said for the “hat city” in Figure 1’s panel (b). Alternatively, if lp
exceeds 1/4 then it is the landlord proponents of the ring road who will prevail. Panel (a) provides
one example.
4 The Skewness of the City’s Shape
Different city shapes may give rise to similarly sized bounds. It may not so much be the entire
commuting distribution that matters to the urban majority but one particular aspect of it. Perhaps
a simple suitable indicator of asymmetry, rather than the previous section’s more intricate bounds
lo and lp, could provide an assessment of the city’s political economy, also. This section pursues
these ideas. We suggest the commuting distribution’s skewness as an indicator that (i) itself bounds
lower bounds from below and (ii) is visually appealing at that. Ultimately it is skewness (form)
that drives decisions on the ring road proposal (function): Function follows form (Proposition 2
later).
To start us on this idea we offer an alternative definition of skewness σ, i.e.,
σ =
∫ r˜/2
0
D(r)
(
r˜/2− r
)
dr. (6)
Here σ is a weighted sum of those ring differences D(r) introduced in the previous section, with
a given ring difference’s (positive) weight equal to the two underlying rings’ common distance to
midtown.18 We justify σ by pointing to its visual appeal. In formula (6), early ring differences
(associated with distances close to 0) receive large weights while late ring differences (associated
with distances close to r˜/2) only benefit from small weights. That an indicator of skewness should
reward early ring differences makes sense. Surely how the very distant first and last ring compare
to each other frames our perception of the commuting density’s (i.e. city shape’s) skewness by
more than how the two adjacent rings right on either side of midtown r˜/2 compare to each other.
Generally, for a city shape to exhibit strong positive skew, two properties contribute. First, ring
differences should more often than not be positive (true for our stylized “classical city”, “hat city”
and “inverted-U-city” (Figure 1 again), though not true in our “edge city”). And second, these
positive ring differences better occur early (close to the CBD) rather than late (close to midtown).
The “inverted-U city” displays visibly smaller skew than our “hat city” precisely because it lacks
those early positive ring differences.19 We argue that these properties support our choice of σ as
one plausible indicator of skewness.
17In that sense we do expect to find the interests of a majority of Parisians (or Parisian landlords at least) to
always go “back to the center”, as suggested by Alexandre Gady, a historian of Paris, who argues: “Paris – it’s
beautiful. But it’s a doll’s house! And that’s one reason the Parisian élite is so conservative. They live in the doll’s
house. . . . The blindness of the élites is to reproduce a model of returning to the center, always back to the center
. . . ” (as quoted by Gopnik (2014))
18In its reliance on r˜, the length of the commuting distribution’s support, σ differs from the various definitions
of skewness found in the literature. Let ρ denote the commuting distribution’s mean, that is ρ =
∫ r˜
0 f(r)rdr. Next
note that σ may be rewritten as
∫ r˜
0 f(r)(r˜/2− r)dr, which in turn simplifies to r˜/2− ρ. Hence σ simply is midtown
distance to the CBD minus mean distance to the CBD. This is not the same as any of the standard definitions of
skewness.
19Additional shapes could be drawn to illustrate how σ conforms with our intuition on skewness. Symmetric
distributions, for instance, are characterized by skewness being equal to zero (as they should be). For symmetric
distributions, ring differences D are all zero and hence so is skewness.
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At the same time, and as the paper’s next proposition, σ also allows us to bound city politics. City
skewness connects the graphic with the political, by exploiting both concepts’ common mutual
connection with the physical. A compact statement of this idea runs through the following short
sequence of inequalities:
σ =
∫ r˜/2
0
D(r)
(
r˜/2− r
)
dr ≤ max
b∈[0, r˜/2]
[∫ b
0
D(r)
(
r˜/2− r) dr ] (7)
≤ max
b∈[0, r˜/2]
[ ∫ b
0
D(r)
(
r˜/2
)
dr
]
(8)
= r˜ max
b∈[0, r˜/2]
[ ∫ b
0
D(r) dr
/
2
]
= r˜ lo, (9)
Inequality (7) exploits the fact that the integral over weighted ring differences is greatest if the
integral’s upper limit is chosen freely, rather than being invariably fixed at r˜/2. And equation (9)
makes use of the simple fact that a monotonic transformation of the maximand does not affect
the maximization procedure’s solution. This leaves us with inequality (8). Recall that generally f
need not be monotonic in r. But then ring differences D(r) cannot be signed. A ring difference
may be anything: positive, zero, or even negative. So replacing (r˜/2 − r) by r˜/2, as we do when
going from the r.h.s. of (7) to the r.h.s. of (8), not necesssarily increases the integral.
And yet increase is precisely what that integral does. As the formal proof in the Appendix shows,
inequality (8) is true indeed. Its proof really relies on one single important insight. By definition,
the upper limit of the integral b on the r.h.s. of (7) is chosen to render the expression in square
brackets as large as possible. Let r∗ denote the underlying maximizer. In the resulting integral,
i.e. in ∫ r∗
0
D(r)
(
r˜/2 − r) dr, (10)
ring differences may well alternate in sign, but late ring differences at distances just short of r∗
must be positive. Why else would they have been included in the sum (10)? Yet these late, and
positive, ring differences close to r∗ are also those where replacing (r˜/2 − r) with r˜ has greatest
impact. After all, the change in weight applied when going from the r.h.s. of (7) to the r.h.s. of
(8) is r, and hence is largest if r is close to r∗. So intuitively positive ring differences come to enjoy
a greater extra in weight than negative ring differences do. On balance replacing weights serves
to increase the overall sum.20 To summarize, replacing (r˜/2− r) by r˜/2 does contribute to raising
the r.h.s. of (7), and so inequality (8) is true.
We summarize the overall inequality implied by the succession of inequalities (7) through (9), and
combine it with lo ≤ lo (Proposition 1), in Proposition 2’s first part. There we state that landlord
opposition to the ring road proposal is bounded from below by skew σ adjusted for “city size” r˜,
or σ/r˜. The more skewed the city is the more confident we can be of the ring road proposal’s
meeting landlord resistance. Proposition 2’s first part also states that the negative of adjusted
city skew bounds landlord proponents from below.21 We conclude that in sufficiently positively
skewed cities (Figure 1’s panel (a), (b) and (d))), part (i)’s first inequality may be useful, while in
20The formal proof in the Appendix generalizes this intuitive idea to city shapes for which ring differences’ signs
alternate more often than just once (i.e. finitely many times).
21The formal proof is similar to that just presented. A sketch appears in the Appendix.
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sufficiently negatively skewed cities (Figure 1’s panel (c)) we exploit the second inequality instead.
Either way one of the proposition’s two inequalities must be helpful except when the city’s shape
f is symmetric.
Proposition 2: (Function Follows Form)
(i) (Physical and Visual): Adjusted city skew σ/r˜ bounds landlord opponents via σ/r˜ ≤ lo, and
bounds landlord proponents as in −σ/r˜ ≤ lp.
(ii) (Function Follows Form): If σ/r˜ > 1/4 (or −σ/r˜ > 1/4 alternatively) the center retains its
retail and employment function (the periphery takes over jobs and shops).
Proposition 2’s Part (ii) sets out the paper title’s causality from city shape (form) to buildings’
residential vs. commercial uses (function). On the one hand, if σ/r˜ exceeds 1/4 then this is not
just true for lo but a fortiori also for lo. On the other hand, if −σ/r˜ exceeds 1/4 then so does
lp. Buildings in the city traditionally house retail and office uses. If city skew is strong enough
then traditional uses are certain to be preserved, while if city skew is sufficiently negative then
uses are sure to be reversed, i.e. city center buildings become residential and it becomes peripheral
structures’ turn to take over the retail and office function.22 Of course, for “amorph cities”, with
σ/r˜ in the closed interval [−1/4, 1/4], equilibrium policy cannot be assessed further.
5 Shape Origins and Skyline Convexity
This section traces the city’s shape back to urban (i) topography and (ii) technology. To best
discuss these ultimate determinants of urban form (and hence, by virtue of Proposition 2, urban
functions), we make two stylized additions to the model. First, land supply is capped in lagging,
though not in leading, rings. Only fraction α represents developable land available in lagging
rings. Below, an exogenous drop in α roughly represents the transition to a more “linear” city.
And second, residential housing only begins at r̂, rather than at 0, where r̂ ≥ 0 generally and
r̂ = 0 initially. Differences in r̂ may reasonably be thought to reflect differences in CBD size,
cross-sectional variation in federal zoning (e.g., prohibiting residential uses near the CBD) or the
presence of a green belt. We might add that much of World War II aerial bombing aﬄicted central
city, rather than peripheral, housing (starting with Germany’s bombing of Warsaw and Rotterdam,
e.g. Lampugnani (1985), Brakman et al. (2004)), and hence may fit the increase in r̂ analyzed
below. Besides, changes in α and r̂ are not purely cross-sectional only. A climate change induced
rise in the sea level, for instance, will also induce variation in coastal contours, and hence variation
in α.
22To pick up on an earlier footnote, shape and skyline coincide in peninsula (linear) cities. Intuitively, New York
and San Francisco appear to have both: positively skewed skylines-shapes and strong, confident CBDs. According
to Proposition 2, this is not a coincidence but an implication of the city’s shape. We further pusue this idea in
the following section. We also briefly comment on the evidence in Burchfield et al. (2006) according to which
there is “almost no correlation between the extent to which residential development is scattered and that to which
employment is decentralized” by noting that Proposition 2 relies on the skew of the commuting distribution, rather
than on the extent to which development is scattered.
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Now, ring differences, housing market equilibrium, and our lower bound become
D(r, r˜, α) = 2pi
(
rh(r) − α(r˜ − r)h(r˜ − r)
)
, (11)
1 = 2pi
(∫ r˜/2
rˆ
rh(r) dr +
∫ r˜
r˜/2
αr h(r) dr
)
, (12)
lo(α, r̂) = max
b
∫ b
rˆ
D(r, r˜, α) dr
/
2 (13)
respectively. For completeness we add that changes in lp(α, r̂) simply go into the opposite direction
of any changes in lo(α, r̂), and so there is no explicit discussion of these former changes below.
Changes in α or r̂ have direct effects on our lower bound on landlord opponents that are easily
gauged from consulting (13). But there are also indirect effects, operating through the adjustment
of r˜ implied by having to maintain equilibrium in the housing market (12). Fortunately, there is
no need to account for the adjustment in the optimum upper limit entering lo, denoted b∗. By its
definition (in (6)), lo is a (maximum) value function, and so its derivatives with respect to α and
r̂ may be approached with the envelope theorem in hand. We thus have
dlo(α, r̂)
dα
=
∫ b∗
0
(∂D(r, r˜, α)
∂α
+ ∂D(r, r˜, α)
∂r˜
∂r˜
∂α
)
dr
/
2, (14)
dlo(α, r̂)
dr̂
=
∫ b∗
0
∂D(r, r˜, α)
∂r˜
∂r˜
∂r̂
dr
/
2. (15)
These derivatives inform us about changes in the lower bound on landlord opponents, and so we do
not know how actual landlord opponent numbers change. Nonetheless we will think of an increase
in lo joint with a simultaneous decrease in lp as indicating that decentralization is becoming less
“likely”.
Both derivatives feature the common partial derivative ∂D/∂r˜. This derivative is positive if the
skyline h is convex (Lemma 2, in the Appendix). An increase in r˜ (as implied by a shock to α or
r̂) raises rent throughout the city, yet has two opposing effects on ring differences D. On the one
hand, population in each leading ring, at r, grows because buildings rise in height when rents go
up. On the other hand, population in each lagging ring, at r˜ − r, grows because that ring now
has shifted out, and hence commands a greater area. If the city skyline is convex, then the extra
floor space obtained from building higher up near the center exceeds the extra floor space provided
by even more bungalows at the city’s periphery.23 Note that historically, skylines have often been
found to be convex. Bertaud (2003, p. 12) shows a number of population density plots that best
are approximated by strictly convex densities (Paris, Bangkok, Jakarta). The negative exponential
that often is successfully fitted to empirical population densities in the literature (e.g. Mcdonald
(1989), Bertaud/Malpezzi (2014), Duranton/Puga (2015)) is strictly convex.24
Consider a city with a convex skyline (Proposition 3). First, a circular city will be more inclined
to decentralize than a slightly less circular one. Taking land away from lagging rings has the urban
boundary shift out, so that rents rise throughout the city. Because leading rings add more popu-
lation than lagging rings do (given convexity), ring differences, and our lower bound on landlord
23For now we take skyline convexity as given. But one might wish to relate the skyline’s convexity to its proximate
causes. Building height restrictions surely do not contribute to convexity (and in fact may cause the skyline to be
concave rather than convex.)
24We add that, Kim (2007), however, also supplies evidence according to which density gradients in US urban
areas may have “flattened”, i.e. become less convex.
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opponents, rise. As an application, and somewhat speculatively, Europe may have decentralized
jobs and shops less than the US because its more rugged topography presses its cities into more of a
linear mold. And second, a city embraces decentralization less when its CBD expands. As housing
shifts out to the city periphery, rents rise throughout the city. Due to the skyline’s convexity,
this will again raise population in leading rings by more than it will raise that in lagging rings.
The lower bound on landlord opponents increases. Skyline convexity emphasizes the importance
of being able to build up in the city’s leading rings in response to central housing loss if a city
is to retain its traditional center. Building height requirements often prevent such adjustment
(Bertaud/Brueckner (2005), Glaeser (2011)).
Proposition 3: (The Origins of Form, and Function)
Consider a city with a convex skyline. Let α fall, marking a transition from a more circular to a
more linear city, or let r̂ rise, driving residential housing away from the center. In either case, our
lower bound on landlord opponents lo rises, and our lower bound on landlord proponents lp falls.
6 Extensions
The paper’s model rests on a closed-city-resident-landlords framework. Resident landlords’ political
interests we unveil by inspecting the city’s shape. City shape’s skew turns out to be an urban
property endowed with the merits of (i) data availability and (ii) predictive power. Admittedly,
exposing this property relies on a number of debatable assumptions. Not all cities are closed;
landlords may own more, or less, than two apartments; landlords may vary by the extent to which
they own multiple properties; decentralization need not be beneficial if commuting costs also rise;
building a ring road may seem a very special case of an urban policy; and so forth. In any event,
note that our assumptions give conditions sufficient for the paper’s propositions. Mild deviations
from these assumptions not necessarily overturn them. In fact, mild variations may even strengthen
these propositions.
Consider the role of the closed city assumption. Treating the city as closed if really it is open
biases our results. If the city is open then constructing a ring road opens up a host of new property
developments on land that was out of reach previously. This land will be attractive to the mobile
among other cities’ residents, and a competitive housing industry will develop residential housing
on it. If rents earned from all of this extra housing accrue to the city’s indigenous landlords then
these indigenous landlords obviously have an – added – incentive to decentralize, and this continues
to be true if indigenous landlords only appropriate a fraction of these gains. Moreover, we still
may treat mobile, indifferent tenants as abstaining from the ring road poll. An open city must be
particularly skewed if it is to withstand this extra temptation and stick to its traditional center.
We have argued that the one landlord–one tenant assignment exposes the city shape’s role for urban
political economy at minimum cost. Relaxing this assumption can enrich the model in interesting
ways, too. E.g., suppose that a fraction 1− α of all housing belongs to owner-occupiers, while the
remaining share α is owned by landlords owning two properties each. Suppose further that owner-
occupiers only, and exclusively, live in apartments located beyond r1 > r˜/2. This probably is a
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fair assumption for many cities’ suburban housing. Owner-occupiers’ interest in decentralization is
obvious, but those α/2 landlords’ political interests are not. Suppose the last ring were inhabited
by owner-occupiers only. Consulting (3), now all housing in the first ring can safely be assumed
to point to landlord opponents. When constructing the first lower bound, no correction other
than dividing by 2 is called for. Ultimately it merely is the skewness of the city’s shape over the
“intermediate rings” that matters.
Our analysis has focused on replacing the CBD with a string of shopping districts and office parks
along the ring road, in one swipe. One might object that this is too radical a policy. But our
analysis may apply to other urban transportation policies, too. We might, for example, analyze an
increase in t brought about by a tax on commuting or a neglect of radial roads. Taking the first
derivative of landlord utility ω+ t(r˜− ri− rj) with respect to t gives (r˜− ri− rj). A landlord votes
for the tax on commuting precisely if i + j ≤ n, which just repeats the familiar condition (3) We
conclude that our lo also is a lower bound on landlords supporting an increase in t. When tenants
have less political clout than landlords this observation could be useful. Not all landlords vote for
the commuting tax. But those who do clearly do so for the rise in rent implied (as in Borck/Wrede
(2005)). Likewise, lp may be a lower bound on landlords endorsing a commuting subsidy.
Average commuting cost ρ could be considered one useful measure of welfare. The city decentralizes
for sure if −σ/r˜ > 1/4 (Proposition 2, Part (ii)), or if ρ > (3/4)r˜ equivalently given that σ = r˜/2−ρ.
Decentralization transforms each distance r into r˜−r, and hence also transforms average commuting
cost ρ into r˜ − ρ. Yet if average commuting cost ρ exceeds (3/4)r˜ initially, then average post-
decentralization commuting cost must fall short of r˜/4. Building costless ring roads, on which
commuters later travel at no cost, makes negatively skewed cities better off. At the same time,
ring roads are certainly not costless, and neither is travel on a ring road. Suppose, for instance,
that t rises to t′ > t as the city decentralizes. If aggregate commuting costs equal tρ before, they
amount to t′(r˜ − ρ) after, decentralization. Whether society is better off depends on whether
t′/t < (r˜ − ρ)/ρ. This may, or may not, hold. Welfare reducing decentralization is a possible
outcome of an extended model.
Throughout the paper we have held population fixed. If we allow for immigration, extra layers of
peripheral rings will form, and rents throughout the city will rise. Again it is the city skyline’s
convexity that helps predict how ring differences, and hence landlord interests, respond. Building
height restrictions, in particular, will prevent the central city housing height adjustment that may
counter the extra political weight that the proposition of decentralization inevitably attracts.
7 Conclusions
While city policy obviously shapes urban form, this paper argues that urban form also shapes city
policy. The more skewed a city’s shape, the less conceivable a majority of residents that prefer
replacing the traditional center at the CBD by a succession of office parks and shopping malls
along a ring road. This theory also relates to two long-standing themes in both architectural
theory and economics. It connects to architectural theory because it completes the relationship
between function and form. As Frank Lloyd Wright notes (quoted in Saarinen (1954)), “Form
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follows function – that has been misunderstood. . . . Form and function should be one, joined
in a spiritual union.” And it connects to mainstream economics. Economics as a field is weary
of generalizing an aggregate’s properties on towards the aggregate’s component members lest it
commit a “fallacy of division”. By linking the built environment (a society aggregate) to the
preferences of at least a majority of its landlords (a decisive subset of society’s members) we
provide an example of where inferring dominant residents’ properties does seem justified after all.
Whenever the city’s shape “leans towards” the city center (a majority of) resident landlords are
inclined to maintain, and hence “lean towards”, the city center. Conversely, if the city “leans
towards” the periphery (a majority of) resident landlords are inclined to develop, and hence “lean
towards”, the periphery. No fallacy is involved when assessing a city’s politics by its shape.
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9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Part (i) (Lower Bounds, and Existence): Consider a landlord who resides in ring i yet rents out
the extra property in ring j. This is a “match” {i, j}. Let matrix B collect the frequencies with
which matches {i, j} occur. For example, b1,3 is the number of times a landlord owning, and living
in, an apartment in the first ring also owns an apartment in ring 3. Note that, with this definition,
the sum of all entries in row i plus the sum of all entries in column i just yield the apartment total
in ring i.
B =

b1,1 b1,2 b1,3 . . . b1,n−2 b1,n−1 b1,n
b2,1 b2,2 b2,3 . . . b2,n−2 b2,n−1 b2,n
...
...
...
...
...
...
bn−1,1 bn−1,2 bn−1,3 . . . bn−1,n−2 bn−1,n−1 bn−1,n
bn,1 bn,2 bn,3 . . . bn,n−2 bn,n−1 bn,n
 . (16)
In view of condition (3), B’s counter diagonal (comprising all the elements on the diagonal stretch-
ing from the bottom left corner to the top right hand corner) collects all those matches that leave
landlords indifferent to the ring road. In contrast, entries above (below) B’s counterdiagonal collect
all those matches that involve landlord opponents (landlord proponents).
Since (s1 − sn)/2 is an obvious first lower bound, let us make precise the second lower bound
discussed in the main text instead, or (s1+ s2− (sn−1+ sn))/2. In (16), s1 and s2 are the sums of
all entries given in the first row and column and second row and column, respectively. It is clear
that this sum overstates the number of landlord opponents; some of its elements are found on, or
below, our counterdiagonal. The implied error amounts to(
bn,1 + bn−1,2 + bn,2
)
+
(
b1,n + b2,n−1 + b2,n
)
. (17)
This error collects a subset of all the matches linking apartments in the last two rings to apartments
in the first two rings, indicating landlords that do not oppose the ring road at all. We take care
of these by subtracting all apartments in the last two rings from (s1 + s2), i.e. by subtracting
(sn−1 + sn). Similar reasoning applies to subsequent lower bounds on landlord opponents, or to
any lower bound on landlord proponents.
As shown in the main text, the desirable lower bound on landlord opponents and the desirable
lower bound on landlord proponents are the maximum of lo(b) and that of lp(b), respectively. Being
integrals of continuous functions, lo(b) and lp(b) are differentiable on the compact interval [0, r˜/2].
Hence both these maxima always exist. 
Part (iv) (Useful Bounds): The proof is by contradiction. Thus suppose both lower bounds are
useless. I.e., suppose
max
b∈[0, r˜/2]
[∫ b
0
D(r) dr
]
= 0 and min
b∈[0, r˜/2]
[∫ b
0
D(r) dr
]
= 0.
From the first equation we gather that
∫ b
0 D(r)dr ≤ 0 for all b ∈ [0, r˜/2] (else lo would need to
be positive, contradicting our assumption); whereas from the second equation above we infer that∫ b
0 D(r)dr ≥ 0 for all b ∈ [0, r˜/2] (else lp would have to be positive, contradicting our assumption).
Joining these latter two inequalities gives∫ b
0
D(r) dr = 0
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for all b ∈ [0, r˜/2]. This implies that the integral in the last equation is a constant function of
b. Hence its derivative with respect to b, or D(b), must equal zero for all b. So f is symmetric.
Finally, if f is symmetric both bounds obviously are useless (zero). 
Part (vi) (Special Bounds): If f is decreasing (increasing) on [0, r˜/2], then r˜/2 maximizes lo(b)
(lp(b)). 
Proof of Proposition 2:
Part (i) (Physical and Visual): Following the discussion in the main text, to complete the proof
it remains to show that inequality (8) is true. We introduce some auxiliary notation first. Let the
signs of ring differences D(r) alternate on [0, r∗]. Consider all those intervals on which D retains
its sign. We pair off these intervals into groups of two. That is, we divide [0, r∗] into n consecutive
intervals (or rings) [0, r∗1 ], [r∗1 , r∗2 ], . . . , [r∗n−1, r∗] such that the i-th such interval (ring) decomposes
into one subset on which D < 0, denoted [r∗i−1, r̂i], and another on which D > 0, written [r̂i, r∗i ].
We also adopt r∗0 = 0 and r∗n = r∗.
Now, by the mean value theorem of integration, there must be numbers c′i and c′′i , satisfying
r˜/2 ≥ c′i ≥ c′′i > 0 as well as c′i ≥ c′i+1 for all i, such that
max
b∈[0, r˜/2]
[∫ b
0
D(r)
(
r˜/2− r) dr] = n∑
i=1
[∫ r̂i
r∗
i−1
D(r)
(
r˜/2− r) dr + ∫ r∗i
r̂i
D(r)
(
r˜/2− r)dr]
=
n∑
i=1
[
c′i
∫ r̂i
r∗
i−1
D(r) dr + c′′i
∫ r∗i
r̂i
D(r) dr
]
≤
n∑
i=1
[
c′i
∫ r̂i
r∗
i−1
D(r) dr + c′i
∫ r∗i
r̂i
D(r) dr
]
=
n∑
i=1
c′i
∫ r∗i
r∗
i−1
D(r) dr. (18)
Lemma 1 (following this proof) shows that
∫ r∗
r∗
n−j
D(r)dr ≥ 0 for any j = 1, . . . , n. That is, summing
over any j last ring differences gives a non-negative number. We continue with the r.h.s. of (18)
making repeated use of this. I.e.,
n∑
i=1
c′i
∫ r∗i
r∗
i−1
D(r) dr =
n−1∑
i=1
c′i
∫ r∗i
r∗
i−1
D(r) dr + c′n
∫ r∗
r∗
n−1
D(r) dr
≤
n−1∑
i=1
c′i
∫ r∗i
r∗
i−1
D(r) dr + c′n−1
∫ r∗
r∗
n−1
D(r) dr
=
n−2∑
i=1
c′i
∫ r∗i
r∗
i−1
D(r) dr + c′n−1
∫ r∗
r∗
n−2
D(r) dr ≤ . . . ≤ c1
∫ r∗
0
D(r) dr
Note how successive inequalities repeatedly exploit Lemma 1, for increasingly larger values of j.
It remains to add that
c1
∫ r∗
0
D(r) dr ≤
∫ r∗
0
D(r)(r˜/2) dr ≤ max
b∈[0, r˜/2]
[∫ b
0
D(r)
(
r˜/2
)
dr
]
Putting all consecutive inequalities in this paragraph together completes the proof of inequality
(8). (The proof of the second inequality in Part (i) proceeds along similar lines.) 
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Lemma 1:
For all j = 1, . . . , n, it is true that ∫ r∗
r∗
n−j
D(r) dr ≥ 0. (19)
Ring differences in any last j rings sum to a non-negative number.25
Proof of Lemma 1: The proof makes use of the notation introduced in the proof of inequality
(8) in the main text. We first show that
∫ r∗
r∗
n−1
D(r)dr ≥ 0. As our point of departure, recall that
surely
0 ≤
∫ r∗
r∗
n−1
D(r)(r˜/2− r)dr
because otherwise r∗ could not be the optimizer. (The n-th ring should not have been included in
lo.) But then
0 ≤ c′n
∫ r̂n
r∗
n−1
D(r) dr + c′′n
∫ r∗
r̂n
D(r)dr
≤ c′n
∫ r̂n
r∗
n−1
D(r) dr + c′n
∫ r∗
r̂n
D(r)dr = c′n
∫ r∗
r∗
n−1
D(r) dr
Since 0 < c′n this proves
∫ r∗
r∗
n−1
D(r)dr ≥ 0. Next we show that ∫ r∗
r∗
n−2
D(r)dr ≥ 0. Following similar
reasoning as above, clearly
0 ≤
∫ r∗
r∗
n−2
D(r)(r˜/2− r)dr
But then
0 ≤ c′n−1
∫ r̂n−1
r∗
n−2
D(r) dr + c′′n−1
∫ r∗n−1
r̂n−1
D(r)dr + c′n
∫ r∗
r∗
n−1
D(r) dr
≤ c′n−1
∫ r̂n−1
r∗
n−2
D(r) dr + c′n−1
∫ r∗n−1
r̂n−1
D(r)dr + c′n−1
∫ r∗
r∗
n−1
D(r) dr = c′n−1
∫ r∗
r∗
n−2
D(r) dr
Since 0 < c′n−1 this proves
∫ r∗
r∗
n−2
D(r)dr ≥ 0. Proceeding along these lines proves Lemma 1. 
Lemma 2: If building height h(r) is convex then the following inequality holds:
∂D(r, r˜, α)
∂r˜
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 2: We note three properties of the building height (or skyline) function h. First,
h(r) also depends on r˜. A greater urban boundary r˜ increases pressure on rent, and this in turn
raises building height. Second, h(r˜ − r) does not depend on r˜. A greater urban boundary r˜ does
not increase pressure on rent in a ring r˜ − r that sees its relative position (its position relative to
the urban boundary) unchanged. And third, the increase in building height implied by the urban
boundary shifting out by one unit of distance equals the change in building height induced by
approaching the CBD by one unit of distance, or:
∂h(r)
∂r˜
= −∂h(r)
∂r
. (20)
25This property also is illustrated by the simple example of Figure 1’s panel (d) where positive ring differences
dominate negative ring differences.
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Differentiating D(r, r˜, α) as in (11) with respect to r˜, accounting for the first two Ricardian rent
properties just listed and also dividing by 2pi gives
1
2pi
∂D(r, r˜, α)
∂r˜
= ∂h(r)
∂r˜
r − αh(r˜ − r). (21)
Now, by the convexity of h, we have
∂h(r)
∂r
r <
∂h(r˜ − r)
∂r
r < h(r˜) − h(r˜ − r)
for r ∈ [0, r˜/2]. Combining this with the fact that h(r˜) = 0, making use of the third of Ricardian
rent’s properties listed in (20) and exploiting 1 ≥ α gives
∂h(r)
∂r˜
r > αh(r˜ − r).
This proves that either expression in (21) is strictly positive. 
Proof of Proposition 3: Implicitly differentiating (12) reveals the partial derivatives of r˜ with
respect to parameters α and r̂. These derivatives’ signs are
∂r˜
∂α
< 0 and ∂r˜
∂r̂
> 0.
Assuming convexity of h, we infer the corresponding sign of ∂D/∂r˜ by making use of Lemma 2.
Finally, we write down the obvious property that
∂D(r, r˜, α)
∂α
< 0. (22)
Combining the various derivatives’ signs then reveals that
dlo(α, r̂)
dα
< 0 and dl
o(α, r̂)
dr̂
> 0
The corresponding signs for the implied changes in lp are simply the negative of the signs given
above. 
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1 Introduction 
 
“[…] Even more so in a monetary union where 
vulnerability identified in each country can be 
addressed with macro-prudential policy, allowing 
for the appropriate heterogeneity, while countries 
remain subject to a single monetary policy. […], 
macro-prudential policy provides monetary policy 
with additional room for manoeuvre to better focus 
on ensuring price stability. “ 
                  -- Vítor Constáncio. Speech ECB 2015  
 
Over the last decades, one can observe a certain ‘de-linking’ of short-term house price dynamics 
from fundamental factors such as income. The non-fundamental house price dominates the short 
term movement in house prices and leads to massive boom and bust cycles as came apparent in 
several real estate bubbles. As a large fraction of national wealth, residential investment is a 
crucial part of general business conditions. Besides that, housing also serves as collateral for 
loans. The fluctuations of house values would remarkably affect the performance of leveraged 
financial institutions. Therefore, the fluctuation of house prices may be dangerous and costly, and 
may even be the source of economic vulnerabilities and crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008, 
Reinhart and Reinhart, 2008). 
 
The relationship between monetary policy and asset market stability is always an open question. 
Compared to professional investors in the stock market, homeowners might have a less 
sophisticated understanding of the economy and hence might view a one-time rise in home prices 
– resulting from a decline in interest rates – as evidence of a more persistent upward trend. As a 
result, the housing market might be particularly vulnerable to bubbles. This issue is of particular 
importance for a monetary union where all countries are subject to a common monetary policy. 
Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015b) show that because the domestic demand growth was 
extremely strong at the periphery but very weak at the core, monetary policy was too loose for 
the periphery and too tight for the rest. Such differences in the monetary policy stance might lead 
to varying housing market movements in the EMU countries (Seyfried, 2010). As we experienced 
in the first decade of the twenty first century, although inflation has been muted in most countries, 
real house prices have very different development. Some Eurozone countries, such as Spain and 
Ireland, experienced unprecedented boom times, which are arguably contributed to the too loose 
monetary policy stance. By contrast, in other countries, such as Germany and Austria, very little 
price movement was observed over the same time horizon.  
 
Moreover, a common monetary policy also limits the use of monetary policy for stabilisation 
purposes. As bubbles may appear only in some of the member countries, the “lean against the 
wind” strategy might be effective for preventing the bubble in these countries but at the cost of a 
recession or at least slower growth in some of the other countries (Allen and Rogoff, 2011). So 
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the “lean against the wind” strategy is difficult to operationalize in the euro area. Policymakers 
may thus have to choose policy instruments at the national level – macro-prudential policies. 
Hence, the evaluation of the effectiveness of macro-prudential policies for preventing housing 
bubbles in the euro area is another purpose of this paper. 
 
However, most of the related researches are based on major OECD countries (see. e.g., 
Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004); Giuliodori (2004); Calza et al. (2013); Sá et al. (2014); Iacoviello 
and Neri (2010); Bauer (2014)). The results from studies focusing on OECD countries may not 
be directly applicable to euro area countries. One reason could be the heterogeneous banking 
systems in OECD countries. For instance, in the U.S., market-based financial intermediates hold 
more than 60% of mortgage (Shin, 2009), while deposit banks are still the dominant mortgage 
holders in most European countries. Consequently, the traditional bank lending channel may be 
less effective in the U.S., as the emergence of the market-based financial intermediaries makes 
banks dependent on insured deposits for funding. Apart from that, euro area countries are 
subjected to fixed exchange rate. Rubio (2014) shows that as long as the countries are not small 
and homogeneous enough, fixed or managed exchange rates may amplify the response of house 
price to a policy shock. Therefore, OECD countries might not be an appropriate sample for the 
studies on the impact of the monetary policy stance on housing market stability for EMU 
countries. 
 
The analysis for the EMU countries has received increasingly attentions. Based on DSGE model 
Rubio (2014) how that the heterogeneous mortgage market structure leads to a different response 
to monetary policy shocks. Under a similar theoretical framework, Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego 
(2015a) show that the common monetary policy would be associated with the increase in the 
liquidity at the periphery and can explain the increase in the house price and stronger credit 
growth in the peripheral economies in the pre-crisis period. However, empirical evidence is still 
limited. Focusing on EMU countries, Maclennan et al. (1998) find that countries with fixed 
interest rate, low loan to value ratios, high transactions costs, and a smaller own-occupied sector 
tended to experience lower house price change. Annett (2006) show a significant impact of 
monetary policy on house prices of EMU countries only appears in France, Ireland, Belgium, 
Finland, and Spain, but not for the panel.  
 
Our paper differs from the aforementioned literature in three ways. First, we are interested on the 
impact of monetary policy on the non-fundamental run-ups. Literature shows that the interest rate 
may impact house prices by altering the home buyers’ costs of capital (Goodman and Thibodeau, 
2008), by affecting the credit channel (Aoki et al., 2004, Iacoviello, 2005, Bernanke and Blinder, 
1992) and by changing the investors’ risk appetite (Adrian and Shin, 2008, Adrian et al., 2012). A 
decrease in the homebuyers’ borrowing cost is not necessary to relate to an unsustainable house 
price overshooting. The non-fundamental house price movements would increase market 
vulnerability and therefore deserve more attention from policymakers. 
 
Second, we use the deviation from Taylor rule rate to proxy the monetary policy stance. Allen 
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and Rogoff (2011) show that the ECB’s monetary policy was essentially too loose compared to 
Taylor rule rate for some countries while being appropriate for the others. So interest rate stance 
could be different at the core and periphery, due to the heterogeneous local economy conditions 
among EMU countries. Using short term interest rate as the proxy of monetary policy stance may 
not be able to capture such difference.  
  
Third, we examine whether macro-prudential policy could help policymakers to eliminate the 
side effect of an accommodative monetary policy on housing market stability, especially for 
peripheral countries, which are more likely to be subjected to a too loose monetary policy. We 
adopt the interacted Panel VAR model to quantify the impact of institutional factors on the 
responses of the non-fundamental house price run-ups to a monetary easing shock. This approach 
compares the impact of monetary policy without splitting the country samples and allows for a 
time varying mortgage market characteristics.  
 
Our results show that the monetary policy stance can significantly trigger non-fundamental house 
price overshooting in euro area countries with liberal mortgage markets. Peripheral countries are 
more sensitive to the interest rate gap shock. Mortgage market characteristics also play a more 
critical role in the transmission of monetary policy at the periphery. A one-time positive shock to 
interest rate gap can explain over 20% of the forecasting error variance of non-fundamental house 
price run-ups in Ireland and Spain. In housing markets with a less liberalized mortgage market, 
we see limited responses of the non-fundamental house price component to the interest rate shock. 
Thus, policy makers may focus on limiting mortgage equity withdrawals, Loan-to-Value ratios 
and avoiding exaggerated use of tax policies to promote homeownership in order to minimize the 
side effects of accommodative monetary policies on housing market stability for those peripheral 
countries which are more likely to be subjected to a too loose monetary policy.   
 
 
2 Literature review 
 
Our paper is built upon several strands of literature. Concerning the interdependence between 
monetary policy and house price movements, many studies found that monetary policy 
significantly affects house prices, especially when it is too dovish. Indeed, house price booms are 
typically preceded by a period of loose monetary policy (Dokko et al., 2011, Seyfried, 2010, 
Ahearne et al., 2008, Simo-Kengne et al., 2013, Taylor, 2007, Greiber and Setzer, 2007, 
Jarocinski and Smets, 2008, Antipa and Lecat, 2009, Escobari et al., 2013). Monetary policy can 
affect the house price through several channels. The primary one is the interest rate channel. 
Given the price stickiness, an increase in nominal interest rates translates into an increase in the 
users’ cost of capital, which in turn leads to a reduction in investment spending and a decrease in 
the housing demand (Goodman and Thibodeau, 2008). Besides that, studies by Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992) as well as Disyatat (2011) show that a monetary policy shock can transmit to the 
housing market through the credit channel. For example, a shock tightening monetary policy can 
hit the banks and decrease their loan supply by decreasing the borrowers’ net worth (Aoki et al., 
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2004, Iacoviello, 2005) and/or by inducing banks to tighten the reserve requirements (Bernanke 
and Blinder, 1992). Furthermore, monetary policy can affect house prices by changing the 
investors’ risk perceptions. Lower interest rates may result in lower risk premiums either due to 
the decrease in perceived risk or because of the increase in risk tolerance (Adrian and Shin, 2008, 
Adrian et al., 2012). 
 
A key issue is the identification of a monetary policy shock. Most of the literature uses the short-
term and/or long-term interest rates. Other literature, such as Sá et al. (2014), imposes sign 
restrictions on the impulse responses to identify a monetary policy shock. A third strand of 
literature uses the Taylor rule rate. Proposed by Taylor (1993), the Taylor rule is used to stipulate 
how much the central bank should change the nominal interest rate in response to changes in 
inflation and GDP or other economic fundamentals. Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) demonstrate 
that interest rate policies in the European countries moved very closely with output gaps and 
inflation as suggested by the Taylor rule. Thus, the Taylor principle does apply to the European 
countries as well. Using Taylor’s rule as a benchmark, Seyfried (2010) found that monetary 
policy was too loose in several countries including Ireland, Spain and the United States prior to 
the bust of the respective housing bubbles. In addition, Seyfried (2010) states that monetary 
policy was appropriate or slightly restrictive for France and Germany where we did not see any 
housing bubbles in the same period. Using a Panel logit framework, Bauer (2014) estimates the 
likelihood of a house price correction in 18 OECD countries. Using the Canadian housing market 
as an example, the results show that a sharp interest rate tightening can trigger a house price 
correction. Hott and Jokipii (2012) regress the non-fundamental house price change of 14 OECD 
countries on the deviation of Taylor rule rate and find a strong link between housing bubbles and 
low interest rate. The impact would be stronger when the interest rate is “too low for too long”.  
 
Even though monetary policy is a major determinant of house price movements, other factors 
may still remain highly relevant. It is worth noting that the reaction of house price inflation is 
found to differ across regions with a common monetary policy (Barigozzi et al., 2014, Rubio, 
2014). Even though its importance is obvious, there is still little empirical evidence on how 
country-specific factors affect housing markets, in particular how monetary policy transmission 
and the mortgage market structure are related to the non-fundamental house price component. 
Some studies assessed the drivers behind country and region specific differences in real estate 
markets and explored the importance of mortgage market heterogeneity for the transmission of 
monetary policy. For example, Based on OECD countries, Adams and Füss (2010) found that 
varying housing market dynamics can be traced back to differences in the national regulatory 
setting and mortgage market features. Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) as well as Iacoviello and 
Minetti (2003) argue that financial liberalization of mortgage markets supported a significant 
increase of house price sensitivity to short term interest rates for U.S. and U.K. Milcheva and Zhu 
(2015) studies 17 OECD countries and show that countries with more developed mortgage 
market are more sensitive to international house price comovement. More flexible mortgage 
market structures provide a better monetary policy transmission is further supported by Calza et 
al. (2013), who found that economies with a more flexible mortgage market are more responsive 
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to monetary impulses based on DSGE models. Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015c) as well as 
Rubio (2014) focus on the leverage of households. They show that the loan to value ratio is an 
important determinant of house price increases. Based on a two-country monetary union DSGE 
model, Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015a) study how a house price shock in the periphery and 
a technology shock in the core countries are transmitted to the both economies. Using European 
countries as the sample, Maclennan et al. (1998) find that countries that experienced lower house 
price change are characterized with fixed interest rate, low loan to value ratios, high transactions 
costs, and a smaller own-occupied sector.  
 
We want to bring together the different strands of the literature concerning the linkage between 
monetary policy, country-specific mortgage market structures and housing market developments. 
Our paper differs from previous studies in three ways: first, we focus on the non-fundamental 
house price run-ups. Second, we use deviation from the Taylor rate as the proxy of interest stance. 
Third, we explore the role of time-varying mortgage market characteristics. For example, in the 
early 2000s, many countries increased the maximum loan-to-value ratio. Later, during the crisis, 
the maximum loan-to-value ratio decreased slightly in those countries. Therefore, we expect to 
see variations in the VAR coefficients. Based on an interacted panel VAR model, we are able to 
compare the importance of a monetary policy shock to housing market stability in countries with 
different mortgage markets without splitting the country samples.  
 
 
3 Econometric modelling 
To estimate the relationship between the non-fundamental house price and the monetary policy 
stance as well as the influence of the mortgage market, we use a three-stage estimation strategy. 
First, we estimate the non-fundamental house price run-ups, which are defined as the residuals of 
the observed house price change and the respective fundamental part. The fundamental house 
price change is predicted using local housing demand and supply factors. In the second stage, we 
use the deviation of the short term interest rate from the Taylor rate level in each country in order 
to proxy for the monetary policy in the individual countries. In the third stage, we investigate the 
impact of monetary policy on house price run-ups using an interacted panel VAR setting, 
conditional on the mortgage market development in each country.  
3.1 Non-Fundamental House Price Run-ups 
We first estimate the non-fundamental part of the house price in each country. Monetary policy 
can affect the house price by changing the users’ cost which impacts the fundamental value of 
housing assets. However, additional deviation may still be caused by investors’ speculative 
behaviors and optimistic expectations. As the non-fundamental deviations may result in market 
instability as well as asset price fluctuations, we are particularly interested in the monetary 
policy’s impact on the non-fundamental price run-ups.  
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As equation (1), following Dipasquale and Wheaton (1994), Case and Shiller (2003), Goodman 
and Thibodeau (2008), Gallin (2006) Muellbauer and Murphy (2008) as well as Koetter and 
Poghosyan (2010), a country’s demand for housing (QD) can be defined as a function of 
households’ income (Y), the price of rental housing service (R) and the market size, which is 
measured as population (POP). 
The price of rental housing service equals users’ cost (ρ), which is positively related to mortgage 
rate (Mr), asset depreciation (d), and the property tax rate (tr). Further, it is negatively related to 
the product of expected capital gains { }E p and house value (V). From the supply side, the 
aggregate quantity of house supply can be a function of asset price (V) and supply shift (G).  
1 2 3
4 5,
1
ln ln ln ln
ln [ { }]
ln ln
D
J
S
j j
j
Q Y R POP
R V Mr d tr E p
Q V G
α α α
α α
=
= + +
= + + −
= +∑
        (1) 
In the product market equilibrium, ln lnD SQ Q= . Solving Equation (1), we obtain: 
1 2 3 4,
1
ln ln ln ln
J
j j
j
V Y POP Gϑ ϑ ρ ϑ ϑ
=
= + + +∑         (2) 
The fundamental house price ( fP ) is the long-term equilibrium price based on Equation (2). In 
the empirical part, we define the non-fundamental house price run-ups as the deviation of the 
observed house price change ( P ) from the respective fundamental price change. We estimate the 
fundamental price for each country individually. According to Equation (2), changes in the 
fundamental house price in country i at period t are based on the changes in a set of local demand 
and supply determinants, including GDP, inflation (CPI), population (POP), disposal personal 
income (Income), housing permits (Permit) and the mortgage rate (Mr). Since the depreciation 
rates as well as the property tax rates remain unchanged over time in many countries, they are 
captured by the constant term (αi) in our regression estimation. Considering the endogeneity 
problem between demand/supply factors and the house price, we use the lagged variables to 
estimate the fundamental price:  
4 4 4 4
, 1 , , 2 , , 3 , , 4 , ,
1 1 1 1
4 4 4
5 , , 6 , , 7 , , ,
1 1 1
ln = ln ln ln ln
               ln ln
i t i i p i t p i p i t p i p i t p i p i t p
p p p p
hp
i p i t p i p i t p i p i t p i t
p p p
P GDP CPI POP Income
UE Permit Mr e
α β β β β
β β β
− − − −
= = = =
− − −
= = =
∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
 (3)  
where αi and βi are the coefficients for country i. The estimation of the fundamental price includes 
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up to 4 lags.1 The fundamental price change is the predicted price change (
,
ˆln i tP∆ ) whereas the 
non-fundamental price run-ups are defined as the residuals (
,
hp
i te ). Considering that the elasticity 
on house price with respect to fundamental factors can vary across countries, we estimate 
Equation (3) by OLS estimator separately for each country.23 
  
3.2 Deviation from Taylor Rule Rate  
In order to proxy for the central banks’ monetary policy stance, we estimate the deviation of the 
short-term interest rate from its Taylor rule level. The Taylor rule level of the interest rate in each 
country is estimated by constructing both inflation and output gaps. We then use the deviation of 
the GDP from its filtered value as an estimate of the output gap. The Taylor rule level of the 
short-term interest rate is defined as: 
* *
, 0, 1, , 2, , , ,( ) ( ) TRi t i i i t i i i t i t i tr y y eγ γ pi pi γ= + − + − + , (4) 
where 
,i tr  is the short-term interest rate, 0,iγ  is the neutral (nominal) rate of interest in country i. 
,i tpi  is the actual inflation rate in country i at period t and the starred value indicates the target, 
which is set at 2 percent. ( *
, ,i t i ty y− ) is the output gap, with yi,t for the log transformed GDP in 
country i at period t. *
,i ty  is the filtered series using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (with a smoothing 
parameter of 1600). 
,
TR
i te  is the difference between the short-term interest rate and the Taylor rate 
(TR).  
Svensson (1999) suggests that the TR equation is the optimal reaction function for a central bank 
which targets information in a simple backward-looking two-equation model of the economy and 
γ1 and γ2 are convolutions of policymakers’ preferences as well as the parameters in the IS and the 
Phillips curves.  Taylor (1993) suggests that γ0 = 4, γ1 = 1.5 and γ2 = 0.5 for the U.S. market. 
However, Gerlach-Kristen (2003) suggests that these values may not apply for all countries. 
Therefore we estimate the coefficients (γs) separately for each country. Considering the potential 
endogeneities in Equation (4), we use the GMM estimator including up to 4 lags of inflation and 
output gaps as instrument variables. The fitted value (
,
ˆi tr ) is TR and the residuals ,TRi te  are the 
deviation from TR, which represents a measure of the monetary policy stance. 4  
 
                                                 
1
 Up to 8 lags are tested. All specifications yield very similar results.  
2
 Using weighted least squares to account for the outliers during the boom periods generates robust results. We also 
estimate the residuals based on contemporaneous demand and supply factors using GMM estimator (instrument 
variables are set as lagged demand/supply variables up to 4 periods),, the results are also robust.  
3
 Detailed graphs on fundamental change and observed change are available in online appendix.  
4
 Detailed information about the fitted Taylor rule rate are available in online appendix.  
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3.3 Impact of Monetary Policy Stance on House Price  
At this stage, we combine the estimated non-fundamental price change and the deviation from the 
Taylor rate into the panel data setting and incorporate the credit supply into the regression in 
order to perform an interacted panel VAR model as follows: 
4 4 4 4
, , , , , , ,
1 1 1 1
M M M
i t i p i t p i t p i t i t p p t p p i t t p i t
p p p p
X X M M X Z M Z ε
− − − −
= = = =
= Ψ + Φ + Ψ + Φ + ϒ + ϒ +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (5) 
where 
,i tX is a 5 by 1 vector of the non-fundamental house price change, the deviation from 
Taylor rule rate and the change in domestic total credit to households, account balance, and 
sentiment in country i at period t:
, , , , . ,
[ ]hp TRi t i t i t i t i t i tX e credit e account senti ′= ∆ .5 Since we are 
interested in the impact of variable iM  on the interdependence of endogenous variables, we keep 
everything else fixed.  iΨ  is the country-specific intercept. pΦ  is the 5 5×  matrix of 
autoregressive coefficients. The maximum lag is selected as 4 based on BIC criteria. 
,i tM  is the 
mortgage market indicator for country i  at period t,  and is standardized to be between 0 and 1. It 
measures the relative mortgage market development of country i at period t  to the rest of the 
other countries and other periods. MΨ is the coefficient for mortgage market indicators. When 
index  
,i tM  keeps constant over time, in order to avoid any singular matrix, MΨ  is set as zero. 
M
pΦ  is the coefficient vector for the interaction term ( , ,i t i t pM X − ). The interaction term measures 
the impact of mortgage market developments on the interdependence of the endogenous variables 
without splitting the sample.  
tZ  is a 3 by 1 vector for three global/regional variables in period t presented in Section 4. They 
are the same for all countries.  They are also interacted with mortgage market indicators. pϒ  is a 
5 by 3 vector of coefficients for variable Z, and Mpϒ  is a 5 by 3 vector of coefficients for the 
interaction with mortgage market indicator.  
,i tε  is the 5 1×  vector of error terms and , ~ (0, )i t Nε Ω , where Ω  is a 5 by 5 matrix. This model 
extends the standard panel VAR model with fixed effects and takes into account both the intercept 
and slopes heterogeneity. We estimate the coefficients in Equation (5) using OLS equation by 
equation.  
The impulse response is essentially based on estimated coefficients
,i pΦ , ,
M
i pΦ  and Ω . The 
Cholesky decomposition order is the deviation from Taylor Rate non-fundamental, change in 
                                                 
5
 Using the credit gap generates totally robust results. It is calculated as the difference between the credit to GDP 
ratio in each country and the corresponding Hodrick-Prescott filtered credit to GDP ratio (with a smoothing 
parameter of 1600). 
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housing credit, account balance, non-fundamental house price change and sentiment. The results 
are totally robust with other order sequences. Because 
,
M
i pΦ  may vary across countries, the 
responses also vary across countries, and the variation of the responses depend on the countries’ 
mortgage market characteristics. We follow Sá et al. (2014) and report the results for 
,
0.75i tM =  
as the more liberal mortgage market, and 
,
0.25i tM = as the less liberal mortgage. So the impulse 
response function is based on the coefficients 0.75High Mp p pΦ = Φ + Φ  for more liberal mortgage 
markets, while it is based on the coefficients 0.25Low Mp p pΦ = Φ + Φ for less liberal mortgage 
markets. 
 
4 Data 
The sample includes the following 11 countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. For the Taylor Rate estimation, we 
use a larger time horizon for some countries as we used the maximum available time series. Thus, 
Taylor Rate estimation is based on data that goes back until the 1980s for some countries. 
However, we had to cut the panel to between the first quarter of 1992 and the fourth quarter of 
2012 due to the restricted availability of house price data. House price indices are collected from 
BIS and are based on national sources. BIS data was not available for Greece and Portugal so we 
use data from Oxford Economics.  
 
As the main focus of the paper is to analyze how the monetary policy stance and the mortgage 
market structure influence non-fundamental house price developments, we consider country-
specific factors that can be regarded as fundamental demand and supply drivers of house prices. 
These country-specific variables include the real gross domestic product (GDP), the credit from 
domestic banks to the private nonfinancial sector as a share of the GDP, the consumer price index 
inflation (CPI), total population (POP), the unemployment rate (UE), disposal personal income 
(Income), housing permits (Permit), the mortgage rate (Mr), account balance, and exchange rate. 
GDP, CPI, UE, account balance, sentiment data, and exchange are taken from OECD. Mortgage 
rates are taken from national sources or the ECB. Credit, population, housing permits data and 
exchange rate are taken from BIS, Oxford Economics and Datastream, respectively.  In our model, 
these country-specific variables are expressed in growth rates.  
 
We also include three global factors. The European current unit/Euro to US dollar exchange rate 
is from OECD database. European current unit was adapted by the 11 countries since 1979 and 
was later replaced by Euro. The oil price is taken from Datastream. It is a good indicator of global 
economic cycles and inflation expectations whereas financial leverage is a good measure of 
financial risk appetite globally. During the financial crisis we have observed global deleveraging 
(see (Shin, 2009), Adrian et al. (2012)) which affects the credit supply by reducing interbank 
flows and hence bank balance sheet size. We follow Bruno and Shin (2014) and measure global 
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financial leverage as the sum of equity and total liabilities of US broker-dealers divided by their 
equity. The broker-dealer balance-sheet data comes from the US Flow of Funds. Broker-dealer 
leverage is closely negatively associated with the VIX index of implied S&P stock market 
volatility and can therefore be also associated with risk appetite of investors internationally. 
Precise definitions and sources of all variables are provided in Table A1. 
 
Table A2 provides an overview of the countries’ mortgage market indicators. The higher the 
mortgage market indicator, the more liberal is the respective mortgage market. A liberal mortgage 
market is characterized by predominated variable mortgage rate, the possibility of mortgage 
equity withdrawal, a high loan-to-value ratio, the existence of secondary mortgage market as well 
as high government participation. The data for mortgage rate type, mortgage equity withdrawal, 
maximum loan-to-value ratio and government participation comes from Tsatsaronis and Zhu 
(2004), IMF (2008), and IMF (2011). Regarding the degree of mortgage securitization in the 
mortgage sector, we follow Sá et al. (2014) and use the de-jure qualitative securitization index 
constructed by Hoffmann and Nitschka (2008). This index equals to one if countries have a fully 
liberalized MBS market and zero if secondary mortgage market is not permitted by national law 
or regulation. Although this securitization index does not reflects institutional changes in the 
ability to securitize mortgage assets, it could avoid the potential endogeneity issues with de-facto 
measures of mortgage backed securitization. Precise definitions of mortgage market development 
indicators are provided in Table A2. 
 
 
5 Results 
5.1 Non-fundamental House Price Run-ups 
In a first step, we analyse the non-fundamental house price run-ups. Table A3 reports the F tests 
for the joint significance of the lagged fundamental factors. Total population can significantly 
explain the house price in 6 out of 11 countries. Other factors, such as the mortgage rate and 
personal income, play a significant role in many countries as well. With the exception of Belgium, 
Germany and Austria, the 7 fundamental variables can predict more than 50% of the house price 
variance.  
Figure 1 illustrates the maximum cumulative deviation from the fundamental values for the 11 
countries.6 The labels show the respective quarters when the maximum deviation occurred. The 
time of the booms shows that most of the countries faced the maximum deviation from the 
fundamental values in the mid to late 2000s and before Q3 2007. Stable countries such as 
Germany (DE) and Austria (AT) are characterized by low deviations of the house price change 
from the fundamental change while instable countries such as Ireland (IE) can be characterized 
                                                 
6
 In order to simplify the illustration, the initial values of the fundamental house price are assumed to be the observed 
house price for each country. However, we do not use these initial values in the panel VAR model as we rather use 
the change in the fundamental values. 
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by a rather large gap between the overall house price change and the underlying fundamental 
change which in turn suggests a large non-fundamental change in house prices. In the case of 
Ireland, for example, we observe a 13% maximum cumulative deviation from the underlying 
fundamental level in the first quarter of 2007. For comparison, the maximum cumulative 
deviation from the fundamental value in Germany was only 2%. 
Figure 1: Maximum Cumulative Percentage Deviation from Fundamental Values  
 
 
 
Note: the graph shows the maximum cumulative deviation of house price from fundamental values for 11 euro area 
countries from 1992Q1 to 2012Q4. The label shows the quarter when the maximum cumulative deviation occurred.  
 
5.2 Deviation from Taylor Rule Rate 
Table A4 presents the read out of the GMM model that we used to estimate the historic Taylor 
Rule. We see that the coefficients are quite similar to the ones found by Taylor (1993). It is worth 
noting that we observe different degrees as well as different directions of the deviation of the 
actual interest rate from the respective Taylor Rate. These are crucial in determining the monetary 
policy stance. In general, when the Taylor Rate is larger than the actual interest rate, we conclude 
loose monetary policy while we conclude restrictive monetary policy in the case of the Taylor 
Rate being smaller than the actual interest rate. 
Figure 2 provides an overview of the average interest rate gaps in the 11 countries, split into three 
time periods. The first time period lasts from Q1 1993 until Q4 1999, the second from Q1 2000 
until Q2 2007 and the third refers to the time between Q3 2007 and Q4 2012. Monetary policy 
was restrictive before 2000, as we observe positive average interest rate gaps for all countries. 
Contrary, monetary policy became more relaxed in the beginning of 2000. Thus, there are 
negative interest rate gaps for all the European countries after 2000.   
When analysing the European countries, we must account for the fact that they have a common 
monetary policy as set by the ECB. In general, it can be stated that the ECB does not aim to 
Q1'93
Q3'07 
Q2'08 
Q4'05 
Q1'05 
Q2'07 
Q1'07
Q3'06 
Q1'10 
Q2'05 
Q3'04
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
AT BE FI FR DE GR IE IT NL ES PT
 13 
conduct a policy that is optimal for a particular country but that is optimal for the EMU as a 
whole. As long as the ECB tries to set a policy rate that is appropriate for the entire EMU and as 
long as economic fundamentals and mortgage market structures differ among the European 
countries (which appears to be an endogenous problem), the ECB’s monetary policy would be too 
loose for some countries while being too restrictive for others. In Ireland and Spain, for example, 
we see that interest rates were too low as compared to the Taylor Rate during the housing boom 
period. Contrary, monetary policy seems to have been more restrictive for other countries such as 
Austria, Germany or Finland where we did not see any severe misalignments between the house 
price and its underlying fundamental value. 
Figure 2: Average Interest Rate Gaps  
 
 
Note: the graph shows the average difference between the short-term interest rate and Taylor Rule rate for 11 
countries in three periods: from 1992Q1 to 1999Q4, from 2000Q1 to 2007Q2 and from 2007Q3 to 2012Q4. The 
three stages for Greece is divided as from 1992Q1 to 2000Q4, from 2001Q1 to 2007Q2, and from 2007Q3 to 2012Q4.   
 
5.4 Transmission of Monetary Policy  
At the third stage of our estimation approach, we combine the estimated non-fundamental price 
change and the deviation from the Taylor Rate to perform an interacted panel VAR model. Since 
Chow test suggests a significant structure break in Q3 2007 (Table 1), our estimation is from 
1993Q1 to 2007Q2. After the crisis, ECB adopted conventional monetary policies. Figure 3 
shows the impulse responses to the respective shocks. In order to derive conclusions about the 
role of the mortgage market structure, we compare the response of the country with a developed 
mortgage market (Mi,t = 0.75, in red) with the response of the country with a less developed 
mortgage market (Mi,t = 0.25, in black). The mortgage market development is measured as the 
average value of five mortgage market indicators: mortgage rate type, the availability of 
Mortgage Equity Withdrawal (MEW), the maximum Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio, the degree of 
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mortgage securitization, and government participation index. We forecast the impact from the 
first until the twentieth quarter after the shock. The results are based on a 90% confidence 
interval. 
Table 1: Structural Break Tests   
 
Note: Chow test is applied to Equation (5) to investigate whether significant structural break exists in 2007Q3. With 
330 parameters, 4180 observations, the critical value for Chow statistic is 1.10, 1.14 and 1.20 for 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance level. With 330 parameters, 1900 observations, the critical value for Chow statistic is 1.10, 1.15 and 
1.22 for 10%, 5% and 1% significance level. With 330 parameters, 2280 observations, the critical value for Chow 
statistic is 1.11, 1.15 and 1.22 for 10%, 5% and 1% significance level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 Chow Test 
Model 1: 11 Euro Area Countries 2.57*** 
  
Model 2: 6 Core Area Countries 1.31*** 
 
Model 3: 5 Peripheral Countries 2.18*** 
 
 
First, we analyse the impact of a one standard deviation interest rate easing shock (a negative 
interest rate shock) based on all Euro area countries. As shown in Figure 3-1, for the interest rate 
shock, there is a significant difference in the response of the two mortgage market structures. For 
the country with a more liberal mortgage market, a negative interest rate shock of one standard 
deviation leads to a maximum increase in the non-fundamental house price of 0.2% in the third 
quarter after the shock, which is much more severe as compared to the close to zero response in 
the country with a less liberal mortgage market. However, the impact of a one standard deviation 
interest rate easing shock is not persistent as it disappears after two to three years. Thus, the 
impact is mostly relevant in the short-term perspective.  
The variance decomposition of non-fundamental house price run-ups, as shown in Table 2, 
provides further evidence that a more liberal mortgage market is associated with a stronger 
impact of a monetary impulse. The explained variance triggered by a one standard deviation 
monetary easing shock rises from 0.39% to 7.38% of total forecasted non-fundamental house 
price change, as Mi,t increases from 0.25 to 0.75. 
Figures 3-2 and 3-3 illustrate the impact of an interest rate easing shock by splitting the core and 
periphery Euro area countries. Core area countries include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, and the Netherlands. Countries in periphery area include Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, 
and Portugal. 
For the core area countries, there is no statistically significant difference in the response of house 
prices to the monetary easing shock. There is a close to zero response for all countries, 
irrespective of the individual mortgage market structure. The variance decomposition (Table 2, 
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Model 2) confirms this observation as the explained variance of non-fundamental house price 
movements is 2.32% and 0.39% for the more and less liberal countries, respectively. 
However, for the peripheral countries, there is a significantly higher response of house prices in 
the countries with more liberal mortgage markets between the first and the fifth quarter after the 
shock. For the countries with more liberal structures, we observe an increase of up to 0.4% in the 
third quarter. These findings are undermined by the explained variance as illustrated in Table 2, 
Model 3. For the countries with more liberal mortgage market, the one standard deviation 
monetary easing shock can explain 20.52% of the non-fundamental house price movement. By 
contrast, in less liberal countries, we observe only 2.83%.  
Figure 3:  Impacts of 1 Standard Deviation Interest Rate Easing Shock on Non-
Fundamental House Price to in Countries with Developed Mortgage Market (in Red) and 
with Less Developed Mortgage Market (in Black)  
 
Figure 3-1 Euro Area Countries 
                 
 
Figure 3-2  Core Countries                Figure 3-3 Peripheral Countries     
          
Note: The estimation period is from Q1 1992 to Q2 2007.The graphs show the responses of non-fundamental house 
price to a 1 standard deviation positive shock to the reverse of interest rate (monetary easing). Red solid lines show 
the response in the developed mortgage market (
,
0.75i tM = ). Red dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds for 
bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the corresponding responses. Black solid lines show the response in less 
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developed mortgage market (
,
0.25i tM = ). Black dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped 
90% confidence intervals to the corresponding responses. 
 
Table 2: Explained Variance of Non-Fundamental House Price by 1 Standard Deviation 
Monetary Easing Shock at T=20 
Note: The table shows the percent of explained variance of non-fundamental house price run-ups triggered by one-
standard deviation of monetary easing shock. The absolute forecasted error variance (in bps) is in parenthesis. The 
estimation period is from Q1 1992 to Q2 2007 based on Equation (5) with individual mortgage market 
characteristics interaction variables. We only report the results when 
,
0.75i tM =  and , 0.25i tM = . 
 
 High  Low  
 
,
0.75i tM =  , 0.25i tM =  
Model 1: 11 EU Countries 
REV IR shock to NF HP 
7.38% 
(0.010) 
0.39% 
(0.000) 
Credit shock to NF HP 2.50% (0.003) 
1.89% 
(0.002) 
Capital inflow shock to NF HP 3.62% (0.005) 
0.64% 
(0.001) 
Sentiment Shock to NF HP 1.73% (0.002) 
0.37% 
(0.000) 
NF HP shock to NF HP 84.77% (0.111) 
96.70% 
(0.107) 
 
  
Model 2: 6 Core Countries 
REV IR shock to NF HP 
2.32% 
(0.003) 
0.39% 
(0.000) 
Credit shock to NF HP 1.63% (0.002) 
3.25% 
(0.003) 
Capital inflow shock to NF HP 1.50% (0.002) 
1.23% 
(0.001) 
Sentiment Shock to NF HP 3.88% (0.005) 
0.88% 
(0.001) 
NF HP shock to NF HP 90.67% (0.117) 
94.25% 
(0.095) 
 
  
Model 3: 5 Peripheral countries 
REV IR shock to NF HP 
20.52% 
(0.036) 
2.83% 
(0.003) 
Credit shock to NF HP 4.91% (0.009) 
2.42% 
(0.002) 
Capital inflow shock to NF HP 11.39% (0.020) 
0.77% 
(0.001) 
Sentiment Shock to NF HP 3.90% (0.007) 
0.56% 
(0.001) 
NF HP shock to NF HP 59.29% (0.103) 
93.42% 
(0.092) 
 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the cumulative 1-year and 3-year impact of a one standard deviation shock to 
the interest gap for the core and peripheral countries. Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show the cumulative 
response as well as the explained variance, respectively. 
Starting with the cumulative responses, we observe that the peripheral countries show stronger 
responses in both the 1-year and 3-year perspective. There is a larger difference after the first four 
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quarters as compared to the first twelve quarters. This provides further evidence that the 
difference between the countries’ responses is mostly in the short-term. Thus, cumulative 
responses align in the medium and long term. It comes apparent that the peripheral countries 
show stronger responses for both the 1-year and 3-year horizon as compared to the core countries. 
For example, there is a cumulative 1-year response of 1.3% and 1.1% in IR and ES, respectively, 
while core countries like AT and DE show a close to zero or even negative response. There is a 
similar pattern for the cumulative 3-year response, even though the difference between core and 
peripheral countries becomes smaller as mentioned above. For the core area countries, NL is the 
country with the highest percent of explained variance. In the 3-year perspective, 5% of the house 
price movement can be explained by the monetary easing shock. However, the explained 
variance is very small in the core countries. Contrary, the interest rate shock can explain a higher 
percent of the house price movement for the peripheral countries. The interest rate shock can 
explain approx. 27% and 23% of the changes in house price for IR and ES, respectively.  
Figure 4:  Impact of Interest Rate Gap on Non-Fundamental House Price Change in 11 
Euro Area Countries in 2000s 
 
Figure 4-1: Cumulative Response            Figure 4-2: Explained Variance  
  
 
Obviously, the cumulative response and explained variance differ among the countries. While the 
housing markets in AT, BE, FI, FR and DE remain stable after the shock, housing markets in IR 
and ES, where the mortgage market is more liberalised, show substantially higher responses. The 
channel can work as follows: increase in the gap to Taylor rule rate may result in a decrease in the 
perceived risk or an increase in the risk tolerance and inject more liquidity into the system. 
Mortgage market liberalization allows for a higher leverage in the mortgage market, which 
increases the risk-taking capacities of households, financial institutions and investors. Therefore, 
it facilitates excessive risk-taking in the housing market. As a result, households, financial 
institutions and investors may overreact to a one time increase in house prices triggered by 
monetary policy easing.  
On average, the responses in the peripheral countries are more serious than in the core countries. 
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Such difference could be due to the different domestic demand in the core and periphery. As 
shown by Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015b), the domestic demand growth was extremely 
strong at the periphery but very weak at the core. In countries with stronger domestic demand, 
liberalized mortgage market is more likely to facilitate excessive risk-taking behaviours of 
investors or homeowners.  
 
5.4 Individual Mortgage Market Indicators 
In order to derive more detailed implications about how the mortgage market structure effects the 
non-fundamental house price, we have a closer look at the individual components of the 
mortgage market indicator and how these effect the transmission of an external interest rate shock. 
We also forecast the responses to a one-standard deviation monetary easing shock from the first 
until the twentieth quarter after the shock. We compare the responses of liberal and less liberal 
mortgage markets based on individual indicators. In the liberal market (in red), Mi,t is set as 0.75 
for the corresponding indicator and in the less liberal market (in black), Mi,t is set as 0.25 for the 
corresponding indicator. 
We first examine mortgage rate type. Mortgage contracts can be distinguished between variable 
and fixed rate mortgages: variable rate contracts are those in which the lending rate floats with, or 
is frequently adjusted to, a short-term market interest rate; fixed rate contracts are those in which 
the lending rate remains constant throughout the duration of the contract.  
As illustrated in Figures 5, there is no significant difference in the response to monetary impulse 
in the two markets dominated by fixed and variable mortgage rate in both the core and peripheral 
countries. Also the variance decomposition as shown in Table A5, Model 4, indicates that there is 
only limited impact on the non-fundamental house price. Based on OECD countries, Calza et al. 
(2013) show that mortgage rate type yields considerably stronger impact of the monetary impulse 
on home price, compared to loan to value ratio and mortgage equity withdrawals. However, 
based on our analyses, variable mortgage rate is not the predominated factor in triggering the 
destabilization effects of monetary policy on the housing market for euro area countries.  
Figure 5:  Impacts of Interest Rate Type on Responses to Monetary Impulse  
                                           
                                          Core                                                Periphery 
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Note: The estimation period is from Q1 1992 to Q2 2007.The graphs show the responses of non-fundamental house 
price to a 1 standard deviation positive shock to the reverse of interest rate (monetary easing). Red solid lines show 
the response in the mortgage market with variable mortgage rate (
,
0.75MRi tM = ). Red dotted lines show the upper 
and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the corresponding responses. Black solid lines show 
the response in less developed mortgage market, i.e., with predominated fixed mortgage rate(
,
0.25MRi tM = ). Black 
dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the corresponding 
responses. 
 
Next, we analyse the effect of MEW. An important feature of the mortgage market structure is 
whether or not households have the possibility to withdraw equity from the mortgage due to an 
increased value of the underlying real estate. Home equity withdrawals can be used to finance 
consumption and home investments, for example. Literature shows a close relationship between 
mortgage equity withdrawals and the boom and bust cycles of housing markets (Mian and Sufi, 
2011).  
As illustrated in Figure 6, at the core there is no statistically significant difference in the reaction 
to an interest rate shock between countries with liberal and less liberal mortgage markets. Also 
the variance decomposition (Table A5, model 5) shows that the impact of the monetary policy 
shock is still limited for the core countries. Contrary, as illustrated in Figure 6, for the peripheral 
countries an interest rate shock has a more severe impact (up to 0.7% in the second quarter after 
the shock) on the non-fundamental house price component when there is the possibility of MEW, 
while the effect remains close to zero in the more conservative market. The variance 
decomposition (Table A5, model 5) shows that the monetary policy shock can explain over 
36.49% of the movement in non-fundamental house prices in peripheral countries with a liberal 
mortgage market.  
Figure 6:  Impacts of MEW on Responses to Monetary Impulse  
                                           
                                          Core                                                Periphery 
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Note: The estimation period is from Q1 1992 to Q2 2007.The graphs show the responses of non-fundamental house 
price to a 1 standard deviation positive shock to the reverse of interest rate (monetary easing). Red solid lines show 
the response in the mortgage market with MEW (
,
0.75MEWi tM = ). Red dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds 
for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the corresponding responses. Black solid lines show the response in 
less developed mortgage market, i.e., with limited MEW (
,
0.25MEWi tM = ).Black dotted lines show the upper and lower 
bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the corresponding responses. 
 
Moreover, we examine the relevance of the maximum LTV ratio in the mortgage market. The 
LTV is relevant because an extended LTV implies relaxed credit constraint to borrowers. 
Especially first time home buyers may benefit from high LTVs. With a higher LTV, the borrower 
requires less equity which simplifies the borrowers’ access to mortgage loans. This facilitates the 
transmission of a monetary policy shock via the balance sheet channel and risk-taking channel.   
As shown Figure 7, in the core countries, while the non-fundamental house price shows a positive 
response in both markets, the reverse of the interest rate shock impacts prices significantly 
stronger in the market with a higher maximum LTV ratio in the second quarter after the shock. In 
the peripheral countries, as illustrated in Figure 7, there is a significantly higher response (up to 
0.2% increase in house prices) to the monetary policy shock in the countries with high LTV ratios 
until the fourth quarter after the shock. As shown in Model 6, Table A5, the explained forecasting 
error variance is 7.22% for the mortgage market with a higher maximum LTV ratio in the core 
countries, while it is 10.02% for the mortgage market with a higher LTV ratio in the peripheral 
countries. For the countries with lower maximum LTV ratios, the explained variance remains 
small in both the core and peripheral countries. 
Thus, we found that the LTV plays a crucial role in determining housing market as it supports a 
boom in the non-fundamental house price component after an interest rate shock in both the core 
and peripheral countries. This finding is consistent with previous literature about the LTV ratio’s 
relevance as a macro-prudential policy tool that may be used to adjust housing market stability. 
As Mendicino and Punzi (2014) show in a DSGE model, LTV ratios can be used as a tool of 
macro-prudential policy in order to mitigate the procyclicality arising from the interlinkages on 
mortgage markets. Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015c) also use a DSGE model to show that 
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LTV ratios can be used as a macro-prudential tool to improve financial stability. 
Figure 7:  Impacts of LTV on Responses to Monetary Impulse  
                                           
                                          Core                                                Periphery 
         
 
Note: The estimation period is from Q1 1992 to Q2 2007.The graphs show the responses of non-fundamental house 
price to a 1 standard deviation positive shock to the reverse of interest rate (monetary easing). Red solid lines show 
the response in the mortgage market with a high LTV (
,
0.75LTVi tM = ). Red dotted lines show the upper and lower 
bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the corresponding responses. Black solid lines show the 
response in less developed mortgage market, i.e., with a low LTV (
,
0.25LTVi tM = ).. Black dotted lines show the upper 
and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the corresponding responses. 
 
Furthermore, we take a closer look at the role of mortgage securitization. Mortgage securitization 
is designed to increase banks’ liquidity and capacity of loan supply (Altunbas et al., 2009). 
However, due to moral hazard and adverse selection, it may reduce the banks’ incentives to 
screen and monitor their borrowers in a period of booming housing markets. Consequently, 
mortgage securitization may lead to a deregulation of the mortgage market and support an 
overheating of housing markets (Allen and Carletti, 2006, Duffee and Zhou, 2001, Gorton and 
Pennacchi, 1995).  Shin (2009) and Rajan (2005) point out that the larger risk-taking capacity of 
the shadow banking system leads to an increased demand for new assets in order to fill the 
expanding balance sheets and leverage. This, consequently, results in an increasingly important 
role of securitization for financial stability.  
As illustrated in Figures 8, different from studies based on OECD countries, we do not observe 
significant difference in the reaction to a monetary policy shock based on MS for the European 
countries. The explained variance of the non-fundamental house price remains small in all cases 
(Table A5, Model 7). The reason could be that most EMU countries do not allow for, or only 
allow for limited mortgage securitization and banks in EMU still primarily reply on deposits to 
guarantee mortgage. 
Figure 8:  Impacts of MS on Responses to Monetary Impulse  
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                                          Core                                                Periphery 
 
 
Note: The estimation period is from Q1 1992 to Q2 2007.The graphs show the responses of non-fundamental house 
price to a 1 standard deviation positive shock to the reverse of interest rate (monetary easing). Red solid lines show 
the response in the mortgage market with a high degree of MS (
,
0.75MSi tM = ). Red dotted lines show the upper and 
lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the corresponding responses. Black solid lines show the 
response in less developed mortgage market, i.e., with limited MS (
,
0.25MSi tM = ).. Black dotted lines show the upper 
and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the corresponding responses. 
 
As the last mortgage market indicator, we focus on Government Participation. GP includes 
subsidies to selected groups such as first time buyers and low-income buyers that influence the 
demand side of the housing market. In addition, the GP index reflects subsidies to buyers through 
savings account contributions as well as tax deductibility of housing expenses. Thus, the GP 
index describes to what extent the government supports affordable income, promotes 
homeownership and encourages home purchasing for lower income households. 
At the core (Figure 9), there is a significantly lower impact of monetary policy in the second and 
fourth quarter after the shock for more liberal countries. The interest rate shock can explain 
8.38% of the forecasting error variance in core countries with high GP (Table A5, Model 8). For 
the peripheral countries, the more liberal countries show a significantly higher response in the 
third quarter after the shock. The explained variance of the non-fundamental house price, as 
shown in Table A5, Model 8, is 6.96% for the peripheral countries with high GP. Policies like tax 
deduction may lead to over-reaction of homeowners to the housing market in both core and 
peripheral countries.  
Figure 9:  Impacts of GP on Responses to Monetary Impulse  
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Note: The estimation period is from Q1 1992 to Q2 2007.The graphs show the responses of non-fundamental house 
price to a 1 standard deviation positive shock to the reverse of interest rate (monetary easing). Red solid lines show 
the response in the mortgage market with a high level of GP (
,
0.75GPi tM = ). Red dotted lines show the upper and 
lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the corresponding responses. Black solid lines show the 
response in less developed mortgage market, i.e., with a low level of GP(
,
0.25GPi tM = ).. Black dotted lines show the 
upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the corresponding responses. 
 
5.5 Additional Results and Robustness Checks 7 
5.5.1 Account Balance and Sentiment   
In addition to interest rate stance and housing credit, Sá et al. (2014), Diamond and Rajan (2005) 
Fratzscher et al. (2010) and Ferrero (2012) show that the account balance as well as the exchange 
rate may affect housing cycles, too. A negative account balance shock can be interpreted as an 
unexpected increase in foreign demand for domestic assets. Such an increase in foreign demand 
may lead to booms in domestic assets’ prices. The negative relationship with the current account 
balance can be explained by the “global saving glut” hypothesis (Bernanke, 2005). Additionally, 
literature suggests that housing booms can be largely associated to investors’ sentiment. For 
example, Case and Shiller (1988) and Ling et al. (2015)  show that sentiment can affect 
homebuyers’ investment decisions. Therefore, we add the two variables to the Panel VAR model: 
Account Balance and Consumer Sentiment.  
Consisting with Sá et al. (2014), we find that mortgage market development can amplify the 
response to capital inflow shock, but only in the peripheral countries. As shown in Figure A4, 
there is no significant influence of capital inflow in the core countries and there is also no 
difference between liberal and less liberal mortgage market structures. In the peripheral countries, 
however, there is a significant impact on house prices between the second and fourth quarter after 
the interest rate shock with the liberal markets showing a more pronounced response of up to 0.2% 
increase in non-fundamental house prices. For the sentiment, we cannot find a very strong impact 
                                                 
7
 Detailed impulse response for each robustness check is available on online appendix.  
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on the response to a negative interest rate shock. 
  
5.5.2 Constant Maximum Loan to Value Ratio 
As the de-facto measure of leverage in the housing market, maximum loan to value ratio may 
suffer from the endogeneity problem, as households and financial institutions may respond to 
monetary easing by increasing the leverage. As most of the euro countries did not really have a 
restriction on the maximum LTV before 2012, we use the constant maximum LTV ratio (before 
2000) in the robustness test. As shown in Table A5, Model 9, the forecasting error variance of the 
non-fundamental house price by a monetary policy shock in countries with a deregulated 
mortgage market indeed drops. However, it is still significantly higher as compared to countries 
with a regulated mortgage market where the impact of monetary policy remains marginal.  
 
5.5.3 Exogenous Monetary Policy Shock  
Further concern is the endogeneity between interest rate shock and credit supply shock. We 
follow the approach in den Haan et al. (2007) and Milcheva (2013). We compare the effect on 
non-fundamental house price changes stemming from a monetary policy shock with the effect on 
non-fundamental house price changes stemming from an credit supply shock, when the value of 
the credit supply is set equal to the value observed during the ‘monetary easing’, and values for 
the remaining variables are then obtained by iterating on the VAR. The former is the effect of 
monetary policy shock on the house prices. The latter measures the responses to a monetary 
policy induced credit supply shock, which is also referred to as the ‘bank lending channel’ effect. 
The difference between the impulse response functions of the two kinds of shocks is equal to the 
response to a monetary policy shock when the response of the credit to GDP ratio is restricted to 
zero in every period. It can be interpreted as the response of house price to an exogenous 
monetary policy shock when the credit supply is held constant. As shown in Table A6, Model 10, 
the explained variance by an interest rate shock in the mortgage market with high LTV and MS 
ratios only slightly drops by 2% at T=20. This implies that the bank lending channel does not 
play a very significant role in the transmission of a monetary policy shock.  
 
5.5.4 Alternative Estimators for Fundamental Values 
Koetter and Poghosyan (2010) and Kholodilin et al. (2007) define the non-fundamental house 
price as the deviation from the equilibrium trend price. Based on this definition, Equation (3) can 
be rewritten as: 
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, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,
5 , 6 , 7 , ,
ln = ln ln ln ln
               ln
i t i i i t i i t i i t i i t
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i i t i i t i i t i t
P GDP CPI POP Income
UE Permit Mr e
α β β β β
β β β
+ + + +
+ + + +
.  (7)  
Considering the non-stationarity of the series, we use Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares Estimator 
(DOLS) (Stock and Watson, 1993) to solve Equation (7). Unlike Koetter and Poghosyan (2010) 
and Kholodilin et al. (2007), we do not estimate Equation (7) in a panel setting, because we do 
not want to impose any restrictions on the long-term relationship between house price and 
fundamental variables to make them keep constant across countries. The estimated residuals are 
defined as the non-fundamental house price values. Based on Table A6, Model 12, the impact of 
monetary policy remains totally robust. 
We also include additional fundamental variables such as percent of population between 20 to 44 
years old as well as the rent price in the 17 countries. The results are also totally robust.  
 
5.5.5 Alternative Estimators for Taylor Rule Rate 
Instead of the traditional Taylor rule rate as shown in Equation (4), Gerlach-Kristen (2003) 
suggests considering adding interest rate smoothing into the TR estimation, which means that the 
estimates of the TR not only relate to the current levels of inflation and to the output gap but also 
to the lagged short-term rate. Hence, the traditional TR rate can be modified as: 
* *
, 3, 0, 2, , , 2, , , 3, 1 ,(1 )[ ( ) ( )] TRi t i i i i t i t i i t i t i t i tr y y r eγ γ γ pi pi γ γ −= − + − + − + + , (8) 
where γ3,i  is the coefficient for the smoothing term. Empirically, Equation (6) is estimated as: 
 
* *
, 0, 1, , , 2, , , 3, 1 ,( ) ( ) TRi t i i i t i t i i t i t i t i tr y y r eγ γ pi pi γ γ −= + − + − + +ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ , (9) 
using GMM estimator with up to 4 lags of  
,i tpi , ,i ty  as the instrument variables. Equation (8) can 
be converted to Equation (9) with the relationships that: 0, 0, 3,/ (1 )i i iγ γ γ= −ɶ ɶ  , 1, 1, 3,/ (1 )i i iγ γ γ= −ɶ ɶ  
and 2, 2, 3,/ (1 )i i iγ γ γ= −ɶ ɶ . Based on Table A6, Model 13, the response of the non-fundamental 
house price is even larger than in the baseline model. The monetary policy shock explains over 
70% of forecasting error variance of non-fundamental house price run-ups in deregulated housing 
market. 
 
6 Conclusions 
This paper provides empirical evidence for the impact of monetary policy and mortgage market 
regulation on the housing markets using a sample of 11 euro area countries. In order to identify 
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the relationship between the non-fundamental house price, monetary policy and the mortgage 
market structures’ influence, we use a three-stage estimation approach. First, we estimate the non-
fundamental run-ups as the deviation of the observed house price change from the respective 
fundamental price change. Second, we implement the Taylor Rule concept in order to proxy for 
the monetary policy stance. In the final stage, we analyze the impact of monetary policy on the 
non-fundamental house price using an interacted panel VAR setting, conditional on the mortgage 
market development in each country.  
The empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests that a negative shock to the deviation 
from the Taylor rule rate can significantly trigger boom and bust cycles in housing markets by 
impacting the non-fundamental house price in the euro area. Moreover, the transmission of 
monetary policy shocks is not equal among all the countries. Country-specific mortgage market 
conditions are crucial for determining how external shocks transmit to the respective housing 
markets. Those housing markets with more liberal mortgage markets, as represented by variable 
mortgage rate, availability of mortgage equity withdrawals, a high Loan to Value ratio, a high 
degree of mortgage securitization and a high degree of government participation, are more 
vulnerable to external shocks emerging from interest rate movements. The home price in 
peripheral countries tends to be more sensitive to mortgage market characteristics. The monetary 
policy shock can explain over 20% of the forecasting error variance of non-fundamental house 
price run-ups in Spain and Ireland.  
 
Our findings can yield implications for macro-prudential policy and the design of mortgage 
markets for a monetary union where monetary policy might be too loose for some countries while 
being too restrictive for others. Since monetary policy might have adverse side effects as it may 
destabilize housing markets, regulations on housing finance can close this gap in the central 
banks’ toolbox. Countries with a high maximum loan to value ratio and a high degree of 
government participation may need to closely monitor the housing market in times of relaxed 
monetary policy as the side effect of accommodative monetary policy may be amplified. For 
peripheral countries, policymakers should also keep a close eye on the markets that allow for 
mortgage equity withdrawals. On the other hand, policy makers may consider macro-prudential 
policies as a way to prevent adverse housing bubbles triggered by the monetary easing or interest 
rate gap. Further studies may extend the current work by proofing the causality between the 
monetary policy and housing market stability as well as the causal relationship between the 
deregulation in the banking system and the housing market stability.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Data sources and definitions 
 
Variable Source Description 
Real house prices BIS 
House price indices are collected from BIS and are based on national 
sources. BIS data was not available for Greece and Portugal so we use 
data from Oxford Economics. 
Real GDP OECD 
 
Households Credit-
to-GDP ratio BIS 
Credit from domestic banks to the households as a share of GDP. Data 
for Austria starts from Q4 1995. Data for Greece starts from Q4 1994. 
Data for Ireland starts from Q1 2002. The missing data are interpolated 
using credit from domestic banks to nonfinancial private sectors.  
Inflation OECD CPI inflation rate 
Population Oxford Economics Total population 
Population between 
20 and 44 years old  World bank  In percent of total population 
Short-term interest 
rate OECD  
Unemployment rate OECD 
 
Consumer 
Sentiment OECD  
Mortgage rate ECB, national 
sources 
From 2003 to 2012, we use the households borrowing costs for 
purchasing a new home from the European Central Bank (ECB). In 
order to interpolate the above data back to 1990, we use the mortgage 
rate collected from national statistical offices of above countries. For 
the remaining countries we also use the mortgage rate available from 
national sources. When mortgage rate data is not available, we use the 
ten-year government bond yield in those countries that have mixed-rate 
mortgage rates as predominant mortgage contracts. For countries where 
a variable mortgage rate is more widely used, we choose the one-year 
government bond yield instead.  
Building permits 
OECD, Eurostat, 
Oxford Economics, 
national sources 
Volume index. Data for Belgium, Finland, Germany and Spain are 
from national sources. Data for Austria, France, and Ireland are from 
OECD. We also use Eurostat building permit index to interpolate when 
OECD housing permit volume data are incomplete. For Greece, the 
Netherlands, and Italy, housing permit data are not available. We use 
housing starts instead. Housing starts data are from Oxford Economics.  
Account Balance OECD Countries’ Current Account Balance, in percent of GDP. 
Financial leverage US Flow of Funds The sum of equity and total liabilities of US broker-dealers divided by their equity 
Oil Price OECD Price of crude oil. 
ECU-Euro to US 
dollar rate OECD Exchange rate for 11 countries.  
Mortgage Rate Type Literature Before 2003: Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) and Maclennan et al. (1998); between 2003 and 2012: IMF (2011).  
Mortgage equity 
withdrawal Literature 
Before 2003: Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004); between 2003 and 2005: IMF 
(2008);between 2006 to 2012: IMF (2011). 
Maximum Loan to 
Value ratio  Literature 
Before 2003: Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004); between 2003 and 2012: IMF 
(2011).  
Mortgage 
Securitization  Literature Hoffmann and Nitschka (2008). 
Government 
Participation Literature IMF (2011) and Maclennan et al. (1998). 
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Table A2: Mortgage Market Indicators 
  
Mortgage Rate 
Type (Fixed 0, 
Variable 1, 
mixed 0.5)  
Mortgage equity 
withdrawal 
(MEW) 
(Yes 1, No 0, 
Limited 0.3) 
Maximum 
loan-to-
value 
(LTV) ratio 
Mortgage 
Securitization 
(Yes, 1, No 0, 
Limited 0.3) 
Index of 
government 
participation 
Mortgage 
Market 
liberalization 
(average of 
the five 
indicators) 
Before 2000       
AT  0 0 0.8 0.3 0.19 0.02 
BE  0 0 0.85 0 0.25 0 
FI  1 1 0.75 0.3 0.29 0.70 
FR  0 0 0.8 0.3 0.31 0.14 
DE  0 0 0.6 0.3 0.25 0.00 
GR  0.5 0 0.7 0 0.19 0.18 
IE  1 0.3 0.9 1 0.25 0.77 
IT  0.5 0 0.5 0 0.25 0.01 
NL  0 1 0.75 0.41 0.50 0.63 
ES  1 0.3 0.8 0.80 0.31 0.58 
PT 1 0 0.8 0 0.19 0.58 
 
After 2000       
AT  0 0 0.80 0.3 0.19 0.02 
BE  0 0 0.97 0 0.25 0.05 
FI  1 1 0.95 0.3 0.29 0.77 
FR  0 0 0.96 0.3 0.31 0.20 
DE  0 0 0.76 0.3 0.25 0.06 
GR  0.5 0 0.78 0 0.19 0.21 
IE  1 0.81 0.98 1 0.25 0.89 
IT  0.5 0 0.74 0 0.25 0.10 
NL  0 1 1.14 1 0.50 0.96 
ES  1 0.3 0.96 1 0.31 0.70 
PT 1 0 0.9 0 0.19 0.70 
Source: Maclennan et al., 1998; Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004); IMF (2008); IMF (2011); Hoffmann and Nitschka 
(2008);. 
 
 32 
Table A3: F Test and R2 for House Price Fundamental Values 
Note: Estimation for the period Q1 1992 to Q4 2012. Dependent variable is the quarterly log difference of house 
prices. Equation (3) is estimated using OLS. F test statistics report the redundancy of each predictor (4 lags) in 
Equation (3) for each country. R2 is the determinant of coefficients for each country. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Country  Pop Permit Income GDP Unemp. 
Rate 
CPI Mortgage 
Rate 
R2 
AT 0.278 0.193 0.588 0.290 0.518 1.125 0.268 0.266 
BE 0.524 1.399 -0.160 0.508 -0.060 0.147 0.392 0.282 
FI 0.273 3.898*** 1.270 0.403 2.188* 1.944 3.279** 0.686 
FR 31.954*** 0.466 0.001 4.942*** 2.645** 0.659 1.734 0.843 
DE 1.017 0.498 0.447 1.290 -0.276 3.429*** 0.592 0.314 
GR 2.573** 1.352 -0.067 -0.087 0.987 1.080 0.318 0.688 
IE 3.894*** 1.864 1.027 2.001* 1.053 1.076 1.643 0.697 
IT 1.979 1.450 6.769*** 0.349 1.302 1.177 1.319 0.771 
NL 6.025*** 0.127 0.630 13.397*** 1.515 1.418 2.302** 0.779 
ES 24.491*** 5.465*** 5.654*** 0.950 0.568 0.984 3.664** 0.855 
PT 5.941*** 1.648 2.049 2.118 2.650** 1.308 1.332 0.614 
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Table A4: Coefficients for TR 
Note: Estimation for the period Q1 1980 to Q4 2012, with the exception of 
Greece, which is from Q1 1992 to Q4 2012. Dependent variable is the quarterly 
short-term interest rate. Equation (4) is estimated using GMM estimator. R2 is the 
determinant of coefficients for each country. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Country γo γ1 γ2 R2 
AT 3.49
***
 
(0.22) 
1.58*** 
(0.28) 
0.27 
(0.24) 0.39 
BE 
4.38*** 
(0.25) 
1.47*** 
(0.12) 
-0.01 
(0.27) 0.54 
FI 
4.40*** 
(0.26) 
2.64*** 
(0.22) 
-0.89*** 
(0.16) 0.59 
FR 
4.69*** 
(0.22) 
1.18***  
(0.07) 
0.43* 
(0.23) 0.67 
DE 
4.28*** 
(0.15) 
1.50*** 
(0.12) 
0.11 
(0.12) 0.61 
GR 2.73
***
 
(0.49) 
1.89*** 
(0.16) 
0.17 
(0.21) 0.63 
IE 
5.12*** 
(0.39) 
0.89*** 
(0.19) 
-0.04 
(0.21) 0.21 
IT 
4.29*** 
(0.29) 
1.31*** 
 (0.06) 
0.14 
(0.24) 0.78 
NL 3.97
***
  
(0.22) 
0.11 
(0.25) 
0.81*** 
(0.20) 0.14 
ES 3.64
***
 
(0.36) 
1.46***  
(0.08) 
0.48* 
(0.27) 0.70 
PT 
3.50*** 
(0.50) 
1.12***  
(0.06) 
-0.39 
(0.33) 0.85 
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Table A5 Explained Variance of Non-Fundamental House Price by 1 Standard Deviation 
Monetary Easing Shock at T=20 
Note: The table shows the percent of explained variance of non-fundamental house price run-ups triggered by one-
standard deviation of monetary easing shock. The absolute forecasted error variance (in bps) is in parenthesis. The 
estimation period is from Q1 1992 to Q2 2007 based on Equation (5) with individual mortgage market 
characteristics interaction variables. We only report the results when 
,
0.75i tM =  and , 0.25i tM = . 
 
 High  Low  
 
,
0.75i tM =  , 0.25i tM =  
Model 4: Interest Rate Type:  
Core 
1.78% 
(0.003) 
0.78% 
(0.001) 
Periphery  2.93% (0.004) 
1.09% 
(0.002) 
 
  
Model 5: Mortgage Equity Withdrawals:  
Core 
0.97% 
(0.001) 
1.51% 
(0.001) 
Periphery  36.49% (0.101) 
3.01% 
(0.003) 
 
  
Model 6: Maximum LTV:  
Core  
7.22% 
(0.011) 
0.58% 
(0.001) 
Periphery 10.02% (0.014) 
2.29% 
(0.004) 
 
  
Model 7: Securitization:  
Core  
3.40% 
(0.004) 
3.08% 
(0.003) 
Periphery  5.64% (0.014) 
0.81% 
(0.001) 
 
  
Model 8: Government Participation: 
 Core  
8.38% 
(0.011) 
3.88% 
(0.004) 
 Periphery  6.96% (0.019) 
1.28% 
(0.002) 
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Table A6: Explained Variance of Non-Fundamental House Price by 1 Standard Deviation 
Monetary Easing Shock at T=20 
Note: The table shows the percent of explained variance of non-fundamental house price run-ups triggered by one-
standard deviation of monetary easing shock. The absolute forecasted error variance (in bps) is in parenthesis. dWe 
only report the results when 
,
0.75i tM =  and , 0.25i tM = . 
 
 High Low 
 
,
0.75i tM =  , 0.25i tM =  
 
  
Model 9:  Constant Maximum LTV 
Core 
7.72% 
(0.012) 
0.49% 
(0.000) 
Periphery 4.77% (0.007) 
3.85% 
(0.005) 
 
  
Model 10: Exogenous IR Shock 
Core   
2.57% 
(0.003) 
0.32% 
(0.000) 
Periphery   20.99% (0.037) 
2.25% 
(0.002) 
 
  
Model 11: Alternative Fundamental Estimation:  
Core  
9.66% 
(0.432) 
5.48% 
(0.101) 
Periphery  15.16% (0.573) 
4.47% 
(0.070) 
 
  
Model 12: Alternative Taylor Rate Estimation 
Core 
1.00% 
(0.001) 
2.42% 
(0.002) 
Periphery 20.48% (0.035) 
2.43% 
(0.003) 
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Figure A1: House Price Changes and Fundamental Changes 
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Figure A2:  Interest Rate and Estimated Taylor Rate 
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Figure A3:  Robustness Tests 
 
Figure A3-1: Capital Inflow_Core            Figure A3-2: Capital Inflow_Periphery  
 
 
Figure A3-3: Sentiment_Core            Figure A3-4: Sentiment_Periphery  
 
 
Figure A3-5: Constant LTV_Core            Figure A3-6: Constant LTV_Periphery  
  
 
Figure A3-7: Exogenous IR_Core            Figure A3-8: Exogenous IR_Periphery  
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Figure A3-7: Alternative FH_Core         Figure A3-8: Alternative FH_Periphery  
  
 
Figure A3-9: Alternative TR_Core         Figure A3-10: Alternative TR_Periphery  
  
 
Note: The graphs show the responses of non-fundamental house price to a 1 standard deviation positive shock to the 
reverse of interest rate (monetary easing). Red solid lines show the response in the developed mortgage market 
(
,
0.75i tM = ). Red dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the 
corresponding responses. Black solid lines show the response in less developed mortgage market 
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(
,
0.25i tM = ).Black dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the 
corresponding responses. 
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1 Introduction
A dwelling is characterized by its physical structure and its location. The physical exten-
sion of the structure is naturally a necessary requirement for living in the dwelling. The
location, however, which constitutes the access to local public amenities, is principally
a point in space. For that reason, including locations as points in hedonic models has
widely been applied in the hedonic pricing literature. The general approach is to include
a broad set of physical and local attributes in the “hedonic function”, which assigns a
price to a dwelling, given its composition of attributes. The underlying idea is that all
attributes are associated with a decreasing marginal rate of utility. In most applications,
the amenities are implicitly treated as if they were available on a perfect market, i.e., as
if they could be composed and decomposed arbitrarily. This also means that attributes
are available for an implicit market price in any amount.
For the physical structure of the house, this market model is realistic in the long
term, hypothesizing that supply for physical structure is rather elastic. However, it is
inadequate for the determination of the location price of a dwelling because location is
restricted in a given area. In particular, the amount of location, i.e. land, is scarce and
is therefore not available in any amount. Despite that fact, most empirical applications
account for the amount of land only in a spatially invariant way. A typical approach is
to include the size of the lot and regional dummy variables separately. The underlying
hypothesis is that a household pays a local fixed price for the amenities associated with the
location and a variable, but global, price for land. The main shortcoming of this model is
that the price for a location is independent of the amount of the location. Especially in an
area where location relative to physical attributes is expensive, it is important to account
for the size of the location (i.e., the area of the land). To emphasize this point, note that
the value of a specific location can be regarded as the value of access to public goods
surrounding that location. Thus, using more land means crowding out other households
from access and consumption of public goods.
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As a consequence, the location price must be weighted by the amount of location,
i.e., the size of the land that is necessary to provide a unit of dwelling. When a unit of
dwelling is measured in sqm of floor area, then the maximum permitted floor area ratio
(FAR) is the ultimate measure for the square meters of land that are necessary to provide
one square meter of floor area. The density of dwellings is often not random, but rather
the result of interdependent land use planning, dwelling prices, and land prices. The
result of this interdependence is typically a higher building density at central locations.
For the real estate builder, a higher permitted dwelling density means more dwellings per
sqm of building land. We thus refer to the FAR as land quality.
For the real estate developer, who sells and leases residential floor area, the FAR is a
limiting device of the floor area he can produce on a given lot of land. Given an exogenous
rent for the amenities associated with the location of the real estate developer’s land lot,
the FAR works as a multiplier of the total floor area rental profit. Assuming an efficient
rental market, the FAR will somehow be capitalized into the land value. In the absence
of externalities, i.e., when the public good associated with the location are non-rival,
then the FAR will ceteris paribus be proportional to land values. If, however, a higher
residential density is associated with negative externalities (e.g., congestion), then the
effect of the FAR on land prices will not be proportional. In terms of the model, this
means that the marginal effect will be FARρ, with ρ < 1.
In this paper, we formulate a theoretical model that relates residential apartment
rents to the underlying land values. Following the principles mentioned above, the model
includes location amenities, land size, and land quality. The land quality, in particular, is
measured by the FAR, augmented by a congestion effect ρ. As a side effect of the hedonic
model specification, our approach can account for spatial heterogeneity in a concise way
and allows an estimation of the hedonic prices of attributes. In this paper, however, we
have a variety of different goals. First, we demonstrate how the model can be used to
determine local land values using data of apartment rents. While in practical applications
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the appraisal of land using rental prices has been a common approach, it has gained only
little attention in the academic literature. To fill this gap, we use apartment rent data
from a Multiples Listing Service (MLS ) to determine implicit local land rents. As a by-
product of the transformation into land values, a capitalization rate can be determined.
This allows us, finally, to make a smooth price prediction for land in the form of a
land value surface, which is the cornerstone for a series of practical applications and
future research. Indeed, the land value surface reveals a highly monocentric pattern for
the regional housing market in our study. As a direct consequence of our model, this
pattern has two main sources: The first and extensively studied determinant is the high
attractiveness of centrally located floor area. The second determinant, which has gained
less attention, is the density of local floor area.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. The most important is the
theoretical model of efficient land use, resulting in a methodological approach of determin-
ing land values from residential rent data. Using apartment rents has several advantages
and interesting features. Most notably, the density of apartment rent observations are
typically high where land transaction are infrequent, which enables land value prediction
in sparse local land markets. An interesting feature is the estimation of a capitalization
rate resulting from transforming rent data into land prices. Second, we support the theory
of monocentric land values. Further, we can demonstrate that this pattern is the result
of high attractiveness in central locations and land use planning that pursues higher den-
sities in central locations. The potentially monocentric structure of urban areas has been
of major interest in the urban and housing economics literature. Therefore, the question
of what is monocentric is particularly important. Based on the broad literature of urban
rent models, we expect that land values are monocentric. These land values depend on
and are highly influenced by the land quality since it determines the builders’ rent po-
tential. Our empirical findings support the idea that both location attractiveness and
land quality exhibit monocentric structures. The land values, as the product of these two
3
factors, exhibits a significant monocentric structure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we give a brief overview
of the related literature. Section 3 contains the theoretical model. Section introduces
the methodology 4. The empirical results are presented in section 5. Finally, section 6
concludes the study and summarizes the most important results.
2 Literature Review
There are plenty of contributions including location-related variables in the hedonic model.
A recent example is Kiel and Zabel (2008), who include a broad set of attributes from
different region levels. They find that all levels (MSA, town, street) have a significant
effect on the price of houses. More flexible models also allow spatial variation in the
marginal effects of physical attributes. A good taxonomy of different methodologies for
modelling spatial heterogeneity is given in Helbich, Brunauer, Vaz, and Nijkamp (2013).
The purpose of this paper is not to account for spatial heterogeneity to attain
unbiased hedonic prices. Our intention is to develop a model to determine land prices
using residential rental data. However, these tasks turn out to be two sides of the same
coin. Similarly to Fik, Ling, and Mulligan (2003), we strongly advocate the interaction
of physical attributes with location in principle. The main difference to our study is
that these authors do not consider land quality, which is a central part of our analysis.
Further, we restrict the interaction with lot area, while Fik, Ling, and Mulligan (2003) try
different specifications. Finally, our study is completely different concerning the purpose
of the land size interaction. Indeed, our goal is to actually estimate the underlying land,
not just account for potential heterogeneity induced by price differences.
The idea of land price interaction is conceptually similar to Parsons (1990), who
suggested weighting location amenities in hedonic models with lot size. The reason is that
attributes related to location are regarded as public goods. In turn, more land implies
4
more residential potential to consume the public good. This view, however, requires the
efficient land use assumption. We make this assumption explicit in our model. In the
empirical application, we use data on rental dwellings. These properties, owned by real
estate investors, are likely to meet the efficient land use assumption, while it might be
questionable in the case of owner-occupied dwellings.
There are few studies that have used the implicit location value approach, i.e.,
regressing prices on physical attributes and interpreting the residual as the location value.
The main difference in these studies is the way these location values capitalize into per
sqm land prices and the specification of the functional form in the spatial dimension. Two
recent studies estimating land prices with a spatially non-parametric equation are Rossi-
Hansberg, Sarte, and Owens (2010) and Kolbe, Schulz, Wersing, and Werwatz (2012).
The former estimates the land price impact of a residential urban revitalization program
implemented in Richmond, Virginia. They find that the program increased land prices by
2-5% per annum. Similarly to our study and conceptually inherited from Parsons (1990),
they use per sqm values, i.e., weighting location-related amenities by lot size. The same
approach is applied in Kolbe, Schulz, Wersing, and Werwatz (2012), who use the per sqm
value of these residuals to predict location values.1 Cheshire and Sheppard (1995) use a
similar specification of the per sqm location value. With a data sample of only about 900
observations, the authors chose a more structured functional form, allowing for multiple
radial asymmetries.
To our knowledge, Kolbe, Schulz, Wersing, and Werwatz (2012) is the only study
comparing the estimated location values to land value benchmarks. In particular, they use
expert-based land values and location ratings. In contrast, we compare the estimated land
values with actual land transaction data. Further, none of the studies above explicitly
account for land quality in terms of the floor area ratio (FAR).2
1In this paper, we denote location value as the (total) location value per apartment, while the per sqm
value is denoted as land value.
2In particular, the way how Kolbe, Schulz, Wersing, and Werwatz (2012) account for quality remains
unclear.
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3 A Simple Land Value Model
3.1 Land Use Regulations, Floor Area Ratio, and Efficient Land
Use
In most countries, the use of land is regulated by local or national planning authorities
to some extent. Quigley and Rosenthal (2008) give an extensive list and taxonomy of
regulatory and non-regulatory instruments for land use planning.3 The common goal
of many of these instruments is to regulate the population density in an area. In the
literature many empirical and theoretical studies exist about land use regulation and
housing prices4, while only a very few studies exist that consider the floor area ratio
(FAR) as the central residential planning instrument. For instance, Barr and Cohen
(2014) analyze the structure and the development of the FAR gradient in New York
City from 1890 to 2009 and find that it exhibits a monocentric pattern. A theoretical
contribution by Joshi and Kono (2009) suggests using both minimum and maximum FAR
regulations. In contrast to the FAR measure, population density has been extensively
studied from the theoretical perspective.5 A central issue has been the externality effects
resulting from increased population density.
In this paper, the central focus is on the residential real estate developer’s land use
problem. We will include the congestion issues associated with a high urban density.
Particularly, the real estate developer’s intention is to produce as much residential floor
area as possible on his own land. In that simplified context, the relevant regulatory
instruments can be limited to those directly affecting the residential floor area permitted
to be built per sqm of land. The most obvious way to impose such a restriction is to
3Non-regulatory instruments are measures that regulate settlement indirectly. For instance, the absence
of public services and infrastructure leads to a low building density without regulatory measures.
4As Quigley and Rosenthal (2008) point out, a main issue in this field is the complexity of the actors
involved with often ambiguous interest. Thus, identifying a causal structure is, especially in a temporal
context, a very difficult task.
5For instance, Wheaton (1998) provides a theoretical analysis of land use with and without congestion.
As such it is clearly the conceptual approach closest to our.
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define a maximum floor area ratio (FAR). This measure is defined as the total floor area
divided by the land lot area. Denoting floor area by X and land area by L, FAR is
defined as:
FAR ≡ floor area
land area
=
X
L
. (1)
As a regulatory instrument, the local government can impose restrictive values on
the floor area ratio for every lot of land. We are only interested in the maximum value,
denoted by FARmax. This measure allows introducing a cap on the local building density.
We demonstrate that for real estate developers, the FAR is a central figure working as a
multiplier with respect to the rents gained from the land lot. In that respect, the FAR
is the developer’s land quality, which differs from the size of the lot, denoted as land
quantity.
In our theoretical model, we make a weak assumption of efficient land usage, i.e.
the building exploits the land within its regulatory restrictions. Hence, it follows that
FAR = FARmax (2)
for every lot of land. We refer to this equality as efficient land use condition. Note
that in an urban area the assumption is rather weak regarding the fact that the owners of
apartments are rent-seeking real estate investors.6 For the apartment builder, it follows
that for an additional sqm of living area, 1/FARmax of building land is required. The
land use efficiency assumption implies that this relationship is always exactly fulfilled,
i.e. no land is wasted and the maximum restriction is not violated. In order to build an
6Rental apartments exclude owner-occupied apartments by definition. For this reason, the owners of
rental apartments are real estate investors, who own apartments for financial purposes. Typically, these
kinds of real estate holders exploit land efficiently. A debate related to the topic of this paper is the
valuation of land under the efficient use (also best use) assumption, originally initiated by Smith (1979)
and his rent gap theory. For the interested reader we refer to Hammel (1999) for a detailed discussion
of the rent gap theory and its critics. The central and most important aspect for this study is that the
actual use of the land, i.e. the apartments built on the land are not too far away from the best use
assumption.
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apartment with living area X (size), the builder thus requires total land area L = X
FAR
.
In a competitive developers’ market, the efficient land use assumption is plausible even
in the context of negative externalities of population or building density.7
3.2 Threefold Nature of Apartment Size
The price of an apartment can be attributed to two kinds of amenities: physical attributes
and local amenities. Location attributes are by definition bound to the physical location
of the apartment. The local amenities include, for instance, local taxation advantages, the
households relevant school districts, proximity to goods and services as well as transport
connections.
Different from the physical structure, each house has its own location. From the
households’ perspective, the location of the land does not have a physical extension. In
particular, the amenities provided externally in the form of public goods, associated with
a particular location, are available almost independent of the size of the land. However,
buying more land crowds out other potential bidders for the same location. It follows
that the price of the location must somehow depend on the location quantity, i.e, the size
of the land, which constitutes the location. As a consequence, the price of the location
depends on the lot size. Thus, the rental price must include a location value depending
on the size of the lot of land.8
The competitiveness of locations has its roots in the land market. We demonstrate
how the value of amenities is reflected in the land price. Our model is based on and inherits
7Wheaton (1998), for instance, argues that local rent maximization is not necessarily the aggregate rent
maximization.
8Note that a particular lot of land does not only constitute location. It has also physical characteristics,
of which the most important is the size of the lot. It is associated with two major non-location amenities.
On the one hand, it is the restriction on the ground floor of the apartment. If apartments have only one
floor, it is a direct restriction of the apartment size. On the other hand, it should be noted that besides
the lot size, the distinction between physical and locational is also ambiguous for other attributes. For
instance, the floor of an apartment has physical as well as location characteristics. Living on a higher
floor increases the view but also the (potentially challenging) route from the building entrance to the
apartment. However, such property characteristics are neglected in our analysis. In the following, we
restrict the focus on the size of the apartment and the land.
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the conceptual ideas from Parsons (1990). Consider a real estate developer (“developer”,
henceforth) who owns a lot of land with total area LT . The land exhibits constant local
amenities. The developer can divide the land into m lots of equal size. Local amenities
associated with living on a lot of the developer are constant and denoted by A. There is
a construction firm from which the developer can borrow structure X, which costs c(X).
The developer can rent out each of the m composite bundles (consisting structure and
land) for a rent r(X,A,L). In this setting, the developer face the profit maximization
problem
maxX,m {r (X,A,L)m− c(X)m} . (3)
Assume there exists an equilibrium characterized by a bundle {A∗, X∗, L∗} with
L∗ = LT
m∗ , where A
∗ is the equilibrium level of location-related attributes, and X∗ the
equilibrium structure attribute. The rent in equilibrium is therefore r(X∗, A∗, L∗). The
number of equally sized land lots m∗ follows directly from m∗ = LT/L∗.
Now suppose there is a potential renter who wants to rent an apartment on a lot of
land that is a multiple (λL∗) of the standard lot size. In addition, he prefers a structure
X˜. The builder would only sell the bundle {X˜, A˜, L˜} if
[r(X∗, A∗, L∗)− c(X∗)] (m∗ − λ) + r(X˜, A˜, λL∗)− c(X˜)
≥ [r(X∗, A∗, L∗)− c(X∗)]m∗.
(4)
If the cost and rent functions are linear, this condition can be simplified to
r(X˜, A˜, λL∗) ≥ rXX˜ + λrAA∗ + λrGL∗. (5)
Under market competition, this must hold with equality and corresponds to the rent
price of the bundle with the large lot size. The price of the bundle with the standard lot
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size (λ = 1) is r(X∗, A∗, L∗A) = rXX
∗ + rAA∗ + rGL∗.
Without loss of generality, we can set L∗ to unit size (1 sqm, for instance). Then,
λ is the lot size in sqm. By rearranging the pricing equation, we can write the general
rental price function as
r(X,A, λ) = XrX + λArA + λrG. (6)
This corresponds to the result from Parsons (1990). For this reason, Parsons suggests
weighting local amenities by lot size. We now include the efficient land use condition
represented by Equation (2), which states that the lot size under efficient land use is X
FAR
.
The term ArA is the rent for a unit size location. Since we have set the unit size to 1
square meter, we can replace it with rL, denoting the per sqm land rent. Therefore, the
apartment rent can be written as
r(X,A) = rXX + rG
X
FAR
+ rL
X
FAR
(7)
By taking the first derivative, the marginal effect of an additional sqm in apartment
size can be determined:
∂r(X,A)
∂X
= rX + rG
1
FAR
+ rL
1
FAR
. (8)
That is, the marginal rent of an additional unit in apartment size is composed of
three components. The first component is the price for an additional square meter of
structure (rX), which is regarded as a globally constant structure price. The second
component is the rent price for physical land (rG). As the structure rent, the value of this
garden attribute is independent of the location.9 Finally, the third rent component, rL, is
the rental price for the local amenities per land unit, reflected in the land price. The land
9Note that the term garden stems from the fact that the second term is associated with a building’s
surroundings, not with the unusable land below the structure.
10
price therefore consists of prices for two kinds of amenities: physical amenities associated
with the garden and amenities associated with the location. Only the last term is directly
associated with and, therefore, depends on the apartment’s location. In this study, we
are interested in the land value, i.e., estimating rL for a set of locations. In the next step,
we present our identification strategy to derive local land values from rental data.
3.3 Short-Term Dynamics vs. Long-Term Equilibrium
In order to determine local land values, Equation (7) is estimated in a hedonic regression.
With respect to the interpretation of the results, we briefly outline the relationship be-
tween our exogenous and endogenous variables. Considering the third term in Equation
(8) and assuming an apartment size X¯, the total location price per dwelling is
rd = rL
X¯
FAR
. (9)
Depending on the temporal scope we expect different and ambiguous effects. First,
consider a fast and substantial increase in the FAR in the whole urban area. This would
increase the supply of floor area and therefore decrease the corresponding rent temporarily.
From this perspective, land prices rL are exogenous, while the location prices of dwellings
rL
X
FAR
are endogenous. However, this change in the floor area rent will be capitalized into
the equilibrium land value. Hence, it follows that rental prices are exogenous to the land
values in the long run. This non-dynamic equilibrium can be analyzed cross-sectionally.
In the empirical part, we estimate land rents using a global hedonic function with time
dummy variables, i.e., it is a quasi-cross-sectional analysis where the estimated land rent
prices are averages. Given a particular homogeneous region, the long-term demand for
residential location floor area is assumed to be highly elastic and therefore constant. With
an endogenous land price, it is convenient to rewrite (9) as
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rL =
rd
X¯
FARρ, (10)
by augmenting the floor area ratio with a congestion parameter ρ. A change in the
FAR directly capitalizes into land values. The parameter ρ is the elasticity of the land
price with respect to FAR:
∂rL/rL
∂FAR/FAR
= ρ. (11)
For instance, let us consider two lots of land with the same local amenities, e.g., due
to the proximity. Lot A has a FAR that is twice that of lot B. In the case with congestion,
the FAR has a decreasing marginal effect. Formally, we model this non-proportionality
as FARρ. The congestion affects the demand for residential floor area in a negative way,
an aspect which is illustrated in Figure 1.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
4 Empirical Methodology
4.1 Estimation Strategy
In the previous section, we demonstrated that the value of land has a physical and location-
related component. Assume the residential area is partitioned into Rk subareas, where
k = 1...K. The subareas are constituted by homogeneous local amenities, i.e. apartments
exhibit the same local amenities within subareas. The resulting hedonic equation is
ri = α + rGLi + rY Yi + rXXi + r
k
LI(si ∈ Rk)Li + εi, (12)
where Yi is a vector containing general physical attributes (excluding apartment
size) and rY is the vector of corresponding rent prices. The location si = {lati, loni} is
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defined by the geographical coordinates of the apartment. The total rental price is a sum
of the price for general physical attributes pY Yi, the price for the physical apartment size
pXXi, and the rent price for location k, given by r
k
LI(si ∈ Rk)Li. Note that the I(si ∈ Rk)
is the indicator function mapping the location to aggregate regions.
In terms of rental market heterogeneity, this model states that there is only spatial
heterogeneity in prices for locations. Spatial heterogeneity in hedonic pricing models has
at least two different aspects. First, the heterogeneous structure of residuals leads to
inconsistent estimates of pricing coefficients. Second, the residuals can be regarded as the
price of unobserved property factors. With our model specification, we can account for the
spatial heterogeneity by finding the homogeneous area. However, it does not necessarily
ensure consistent estimates of the hedonic pricing equation, but rather allows estimating
the location values, which determine implicit land prices.
In order to estimate location prices, we need to differentiate between the physical and
the location land price. This can be reached by including the interaction of homogenous
areas with land size:
ri = α + rGLi + rXXi + r
k,r
L (Li × I(si)), (13)
where I(si) denotes the indicator variable reflecting whether apartment i is located
in area k. The coefficients rk,rL , k = 1 . . . K, are the estimates for regional land rents. Note
that the superscript r in rk,r indicates that the estimation coefficients are relative rents
since the intercept of the land rents cannot be identified from the interaction with region
dummies. The absolute land rent is therefore rkL = δ+ r
k,r
L . This relationship is discussed
in the next section.
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4.2 Transformation of Land Rents into Land Values
In this section, we demonstrate how absolute land values (pkL) can be estimated from
relative, regional land rents (rk,rL ). Obviously, such a transformation must include a shift
in levels (because rental prices are determined in relative terms) as well as a capitalization
rule, which transforms rents into land prices. In order to keep the model simple, we
assume there is a single (and constant) capitalization rate d for all regions. The whole
transformation can thus be formulated as
pkL =
rk
r
L + δ
d
=
δ
d
+
1
d
rk,rL , (14)
where δ is the level coefficient to transform the relative rent into an absolute rent
and d is the capitalization rate. The term δ
d
is therefore the level factor transforming
the relative land price into the absolute land price. One possible approach is to make
assumptions about the δ and d and for land price predictions. However, in order to test
the validity of our implicit land price model, we use observed regional land price data to
roughly estimate the coefficients. We have to note that the main purpose of our estimation
is to verify the model. In addition, the estimated value of the capitalization rate is only
a by-product of this test.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Data and Study Area
In the canton of Zurich, the land use regulation is subsidiary to a national land use
plan. The building law allows for a wide range of measures to establish a foundation for
human development.10 This variety of instruments makes the consideration of regulatory
measures impossible. We restrict our attention to the most important, and for our analysis
10Written in the building law of the canton of Zurich, Planungs- und Baugesetz, §18, Abs.1.
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sufficient, regulatory measure, the floor area ratio (FAR). It is defined as the total living
area ST divided by total lot area LT :
11 Typically, in core areas, i.e., in city centers a
higher building density is allowed compared to rural areas. The data source of the FAR
is the parcel data record provided by the statistical office of the canton of Zurich. The GIS
data contains the location and shape of all land parcels in the canton of Zurich and the
corresponding building rights and regulations. Using the coordinates of the rental data,
the apartments’ underlying land and its building rights can be determined.
The rental price data we use stems from a Multiple Listings Service (MLS ) for
apartment offerings from 2002 to 2014. Using rental data has the advantage that there
is a very large number of observations, while property and vacant land transactions are
sparse in the Zurich urban area. In fact, an overwhelming majority of households are
renters. The share of owner-occupiers, for both houses and apartments, is about 7% in
the central city. The advantage of the usage of rental data is that rental dwellings more
often change hands, which results in a larger amount of data. In fact, our data contains
more than 40,000 observations from 2002 to 2014 including a wide set of apartment
characteristics, as shown in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The apartments come with a
street address, which enables us to find coordinates using a geocoding service.12
Figure 2 shows a map of the canton of Zurich with the spatial dispersion of the
observations represented by the dots, where light and dark colors represent low and high
rents, respectively. The smallest jurisdictions are 171 communes, illustrated by solid
shapes and listed in Table A.2 in the Appendix. The largest city in the canton is Zurich
city, with a population of 383,708 at the close of 2013, the second largest city is Winterthur.
In terms of population (105,461), it is only about a quarter of the size of Zurich.13 The
population in these two cities accounted for almost 35% of the total canton’s population
11Defined in the Planungs- und Baugesetz §254 and in more detail Bauordnung der Stadt Zu¨rich 2012.
12We used Googles geocoding API to translate street addresses into global coordinates. These coordinates
are than transformed into Swiss Grid coordinates using transformation functions provided by Swisstopo.
13With regard to these population figures, the two cities are defined by the jurisdictions (or communes,
respectively) of Zurich and Winterthur.
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(1,421,895) at the end of 2013. In our data, 36% of the observations stem from Zurich
and Winterthur, i.e., the data represents the dispersion of residents. Moreover, when
comparing the data to BFS’s 2012 nationwide household survey, we find that the rent
prices of the apartments have representative mean values. For instance, the average rent
price of an apartment with three rooms was 1,442 CHF, and 2,354 CHF for an apartment
with four rooms.14
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
For testing the quality of our land model, we compare the estimated implicit land
values to regional averages of land price transactions. The corresponding data is based
on communal land registry offices, where all property transactions must be registered.
For confidentiality reasons, only averages of these transaction prices are provided by the
Zurich Statistical Office.15
5.2 Testing and Calibrating of the Model
In Section 3, we outlined how the relative rental price is transformed into absolute land
prices. In order to identify the capitalization rate and the level coefficient in Equation
(14), we need to make use of regional land prices. In this section, we test and calibrate the
model in two steps. In the first step, we estimate the model of relative implicit land rents
prk in Equation (13). In the second step, these estimates are compared to observed regional
land prices as suggested in Equation (14). We run a regression of regional (aggregate)
average land prices on our implicit relative land rents for the same regions to derive the
coefficients δ and d.
As mentioned above, the sparsity of vacant land transactions is one of the main
reasons for the use of residential data to determine land values. For the same reason,
14The corresponding average rent prices in the BFS survey were 1,419 and 2,137 CHF. See BFS Struk-
turerhebung (2012) for more information.
15See Statistisches Amt des Kantons Zu¨rich (2014).
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however, we use averages of regional land transaction prices to test the predictive power
of our model. A higher level of aggregation (i.e., larger regions) of land transaction prices
has the advantage of better estimates of the mean land prices. The disadvantage is,
however, that we get fewer (aggregate) observations to test the predictive power. This
trade-off is restricted by the availability of data. We have access to regional mean prices
for two regional aggregation levels: communes (171 communes) and consensus land use
planning regions (12 regions). On the level of communes, the number of land transactions
ranges from 0 to 26, with an average of 2.6 transactions per commune and year. On
the level of consensus land use planning regions, the corresponding range is from 16 to
72, with an average of 40.5 transactions. Average land price transactions for communes
are not suitable because we do not have observations for every commune in every year.
For this reason, we decided to use the pre-defined consensus land use planning regions to
calibrate the model and test its predictive power.
The regression result of the first step is listed in Table A.3 in Appendix A. Besides
the hedonic rental prices for different apartment characteristics, the coefficients represent
the implicit relative land prices for regions 1 to K. In the next step, we compare the
implicit relative land rents to the observed absolute mean land prices of the regions.
Figure 3 shows the scatter plot of the two variables.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
The strong linear dependence indicated by the graphical inspection is reflected in
a high correlation coefficient of 0.904 between the actual land prices and predicted land
values. Further, we report the results for the fitted values according to Equation (14).
Note that the number of observations in this regression is only N=72. The results of the
linear regression of effective land prices on implicit land rents are summarized in Table 1.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
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We conclude that for this level of aggregation, our prediction of aggregate land price
data is relatively accurate. As a by-product of the goodness-of-fit test, we report the
level and slope coefficients in Table 1. The slope estimate of 12.304 corresponds of to the
inverse of the capitalization rate. The capitalization rate is therefore 1/12.304 = 8.127%,
which is a comparably high value.16 The high accuracy of the land prediction model
makes it feasible for practical application.
A further parameter identified in the estimation is the global congestion parameter
ρ. We estimate a value of 0.65, which means that the FAR is associated with negative
externalities. The goodness-of-fit of the overall regression (in terms of R2) is shown in
Figure A.1 in the Appendix, where our estimate is the value that maximizes the regression
R2. A congestion parameter of 0.65 means that the effect of the FAR on land prices is
diminishing, for instance, the effect for FAR = 2 is 20.65 = 1.569.
5.3 Land Value Surface
In the previous section, we have shown that the implicit land price model fits land price
transaction data well. As a by-product of this test, we have estimated coefficients that
allow us to predict land prices from implicit land rents. Using these results, we can
estimate a land value surface by smoothing the predicted (implicit) land values. For that
purpose, we spatially generalize the rent function (12) and get17
ri = α + φLi + βXi + r(si)Li + εi. (15)
In particular, we run a non-parametric local regression of land price predictions (at
individual level) on the longitude and latitude values. In particular, the estimation is
based on the Nadaraya-Watson local constant estimator:
16Indeed, this capitalization rate can well be compared to rent-discount rates used to evaluate the net
asset value (NAV) in real estate funds. For funds invested in residential real estate, the average discount
rate for Swiss real estate funds were around 5% from 2004 to 2014.
17We follow the notations of Clapp and Wang (2006) for the specification of the hedonic model.
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rˆ(loch) = N
−1
N∑
i=1
Kh, i(locj)ri, (16)
where
Kh,i(locj) =
Kh(locj − loci)
N−1
∑N
i=1Kh(locj − loci)
and Kh(u) = h
−1K
(u
h
)
. (17)
We use a Gaussian Kernel function K(.), with a bandwidth h determined by cross-
validation. As a result, we get a smooth surface of relative residential rents. Based on
Equation (14), these estimates are transformed into land value estimates. The corre-
sponding smooth land value surface is illustrated in Figure 4.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
In this section, we demonstrate how the predicted land values of the canton of Zurich
can be explained by major land attributes. First, note that the land price surface does,
to some degree, smooth out the micro location. Therefore, it is primarily associated with
macro location values. According to Kubli, Lu¨scher, Salvi, Schellenbauer, Schellenberg,
Moser, Rey, and Bischoff (2008), the macro location is indeed the most important deter-
minant of land prices in this area. In addition, our findings are largely in line with the
finding of Kubli, Lu¨scher, Salvi, Schellenbauer, Schellenberg, Moser, Rey, and Bischoff
(2008). The corresponding land attributes are distance to CBD, tax level, and proximity
to the lake. Since the proximity to the lake is a matter of the larger environmental situa-
tion, we regard it as a macro location attribute as well. A graphical inspection of Figure
4 reveals evidence of a multi-radial monocentric land price. The center is located next to
the lake, very close to the CBD. As the contour lines indicate, the decrease in land prices
along the lakeside is much flatter compared to all other directions.
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5.4 Dual Monocentric Structure
We have argued from a theoretical perspective that the land use efficient lot size is a
promising measure for determining land values and showed empirically that the predicted
land values fit the empirical data well. In particular, interacting the land efficient lot size
has been successful for land price determination. In this section, we restrict the analysis to
the larger urban area around the city of Zurich to demonstrate the monocentric structure
of implicit land prices in this area. Since a main focus of this paper is on the land
use regulation, we will illustrate the role of this regulation in the resulting monocentric
pattern. Methodologically, the fitting of monocentric models is not necessary since the
visual evidence of the value gradients is obvious.
The predicted land value is the product of location value per sqm and land quality.
We can decompose these two factors and analyze them visually. First, we focus on the
central location’s attractiveness. This fact is reflected in the left panel of Figure 5, which
shows a non-parametric surface of the location value, i.e. the part of the apartment that
reflects the value of the location. The monocentric structure is distorted and irregular.
However, the CBD has the highest value and location prices are decreasing in all directions.
Clearly, the lakeside is the main source of the irregularity of the location value. In
summary, location values exhibit a monocentic structure, even without controlling for
non-monocentric location amenities such as the proximity to the lake.
Second, the fact that floor area ratios are higher in central areas increases land rents
in the center. Since these two location characteristics, location attractiveness and FAR,
are correlated, the implicit land prices exhibit considerable variation. Indeed, the building
regulation aims at a high FAR in central locations, where the location value is already
high. The obvious reason for this policy is to reduce prices for dwellings at favorable,
central locations.
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE]
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Finally, the predicted land values as the product of location quality and land quality
is shown in Figure 6. The interaction of location value and location quality is embodied
in this surface. The monocentric structure of land quality has clearly shaped the land
price patterns into oval gradients. However, the pattern of the location values dominates
the high value locations along the lakeside. In addition, the location value determines the
center of the monocentric structure in land prices. Indeed, the highest land price is not
in the CBD, but slightly more northward next to the lake. In that point, very high local
amenities meet a relatively high floor area ratio, making it the most valuable land in the
canton of Zurich.
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE]
6 Conclusion
The main goal of this paper is to propose a simple model that meets the functional char-
acteristics of the land market. Based on a concept of the underlying value of locations,
we demonstrated that location does not, in principle, have a spatial extension and the
“amount of the location” is, at first glance, meaningless. However, the product on the
“market for locations” inevitably comes in the form of land, which does have a spatial
extension. When we assume that land is exploited efficiently, an additional unit of apart-
ment surface requires 1/FAR units of land. Then, for a constant FAR, it can be shown
that the marginal price for the apartment size has three rent components: the presumably
constant rents for structure and physical land, as well as the land rent inherent location
value.
We were interested in the location value component. Thus, we formulated a loca-
tion interaction model that can be estimated for pre-defined regions. One of the main
features of this model is the consideration of the land use efficient lot size, accounting for
the apartments’ underlying land quality. Applying the model in a hedonic setting to a
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large amount of rental data in the canton of Zurich, we estimated local residential land
values. The transformation of rent components into land prices is a linear function, which
includes the capitalization rate as a coefficient. Using consensus submarkets (“Raum-
planungsregionen”) in the canton of Zurich, we demonstrated that our model is highly
reliable in predicting land prices. In particular, the correlation coefficient of predicted
values and observed land prices is 0.905, and the relative prediction error is 18.9%. This
high prediction accuracy makes the model suitable for practical application. For instance,
it provides a basis for predicting land values in places where land transactions are infre-
quent or even absent. This is particularly good news since land transactions tend to be
low in urban areas, where rent observations are very frequent.
As a by-product of the goodness-of fit test of our model, we estimated a capitalization
rate of 8.13%. This finding is interesting from an asset pricing perspective. Particularly, it
can serve as a benchmark capitalization rate for residential real estate investments. How-
ever, compared to the capitalization rate of residential real estate funds, our estimation
is relatively high.
In a final step, we utilize our findings from the model test to estimate a land value
surface. The number of observations allowed us to use a non-parametric approach to
predict land values for any location. Concentrating on the larger urban area around the
city of Zurich, we found a monocentric pattern in the predicted land values. This pattern
is the result of two main urban patterns: First, the monocentric location value pattern is
the result of higher amenities in central locations. Second, the monocentric land quality
pattern is the result of land use regulation, i.e., the result of the higher permitted floor area
ratios in central areas. When estimating land values, and especially when the location
values stem from regression residuals, land quality should be accounted for.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Data Description
This table shows the apartment characteristics of rental dwellings for the canton of Zurich by category,
i.e. by rental price, structure, location, and time. The data set contains more than 40,000 observations
provided by a Multiple Listing Service (MLS) for apartment offerings from 2002 to 2014.
Category Variable Description
Rental price Rental price Gross rental price in Swiss Francs per month
Structure Area Living area of the apartment in m2
Rooms Number of rooms. Living rooms counting for 1.5 rooms
Special view Binary variable, indicating whether the apartment has special view
Lift Binary variable, indicating whether the apartment has a lift
Parking Binary variable, indicating whether the apartment
offers a parking opportunity
Garage Binary variable, indicating whether the apartment
has a parking garage space
Duplex Binary variable, indicating whether it is a duplex apartment
Attic Binary variable, indicating whether it is a attic apartment
Flat roof Binary variable, indicating whether it is a attic apartment
Studio Binary variable, indicating whether it is a studio apartment
Single Binary variable, indicating whether it is a single apartment
Furnished Binary variable, indicating whether the apartment is furnished
Terrace Binary variable, indicating whether the apartment has a terrace
Single Binary variable, indicating whether it is a single apartment
Loft Binary variable, indicating whether it is a loft apartment
Location Address Street address of the apartment
Time Availability Date of availability of the apartment
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Table A.2: Regions (Jurisdictions) in the Canton of Zurich
This table lists the 171 communes of the canon Zurich, which are the smallest jurisdictions in Switzerland.
ID Name ID Name ID Name ID Name
1 Aeugst a.A. 56 Embrach 115 Gossau 192 Egg
2 Affoltern a.A. 57 Freienstein-Teufen 116 Gru¨ningen 193 Fa¨llanden
3 Bonstetten 58 Glattfelden 117 Hinwil 194 Greifensee
4 Hausen a.A. 59 Hochfelden 118 Ru¨ti 195 Maur
5 Hedingen 60 Ho¨ri 119 Seegra¨ben 196 Mo¨nchaltorf
6 Kappel a.A. 61 Hu¨ntwangen 120 Wald 197 Schwerzenbach
7 Knonau 62 Kloten 121 Wetzikon 198 Uster
8 Maschwanden 63 Lufingen 131 Adliswil 199 Volketswil
9 Mettmenstetten 64 Nu¨rensdorf 132 Hirzel 200 Wangen-Bru¨ttisellen
10 Obfelden 65 Oberembrach 133 Horgen 211 Altikon
11 Ottenbach 66 Opfikon 134 Hu¨tten 212 Bertschikon
12 Rifferswil 67 Rafz 135 Kilchberg 213 Bru¨tten
13 Stallikon 68 Rorbas 136 Langnau a.A. 214 Da¨gerlen
14 Wettswil a.A. 69 Wallisellen 137 Oberrieden 215 Da¨ttlikon
21 Adlikon 70 Wasterkingen 138 Richterswil 216 Dinhard
22 Benken 71 Wil 139 Ru¨schlikon 217 Elgg
23 Berg a.I. 72 Winkel 140 Scho¨nenberg 218 Ellikon a.d.Th.
24 Buch a.I. 81 Bachs 141 Thalwil 219 Elsau
25 Dachsen 82 Boppelsen 142 Wa¨denswil 220 Hagenbuch
26 Dorf 83 Buchs 151 Erlenbach 221 Hettlingen
27 Feuerthalen 84 Da¨llikon 152 Herrliberg 222 Hofstetten
28 Flaach 85 Da¨nikon 153 Hombrechtikon 223 Neftenbach
29 Flurlingen 86 Dielsdorf 154 Ku¨snacht 224 Pfungen
30 Andelfingen 87 Hu¨ttikon 155 Ma¨nnedorf 225 Rickenbach
31 Henggart 88 Neerach 156 Meilen 226 Schlatt
32 Humlikon 89 Niederglatt 157 Oetwil a.S. 227 Seuzach
33 Kleinandelfingen 90 Niederhasli 158 Sta¨fa 228 Turbenthal
34 Laufen-Uhwiesen 91 Niederweningen 159 Uetikon a.S. 229 Wiesendangen
35 Marthalen 92 Oberglatt 160 Zumikon 230 Winterthur
36 Oberstammheim 93 Oberweningen 161 Zollikon 231 Zell
37 Ossingen 94 Otelfingen 171 Bauma 241 Aesch
38 Rheinau 95 Regensberg 172 Fehraltorf 242 Birmensdorf
39 Thalheim a.d.Th. 96 Regensdorf 173 Hittnau 243 Dietikon
40 Tru¨llikon 97 Ru¨mlang 174 Illnau-Effretikon 244 Geroldswil
41 Truttikon 98 Schleinikon 175 Kyburg 245 Oberengstringen
42 Unterstammheim 99 Scho¨ﬄisdorf 176 Lindau 246 Oetwil a.d.L.
43 Volken 100 Stadel 177 Pfa¨ffikon 247 Schlieren
44 Waltalingen 101 Steinmaur 178 Russikon 248 Uitikon
51 Bachenbu¨lach 102 Weiach 179 Sternenberg 249 Unterengstringen
52 Bassersdorf 111 Ba¨retswil 180 Weisslingen 250 Urdorf
53 Bu¨lach 112 Bubikon 181 Wila 251 Weiningen
54 Dietlikon 113 Du¨rnten 182 Wildberg 261 Zu¨rich
55 Eglisau 114 Fischenthal 191 Du¨bendorf
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Figure A.1: R2 in Dependence of the Congestion Parameter
This figure illustrates the development of the goodness of fit of the overall regression in terms of R2
derived from Equation (14) based on various levels of the global congestion parameter (ρ). At a congestion
parameter of 0.65 the effect of the FAR on land prices is decreasing. The graph demonstrates the negative
externalities of the FAR.
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B Tables
Table 1: Regression Results for Land Price Prediction
This table shows the regression results of regional (aggregated) average land prices on implicit relative
land rents for the same regions. The number of observations is N = 72. MAE and MRE stand for mean
absolute error and mean relative error, respectively.
Estimation Results Value
Intercept 749.182
Slope 12.304
Statistics
R-squared 0.81811
Correlation Coefficient 0.9045
MAE (mean absolute error) 122.19
MRE (mean relative error) 0.1887
Relative error > 15% 0.4692
Relative error > 25% 0.2769
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C Figures
Figure 1: Demand for Floor Area in the Short and Long Term
This figure shows the relationship between land price and the quantity of land. In a homogeneous,
regional housing market the short-term demand for residential floor is assumed to be unit elastic, while
the long-term demand is perfectly elastic. The introduction of congestion by accounting for the price
elasticity of land with respect to the floor area ratio (FAR) affects the long-term demand negatively.
It follows that a change in the FAR directly capitalizes into land values due to its decreasing marginal
effect.
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Figure 2: Map of Canton of Zurich
This figure shows the spatial dispersion of the observations for the canton Zurich. The light and dark
colored dots represent low an high rents in the data sample, respectively. The solid shapes of the map
indicate the 171 communes within the canton’s boundaries. The dispersion of the observations reflects
the dispersion of the residents, with a total population of approx. 1.4m at the end of 2013.
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Figure 3: Predicted versus Observed Land Transaction Prices
This figure compares the implicit relative land rents to the observed absolute mean land prices of the
canton Zurich. The predicted implicit relative land prices are the fitted values based on the estimation
results from Table A.3 in the Appendix. The strong linear relationship between the predicted predicted
versus actual land prices is reflected in a correlation coefficient of 0.904.
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Figure 4: Non-parametric Estimates of Predicted Land Values
This figure shows the estimation results for the land value surface based on smoothed predicted (implicit)
land values. In the non-parametric local regression land price predictions are regressed on the longitude
and latitude. The estimation is based on the Nadaraya-Watson local constant estimator. According to
Equation (14) the estimates are transformed into land value estimates, which results in a smooth surface
of relative residential rents.
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Figure 5: Non-parametric Estimates of Location Value and Land Quality
This figure shows the non-parametric surface of the location value in the left-hand-side graph, while the
right-hand-side graph shows the land quality measured in terms of the floor area ratio (FAR). The
location value reflects the central location’s attractiveness with the highest value in the CBD, from which
location prices decrease in all directions. Because of higher FARs in central areas, land prices increase
in the CBD.
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Figure 6: Non-parametric Estimates of Predicted Land Values
This figure shows the predicted land values as the product of location quality and land quality. The oval
gradients of land prices reflect the monocentric structure of land quality in the larger area of the city of
Zurich. High location values can be observed along the lakeside as well as more in the north next to the
lake, i.e. high floor area ratios reflect high local amenities.
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Shareholder Activism in REITs 
 
 “No recent development has influenced firms’ strategic and financial decision-making 
as profoundly as the surge in shareholder activism following the global financial crisis.” 1  
1. Introduction 
In recent years, shareholder activists, predominantly represented by activist hedge funds, 
have been playing an increasingly important role in the corporate governance landscape. These 
shareholders, dissatisfied with some aspect of a company’s management or operations, try to 
bring about change within the company, and, in some cases, agitate firms for a change in 
corporate control. Examples of activist campaigns include demands for major operational or 
capital structure changes, changes in business strategy, seeking strategic alternatives, oppositions 
to proposed corporate transactions, or changes in corporate governance, such as elimination of 
takeover defenses (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008; Greenwood and Schor, 2009; 
Gantchev, 2013).  
The research on the wealth effects of activism generally agrees that the activism is 
beneficial to the activist investors. Several recent studies have shown that activists generate 
significant abnormal returns both in absolute terms and in comparison to non-activist investing 
(Brav, et al., 2008; Clifford, 2008; Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi, 2008). Perhaps because of 
this success, the funds under management in activist hedge funds have increased from about $12 
billion in 2003 to about $112 billion in 2014, with more than 10 activist and multiple-strategy 
funds managing over $10 billion each (J.P.Morgan, 2015). The number of campaigns has also 
                                                          
1 The activist revolution: Understanding and navigating a new world of heightened investor scrutiny, J.P.Morgan 
publication, January 2015. 
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increased over time. While Bebchuk, Brav, Jackson and Jiang (2013) report 757 interventions by 
activist hedge funds in 1994-2000, they report 1,283 such interventions in the more recent 2001-
2007 period.  
Although shareholder activists seem to play a prominent role in shaping the operation of 
public corporations today, conventional wisdom seems to be that the activists take only a back 
stage in affecting REITs.2 This common belief is plausible for at least two reasons. First, 
managers in a typical REIT are thought to be well protected against hostile bids, making activist 
attacks less likely.3 Capozza and Seguin (2003) argue that because REITs are subject to the 
IRS’s “five or fewer” rule that prohibits five or fewer shareholders from owning 50% or more of 
a firm, all REIT management teams are essentially fully protected from removal by a hostile 
bidder. Additionally, REITs routinely use so-called excess shareholder provisions, under which 
voting rights and dividend payments are automatically suspended should a single shareholder's 
stake exceed some prescribed hurdle, typically 10% (Chan. Erickson and Wang, 2003). Finally, 
most REITs are incorporated in Maryland, where state law protects them from unsolicited 
takeover bids. 
The second reason for the plausibility of the view that shareholder activism is less 
prevalent in REITs is the notion that REITs are less likely to be undervalued as a result of 
inaccurate cash flow forecasts or governance deficiencies. Unlike many firms whose most 
significant assets are off their books (e.g., human capital or technological advantages), REITs 
derive their value from real estate assets. In a REIT, at least 75% of the assets must be real estate 
                                                          
2 For example, a Wall Street Journal article from 12/2/2014 titled “Activist Explores a New Frontier: Property” 
portrays a fund manager Jonathan Litt and his $100 million hedge fund, Lands and Buildings, as “the REITs sector’s 
only regular activist investor.” It quotes Litt saying that “There are just not a lot of people looking to be activist in 
the space.” The article also notes that “Activism isn’t new to REITs, but it is rare.” 
3 See “Activists Come Back to REITs” Wall Street Journal, 2/13/2008. 
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related and at least 75% of the gross income must be derived from real estate rents or interest on 
mortgages on real properties. REITs are thus thought to have assets that are easier to value than 
the assets of firms in other industries as most cash flows depend on relatively predictable 
changes in rent growth.4 Additionally, because REITs are required to pay out 90% of annual 
income as dividends, the agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986) are thought to be less 
severe in REITs than in other public firms. Indeed, the researchers who find no relation between 
REIT governance measures and performance explain their findings by the fact that REITs 
operate in a strict regulatory environment that in itself limits managerial entrenchment (Bianco, 
Ghosh, Sirmans, 2007; Bauer, Eichholtz, Kok, 2010). This implies that it might be difficult to 
derive additional value from improved governance in REITs. For both these reasons, shareholder 
activists may have less opportunity for economic gain by pushing for operational or governance 
changes in REITs in comparison to other public firms. 
Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that REITs are not immune from shareholder 
activism. A prominent case discussed in the media over the past year is that of CommonWealth 
REIT, in which two activist investors, Corvex Management LP and Related Fund Management 
LLC, succeeded in the fight to remove the company's entire board.5 The activists accused 
managing trustees of excessive compensation and mismanagement that caused CommonWealth 
to trade below the value of its office-property portfolio. Other recent cases of shareholder 
activism include Bulldog Investors pressuring Javelin Mortgage Investment Group to 
significantly repurchase stock;6 Midvale hedge fund seeking to oust the management and replace 
                                                          
4 See “Activist Explores a New Frontier: Property” Wall Street Journal, 12/2/2014. 
5 See “Corvex, Related Call for Earlier CommonWealth REIT Special Meeting” Wall Street Journal 3/25/2014. 
6 See “Bulldog Targets REITs For Shakeup After Javelin Win” Bloomberg, 1/16/2014. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-16/bulldog-targets-reits-for-shakeup-after-javelin-win-mortgages.html  
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the board of Anworth Mortgage Asset Corp;7 and Orange Capital hedge fund urging Strategic 
Hotels and Resorts to sell the company.8,9  
In this research, we first examine the extent to which REITs are likely to become an 
activist target. Our results indicate that, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, REITs are as 
likely to be targeted by shareholder activists as other publicly traded firms. This result is 
important because it warrants further investigation of shareholder activism in REITs. We then 
address several other questions. Are the gains that accrue to REIT shareholders similar to the 
gains accrued by shareholders of other types of activist targets? What are the determinants of the 
likelihood of an activist campaigns in REITs? What are the sources of gains attributed to the 
activist campaign? Are there measurable real consequences to shareholder activism in REITs? 
Our results can be summarized as follows. We document that, similar to other public 
firms, the most frequent campaigns in REITs are described as seeking to maximize shareholder 
value. The top two “value” demands of the activists are (i) the sale, merger, or liquidation of the 
target company or (ii) the review of strategic alternatives. The top “governance” demand is to 
obtain board seats for the activist. A typical REIT target of shareholder activism in our sample 
has lower relative valuations (market-to-book of assets), lower accounting performance (return 
on assets), higher cash, and lower prior abnormal returns. Our REIT targets thus can be described 
as relatively cheap “value” firms with weaker performance. We also find that equity REITs are 
targeted more often than mortgage REITs.  
                                                          
7 See “Activist U.S. Fund Seeks Board Ouster at Anworth REIT” Bloomberg, 4/17/2014. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-17/activist-u-s-fund-seeks-board-ouster-at-anworth-reit-mortgages.html  
8 See “Orange Capital, LLC Urges Immediate Sale of Strategic Hotels & Resorts in Letter sent to the Board of 
Directors” Business Wire available via Factiva, 2/19/2013. 
9 Additional examples of older activist campaigns are discussed in “Activists Come Back to REITs” Wall Street 
Journal, 2/13/2008. 
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With respect to the gains from activism, we find that, similar to other public firms, 
shareholders of REITs experience significantly positive average short-term gains around the 
announcements of activist campaigns. However, we report that the average long-term gains 
measured in the period from one month prior to one year after the event are not statistically 
significant with REITs. Thus, an activist campaign in a typical REIT does not seem to result in a 
long-term gain for shareholders. This result suggests that it is unlikely that we observe any 
measurable improvements in long-term operating performance in a typical REIT target and we, 
indeed, do not find such improvements. We also fail to find significant changes in leverage, 
investment or payout around activist events or any relation between these changes and the 
abnormal returns. 
In the last part of our paper we examine the hypothesis that the significant short-term 
gains around activist events are the result of the market expectation of an increased likelihood of 
takeover. Under this hypothesis, the market believes that activist targets are more likely takeover 
candidates, because activists tend to force target firms into a takeover (Greenwood and Schor, 
2009). Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that, among REIT firms, activist targets are more 
likely to be taken over, after controlling for other observable REIT characteristics. Additionally, 
we find that the long-term returns for the subset of REITs that are ultimately acquired are 
significantly positive. Our results are thus best described as consistent with the view that the 
short-term gains to REITs from shareholder activism reflect market expectations about increased 
takeover likelihood.     
Our research contributes to the literature in at least two ways. First, to our knowledge, 
there is no systematic study that examines the effects of shareholder activism in REITs. The 
research in mainstream finance excludes REITs from their samples because REITs have their 
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own unique regulatory requirements and our search of the real estate literature on the topic of 
shareholder activism returned no results. However, research that aids the understanding of how 
shareholder activists affect REITs seems important given that REITs are increasingly becoming 
used as preferred vehicles for investors seeking real estate exposure. Additionally, an increasing 
number of countries have introduced or are contemplating REIT-like structures to facilitate 
capital flows to the real estate sector (Eichholtz and Kok, 2007). 
Second, by examining a relatively homogeneous group of firms, we aim to remedy some 
of the criticism of the existing research on shareholder activism in public firms. Specifically, 
Coffee and Palia (2014) point out that the control group, i.e. the group of similarly situated firms 
that do not experience shareholder activism, is not well specified in the existing studies on 
shareholder activism as it is not similar enough to the treatment group. Our control group is less 
likely to suffer from this criticism as all REITs have to oblige by the same regulatory 
requirements. Additionally, because REITs are relatively transparent, we can obtain more 
reliable measures of their characteristics, such as valuation through Tobin’s Q (Capozza and 
Seguin, 2003), or investments (Hartzell, Sun, and Titman, 2006). These reasons provide some 
motivations for using REITs as a useful laboratory. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we summarize the 
literature on the recent wave of shareholder activism in public firms other than REITs; in Section 
3, we summarize our data; in section 4, we present our preliminary results and outline future 
research agenda; and in section 5, we conclude.  
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2. Shareholder Activism in Public (non-REIT) Firms  
Shareholder activism in the U.S. dates back to the early 1900s but the role and identity of 
the activist investors have changed as legal and regulatory regimes have shifted. In the early 
1990s, activists were predominantly financial institutions, such as banks, mutual funds, or 
insurance companies. In the 1940s to 1970s, they were mostly individual investors. The 1980s 
saw again increased involvement by institutional investors, mainly public pension funds. The 
1980s also saw the rise of corporate raiders. In the 1990s, labor union pension funds played a 
major role in shareholder activism. Finally, in the early 2000s hedge funds and private equity 
funds assumed prominence in the activist arena (Gillan and Starks, 2007).   
Here we focus on the research that examines the most recent wave of activism, the wave 
that started early in the last decade with the rise of hedge funds as corporate activists. Hedge 
funds are better positioned than traditional mutual and pension funds in pursuing activist agendas 
because they are not subject to regulations that govern mutual and pension funds. Hedge funds 
can hold highly concentrated positions in a small number of companies, and they can use 
leverage and derivatives to extend their reach. Additionally, highly incentivized hedge fund 
managers face few conflicts of interests because they are not beholden to the management of the 
firms whose shares their hold. 
Research documents that hedge fund activists tent to target companies typically described 
as “value” firms, with low market value relative to book value, but profitable and with sound 
operating cash flows and return on assets (Brav et al., 2008). Target firms also tend to have lower 
payouts, more takeover defenses, and CEOs who are paid considerably more than peer CEOs. 
Relatively few targeted companies are large-cap, most have high institutional ownership and 
high trading liquidity. (Brav et al., 2008). 
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The literature on activism wealth effects generally agrees that activism is beneficial to the 
activist hedge funds. Several recent studies have shown that activists generate significant 
abnormal returns both in absolute terms and in comparison to non-activist investing. Brav, et al. 
(2008) report that the average hedge fund activist in 2001-2006 earned a 14.3% higher return 
than a size-adjusted value-weighted portfolio of stocks. Clifford (2008) demonstrates that hedge 
funds earn significantly higher holding-period returns from activist investing compared to their 
passive holdings. Becht, et al. (2008) show that activist investments of a U.K. hedge fund 
significantly outperform the market. Gantchev (2013), however, questions the size of the return 
reported in these studies because they do not account for the costs associated with activism. He 
estimates that these costs reduce activist returns by more than two-thirds. He further reports that 
the net return for an average activist is close to zero and that only the top quartile of activists in 
his sample earn higher returns on their activist holdings than on their non-activist investments. 
The research on the wealth effects in targeted companies generally agrees that, in the 
short-term and the long-term, activist campaigns bring about significantly positive shareholder 
gains (Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang, 2014; Brav et al., 2008; Clifford, 2008; Greenwood and Schor, 
2009; Klein and Zur, 2009). This same research, however, often disagrees about the sources of 
these gains. In their literature review, Coffee and Palia (2014) summarize evidence on four 
potential sources of these gains: improvements in operating performance, capture of takeover 
premium, wealth transfers, and reduction in managerial agency problems. They conclude that the 
evidence is decidedly mixed, especially when it comes to improvements in operating 
performance or the reduction in managerial agency problems. While some studies report 
improvements in operating performance from the period prior to until after activism (Brav, et al., 
2008; Bebchuk, et al., 2014), other studies find no such improvements (Klein and Zur, 2009). 
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Additionally, although many studies report changes in real variables, such as increased payouts 
and leverage, changes in investment, or CEO turnover after activism, most studies find no 
relation between these changes and shareholder returns around activism.  
If improvements in operating performance or governance changes generally do not drive 
the positive shareholder gains observed around activist events, then those gains may be capturing 
an increase in the expected takeover premium. Greenwood and Shor (2009) find positive 
abnormal returns for targets that are ultimately acquired and zero for those that remain 
independent after the activist event. They also find that activist targets are more likely to be 
taken over than similarly situated firms. They conclude that the shareholder gains around activist 
events can be largely explained by the ability of activists to force target firms into a takeover. 
Similarly, Brav et al. (2008) find that the short-term abnormal returns around the activist event 
are highest when the stated objective is to sell the company. 
Overall, the clearest evidence is that there appears to be a positive stock price reaction to 
activist event announcements. What is less clear is whether this reaction can be attributed to 
changes in operating performance, changes in real variables, or changes in the acquisition 
likelihood.  
3. Data Sources and Sample Description  
We obtain our initial data on shareholder activist campaigns from the FactSet 
SharkRepellent database. SharkRepellent provides a comprehensive sample of activist events for 
all publicly listed US firms starting in 2006. Specifically, SharkRepellent includes data on all 
schedule 13D filings containing activism-related Item 4 (Purpose of Transaction), as well as all 
13D filings filed by the members of SharkWatch50 group; the data on proxy fights; the data on 
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exempt solicitation campaigns; and finally the data on any other publicly-announced stockholder 
campaigns. The SharkWatch50 group is the group of fifty most prominent activists specified by 
SharkRepellent.10  
The SharkRepellent data includes information on the date the campaign was announced, 
the identity and the type of the activist investors, the stake the activists hold in the target 
company, as well as several other descriptive items such as the demands of the activists, the 
success, the status and the end date of the campaign and others. We initially obtain the data on all 
4,431 activist campaigns in the database in 2006-2014. We then exclude the campaigns that 
where launched solely by corporations to avoid confusing corporate crossholding and 
acquisitions with shareholder activism from portfolio and individual investors. Activism by labor 
unions and religious groups is also excluded as these groups may have different incentives than 
portfolio investors (Guercio and Woidtke, 2014). We retain all campaigns launched by hedge 
funds, investment advisers, mutual funds, pension funds, and other institutions. This reduces the 
sample to 4,145 campaigns. We then match all events to CRSP and Compustat and keep only 
those events where we can find identifying information in both databases. This further reduces 
the sample to 3,590 events. One hundred and one (101) of those events are launched against 
REITs. REITs are identified using the CRSP Ziman REIT database. 
Table 1, Panel A, and Figure 1 show the distribution of events over time. We present the 
information for all events as well as for events where the activist investor, or at least one activist 
in the group of activist investors, is identified by SharkRepellent as a hedge fund. We also 
present the information separately for non-REIT and for REIT targets. For non-REIT targets, the 
                                                          
10 SharkRepellent uses several criteria to identify the members of this group. The group composition changes 
whenever SharkRepellent considers the change appropriate. 
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number of activist campaigns first increases from 2006 to 2007, then decreases until 2009, and 
since then steadily increases and by 2014 almost reaches the 2006 levels. The trend is similar for 
REIT targets except the decrease in the number of campaigns in 2009-2011 seems to be more 
pronounced. This is understandable given the uncertainty surrounding real estate and mortgage 
sectors during and after the financial crisis. 
SharkRepellent assigns all activist campaigns into several categories. In Panel B of Table 
1, we present the count of campaigns by their primary type category, as defined by 
SharkRepellent.  The campaigns that aim to maximize shareholder value are the most frequent 
campaign types. Among campaigns launched for REITs, 33% aim to maximize shareholder 
value and for non-REITs this proportion is 29%. The other most common campaign types in 
REITs are the campaigns against a merger, campaigns that seek board representation, and 
campaigns that seek to obtain/change the control of the board. 
Shark Repellent also collects information on the specific demands of the activists, if there 
are any, and the success of those demands. We present summary statistics for the demands in 
Table 1, Panel C. Among 101 REIT activist campaigns, 80 have some information on specific 
demands. SharkRepellent categorizes the demands in terms of “value” and “governance.” The 
top two value demands for REITs and non-REITs are (i) the sale, merger, or liquidation of the 
target company and (ii) the review of strategic alternatives. The most frequent governance 
demand is to seek board seats for the activists. In REITs, value demands are more frequent than 
governance demands, and in non-REITs, governance demands are more frequent. Examining the 
success rates, we observe that activists tend to be less successful in obtaining their demands in 
REITs in comparison to non-REITs. Thirty five percent (35%) of the activists in REITs that 
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express some demands observe success in satisfying at least one of those demands. In non-REITs 
this proportion is 50.5%. 
In Table 2, we summarize other activist campaign characteristics and some characteristics 
of the target firms separately for REITs and non-REITs. In the vast majority of the campaigns, 
we observe a single activist in the activist group: the average number of activists in the group is 
1.16 in REITs and 1.2 in non-REITs. Forty eight (48) percent of the activist campaigns in REITs 
are launched by hedge funds. This proportion is 52% in non-REITs. It is worth noting, that some 
non-hedge fund activist investors are among the top activists in SharkRepellent. For example, 
Bulldog Investors, which SharkRepellent categorizes as investment adviser and not a hedge fund, 
is one of the top 50 most active activist investors in the database. On average, activists hold 7.1% 
(8.8%) of target shares in REITs (non-REITs). An average campaign lasts approximately 171 
(161) days and about 23% (20%) of the campaigns in REITs (non-REITs) involve proxy fights. 
With $378 million in market capitalization, the median target REIT firm is larger than the 
median target non-REIT firm with the size of $265 million. Target REIT firms are less likely to 
have a classified board (36% vs. 45%), and they are more likely to be incorporated in Maryland 
(74% vs. 5%). The incidence of poison pills is similar in REIT vs. non-REIT targets (30% vs. 
27%). In summary, in most respects, the activist campaigns launched against REIT targets 
appear similar to those launched against non-REIT targets.  
To judge whether REITs are targeted by shareholder activist to a different degree than 
other public firms, we match our event data from SharkRepellent to Compustat such that the 
Compustat data is from the fiscal year ending prior to the event. We include only US firms that 
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have available data on total assets and market capitalization.11 We then match the Compustat 
panel to the CRSP Ziman REIT database to obtain REIT identification. The characteristics of the 
Compustat panel firms are summarized in Table 3.  
As evidenced from that table, REIT firms are different from non-REIT firms in a number 
of characteristics. Specifically, as expected, REITs have lower valuations as measured by the 
ratio of the market value of assets to book value of assets (an approximation of Tobin’s Q 
calculated as the market value of equity plus book value of assets minus book value of equity 
and deferred taxes divided by the book value of assets), much lower amounts of cash on hand 
(scaled by assets), much higher dividend yield, much higher leverage, and no R&D investment. 
REITs also tend to be larger when size is measured as the log of the market value of equity. 
However, there seem to be little difference in the frequency with which REITs are targeted by 
activist investors. Specifically, REIT firms experience at least one activist campaign in 4.8% of 
firm-years while the frequency in non-REITs is 4.7% per firm-year. When only campaigns by 
activist hedge funds are considered, REIT firms are targeted in 2.35% firm-years while non-
REIT firms in 2.67% firm-years. The difference between the activist frequencies is not 
statistically different when comparing REITs and non-REITs. 
4. Empirical Results  
4.1 The Likelihood of an Activist Campaign 
The data in Table 3 suggest that the likelihood of an activist campaign in any given year 
does not differ for REITs and non-REITs. We first extend this analysis and examine whether this 
                                                          
11 We have not yet matched the panel of Compustat firms to CRSP, though we plan on doing so to be able to 
control for prior stock performance. 
14 
 
likelihood differs after controlling for observable determinants of an activist campaign. Table 4 
presents the results of a probit model with the dependent variable equal to 1 if the firm is the 
subject of at least one activist campaign in any given year and equals zero otherwise. The 
dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) considers all types of activist campaigns; in columns 
(3) and (4) only the campaigns launched by hedge funds are considered. Columns (1) and (3) 
report coefficient estimates, columns (2) and (4) report marginal effects. All regressions use 
robust standard errors clustered by firms and include fiscal year indicators. 
The estimates and marginal effects are of similar statistical significance across all 
columns and suggest that the likelihood of being a target in an activist campaign first increases 
then decreases with size, decreases with market-to-book ratio and sales growth, increases in 
cash-to-assets ratio and R&D-to-assets, and decreases in dividend yield. These results are similar 
to those reported in Brav et al. (2008), although they estimate their probit model on the sample of 
activist targets and matching firms, where the match is performed based on industry, size, and 
book-to-market. Most importantly, the coefficient on the indicator that identifies REIT firms is 
insignificant suggesting that the likelihood of being a target of an activist campaign does not 
differ for REIT firms after controlling for the observable determinants of such likelihood.         
In Table 5 we also report results of the probit models estimating the likelihood of an 
activist campaign in REITs only. In columns (1) and (2) we use the same control variables as in 
Table 4. In columns (3) and (4) we include additional variables, some of which are REIT 
specific. Specifically, we include abnormal stock performance in the prior fiscal year. The 
abnormal performance is calculated as the buy-and-hold stock return minus buy-and-hold value 
weighted CRSP-Ziman REIT index. We also include measures of insider ownership (ownership 
of officers and directors), institutional ownership and institutional ownership concentration, 
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measured as the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of institutional ownership, an indicator for 
whether the REIT is organized as an UPREIT, an indicator for incorporation in Maryland, and an 
indicator for whether the REIT is not self-managed (i.e., externally managed). The data on 
insider ownership come from Capital IQ, intuitional ownership from Thomson Reuters’ database 
of 13f holdings, REIT specific data from SNL Financial. The dependent variable equals 1 if the 
REIT is a target of an activist campaign in the next fiscal year. In Table 5, we only report the 
results for activist campaigns launched by all activist types but note that the results using 
campaigns launched by hedge funds produce similar results. 
As in the whole sample of firms, the likelihood of an activist campaign directed at a 
REIT decreases in relative valuation (market-to-book) and increases in cash-to assets. The 
likelihood also decreases in profitability (ROA), the abnormal return in the prior year, and seems 
to be significantly higher for equity REITs as compared to mortgage or hybrid REITs. In contrast 
to the whole sample of firms, the size, sales growth, and dividend yield seem to have no impact 
on being targeted by an activist investor. Thus it seems that among REITs, cash rich firms with 
low profitability and valuation seem to be the most likely targets of an activist campaign. None 
of the ownership characteristics appear to be significantly related to the likelihood of an activist 
campaign. 
4.2 Short-term and Long-term Market Reaction to the Announcements of Activist 
Campaigns 
As discussed in the introduction, the conventional wisdom today seems to be that REITs 
are less likely targets of activism, partly because the gains to the activist from an activist 
campaign are expected to be small. In the previous section we obtain results indicating that the 
likelihood of an activist campaign does not significantly differ for REITs and non-REITs. In this 
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section we examine whether there are any differences in the short-term and long-term gains 
realized around the announcement of activist campaigns. We measure the short-term and long-
term gains for all firms several ways and over several event windows. First, we measure the 
gains for all firms as the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcement of the 
activist event with the abnormal returns calculated as the stock return minus the value-weighted 
CRSP index return. Second, we measure the gains as the buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs) calculated as the buy-and-hold stock return minus the buy-and-hold value-weighted 
CRSP index return. Third, in measuring the abnormal gains for REITs we replace the value-
weighted CRSP index return with the value-weighted CRSP-Ziman REIT index.  
We measure and report the abnormal returns for initial activist events only. Initial activist 
events are defined as the events not preceded by any other activist events in the prior 365 days. 
Some companies in the sample are subject to more than one activist event, and for some 
companies, the multiple activist events are relatively close together and related to the initial 
activist event. Thus it is likely that the initial event contains the most information and so does the 
market reaction to this event. The sample period in this analysis is reduced to 2006-2013 as we 
cannot observe (do not have data to calculate) long-term abnormal returns for events announced 
in 2014.   
The results are summarized in Table 6. Panel A reports the short-term market reaction 
using daily returns over two event windows {-5, +5} and {-20, +20} with day zero being the 
announcement date of the campaign. Panel B reports the long-term market reaction using 
monthly returns over one event window {-1, +12} with month zero being the month of the 
announcement date. As evidenced from the table, the average and median short-term market 
reaction is positive and statistically significant for REITs and non-REITs in both reported 
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windows when using all but one method for calculating abnormal returns. The returns are not 
statistically significant for REITs when calculated as BHAR over 41-day event period using the 
CRSP-Ziman index as the market index. The CARs for REITs are comparable in size to those of 
non-REITs but the statistical significance is weaker. This is understandable as the sample size of 
activist events in REITs is much smaller. Nevertheless, the market reaction to the activist 
campaigns in REITs does not statistically differ from the market reaction launched in non-
REITs. Thus we find no evidence that the short-term value gains around the announcement of an 
activist campaign are smaller for REITs than they are for non-REITs. 
In terms of magnitude, the results are generally consistent with prior studies. For 
example, we report average CAR of 3.76% in an 11-day window for non-REITs and 6.62% for 
REITs. In the 41-day window, we report average BHAR of 5.55% for non-REITs and 4.23% for 
REITs. In comparison, Greenwood and Schor (2009) report a CAR of 3.5% in the {-10, +5} 
window, Clifford (2008) reports 3.4% in a {-2, +2} window, and Brav, et al., report 7.2% in the 
{-20, +20} window.    
Our results for REITs start to differ from the results for non-REITs when examining the 
long-term market response to activist campaigns. While we continue to observe a positive 
average CAR and BHAR over the 14-month window for non-REITs, the average market 
response for REITs is insignificant using all ways of calculating abnormal returns and the 
averages we report are negative in magnitude. Thus, we conclude that an average activist target 
that is a REIT does not see significantly positive abnormal return in the longer-term.  
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4.3 Changes in Accounting Performance and Real Variables in REITs 
Given that we find no statistically positive impact on REIT stock prices in the longer-
term, one would not expect to find any improvements in performance. Nevertheless, we collect 
data and calculate various measure of accounting performance one year prior and one year 
following the activist event, including operating return on assets, net return on assets, funds from 
operations relative to assets, and all profit variables scaled alternatively by revenue. In 
unreported results, we do not find any significant changes in these variables. We also do not find 
any significant changes in payouts, shares outstanding, leverage, or investment measures that are 
equity REIT specific. Additionally, we do not find any meaningful correlations between the 
changes and the short-term or long-term abnormal returns reported in Table 6. Thus we turn to 
examining the hypothesis that the positive short-term returns we observe for REITs reflect an 
increase in the market expectation of the takeover likelihood of the activist target firm. 
4.4   Shareholder Activism, the Likelihood of Takeover, and the Gains to Activism  
If improvement in operating performance or changes in real variables do not explain the 
positive short-term gains around the announcement of activist events in REITs, then these gains 
may instead be derived from an increased likelihood that the targets of activist campaigns will be 
taken over and a takeover premium realized. This hypothesis holds under two conditions. First, 
activist interventions are a signal that there is an increase in takeover likelihood. Second, when 
the firms are ultimately taken over, positive abnormal long-term gains to the shareholders are 
realized. When they are not taken over, no positive long-term gain is realized. 
To examine whether the first condition holds, we perform a probit analysis measuring the 
likelihood of a takeover as a function of an activist attack and other control variables potentially 
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related to the takeover likelihood. To perform this analysis, we use the same panel data that we 
used when examining the likelihood of an activist campaign in Table 5 and report the results in 
Table 7. The dependent variable in these regressions equals one if the firm delists from CRSP 
within two years from the end of the fiscal year due to merger or acquisition (i.e., delisting codes 
that start with the digits 2 or 3). The main independent variable equals one if the firm 
experiences an activist campaign within two years of the end of the fiscal year. Other control 
variables include those that we used in Table 5 to explain activist campaigns. All regressions use 
robust standard errors clustered by firms and include fiscal year indicators. 
The results indicate that activist campaigns launched at REITs are, indeed, associated 
with an increased likelihood that the firm is eventually taken over. Marginal effects indicate that 
an activist campaign increases this likelihood by 6 to 7.5%. Thus, controlling for other potential 
determinants of a takeover, activists seem to matter for takeover likelihood. This result is 
consistent with that of Greenwood and Schor (2009), which suggests that activists have the 
ability to force target firms into a takeover. In our REIT sample, the other independent variables 
that seem to matter for takeover likelihood are size, return on assets, whether the firm is an 
equity REIT and abnormal returns in the prior fiscal year.   
To examine whether activist campaigns yield positive gains when the targets are 
ultimately taken over and no gains when they are not, we perform subsample analyses for the 
various measures of abnormal returns that we previously report in Table 6. Specifically, we split 
both REIT and non-REIT samples into subgroups based on whether the target is ultimately taken 
over within 18 months of the initial activist campaign. The results are reported in Table 8. 
Among non-REITs, the short term gains are positive and significant for firms that are acquired 
within 18 months and firms that are not. However, the returns to the firms that are acquired, 
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especially in the longer 41-day window, are decidedly larger than the gains to firms that are not 
acquired. Examining the long-term returns in non-REITs, we observe that the returns to the firms 
that are acquired are positive and large, reflecting the takeover premium. The returns to the firms 
that are not acquired are not significant.   
The results for REITs are similar, albeit statistically weaker. As for non-REITs, we 
observe statistically positive short-term returns for both sub-groups: targets that are acquired 
with 18 months and those that are not. However, there is no statistical difference between the 
average returns for these sub-groups. In examining long-term returns, we observe that these 
returns are significantly positive using the measures of abnormal return based on the CRSP index 
as the market index, but not significant when using the CRSP-Ziman REIT index as the market 
index. We also find that BHAR for REITs that are not eventually acquired are significantly 
negative and that the difference between the BHAR for the acquired firms and not acquired firms 
is statistically significant. This difference is similar in magnitude when the abnormal returns are 
measured as CARs but is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the overall evidence suggests 
that while long-term gains tend to be positive for REITs that are acquired within 18 months of an 
activist campaign, the long-term gains are insignificant or negative for REITs that are not 
acquired.  
The results we report in this section for non-REITs are similar in magnitude to those 
reported in Greenwood and Schor (2009) where the sample includes only hedge fund campaigns 
in 1993-2006. Thus, it seems that their explanation for abnormal returns to activism holds 
beyond their sample period and after including other types of activists (i.e., investment advisors, 
private equity funds, etc.). The evidence in this section also suggests that, similar to non-REITs, 
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the short-term gains to activism in REITs might reflect the expectation of higher acquisition 
likelihood. 
5. Conclusion  
In this paper, we examine the incidence and wealth effects of shareholder activist 
campaigns in REITs and the possible sources of those gains. Conventional wisdom suggests that 
activist campaigns in REITs are rare events. This conventional wisdom is plausible for two 
reasons. First, REITs are thought to be well protected from hostile takeovers. Second, it might be 
relatively difficult to create value in REITs that operate as relatively transparent companies 
whose values are relatively easy to assess. 
Our results indicate that this conventional wisdom does not hold for our sample of 
activist campaigns in REITs from 2006-2014. Specifically, we find that REITs are as likely to be 
subjects of activist campaigns as non-REITs and the campaigns directed toward REITs are, in 
many respects, similar to the campaigns launched against non-REITs. Additionally, the short-
term gains around the announcements of activist campaigns for both REIT and non-REIT firms 
are decidedly positive. Our further analysis shows that these positive short-term gains are 
unlikely to result from improvements in operational efficiency, performance, investment, capital 
structure or payout policies as we find no evidence of significant changes in these measures 
around activist events. Further, for the whole sample of REITs there is no evidence of positive 
average long-run returns and the changes in the various measures are not correlated with long-
run returns.  
More importantly, we present two pieces of evidence that suggest that the positive short-
run returns most likely reflect the expectation that activist targets may ultimately be taken over 
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and the anticipated takeover premia realized. Specifically, we document that the REIT targets of 
activist attacks are more likely than other similar REIT firms to be acquired within 18 months of 
an activist campaign and that the long-term average returns to the target firms that are ultimately 
acquired are, on average, positive. 
Collectively, the evidence in this paper suggests that REITs are as likely to be the focus 
of shareholder activism as other publicly traded firms and that the activist campaigns launched at 
REITs are in many respects similar to the activist campaigns launched at non-REITs. The 
evidence in this paper also suggests that a likely source of the positive announcement returns to 
shareholders of firms targeted by activists arises from the expectation of a sale of the firm.  
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Figure 1 – Activist Campaign Distribution 
The distribution of sample activist campaigns by year. The sample contains 3,590 activist 
campaigns from SharkRepellent that also have data on CRSP and Compustat. The campaigns 
launched solely by corporations, religious groups or labor unions, or any combination of these 
types of activists an activist group, are excluded.  
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Table 1 – Activist Campaign Distributions 
Panel A shows the distribution of sample activist campaigns by year. The sample contains 3,590 
activist campaigns from SharkRepellent that also have data on CRSP and Compustat. The 
campaigns launched solely by corporations, religious groups or labor unions, or any combination 
of these types of activists in an activist group, are excluded. Panel B shows the distribution of 
sample activist campaigns by primary type, as identified by SharkRepellent. Panel C shows the 
distribution of sample activist campaigns that list specific value or governance demands as 
reported in SharkRepellent. Not all sample campaigns list the demands and some sample 
campaigns may list more than one value or governance demand. 
 
 
  
Panel A
All Activist Events
Activist Group Includes 
Hedge Fund
REITs non-REITs REITs non-REITs
2006 22 406 6 241
2007 12 511 4 304
2008 16 456 8 245
2009 5 322 1 124
2010 2 363 0 170
2011 4 340 1 170
2012 9 353 5 167
2013 16 341 9 186
2014 15 397 14 208
Total 101 3,489 48 1,815
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Table 1 - continued 
 
 
  
Panel B
Campaigns in:
Primary Campaign Type N [%] N [%]
Maximize Shareholder Value 33      32.7   1,013  29.0    
Vote/Activism Against a Merger 14      13.9   254     7.3      
Board Representation 13      12.9   707     20.3    
Board Control 12      11.9   196     5.6      
Vote For a Stockholder Proposal 8        7.9     304     8.7      
13D Filer - No Publicly Disclosed Activism 6        5.9     562     16.1    
Hostile/Unsolicited Acquisition 4        4.0     58       1.7      
Support Dissident Group in Proxy Fight 4        4.0     70       2.0      
Vote For a Management Proposal/Support Management 3        3.0     36       1.0      
Remove Director(s), No Dissident Nominee to Fill Vacancy 2        2.0     19       0.5      
Vote Against a Management Proposal 2        2.0     122     3.5      
Enhance Corporate Governance -     110     3.2      
Public Short Position/Bear Raid -     26       0.8      
Remove Officer(s) -     12       0.3      
Total 101    100.0 3,489  100.0  
REITs non-REITs
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Table 1 - continued 
  
Panel C:
Campaigns in:
Campaigns with: N [%] N [%]
Value Demand(s) 57       56.4% 1,510  43.3%
Governance Demand(s) 37       36.6% 1,654  47.4%
Value or Governance Demand(s) 80       79.2% 2,526  72.4%
Success In at Least One Value Demand 19       33.3% 662     43.8%
Success In at Least One Governance Demand 12       32.4% 714     43.2%
Success In at Least One Demand 28       35.0% 1,275  50.5%
Value Demand Types and Occurrence
Seek Sale/Merger/Liquidation 23 584
Review Strategic Alternatives 21 501
Block Merger/Agitate for Higher Price (Target) 11 223
Return Cash via Dividends/Buyback 9 357
Other Capital Structure Related, Increase Leverage, etc. 7 148
Potential Acquisition (Friendly and Unfriendly) 7 133
Breakup Company, Divest Assets/Divisions 5 233
Block Acquisition/Agitate for Lower Price (Acquirer) 3 31
Other 1 192
Governance Demand Types and Occurrence
Board Seats (activist group) 25 999
Remove Takeover Defenses 6 234
Other Governance Enhancements 5 378
Remove Director(s) 4 112
Add Independent Directors 3 153
Compensation Related Enhancements 1 214
Remove Officer(s) 0 105
Social/Environmental/Political Issues 0 105
REITs non-REITs
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Table 2 – Activist Campaign Characteristics 
Summary of activist campaign characteristics. The sample contains 3,590 activist campaigns 
from SharkRepellent that were launched in 2006-2014 and also have data on CRSP and 
Compustat. The campaigns launched solely by corporations, religious groups or labor unions, or 
any combination of these types of activists in an activist group, are excluded. All variables are 
taken from SharkRepellent and are self-explanatory.  
 
 
  
Activist Campaigns with non-REIT Targets (n=3,489)
Average
5th 
Percentile Median 
95th 
Percentile
Number of Activists in Activist Group 1.20      1           1           2           
Activist Group Includes (Is) Hedge Fund 0.52      
Activist Group Ownership at Announcement [%] 8.77      1.0        6.7        23.2      
Activist Campaign Length [days] 161       2           96         536       
Activist Initiates Proxy Fight 0.20      
Target Market Cap at Announcement [$ million] 7,928     19         265       26,846   
Target Classified Board 0.45      
Target Poisson Pill 0.27      
Target Incorporated Maryland 0.05      
Target Incorporated Delaware 0.61      
Activist Campaigns with REIT Targets (n=101)
Average
5th 
Percentile Median 
95th 
Percentile
Number of Activists in Activist Group 1.16      1           1           2           
Activist Group Includes (Is) Hedge Fund 0.48      
Activist Group Ownership at Announcement [%] 7.08** 0.5        5.8        16.8      
Activist Campaign Length [days] 171       1           100       480       
Activist Initiates Proxy Fight 0.23      
Target Market Cap at Announcement [$ million] 1,783     35         378** 7,536     
Target Classified Board 0.36*
Target Poisson Pill 0.30      
Target Incorporated Maryland 0.74***
Target Incorporated Delaware 0.09***
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Table 3 – Panel Sample Characteristics 
Panel sample characteristics by REITs and non-REITs. REITs are identified using the CRSP 
Ziman REIT database. The panel contains all US Compustat firm-years from 2005-2013 with 
data available to calculate market capitalization and total assets. A firm-year observation is 
classified as subject to any activist event (hedge fund activist event) if the firm experiences at 
least one activist campaign (campaign launched by a hedge fund) during the next fiscal year. All 
accounting and market variables are from the fiscal year-end immediately preceding the activist 
campaign event. Market Value of Equity is the end-of-fiscal year stock price times the number of 
shares outstanding. Market-to-Book is (book value of assets + market value of equity minus 
book value of equity and deferred taxes) divided by book value of assets. Sales Growth is the 
growth in net sales calculated over the last fiscal year. Net Income is the income before 
extraordinary items. Assets is the book value of assets. Dividend Yield is the dividend paid to 
common stockholders divided by the market capitalization. Debt is the long-term plus short-term 
debt. R&D is the maximum of zero or the reported R&D expense. Averages are reported with the 
medians below in brackets. *, **, *** in column (2) indicates that REIT characteristics are 
significantly different from non-REIT characteristics at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level.  
 
 
Non-REITs REITs
(1) (2)
(55,597 firm-years) (1,533 firm-years)
Proportion of firm-years subject to
any activist event 0.0471 0.0483
hedge fund activist event 0.0267 0.0235
Market Value of Equity (MVE) 4,214 2,394***
[250] [1,049]***
log(MVE) 5.49 6.72***
[5.52] [6.96]***
Market-to-Book Assets (Q) 5.43 1.28***
[1.39] [1.19]***
Sales Growth 1 Year 0.195 0.236**
[0.070] [0.075]
Net Income/Assets (ROA) -0.434 0.007***
[0.011] [0.012]
Cash/Assets 0.213 0.046***
[0.110] [0.022]***
Dividend Yield 0.013 0.061***
[0.000] [0.051]***
Debt/Assets 0.370 0.550***
[0.154] [0.542]***
R&D/Assets 0.064 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000]***
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Table 4 – Activist Campaign Likelihood for All Firms (REITs and non-REITs) 
Probit model for the likelihood that a firm becomes a target of an activist campaign in any given 
fiscal year. The panel contains all US Compustat firm-years in 2005-2013 with data available to 
calculate market capitalization and total assets. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) 
equals 1 if the firm is subject to at least one activist campaign launched by any type of activist 
during the fiscal year. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) equals 1 if the firm is 
subject to at least one activist campaign launched by a hedge fund during the fiscal year. All 
accounting and market variables are described in Table 2 and are from the end of the fiscal year 
immediately preceding the activist campaign event. REIT indicator equals 1 for all firms-years 
classified as REITs by the CRSP Ziman REIT database and equals zero otherwise. Robust 
standard errors clustered by firms are in parentheses below coefficient estimates or below 
marginal effects. Marginal effects reﬂect the change in the probability of an activist campaign for 
a one standard deviation change in a continuous variable, or a shift from zero to one for an 
indicator variable. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance level.   
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Table 4 – continued 
 
  
All Activist Events Activist is Hedge Fund
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficients
Marginal 
Effects Coefficients
Marginal 
Effects
log(MVE) 0.178*** 0.018*** 0.346*** 0.022***
(0.028) (0.003) (0.035) (0.002)
log(MVE) squared -0.012*** -0.001*** -0.028*** -0.002***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Market-to-Book (Q) -0.110*** -0.011*** -0.112*** -0.007***
(0.013) (0.001) (0.018) (0.001)
Sales Growth 1 Year -0.095*** -0.010*** -0.089*** -0.006***
(0.022) (0.002) (0.028) (0.002)
ROA 0.014 0.001 -0.034 -0.002
(0.040) (0.004) (0.037) (0.002)
Cash/Assets 0.297*** 0.030*** 0.248*** 0.016***
(0.064) (0.007) (0.076) (0.005)
Dividend Yield -2.362*** -0.239*** -3.439*** -0.216***
(0.485) (0.049) (0.699) (0.045)
Debt/Assets 0.074 0.007 0.064 0.004
(0.046) (0.005) (0.052) (0.003)
R&D/Assets 0.249** 0.025** 0.373*** 0.023***
(0.101) (0.010) (0.115) (0.007)
REIT Indicator 0.002 0.000 -0.020 -0.001
(0.077) (0.008) (0.088) (0.005)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.028 0.045
Observations 51,552 51,552 51,552 51,552
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Table 5 – Activist Campaign Likelihood for REITs 
Probit model for the likelihood that a REIT firm becomes a target of an activist campaign in any 
given fiscal year. The panel contains REIT firm-years on Compustat from 2005-2013 with data 
available to calculate market capitalization and total assets. REITs are identified using the CRSP 
Ziman REIT database. The dependent variable equals 1 if the firm is subject to at least one 
activist campaign launched by any type of activist during the fiscal year. The Abnormal Return 1 
Year is the buy-and-hold stock return minus the buy-and-hold value-weighted CRSP-Ziman 
REIT index return during the prior fiscal year. Insider Ownership is the percentage ownership by 
officers and directors. Institutional Ownership is the percentage ownership of all institutional 13f 
holders. Institutional Ownership Concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of 
institutional holdings. UPREIT, Maryland, and Not-Self-Managed indicators equal one if the 
SNL Financial reports that the REIT is organized as an UPREIT, is incorporated in Maryland, 
and is not self-managed; and equals zero otherwise. All other accounting and market variables 
are described in Table 2 and are from the end of fiscal year immediately preceding the activist 
campaign event. Equity REIT indicator equals 1 for all firm-years classified as Equity REITs by 
the CRSP Ziman REIT database and equals zero otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered by 
firms are in parentheses below coefficient estimates or below marginal effects. Marginal effects 
reﬂect the change in the probability of an activist campaign for a one standard deviation change 
in a continuous variable, or a shift from zero to one for an indicator variable. *, **, *** in 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level.   
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Table 5 – continued 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficients
Marginal 
Effects Coefficients
Marginal 
Effects
log(MVE) -0.051 -0.005 -0.268 -0.023
(0.191) (0.018) (0.251) (0.022)
log(MVE) squared 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.001
(0.017) (0.002) (0.018) (0.002)
Market-to-Book (Q) -0.674* -0.062* -0.850** -0.072*
(0.367) (0.036) (0.424) (0.037)
Sales Growth 1 Year -0.003 -0.000 -0.003 -0.000
(0.003) (0.000) (0.007) (0.001)
ROA -1.691** -0.156** -3.381** -0.288***
(0.844) (0.076) (1.325) (0.111)
Cash/Assets 2.315** 0.213** 2.482** 0.211**
(0.937) (0.087) (1.185) (0.101)
Dividend Yield -0.008 -0.001 -0.883* -0.075*
(0.232) (0.021) (0.458) (0.039)
Debt/Assets 0.392 0.036 -0.116 -0.010
(0.383) (0.035) (0.461) (0.039)
Equity REIT Indicator 0.360* 0.028** 0.597** 0.040**
(0.197) (0.014) (0.258) (0.016)
Abnormal Return 1 Year -0.529*** -0.045***
(0.184) (0.017)
Insider Ownership -0.013 -0.001
(0.013) (0.001)
Institutional Ownership -0.321 -0.027
(0.370) (0.031)
Inst. Own. Concentration -1.108 -0.094
(0.730) (0.063)
UPREIT Indicator -0.365 -0.034
(0.232) (0.024)
Maryland Indicator 0.140 0.011
(0.202) (0.015)
Not-Self-Managed Indicator 0.014 0.001
(0.241) (0.021)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.086 0.117
Observations 1,436 1,436 1,238 1,238
All Activist Events
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Table 6 –Abnormal Returns for Initial Activist Campaigns 
Daily and monthly abnormal returns around the announcement of activist campaigns. The 
sample contains 2,275 initial activist campaigns from SharkRepellent launched in 2006-2013 that 
also have data on CRSP and Compustat. Initial campaigns are defined as the campaigns launched 
against a target firm that are not preceded by any other campaigns in the same target firm in the 
past 365 days. 2,219 initial campaigns are launched against non-REIT firms, 56 against REIT 
firms. The campaigns launched solely by corporations, religious groups or labor unions, or any 
combination of these types of activists in an activist group, are excluded. CAR is the cumulative 
abnormal return where the abnormal return is calculated as the stock return minus the value-
weighted CRSP index returns. BHAR is the buy-and-hold abnormal return where the abnormal 
return is calculated as the buy-and-hold stock return minus the buy-and hold value-weighted 
CRSP index return. CRSP index return is replaced with the value-weighted CRSP-Ziman REIT 
index in the rows indicated as “w/REIT index.” Averages are reported with the medians below in 
brackets. a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for the test that 
the abnormal returns equal zero. ***, **, * indicate that the abnormal returns for REITs are 
different from the abnormal returns for non-REITs at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (no such 
statistical difference is observed in the sample).  
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Table 6 – continued 
 
  
Initial Activist Events
non-REITs REITs Difference
n=2219 n=56
Panel A: Daily Returns
CAR {-5, +5} 3.76%a 6.62%b 2.86%
[2.13%]a [3.94%]b [1.81%]
w/REIT index 6.90%b
[2.37%]b
CAR {-20, +20} 5.39%a 8.87%b 3.31%
[3.51%]a [5.31%]a [1.80%]
w/REIT index 7.92%b
[5.79%]b
BHAR {-20, +20} 5.55%a 4.23% -1.32%
[2.07%]a [3.34%]b [1.27%]
w/REIT index 3.96%
[3.86%]
Panel B: Monthly Returns
CAR {-1, +12} 5.71%a -7.09% -12.80%
[5.65%]a [1.69%] [-3.96%]
w/REIT index -9.30%
[-0.08%]
BHAR {-1, +12} 7.24%a -6.33% -13.57%
[-0.05%] [-3.32%] [-3.37%]
w/REIT index -4.46%
[-5.66%]
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Table 7 –Likelihood of Takeover for Activist Targets  
Probit model for the likelihood that a REIT firm is taken over within two years from the end of 
the fiscal year. The panel contains REIT firm-years on Compustat in 2005-2013 with data 
available to calculate market capitalization and total assets. REITs are identified using the CRSP 
Ziman REIT database. The dependent variable equals 1 if the firm is delisted due to merger or 
acquisition within two years from the end of the fiscal year. The Activist Campaign Indicator 
equals one if the firm is subject to an activist campaign within the next two fiscal years. All other 
accounting and market variables are described in Table 2 and Table 5. Robust standard errors 
clustered by firms are in parentheses below coefficient estimates or below marginal effects. 
Marginal effects reﬂect the change in the probability of an activist campaign for a one standard 
deviation change in a continuous variable, or a shift from zero to one for an indicator variable. *, 
**, *** in indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. 
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Table 7 – continued 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficients
Marginal 
Effects Coefficients
Marginal 
Effects
Activist Campaign Indicator 0.516** 0.060* 0.688** 0.075*
(0.241) (0.036) (0.304) (0.046)
log(MVE) 0.516* 0.045* 0.272 0.020
(0.287) (0.026) (0.623) (0.046)
log(MVE) squared -0.040* -0.003* -0.030 -0.002
(0.023) (0.002) (0.045) (0.003)
Market-to-Book (Q) -0.317 -0.028 -0.157 -0.012
(0.266) (0.024) (0.379) (0.028)
Sales Growth 1 Year -0.007 -0.001 -0.058 -0.004
(0.061) (0.005) (0.098) (0.007)
ROA -1.625* -0.143* -3.745 -0.277
(0.943) (0.083) (3.341) (0.241)
Cash/Assets 0.728 0.064 1.018 0.075
(0.983) (0.088) (1.459) (0.110)
Dividend Yield 0.304 0.027 0.850 0.063
(0.406) (0.036) (0.601) (0.044)
Debt/Assets 0.186 0.016 -0.707 -0.052
(0.551) (0.048) (0.768) (0.058)
Equity REIT Indicator 0.582** 0.041** -0.021 -0.002
(0.293) (0.016) (0.351) (0.026)
Abnormal Return 1 Year -0.762* -0.056*
(0.427) (0.034)
Insider Ownership -0.034 -0.003
(0.023) (0.002)
Institutional Ownership 0.328 0.024
(0.505) (0.038)
Inst. Own. Concentration -1.523 -0.112
(1.732) (0.127)
UPREIT Indicator 0.333 0.023
(0.234) (0.016)
Maryland Indicator -0.006 -0.000
(0.271) (0.020)
Not-Self-Managed Indicator 0.069 0.005
(0.259) (0.020)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.197 0.220
Observations 1,436 1,436 1,130 1,130
All Activist Events
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Table 8 –Abnormal Returns by Target Acquisition Outcome 
Daily and monthly abnormal returns around the announcement of activist campaigns sorted by 
whether the activist targets delist from CRSP due to merger or acquisition with 18 months from 
an initial activist campaign. The sample contains 2,275 initial activist campaigns from 
SharkRepellent launched in 2006-2013 that also have data on CRSP and Compustat. Initial 
campaigns are defined as the campaigns launched against a target firm that are not preceded by 
any other campaigns in the same target firm in the past 365 days. 2,219 initial campaigns are 
launched against non-REIT firms, 56 against REIT firms. The campaigns launched solely by 
corporations, religious groups or labor unions, or any combination of these types of activists in 
an activist group, are excluded. CAR and BHAR are defined in Table 6. The CRSP index return 
is replaced with the value-weighted CRSP-Ziman REIT index in the rows indicated as “w/REIT 
index.” Averages are reported with the medians below in brackets. a, b, and c indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for the test that the abnormal returns equal zero. ***, 
**, * indicate that the abnormal returns for delisted activist targets are different from the 
abnormal returns for non-delisted activist targets at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
 
Initial Activist Events
Delisted Other Difference Delisted Other Difference
n=532 n=1682 n=12 n=44
Panel A: Daily Returns
CAR {-5, +5} 4.74%a 3.45%a -1.29%* 5.06%c 7.05%c 1.99%
[1.53%]a [2.45%]a [0.92%]** [2.24%] [5.00%]b [2.76%]
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[1.56%] [3.39%]c [1.83%]
CAR {-20, +20} 13.22%a 2.89%a -10.34%*** 7.44%b 9.26%c 1.82%
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w/REIT index 6.48%b 8.32%c 1.84%
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w/REIT index 6.77%b 3.19% -3.58%
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Panel B: Monthly Returns
CAR {-1, +12} 26.90%a -0.68% -27.58%*** 12.97%b -12.68% -25.65%
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[3.85%] [-4.02%] [-7.87%]
BHAR {-1, +12} 27.94%a 0.99% -26.94%*** 14.70%b -12.20%c -26.91%**
[18.92%]a [-6.94%]a [-25.87%]*** [10.31%]b [-14.60%]c [-24.91%]***
w/REIT index 10.33% -8.49% -18.83%*
[3.67%] [-11.87%] [-8.2%]***
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Abstract 
 
 This study investigates whether implementing Dividend Reinvestment and Stock Purchase Plan 
(DRSPP) influences REIT choice of cash flow distribution methods. Both agency cost and 
signaling models indicate that REITs with DRSPP should make relatively conservative payout 
choice, in order to attract and incentivize current and new shareholders to make long-term 
investments in stocks. We provide supportive evidence that relative to REITs without DRSPP, 
REITs with DRSPP are less likely to omit all the payouts, including regular dividends, extra 
dividends, and share repurchases; and REITs with DRSPP are less likely to pay extra dividends 
and/or repurchase shares when they pay stable regular dividends. Less volatile stock market as 
response to dividend announcements of REITs with DRSPP also reflects on the managerial 
effectiveness on maintaining a discretionary payout policy. In addition, we find strong dividend 
payment date effect in REITs with DRSPP but not in REITs without DRSPP, suggesting higher 
temporary price pressure in REITs with DRSPP around the dividend payment date.  
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Introduction 
This study investigates whether a REIT implementing dividend reinvestment and stock purchase 
plan (DRSPP) affects her payout choice to make changes on regular dividend payments, pay 
extra dividends, and repurchase shares. DRSPP provides an economical and convenient way for 
investors to reinvest cash dividends paid on common shares to purchase additional common 
shares, and in many cases, make optional cash payment to purchase shares directly from the 
sponsoring companies. Investors who participate in the DRSPP will not be charged brokerage 
commissions or service charges for purchases made under the plan, and may purchase common 
shares at a discount of 0% ~ 5% of the market prices of shares with a limitation of the amount of 
allowable investment each time. Companies select other companies or banks (i.e., 
Computershare Trust Company, American Stock Transfer & Trust Company LLC, Wells Fargo 
Banks, and others) as transfer agents to administer the plan, and pay all costs of administration
1
. 
While companies have responsibility with respect to the preparation or contents of all the 
prospectus that help communicate with investors, the administrators keep records, send 
statements of account to each participant, and perform other duties related to the plan, including 
the safekeeping of the shares purchases for each participant. The administrators also act as the 
dividend disbursing agent, transfer agent, and registrar for common stocks. Investors can 
complete and sign an authorization form to participate in the plan. The plan is entirely voluntary, 
and investors can withdraw at any time.  
   Companies may use newly issued shares, shares purchased in the open market, shares 
purchased in privately negotiated transactions, or shares acquired by a combination of such  
 1. However, investors must pay brokerage commissions and an administrative fee if request the plan administrator to 
sell their shares held in the plan. 
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methods to exchange for the cash dividends and additional cash investment. DRSPP allows 
companies to raise new equity capital with much less flotation costs and to encourage 
shareholders to make long-term investments in common stocks of the companies. The companies 
can use the proceeds received from sales of the shares for general corporate purposes, including 
but not limited to, the repurchase of shares pursuant to their share repurchase plan, working 
capital, investment in real estate and repayment of debt. 
Back to the early 1960s, some U.S. firms started to adopt dividend reinvestment plan, which 
allows investors to elect to have all or a portion of their cash dividends automatically invested in 
additional shares at the market price. The plan gradually adds some new features. For instance, it 
allows interested investors to make optional cash payment to buy shares directly from the 
company. Today, most enrollment forms allow investors to decide the extent of their 
participation in the plan. Investors normally indicate which features of the plan they will use, by 
selecting one or two of the following choices on the form: (1) full reinvestment of dividends, (2) 
partial reinvestment of dividends, or (3) optional cash investments.  
According to a file documented by the SEC, more than 1,000 U.S. firms had some forms of 
DRSPP by the year of 1994. However, only a handful of studies related to DRSPP have been 
documented for lack of data. Companies with DRSPP are not required to report sources and 
amounts of shares that are used for the plan. 
    Our study focuses on the REITs for several reasons: (1) we only need to focus the equity REIT 
sample in the recent two decades due to regulation and policy changes in REIT industry. In 
addition, most REITs started to adopt DRSPP after the SEC simplified the procedures of 
implementing DRSPP in December of 1994.This suggests that hand-collecting data process in 
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REITs is relatively feasible and precise. (2) We collect DRSPP related data based on SNL 
financial, SEC Edgar files, Google Search, and Factiva, rather than COMPUSTAT. (3) DRSPPs 
facilitate REITs to retain some internally generated cash flows and convert these funds to new 
equity capital with much less flotation costs. This is important due to high dividend payout 
requirement in REITs. REITs need to pay out at least 90 percent of their taxable income to 
shareholders as dividends, in order to qualify for tax-exempt status. (4) DRSPPs help REITs 
obtain wider ownership of shares. The plan requires participants to possess stock certificates 
issued in their own names, instead of in the name of their brokers. This is meaningful as well 
since REITs are also required to be beneficially owned by 100 or more persons and must not be 
closely held.  
      Even though REIT dividend payouts are greatly constrained by their internally generated 
cash flows, REIT managers do not make payout decisions entirely based on the legislation, and 
still aim to smooth dividend payout over time. For examples, Wang, Erikson, and Gau (1993) 
first show that REITs can pay dividends more than their net income. Hardin and Hill (2008) find 
that REIT dividend payments can be decomposed into mandatory payment and excess payment. 
The mandatory payment is essential for REIT to stay tax-preferred status, and the excess 
payment – payment above the statutory minimum, is optional. Boudry (2011) proposes a new 
methodology and decomposes REIT dividends into discretionary and nondiscretionary 
components. All these studies indicate that REIT managers have concerns about their payout 
choice and make discretionary dividend payout decisions.  
    According to SNL Real Estate database, 262 out of 721 active and non-active REITS have 
DRSPPs. Shareholders holding a particular REIT with DRSPP can make election to participate 
in the plan. However, to our best of knowledge, none of the existing literature has investigated 
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any REIT topics related to DRSPP, and no extant payout studies in both accounting and finance 
have examined whether adopting a DRSPP affects firm payout choice. This study tries to fill this 
gap. We investigate whether a REIT adopting DRSPP influences her use of changes in dividends 
and share repurchases.  
     Prior studies have documented many factors (i.e., book-to-market, firm size, and leverage) 
that affect firm payout choice. Firm managers tend to maintain a relatively stable payout policy 
and may use special dividends and share repurchases to distribute non-sustainable excess cash. 
While firm managers use share repurchases to signal undervaluation, they may increase regular 
dividends only if they expect sustainable higher future earnings. Because increases in regular 
dividends may be interpreted by the principle - stockholders as the long-term commitment of 
agent to distribute future cash flows.  
    On the other hand, implementing DRSPP can align interest of managers and shareholders. 
Managers are motivated to invest in positive NPV projects and improve performance, in order to 
attract and incentivize current and new shareholders to make long-term investment in the stocks 
of the companies. This implies that investors who participate in DRSPP would expect REITs to 
pay consistently high dividend payout ratio, and REITs adopting DRSPP recognize the 
importance of this alternative cash preservation strategy for sustainable growth and thus make 
discretionary payout choices. In addition, Scholes and Wolfson (1989) argue that implementing a 
DRSPP may avoid a negative signal a new equity offering provides. In that adopting DRSPP to 
raise equity capital over a long period of time, rather than all at once, can mitigate the adverse 
selection problem and reduce information asymmetries. Due to the sensitivity of investors to 
payout policy, REITs with DRSPP should have a less flexible payout policy than REITs without 
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DRSPP. Therefore, both agency cost and signaling models indicate that REITs with DRSPP 
should make relatively conservative payout choice. 
   We examine the effect of DRSPP on REIT payout choice using multinomial logit regression 
model. The sample includes 271 equity REITs over a period from 1999 to 2014. And 127 out of 
the 271 REITs have DRSPP. After controlling for factors documented in prior studies that affect 
firm payout choices, we find that relative to REITs without DRSPP, REITs with DRSPP are less 
likely to omit all the payouts, including regular dividends, extra dividends, and share repurchases; 
and REITs with DRSPP are less likely to pay extra dividends and/or repurchase shares when 
they pay stable regular dividends. These findings indicate that implementing DRSPP in REITs 
influence REIT managers to make discretionary payout choice.  
 Furthermore, we apply even study methodology to examine the dividend announcement date 
effect and dividend payment date effect between REITs with DRSPP and REITs without DRSPP. 
Less volatile stock market as response to dividend announcements of REITs with DRSPP also 
reflects on the managerial effectiveness on maintaining a discretionary payout policy. For 
example, market reactions to dividend increase (decrease) are smaller (no difference) for REITs 
with DRSPP than (and) for REITs without DRSPP.  
   We study the dividend payment date effect. The dividend payment date will be the date on 
which the administrators will invest any dividends for the purchase of common shares, if plan 
administrators purchase shares directly from the issuing company. Unless the dividend payment 
date is not a trading day, in which case the dividend reinvestment date will be the next trading 
day. If the administrators purchase common shares in the open market, the administrators will 
make such purchases beginning on or after the dividend payment date, in most cases, within 30 
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days after such date. We find strong dividend payment date effect in REITs with DRSPP but not 
in REITs without DRSPP, suggesting higher temporary price pressure in REITs with DRSPP 
around the dividend payment date, consistent with Berkman and Koch (2016). 
    Our study contributes to the existing literature by providing new evidence that REIT payout 
choices are sensitive to the implementation of DRSPP. Most REITs use newly issued shares to 
investors who participate in the DRSPP, converting a portion of internally generated cash flows 
into new equity without flotation costs. Implementing DRSPP helps REITs access public capital 
market to raise less costly new equity. As a consequence, REIT managers, after adopting DRSPP, 
tend to make conservative payout choice. Our finding may help explain why less than 30 REITs 
choose to distribute elective stock dividends subsequent to the enactment of the new IRS rules 
during financial crisis and why REIT investors do not seem to favor cash dividend over stock 
dividends, some facts documented by Devos, Spieler, and Tsang (2014). They attribute their 
findings to the fact that “under efficient market investors can always convert stock dividends into 
cash by selling the stock; hence investors are generally not worse off receiving stock dividends”. 
Alternatively, we interpret the behavior of a few REITs distributing elective stock dividends as a 
reflection of manager discretionary payout policy. Besides, if a REIT adopting DRSPP attracts 
many investors to participate in the plan, the REIT can still retain a significant portion of 
distributed cash flow.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides related literature review 
and develops the research hypotheses. Section III discusses the sample selection procedures and 
research design. Section IV summarizes the empirical results and section V presents robustness 
test results. Section VI concludes.  
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Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
     REITs can distribute cash flow back to shareholders in the forms of regular dividends, extra 
dividends - including irregular dividends and excess dividends, and stock repurchases. In a 
sample of 8,290 REIT regular dividend announcements, 91 percent (about 7,562) of regular 
announcements are made on a recurring quarterly basis and less than 10 percent of regular 
dividend announcements are made on a recurring monthly, annual, or semiannual basis. Special 
dividends are usually one-time dividend distributions to shareholders, and are considered not to 
be sustained in the future. Most REITs repurchase stocks using open market stock repurchase 
program or tender offer. REITs, rather than regular corporations, have much lower overall level 
of repurchases because of the regulation on dividend payout policy (Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu, 
2013). And thus repurchases cannot be the dominant form of REIT payout, which is different 
from regular corporations that use repurchases to substitute for dividend payout in recent decades 
(Grullon and Michaely, 2002; and Skinner, 2008). 
     Existing literature has developed four possible hypotheses to explain firm payout policy: 
agency cost, signaling effect or information content of dividends, clientele effect, and tax 
consideration. Our study builds on both agency-cost and signaling literature to develop four main 
testable hypotheses. Extant studies provide mixed results on the tax and clientele effects on 
payout choice. While Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) suggest that taxes play a 
second-order role in firm payout choice; Hanlon and Hoopes (2014) provide evidence that 
managers adjust corporate payout choices as response to changed investor-level taxes. But 
shareholders who participate in the DRSPP have the same federal income tax obligation for 
dividends reinvested under the plan as for dividends received in cash. The clientele effect 
concerns about the reaction of institutional investors. Interestingly, DRSPP limits the allowable 
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periodic investment to attractive individual clients but to prevent institutional investors and 
corporate insiders from exploiting large economies of scale. These findings suggest that 
estimating the possible link of tax and clientele effects with REIT payout choices is complicated, 
and thus deserves another independent study. We leave it to the future work.  
Agency Cost Theory 
    The principal-agent problem arises when firm managers do not act in the interest of 
shareholders. Firm managers should invest positive NPV projects and maximize returns to 
shareholders in order to attract current and new shareholders to participate in DRSPP. REITs are 
capital-intensive in nature, and often raise funds from external capital markets. Debt holders 
often act as a control to monitor firms’ activities and make sure that firms can fulfill their debt 
obligations. Similarly, firms should have less asymmetric information and invest projects that 
generate positive cash flows to incentivize investors to participate in DRSPP. Agency cost 
models argue that when faced with high asymmetric information, a firm will pay more of its cash 
flow in dividends. Consistent with this model’s prediction, Ghosh and Sirmans (2006) provide 
evidence to show that dividend decisions reflect managerial motives and incentives.  Good 
performing managers invest in positive NPV projects to maximize shareholder value and need 
not pay high dividends, but poorly performing mangers pay generous dividends to appease 
disgruntled investors. Under agency costs, firms with DRSPP should motivate managers to 
invest positive NPV projects and improve stock performance, thereby conducting conservative 
payout policy. 
Payout as Signaling Mechanism   
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     Theoretical models suggest that firm managers use payout to signal changes in their 
expectations about future prospects of the firm (e.g., Leland and Pyle, 1977; Bhattacharya, 1979; 
Aharony and Swary, 1980; Miller and Rock, 1985; John and Williams, 1985). Thus, payouts as 
signaling device, in the form of regular dividend, special dividend, or share repurchase, require 
managers to pay due diligence on conveying information about future prospects. Bradley, 
Capozza, and Seguin (1998) find that REIT managers make discretionary payout choice to 
mitigate the negative effect of dividend reduction on stock market. Brau and Holmes (2006) 
provide evidence that the managerial signaling hypothesis explains for the abnormal returns 
observed around share repurchase announcements. The strict regulation on payout policy 
disenables REITs to finance their growth via internally generated cash flows. Consequently, the 
access to equity market to finance positive NPV projects is crucial for long-term REIT growth. 
REIT managers are aware that the maintenance of dividend payments is a requirement for greater 
access to capital markets. As a return, the capital market rewards REIT managers for considering 
investor demand for dividends.  
    By adopting DRSPP, REITs not only promote long-term investment from existing 
shareholders but also encourage wider ownership of shares. In addition, DRSPPs allow REITs 
not to pay much less flotation costs on newly issued equity, and thus raise equity capital cheaper 
than seasoned equity offerings. Therefore, we make hypothesis that REITs with DRSPP should 
have a conservative payout policy under signaling models, due to high costs for decreasing 
dividends. 
In sum, both the reduction of the agency problem and the signaling effects of payout suggest 
that implementing DRSPP affects REIT payout decision. In our sample of 2,269 firm-year 
observations, REIT payout choices can be classified into 7 categories: (1) paying stable regular 
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dividends only; (2) paying regular dividends, and meanwhile distributing extra dividends, 
repurchasing shares, or both; (3) increasing regular dividends only; (4) increasing regular 
dividends, and meanwhile distributing extra dividends, repurchasing shares, or both; (5) 
decreasing and/or suspending regular dividends, with a possibility of distributing extra dividends, 
repurchasing shares, or both; (6) distributing extra dividends, repurchasing shares, or both 
(without regular dividend payment); (7) omitting all the payout. First, we consider one extra 
payout policy- the payout choice (7). Li and Lie (2006) argue that payout omissions signal firm 
financial stress and uncertainty on future performance. We then make the first testable 
hypothesis:  
   Hypothesis 1 After adopting DRSPP, REITs have lower tendency to omit all the payouts 
during each of the sample years, as opposed to making other payout choices.  
    Second, we consider the payout choice (2) - REITs paying stable regular dividends. Since the 
dividend policy is sticky and the financial need for REITs with DRSPP to invest their positive 
NPV projects, REITs with DRSPP would prefer not paying additional payouts such as extra 
dividends and/or stock repurchase while maintaining stable regular dividends. But for the other 
five payout choices, we cannot easily infer different preferences of these five payout choices for 
REITs with or without DRSPP. Thus, we only state a second hypothesis as follows:  
    Hypothesis 2 Relative to REITs without DRSPP, REITs with DRSPP should be less likely to 
pay stable regular dividends with additional payouts, as opposed to making other payout choices.  
    Payouts convey managerial confidence about future cash flows and thus help alleviate 
uncertainty faced by outside investors (Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely, 2005). After 
adopting DRSPP, firm managers make discretionary payout policy to cater to investor demand 
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for a stable dividend policy, and as a return, such behavior is rewarded with less shock to their 
stock market valuations in dividend announcement events. Thus, we expect that  
   Hypothesis 3 Dividend announcement date effects should be weaker in REITs with DRSPP 
than in REITs without DRSPP.  
    In addition, since investors who participate in DRSPP will receive the new shares converted 
from cash dividends at each dividend payment date, increased demand for shares at that date 
leads to temporary price pressure. Berkman and Koch (2012) use a sample of regular firms from 
2008 to 2012, and show that the payment date effect is concentrated in firms with DRIP, but not 
in firms without DRIP. In a similar vein, we state a fourth hypothesis as follow.  
    Hypothesis 4 The dividend payment date effects are more pronounced in REITs with DRSPP 
than REITs without DRSPP.   
Data and Research Design 
Sample  
   We first select all the U.S. REITs, about 725 REITs, from SNL’s Real Estate database. With 
the field search for “dividend reinvestment plan” in Data Wizard, we find whether REITs have 
DRIP in the most recent year, say, 2014 in our sample. We also identify the REITs with DRIP 
showed in the annual lists of DRIP firms since 1996 from the American Association of 
Individual Investors (AAII). These two sources only roughly tell us whether active or non-active 
REITs have DRIP. We then match these 725 REITs with REITs in CRSP/Ziman Real Estate 
Data by ticker and/or company name and only select overlapped REITs showed in both database.  
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    Companies with DRIPs communicate with investors through filings with Securities and 
Exchange Commission - for example, letters to shareholders, prospectuses, prospectus 
supplements (forms 424 B3, B4, or B5), securities registration forms (forms S-3, S-3D, or 3-11), 
and/or quarterly/annual forms (10-Q/10-K).To identify the initial offering date and suspension 
periods of DRIP for each REIT, we search the key terms “reinvest” and/or “dividend” in the 
above mentioned SEC filings, and read through the designated firm report. When we are not sure 
whether a REIT has DRIP, we further search REIT name with key terms “reinvest” and 
“dividend” in Google and Factiva. We find another eight firms that release public news 
regarding to the initial offering date of DRIP, which is earlier than the date filed in SEC reports. 
We also notice that many REITs have DRIPs but their names are not showed in the annual lists 
of DRIPs provided by AAII. More interestingly, we find that most REITs that have DRIP in the 
early 1990s now change to DRSPP, and most REITs that adopted the DRIP in recent years name 
the plan as DRSPP.     
    Our sample period covers the period from 1999 to 2014. Since accounting data for REITs 
might be limited before the year of 1999(Hardin III and Hill, 2008). We require the sample to 
have positive total asset, positive market equity, and non-missing institutional ownership data. 
The final sample includes 2,269 firm-year observations of 271 REITs. And 127 out of the 271 
REITs have DRSPP.  The data set is an unbalanced panel. The sample REITs have year-
observations between 1 year and 16 years. 
    Table 1 presents the distribution of REITs with DRSPP and REITs without DRSPP by year. 
Columns (1) and (3) show that the number of sample REITs with DRSPP ranges from 71 to 81, 
with an average of 75; and the number of sample REITs without DRSPP ranges from 48 to 89, 
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with an average of 66. Columns (2) and (4) indicate a slightly higher percentage of REITs that 
have DRSPPs than those that do not have DRSPPs on average.    
[Put Table 1 about Here] 
   We collect dividend distribution information from SNL Real Estate’s database. This database 
provides the dividend announcement date, ex-dividend date, dividend payment date, and the 
amount of distributed dividends. It also shows that whether the dividends are distributed as a 
regular, special, irregular, or suspended dividend payment; and whether regular dividends are 
paid on a recurring quarterly, monthly, annual, or semiannual basis. In this study, we define the 
special and irregular dividends as extra dividends for the sake of simplicity. 
    Following Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu (2013), we collect the number of shares repurchases and 
the average price of repurchased shares from SNL Real Estate’s database. The database has these 
two items available starting in the year of 2006. Note that the SEC Exchange Act rule 10b-18 
requires public firms to disclose the two items in their financial statements (i.e., forms 10-K and 
10-Q) beginning at March 15
th
, 2004 (Dittmar and Field, 2015). The dollar value of share 
repurchases is the product of these two variables. For share repurchase data before 2006, we 
obtain the line item common shares repurchases from the cash flow statement. 
    We define a REIT with increasing (decreasing) regular dividends in a given fiscal year as the 
REIT with greater (less) regular dividends in the current year than those in the prior fiscal year. 
A REIT is defined to have stable regular dividends, if it distributes the same amount of regular 
dividends in both current and prior fiscal years. A REIT is defined to pay extra dividends in a 
given fiscal year if it pays any extra dividend during the year. A REIT is defined to have 
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suspended dividends in a given fiscal year if it makes dividend suspension announcement during 
the year. A REIT is defined to repurchase shares if it buys back shares in a given fiscal year.  
    In our sample of 2,269 firm-year observations, REIT payout choices can be summarized into 7 
categories: (1) paying stable regular dividends only; (2) paying regular dividends, and 
meanwhile distributing extra dividends, repurchasing shares, or both; (3) increasing regular 
dividends only; (4) increasing regular dividends, and meanwhile distributing extra dividends, 
repurchasing shares, or both; (5) decreasing and/or suspending regular dividends, with a 
possibility of distributing extra dividends, repurchasing shares, or both; (6) distributing extra 
dividends, repurchasing shares, or both (without regular dividend payment); (7) omitting all the 
payout. Table 2 reports fractions of REIT payout choice during each of the years from 1999 to 
2014. In Table 2, columns (1) and (2) show that an average of 12 percent of REITs only pay 
regular dividends each year, and an average of 6 percent of REITs pay regular dividends, and 
meanwhile distribute extra dividends, repurchase shares, or both; columns (3) and (4) show that 
about half of REITs increase regular dividends; columns (5) - (7) present that an average of 15 
percent of REITs decrease and /or suspend regular dividends, with a possibility of distributing 
extra dividends, repurchasing shares, or both; around 7 percent of REITs distribute extra 
dividends, repurchases shares, or both, but they do not pay regular dividends during the year; and 
about 11 percent of firms omit all the payout.  
[Put Table 2 about Here] 
Research Methodology  
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    We examine the effect of implementing DRSPP on REIT dividend payout choices using 
multinomial logit regression model. The payout choices have j = 7 alternatives. We try to explain 
the probability that REIT i chooses alternative j, 
Pij= β0 + β1 DRSPPi + Σβm CONTROLSi + βn Fixed Effectsi + ε     (1) 
  The dependent variable Pij stands for seven possible payout choices of REITs and is an 
indicator variable, which (1) takes a value of one if a REIT only pays stable regular dividends 
during the year; (2) takes a value of two if a REIT pays regular dividends, and meanwhile 
distributes extra dividends, repurchases shares, or both; (3) takes a value of three if a REIT only 
increases regular dividends; (4) takes a value of four if a REIT increases regular dividends, and 
in the same year, distributes special dividends, repurchases shares, or both; (5) takes a value of 
five if a REIT decreases and/or suspends regular dividends, with a possibility of distributing 
extra dividends, repurchasing shares, or both; (6) takes a value of six if a REIT pays special 
dividends and/or repurchases shares, but does not pay regular dividends; (7)takes a value of 
seven if a REIT omits all the payout. Note that the alternatives j = 1, 2, 3… 7 are assigned 
arbitrarily and have no meaning, because the alternatives have no particular ordering.  
   The main variable of interest is DRSPP, which takes the value of 1 for REITs with DRSPP and 
0 otherwise. We follow Bradley, Capozza, and Seguin (1998), Lie (2005), Hardin and Hill 
(2008), and Case, Hardin, and Wu (2012) to select control variables that affect REIT payout 
choices. The control variables include MTB, BLEV, SIZE, IO, ∆DRAWN, ROA, FFO, BETA-1, 
∆BETA, PAYOUT RATIO, DIVIDEND YIELD, and CREDIT/AT. MTB is the market value of 
equity plus the book value of debt in year t scaled by book value of total assets in year (t - 1). 
BLEV is measured as the book value of total debt in year t over book value of total assets in year 
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(t - 1). SIZE is the log of market capitalization of a firm in year (t - 1). The market capitalizations 
are deflated to 2014 dollars using the consumer price index. IO is the percentage of the total 
shares owned by institutional investors according to 13F filings in the event year t. ∆DRAWN is 
the difference of the ratio of credit line drawn to total credit line between year (t - 1) and year t. 
ROA is measured as net income available to common shareholders in year t divided by total 
assets in year (t - 1). FFO is funds from operations, defined as net income excluding gains or 
losses from sales of real estate, plus depreciation and amortization in year t, divided by total 
assets in year (t - 1). BETA-1 is the equity estimated using daily returns from CRSP during the 
year (t - 1). ∆BETA is the difference between the equity beta estimated using daily returns during 
the year (t + 1) and BETA-1. PAYOUT RATIO is the total dividends in year t scaled by net 
income available to common shareholders in year (t - 1). If the dividends exceed the net income, 
the payout ratio is set to 1. DIVIDEND YIELD is the split-adjusted regular dividends per share 
during the year (t - 1) scaled by the price at the end of the year (t - 1). CREDIT/AT is the ratio of 
credit line available in year t over total assets in year (t - 1).  All the variables are also defined in 
detail in Appendix A. We also include year fixed effect and property-type fixed effect to control 
for time-invariant unobserved correlated variables. We follow Hardin and Hill (2008) and use 
seven property types: multifamily, retail, office, industrial, self-storage, hotel, and other. 
    We use standard event study methodology to investigate differences of dividend 
announcement date effects and dividend payment date effects between REITs with DRSPP and 
REITs without DRSPP. A standard market model is used with the value-weighted Ziman REIT 
index being the market return index, and the estimation period spans from 250 to 10 days prior 
the dividend announcement date. Similar to Case, Hardin, and Wu (2012), we calculate the 
cumulative abnormal returns around dividend announcement date T1 based on three different 
18 
 
event windows: (T1 - 30, T1 -1), (T1 + 0, T1 + 1), and (T1 + 2, T1 + 30). Following Berkman and 
Koch (2016), we calculate the cumulative abnormal returns around dividend payment date T2 
based on three different event windows: (T2 - 10, T2 -1), (T2 + 0, T2 + 1), and (T2 + 2, T2 + 10). 
The estimation period is from (T2 - 250) to (T2 -10).  
Empirical Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
   In Table 3, Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the full sample. The average REIT has a 
market-to-book ratio of 1.46. The sample means of BLEV, SIZE, IO, and ROA are, respectively, 
0.63, 20.51, 0.56, and 0.02. Although the REITs have small payout ratio with mean 0.000, the 
dividend yield is 5.633. Since the variable SIZE has mean much greater than the other variables, 
we standardize all of the selected variables to make our model better behave.  
    Panel B presents descriptive statistics for two subsamples: REITs with DRSPP and those 
without DRSPP. When comparing firm fundamentals between the two subsamples, we make the 
null hypothesis that means (medians) of variables between the two subsamples are equal. The 
last two columns of Panel B indicate that REITs with DRSPP and REITs without DRSPP have 
very different firm characteristics. For example, relative to REITs without DRSPP, REITs with 
DRSPP tend to have higher MTB, larger size, higher percentage of shares owned by institutional 
investors. REITs with DRSPP also report higher ROA and FFO, resulting in higher payout ratio 
and dividend yield. Interestingly, REITs with DRSPP appear to have significantly larger beta in 
year (t - 1). Panel C reports the Pearson correlation coefficients. ∆DRAWN is not significantly 
correlated with other selected firm characteristics.  
[Put Table 3 about Here] 
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Multinomial Logistic Regression Results 
   We present the main empirical results of the multinomial logistic regression analyses for 
specification (1) in Tables 4 & 5. All the independent variables except DRSPP are standardized.  
Thus, we can interpret each estimated coefficient as the effect of a one-standard-deviation 
increase in the independent variable on the percentage change in the possibility of a specific 
payout choice, with the other variables in the model held constant. Odds ratios can be interpreted 
as the effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in the independent variable on the predicted 
odds ratio of making a specific payout choice, with the other variables in the model held constant. 
Year and property-type fixed effects are also included in all regressions.  
Wald Tests of Individual Effects 
   Table 4 reports Type 3 Analysis of Effects, based on the Wald test. Each chi-square is to test 
the null hypothesis that the explanatory variable has no effect on the payout choice. The 
significant level on DRSPP is beyond the 0.01 level. Therefore, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that DRSPP has no effect on the payout choice. Other control variables also 
significantly impact REIT payout choice, except ∆DRWAN.  
 [Put Table 4 about Here] 
REIT Payout Choices 
   In Table 5, Panel A presents results with REIT payout choice (7), in which REITs omit all the 
payout, as the reference category. The statistically significant positive estimated coefficients on 
DRSPP in columns (1) and (3)-(5) indicate that implementing DRSPP decreases the likelihood of 
REITs omitting all the payout during each of sample years. In other words, having DRSPP 
increases the possibility of REITs to pay regular dividends, increase regular dividends, increase 
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regular dividends and meanwhile distribute special dividends, repurchase shares, or both, and 
decrease regular dividends with a possibility of distributing extra dividends, repurchasing shares, 
or both. The corresponding odds ratios, respectively, show that having DRSPP results in a 2.2-
fold increase in the odds of REITS paying stable regular dividends; a 2.1-fold increase in the 
odds of REITs increasing regular dividends; a 2.4-fold increase in the odds of REITs increasing 
regular dividends and meanwhile distributing special dividends, repurchasing shares, or both; 
and a 1.9-fold increase in the odds of REITs decreasing and/or suspending regular dividends. But 
columns (2) and (6) indicate that neither the odds of REITs paying regular dividends with 
additional payout, nor the odds of REITS distributing extra dividends, repurchasing shares, or 
both, without regular dividends, are significant different from the odds of REITs omitting all the 
payout.  
     Column 1 of Panel A, in Table 5, indicates that a one standard deviation increase in MTB 
produces, on average , a 1.400 decrease  in the log odds of getting REIT payout choice (1) – 
paying stable regular dividends only. That is, higher MTB induces greater possibility of REITs 
omitting all the payment. The same conclusion can be drawn from the significant negative 
coefficients on MTB in columns (2) and (4) - (6). In addition, REITs are more likely to omit all 
the payout, when they have higher BLEV, smaller firm size, lower FFO, greater market beta in 
the year prior to the event year, lower dividend yield, or lower CREDIT/AT.  
   Panel B of Table 5 displays results with REIT payout choice (2), in which REITs pay regular 
dividends, and meanwhile distribute extra dividends, repurchase shares, or both, as the reference 
category. The positive and significant estimated coefficients and odds ratio in Columns (1)-(4) 
indicate that REITs with DRSPP are less likely to make payout choice (2), relative to the other 
payout choices –such as paying stable regular dividends only, increasing regular dividends, and 
21 
 
decreasing dividends. In column (1), the odds ratios for DRSPP is 2.2, implying that the odds 
that REITs with DRSPP paying regular dividends, rather than regular dividends with other 
additional payouts, are about 2.2 times the odds for REITs without DRSPP. The odds ratio for 
DRSPP is 2.1 in column (2), suggesting that the odds that REITs with DRSPP will increase 
regular dividends rather than regular dividends with other payout are about 2.1 times the odds for 
REITs without DRSPP. Similarly, the odds that REITs with DRSPP will increase regular 
dividends, as shown in columns (3)-(4), rather than regular dividends with other payout are about 
twice the odds for REITs without DRSPP. The coefficient of DRSPP in columns (6) has positive 
sign but is not statistically significant, indicating that the possibility that REITs with DRSPP will 
only pay extra dividends and/or share repurchases instead of regular dividends with other payout 
is not different from the possibility for REITs without DRSPP.  
   Column 2 of Panel B, in Table 5, indicates that a one standard deviation increase in MTB 
produces, on average , a 2.056 increase in the log odds of getting REIT payout choice (3) - 
increasing regular dividends only. That is, lower MTB induces greater possibility of REITs 
paying regular dividends and making other additional payment, instead of paying regular 
dividends merely.  But the significant negative coefficient on MTB in column (4) of Panel B 
indicate that higher MTB is associated with greater possibility of REITs paying regular 
dividends and other additional payout, instead of deceasing regular dividends. REITs with Lower 
BLEV, larger firm size, or lower percentage of institutional ownership (IO) are more likely to 
make payout choice (2).  
   Panel C of Table 5 shows results based on comparisons of any other two possible payout 
choices. The coefficients on DRSPP are all insignificant, suggesting no significant difference of 
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making any two of payout choices (1) and (3) - (6) between REITs with DRSPP and REITs 
without DRSPP. 
[Put Table 5 about Here] 
Dividend Announcement Date Effect 
   In this section, we study how market responds to different dividend announcements. Stable 
regular dividend announcements are defined as quarterly regular dividends paid at date T1 are the 
same as the most recent quarterly regular dividends. Regular dividend increase (decrease) 
announcements are defined as regular dividends paid at date T1 are greater (less) than the most 
recent regular dividends. Extra dividend announcements include the announcements of special 
dividends and irregular dividends. Increased (decreased) extra dividend announcements are 
defined as extra dividends paid at date T1 are greater (less) than the most recent regular dividends. 
Included in the analyses are 5,650 quarterly stable regular dividend announcements, 1,361 
regular dividend increase announcements, 168 regular dividend decrease announcements, 79 
dividend suspension announcements, and 217 extra dividend announcements. The extra dividend 
announcements consist of 111 increased extra dividend announcements and 106 decreased extra 
dividend announcements. We find that relative to REITs without DRSPP, REITs with DRSPP 
are more likely to pay stable regular dividends, increase regular dividends, and decrease regular 
dividends; and they are less likely to suspend regular dividends and pay extra dividends. 
Announcement period returns are the abnormal stock returns measured from the date T1 a REIT 
makes dividend announcement through the day after the announcement (T1 + 1)  using market 
model, where the value-weighted Ziman REIT index is used to proxy overall market returns and 
the estimation period spans from 250 days to 10 days prior to the announcement date.  
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  The results in Table 6 indicate that the market response to regular dividend increase 
announcements or extra dividend announcements is stronger than the response to either stable 
regular dividend announcements or regular dividend decrease announcements. Importantly, we 
find that REITs with DRSPP, rather than REITs without DRSPP, have much weaker market 
reaction for each type of dividend announcements, a reflection of possible managerial effect to 
stabilize market reaction. For example, Panel B shows that CARs from date T1 to date (T1 + 1), 
or (0, +1) are 0.30 percent (t-stat = 4.80) for REITs with DRSPP and 0.73(t-stat = 6.97) for 
REITs without DRSPP, respectively. The difference of CARs (0, +1) between REITs with 
DRSPP and REITs without DRSPP is 0.43 percent (t-stat = 2.75). The positive CARs (0, +1) in 
Panel E are most likely to be driven by the strong market response to increased extra dividend 
announcements. Panel F shows that CARs (0, +1) in increased extra dividend announcements are 
0.36 percent (t-stat = 2.59) for REITs with DRSPP and 3.10 percent (t-stat = 2.17) for REITs 
without DRSPP, respectively, with a difference of 2.30 percent (t-stat= 2.17) CARs. CARs from 
(T1 - 30) to (T1 + 30) in regular dividend decrease announcements in Panel C are, respectively, 
2.88 percent (t-stat = 0.11) for REITs with DRSPP and   - 5.90 percent (t-stat = -3.28) for REITs 
without DRSPP. In the case of dividend suspension announcements, there is no statistically 
difference of CARs around the announcement dates regardless of REITs having DRSPP. We also 
notice that there is lower percentage of positive daily returns in REITs with DRSPP than in 
REITs without DRSPP, in the day and one day after stable regular dividend announcements, 
regular dividend increase announcements, or extra dividend announcements, respectively; while 
there is higher percentage of positive daily returns in REITs with DRSPP than in REITs without 
DRSPP.  
[Put Table 6 about Here] 
24 
 
Dividend Payment Date Effect 
   In this section, we follow Berkman and Koch (2016) to investigate the dividend payment date 
effect. They find that the dividend payment date effect is concentrated among firms with DRIPs. 
In that the new shares are purchased at each dividend payment date. Therefore, we make 
hypothesis that REITs with DRSPP should have stronger dividend payment date effect than 
REITs without DRSPP. As in the last section, we classify all the dividend announcements into 
six different types, such as stable regular dividend announcements, regular dividend increase 
announcements, regular dividend decrease announcements, extra dividends announcements 
( increased or decreased), and dividend suspension announcements. Each dividend 
announcement, excluding the suspension one, has the corresponding dividend payment date. We 
have slightly different observations of dividend payment date due to the availability of daily 
stock return data. Shown in Table 7 are 5,469 quarterly stable regular dividend announcements, 
1,312 regular dividend increase announcements, 165 regular dividend decrease announcements, 
and 217 extra dividend announcements. The extra dividend announcements consist of 112 
increased extra dividend announcements and 105 decreased extra dividend announcements. 
   Table 7 reports cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around dividend payment date T2. CARs 
are separately estimated from three event windows: (T2 - 10, T2 - 1), (T2, T2 + 1), and (T2 + 2, T2 
+ 10). A standard market model is used with the value-weighted Ziman REIT index being the 
market return index, and the estimation period spans from 250 to 10 days prior the dividend 
payment date. 
   In Table 7, Panel A shows that CARs from date (T2 + 0) to date (T2 + 1) are, respectively, 0.18 
percent (t-stat = 4.21) for REITs with DRSPP and 0.09 percent (t-stat = 1.50) for REITs without 
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DRSPP. But the difference of CARs between these two groups is not significant. Panel B shows 
that CARs from date (T2 + 0) to date (T2 + 1) are, respectively, 0.23 percent (t-stat = 3.65) for 
REITs with DRSPP and 0.02 percent (t-stat = 0.26) for REITs without DRSPP, with a difference 
of -0.21 percent CARs (t-stat = -2.13). We find a similar pattern of dividend payment date effect 
in extra dividend announcements and increased extra dividend announcements. Overall, we show 
the strong dividend payment date effect in REITs with DRSPP. In addition, we find higher 
percentage of daily returns in date (T2 + 0) and date (T2 + 1) in REITs with DRSPP than REITs 
without DRSPP. CARs from date (T2 - 10) and date (T2 + 10) are not significantly different 
between these two groups of REITs. All these findings are consistent with the results in Berkman 
and Koch (2016).  
[Put Table 7 about Here] 
Robustness Check  
    We also use a logistic regression model to model the probability of REITs that pay stable 
regular dividends (decrease regular dividends, increase regular dividends, pay extra dividends, or 
repurchase shares) taking on a value of 1, rather than the probability of REITs that do not pay 
stable regular dividends (do not decrease regular dividends, do not increase regular dividends, do 
not pay extra dividends, or do not repurchase shares) taking on a value of 0. When not 
considering alternative payout choice during the year, we show that REITs with DRSPP are 
more likely to decrease regular dividends (see Column (2) of Table 8) and to increase regular 
dividends (see Column (3)). This result might mislead us to interpret as more flexible payout 
choice in REITs with DRSPP. Thus, it is important to take all the payout choice into account 
when we study the effect of adopting DRSPP on REIT payout choice.  
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 [Put Table 8 about Here] 
   We also use alternative definition of payout choice to re-examine the dividend announcement 
date effect and dividend payment date effect. Stable regular dividend announcements are defined 
as regular dividends paid at quarter Q are the same as the regular dividends paid at the same 
quarter of last year, or quarter (Q - 4). Regular dividend increase (decrease) announcements are 
defined as regular dividends paid at quarter Q are greater (less) than the regular dividends paid at 
the same quarter of last year. According to the new definition of payout choice, we show that 
dividend announcement date effect is weaker in REITs with DRSPP than in REITs without 
DRSPP, and dividend payment date effect is stills stronger in REITs with DRSPP than in REITs 
without DRSPP.  
Conclusion 
To stay federal tax-preferred status, REITS are required to make distributions, other than 
capital gain dividends, to their shareholders each year in an amount at least equal to the sum of 
90 percent of their income. This greatly limits REIT managers to use internally generated cash 
flows and requires them to access capital market frequently to raise capital. Therefore, it is 
important for REIT managers to retain some internal generated cash flows through DRSPP to 
alleviate the need for external financing. Although REIT payout policy has received a great deal 
of attention in the literature, none of the existing studies on REITs has looked into the effect of 
adopting DRSPP on payout decisions.  
This study examines whether implementing DRSPP affects REIT payout choice. Consistent 
with the prediction from agency cost and signaling models, we show managers in REITs with 
DRSPP employ a relatively conservative dividend payout policy. We find relative to REITs 
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without DRSPP, REITs with DRSPP are less likely to omit dividend payments; and DRIP REITs 
are less likely to increase dividends and/or repurchase shares while maintaining a stable payout 
policy. Besides, less volatile stock market as response to dividend announcements of REITs with 
DRSPP also reflects on the managerial effectiveness on maintaining a discretionary payout 
policy.  
In addition, we find strong dividend payment date effect in REITs with DRSPP but not in 
REITs without DRSPP, suggesting higher temporary price pressure in REITs with DRSPP 
around the dividend payment date. Future work will be of great interest if: (1) we can trace how 
and to what extent, firms raise new issues through the DRSPPs; (2) we can figure out why some 
firms adopt this plan while others not; and (3) we can compare the risk and returns of those firms 
that adopted the plan.   
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Appendix A 
Variable Definition 
Seven REIT payout choices during a year: 
(1)REITs only pay stable regular dividends during the year; 
 (2) REITs pay regular dividends, and meanwhile distribute extra dividends, repurchase shares, or both;  
(3) REITs only increase regular dividends;  
(4) REITs increase regular dividends, and in the same year, distribute special dividends, repurchase shares, or both; 
 (5) REITs decrease and/or suspend regular dividends, with a possibility of distributing extra dividends, 
repurchasing shares, or both;  
(6) REITs pay special dividends and/or repurchase shares, but do not pay regular dividends;  
(7) REITs omit all the payout. 
Main Variable of Interest  
DRSPP takes the value of 1 for REITs with DRSPP during a year, and 0 otherwise. 
Controls Variables 
MTB is the market value of equity plus the book value of debt in year t scaled by book value of total assets in year (t 
- 1). 
 BLEV is measured as the book value of total debt in year t over book value of total assets in year (t - 1).  
SIZE is the log of market capitalization of a firm in year (t - 1). The market capitalizations are deflated to 2014 
dollars using the consumer price index. 
 IO is the percentage of the total shares owned by institutional investors according to 13F filings in the event year t.  
∆DRAWN is the difference of the ratio of credit line drawn to total credit line between year (t - 1) and year t.  
ROA is measured as net income available to common shareholders in year t divided by total assets in year (t - 1).  
FFO is funds from operations, defined as net income excluding gains or losses from sales of real estate, plus 
depreciation and amortization in year t, divided by total assets in year (t - 1). 
BETA-1 is the equity estimated using daily returns from CRSP during the year (t - 1).  
∆BETA is the difference between the equity beta estimated using daily returns during the year (t + 1) and BETA-1.  
PAYOUT RATIO is the total dividends in year t scaled by net income available to common shareholders in year (t - 
1). If the dividends exceed the net income, the payout ratio is set to 1.  
DIVIDEND YIELD is the split-adjusted regular dividends per share during the year (t - 1) scaled by the price at the 
end of the year (t - 1).  
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CREDIT/AT is the ratio of credit line available in year t over total assets in year (t - 1). 
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Table 1 
Distribution of REITs With DRSPP and REITs Without DRSPP  
 By Year 
 
   This table reports number and percentage of REITs each year that have 
DRSPP and do not have DRSPP, respectively. The sample includes 271 
REITs and covers the period from 1999 to 2014. And 127 out of the 271 
REITs have DRSPP. 
Year 
REITs With DRSPP REITs Without DRSPP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
No. of REITs % of REITs  No. of REITs % of REITs  
1999 76 0.46 89 0.54 
2000 72 0.46 83 0.54 
2001 78 0.52 73 0.48 
2002 79 0.55 65 0.45 
2003 77 0.53 67 0.47 
2004 81 0.53 73 0.47 
2005 80 0.52 73 0.48 
2006 73 0.55 60 0.45 
2007 71 0.58 51 0.42 
2008 71 0.60 48 0.40 
2009 71 0.59 50 0.41 
2010 74 0.57 56 0.43 
2011 74 0.55 60 0.45 
2012 76 0.56 60 0.44 
2013 76 0.51 73 0.49 
2014 77 0.48 82 0.52 
Average  75 0.54 66 0.46 
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Table 2 
REIT Payout Choice by Year 
 
   This table reports fractions of sample REITs with available data that (1) pay stable regular 
dividends only;(2) pay regular dividends, and meanwhile distribute extra dividends, repurchase 
shares, or both;(3) increase regular dividends only;(4) increase regular dividends, and 
meanwhile distribute extra dividends, repurchase shares, or both;(5) decrease and/or suspend 
regular dividends, with a possibility of distributing extra dividends, repurchasing shares, or 
both; (6) distribute extra dividends, repurchase shares, or both (without regular dividends); and 
(7) omit all the payout, during each of the years from 1999 to 2014. The sample has 2,269 firm-
year observations.  
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1999 0.145 0.055 0.309 0.297 0.097 0.018 0.079 
2000 0.090 0.065 0.297 0.303 0.187 0.013 0.045 
2001 0.079 0.046 0.291 0.285 0.152 0.046 0.099 
2002 0.125 0.049 0.326 0.215 0.139 0.028 0.118 
2003 0.125 0.104 0.326 0.104 0.153 0.049 0.139 
2004 0.188 0.065 0.325 0.084 0.091 0.091 0.156 
2005 0.131 0.059 0.386 0.144 0.065 0.078 0.137 
2006 0.098 0.053 0.421 0.211 0.068 0.053 0.098 
2007 0.115 0.090 0.262 0.279 0.098 0.082 0.074 
2008 0.084 0.042 0.277 0.176 0.286 0.076 0.059 
2009 0.083 0.050 0.107 0.066 0.521 0.066 0.107 
2010 0.138 0.023 0.238 0.062 0.277 0.092 0.169 
2011 0.179 0.067 0.328 0.112 0.067 0.119 0.127 
2012 0.162 0.096 0.346 0.118 0.088 0.081 0.110 
2013 0.141 0.047 0.356 0.195 0.060 0.081 0.121 
2014 0.107 0.063 0.346 0.245 0.069 0.069 0.101 
Average  0.124 0.061 0.309 0.181 0.151 0.065 0.109 
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Table 3 
Summary Statistics 
  
   This table presents summary statistics for the sample of 271 equity REITs and 2,269 firm-year observations from 1999 
to 2014. MTB is the market value of equity plus the book value of debt in the event year t scaled by book value of total 
assets in year (t - 1). BLEV is measured as the book value of total debt in year t over book value of total assets in year (t -
1). SIZE is the log of market capitalization of a firm in year (t - 1). The market capitalizations are deflated to 2014 dollars 
using the consumer price index. IO is the percentage of the total shares owned by institutional investors according to 13F 
filings in year t. ∆DRAWN is the difference of the ratio of credit line drawn to total credit line between year (t - 1) and 
year t. ROA is measured as net income available to common shareholders in year t divided by total assets in year (t - 1).  
FFO is funds from operations, defined as net income excluding gains or losses from sales of real estate, plus depreciation 
and amortization in year t, divided by total assets in year (t - 1). BETA-1 is the equity estimated using daily returns from 
CRSP in year (t - 1). ∆BETA is the difference between the equity beta estimated using daily returns during the year (t + 
1) and BETA-1. PAYOUT RATIO is the total dividends in year t scaled by net income available to common shareholders 
in year (t - 1). If the dividends exceed the net income, the payout ratio is set to 1. DIVIDEND YIELD is the split-adjusted 
regular dividends per share in year (t - 1) scaled by the price at the end of the same year. CREDIT/AT is the ratio of 
credit line available in year t over total assets in year (t - 1). Panel A is the descriptive statistics for full sample. Panel B is 
the descriptive statistics for REITs with DRSPP and REITs without DRSPP, respectively. In last two columns of Panel B, 
the null hypothesis is that means (medians) of variables in REITs with DRSPP and those of variables in REITs without 
DRSPP are equal. P-value is the p-value of the nonparametric Wilcoxon two-sample test. Panel C is the correlation 
matrix. The upper triangular matrix shows the Pearson correlations. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev 25% 75% 
MTB 1,997 1.455 1.252 2.931 0.962 1.570 
BLEV 1,997 0.630 0.563 2.447 0.455 0.687 
SIZE 1,997 20.505 20.754 1.733 19.526 21.613 
IO 2,269 0.564 0.632 0.313 0.308 0.821 
∆DRAWN 1,997 -1.245 0.000 29.384 -14.365 13.265 
ROA 1,997 0.023 0.021 0.086 0.003 0.042 
FFO 1,994 0.056 0.059 0.112 0.042 0.077 
BETA-1 2,172 0.807 0.889 0.437 0.562 1.064 
∆BETA 2,010 0.025 0.025 0.386 -0.137 0.201 
PAYOUT RATIO 1,995 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 
DIVIDEND YIELD 2,269 5.633 5.445 4.218 3.229 7.398 
CREDIT/AT 1,997 0.160 0.139 0.219 0.071 0.209 
 
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics for REITs With DRSPP and REITs Without DRSPP 
 
Variable 
REITs With DRSPP REITs Without DRSPP 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median ∆Mean ∆Median 
 MTB  1,110 1.340 1.261 887 1.599 1.225 0.259** -0.035*** 
 BLEV  1,110 0.586 0.568 887 0.686 0.553 0.099 -0.015*** 
 SIZE  1,110 20.822 20.967 887 20.109 20.547 -0.713*** -0.420*** 
 IO  1,206 0.593 0.663 1,063 0.530 0.595 -0.063*** -0.068*** 
 ∆DRAWN  1,110 -1.551 0.000 887 -0.863 0.000 0.687 0.000 
 ROA  1,110 0.026 0.024 887 0.019 0.018 -0.007** -0.006*** 
 FFO  1,110 0.061 0.060 884 0.048 0.058 -0.013*** -0.002*** 
 BETA-1  1,191 0.860 0.931 981 0.743 0.804 -0.116*** -0.128*** 
 ∆BETA  1,114 0.036 0.027 896 0.011 0.024 -0.025 -0.003 
 PAYOUT RATIO  1,110 0.000 0.000 885 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000*** 
 DIVIDEND YIELD  1,206 6.310 5.968 1,063 4.865 4.501 -1.445*** -1.467*** 
 CREDIT/AT  1,110 0.167 0.149 887 0.152 0.116 -0.014 -0.033*** 
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Panel C. Correlations 
 
BLEV SIZE IO ∆DRAWN ROA FFO BETA-1 ∆BETA 
PAYOUT 
RATIO 
DIVIDEND 
YIELD 
CREDIT 
/AT 
MTB 0.85*** 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.25*** -0.57*** -0.07*** 0.00 -0.22*** -0.06*** 0.68*** 
BLEV 1 -0.06*** -0.04 0.02 -0.47*** -0.79*** -0.03 -0.01 0.004 -0.001 0.78*** 
SIZE 
 
1 0.71*** 0.02 0.15*** 0.20*** 0.59*** -0.004 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 
IO 
  
1 0.02 -0.01 0.09*** 0.55*** 0.007 0.016 -0.16*** 0.03 
∆DRAWN 
   
1 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06*** 0.04* -0.01 0.04* 0.04** 
ROA 
    
1 0.84*** -0.04* 0.05** -0.39*** 0.05** -0.35*** 
FFO 
     
1 0.05** 0.04* -0.30*** 0.05** -0.58*** 
BETA-1 
      
1 -0.41*** 0.04 -0.04* 0.02 
∆BETA 
       
1 0.01 0.08*** 0.01 
PAYOUT RATIO 
        
1 0.05** 0.03 
DIVIDEND YIELD 
         
1 0.10*** 
38 
 
Table 4 
Type 3 Analysis of Effects  
    
   This table reports type 3 analyses of effects from estimation of a 
multinomial logistic model. The dependent variable is an indicator 
variable showing seven possible payout choices of sample REITs. DRSPP 
takes the value of 1 for REITs with DRSPP and 0 otherwise. Other 
explanatory variables are defined in detail in Table 1 and Appendix A.  
Each chi-square is a test of the null hypothesis that the explanatory 
variable has no effect on the REIT payout choice.  The model also 
controls for year-fixed effects and property-type fixed effects. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Effect 
Wald 
Chi-Square 
DRSPP 20.293*** 
MTB 40.161*** 
BLEV 22.829*** 
SIZE 58.087*** 
IO 25.484*** 
∆DRAWN 0.789 
ROA 21.983*** 
FFO 51.469*** 
BETA-1 34.187*** 
∆BETA 14.613** 
PAYOUT RATIO 23.002*** 
DIVIDEND YIELD 158.926*** 
CREDIT/AT 31.472*** 
Year-Fixed-Effect  Yes  
Property-Type-Fixed-Effect  Yes  
Observations 1,828 
Pseudo R
2
 0.59 
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Table 5  
Multinomial Logistic Regression of REIT Payout Choice    
 
     This table reports estimation from multinomial logistic regression of REIT payout choice. Seven REIT payout choices include: (1) REITs that pay stable 
regular dividends only; (2) REITs that pay regular dividends, and meanwhile distribute extra dividends, repurchase shares, or both; (3) REITs that only 
increase regular dividends; (4) REITs that increase regular dividends, and meanwhile distribute special dividends, repurchase shares, or both; (5) REITs that 
decrease and/or suspend regular dividends, with a possibility of distributing extra dividends, repurchasing shares, or both;  (6) REITs that distribute extra 
dividends, repurchase shares, or both (without regular dividends); and (7) REITs that omit all the payments during each of the years. Independent variables 
are defined in detail in Appendix A. All the independent variables except DRSPP are standardized. The corresponding odds ratios (O.R.) are reported. Panels 
A and B report estimations using payout choice (7) and (2), respectively, as the reference categories. Panel C reports estimations using the other payout 
choices as the reference categories. The total number of observations for this analysis is 1,828. Year and property-type fixed effects are also included in each 
specification. In bracket is the P-value. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Using payout choice (7) REITs that omit all the payment during the year as the reference category 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1 vs. 7 2 vs.7 3 vs.7 4 vs. 7 5 vs.7 6 vs.7 
Coef. O.R.  Coef. O.R. Coef. O.R.  Coef. O.R. Coef. O.R. Coef. O.R. 
DRSPP 0.773*** 2.167 -0.026 0.975 0.728*** 2.071 0.867*** 2.380 0.626** 1.871 0.503 1.654 
 (0.01)  (0.94)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.17)  
MTB -1.400* 0.247 -2.046** 0.129 0.010 1.010 -1.748** 0.174 -4.628*** 0.010 -3.002*** 0.050 
 (0.09)  (0.04)  (0.96)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
BLEV -3.079** 0.046 -7.081*** <0.001 -3.377*** 0.034 -3.690*** 0.025 -2.035 0.131 -0.816 0.442 
 (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.12)  (0.60)  
SIZE 0.110 1.116 1.049*** 2.854 0.874*** 2.396 1.226*** 3.409 0.386* 1.470 0.795*** 2.213 
 (0.63)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.06)  (0.00)  
IO 0.171 1.187 -0.428* 0.652 0.206 1.229 0.260 1.296 -0.235 0.791 0.529** 1.697 
 (0.44)  (0.08)  (0.31)  (0.23)  (0.26)  (0.05)  
∆DRAWN -0.018 0.983 -0.002 0.998 0.037 1.038 -0.017 0.983 0.004 1.004 -0.014 0.986 
 (0.89)  (0.99)  (0.75)  (0.89)  (0.97)  (0.93)  
ROA -0.240 0.787 0.141 1.151 -0.158 0.854 -0.315 0.730 0.769*** 2.158 0.493 1.637 
 (0.51)  (0.61)  (0.55)  (0.39)  (0.00)  (0.18)  
FFO 1.273** 3.572 0.674 1.962 1.497*** 4.466 2.370*** 10.693 -0.717** 0.488 0.174 1.189 
 (0.02)  (0.15)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.05)  (0.75)  
BETA-1 -0.495*** 0.610 -0.654*** 0.520 -0.461*** 0.631 -0.671*** 0.511 -0.073 0.930 -1.113*** 0.329 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.63)  (0.00)  
∆BETA -0.372*** 0.689 -0.237 0.789 -0.151 0.860 -0.290** 0.748 -0.019 0.981 -0.485*** 0.616 
 (0.01)  (0.16)  (0.27)  (0.05)  (0.87)  (0.01)  
PAYOUT RATIO 0.695*** 2.004 0.640* 1.897 0.665*** 1.944 0.659*** 1.933 0.762*** 2.142 -0.189 0.827 
 
(0.00)  (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.37)  
DIVIDEND YIELD 2.252*** 9.510 1.931*** 6.894 2.028 7.596 1.8892*** 6.614 1.630*** 5.104 -0.852*** 0.427 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  
CREDIT/AT 1.245*** 3.473 0.833** 2.299 1.454*** 4.279 1.223*** 3.397 1.306*** 3.690 0.123 1.131 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.81) 
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Panel B. Using payout choice  (2) REITs that pay regular dividends, and meanwhile distribute extra dividends, repurchase shares, or both as the 
reference category 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
1 vs. 2 3 vs. 2 4 vs. 2 5 vs.2 6 vs. 2 
 
Coef. O.R. Coef. O.R. Coef. O.R. Coef. O.R. Coef. O.R. 
DRSPP 0.799*** 2.223 0.754*** 2.125 0.893*** 2.441 0.652*** 1.919 0.529 1.697 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.18)  
MTB 0.646 1.908 2.056** 7.813 0.298 1.347 -2.582** 0.076 -0.956 0.384 
 (0.57)  (0.03)  (0.78)  (0.02)  (0.43)  
BLEV 4.002*** 54.707 3.704*** 40.598 3.391** 29.692 5.046*** 155.429 6.266*** 526.130 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
SIZE -0.939*** 0.391 -0.175 0.840 0.178 1.195 -0.663*** 0.515 -0.254 0.776 
 (0.00)  (0.40)  (0.43)  (0.00)  (0.40)  
IO 0.599*** 1.821 0.635*** 1.886 0.688*** 1.989 0.194 1.214 0.957*** 2.603 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.33)  (0.00)  
∆DRAWN -0.016 0.985 0.039 1.040 -0.015 0.985 0.006 1.006 -0.012 0.988 
 (0.90)  (0.72)  (0.90)  (0.96)  (0.94)  
ROA -0.380 0.684 -0.299 0.742 -0.456 0.634 0.629** 1.875 0.352 1.422 
 (0.30)  (0.30)  (0.23)  (0.02)  (0.37)  
FFO 0.599 1.821 0.823* 2.277 1.696*** 5.451 -1.391*** 0.249 -0.500 0.606 
 (0.29)  (0.08)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.42)  
BETA-1 0.159 1.172 0.193 1.212 -0.018 0.982 0.581*** 1.787 -0.460 0.632 
 (0.49)  (0.36)  (0.94)  (0.01)  (0.11)  
∆BETA -0.135 0.874 0.086 1.090 -0.053 0.948 0.218 1.244 -0.248 0.781 
 (0.41)  (0.57)  (0.74)  (0.15)  (0.21)  
PAYOUT RATIO 0.055 1.057 0.025 1.025 0.019 1.019 0.122 1.129 -0.830** 0.436 
 
(0.86) 
 
(0.94) 
 
(0.96) 
 
(0.73) 
 
(0.02) 
 DIVIDEND YIELD 0.322* 1.379 0.097 1.102 -0.042 0.959 -0.301* 0.740 -2.783*** 0.062 
 (0.06)  (0.56)  (0.81)  (0.07)  (0.00)  
CREDIT/AT 0.413* 1.511 0.621*** 1.861 0.3905 1.478 0.473* 1.605 -0.7091 0.492 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.16) 
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Panel C. Using payout choice (6)REITs that distribute extra dividends, repurchase shares, or both (without regular dividends), 
as the reference category in columns (1)-(4); using payout choice (5) REITs that decrease and/or suspend regular dividends, 
with a possibility of distributing extra dividends, repurchasing shares, or both, as the reference category in columns(5)-(7); 
using payout choice (4) REITs that increase regular dividends, and meanwhile distribute special dividends, repurchase shares, 
or both, as the reference category in columns (8)-(9);and using payout choice (3) REITs that only increase regular dividends;  
as the reference category in columns (10), respectively. 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1 vs. 6 3 vs. 6 4 vs. 6 5 vs. 6 1 vs.5 
Coef. O.R. Coef. O.R. Coef. O.R. Coef. O.R. Coef. O.R. 
DRSPP 0.270 1.310 0.225 1.252 0.364 1.439 0.123 1.131 -0.147 1.158 
 (0.45)  (0.51)  (0.31)  (0.73)  (0.48)  
Other Controls* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed-Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Property-Type-Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Variable 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
3 vs. 5  4 vs. 5 1 vs.4 3 vs. 4 1 vs.3 
Coef. O.R. Coef. O.R. Coef. O.R. Coef. O.R. Coef. O.R. 
DRSPP 0.102 1.107 0.241 1.272 -0.094 0.911 -0.134 0.870 0.045 1.046 
 
(0.58)  (0.24)  (0.64)  (0.78)  (0.80)  
Other Controls* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Fixed-Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Property-Type-Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* Other Controls include MTB, BLEV, SIZE, IO, ∆DRAWN, ROA, FFO, BETA-1, ∆BETA,PAYOUT RAITIO, DIVIDEND 
YIELD, CREDIT/AT 
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Table 6 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Dividend Announcement Date 
     
    This table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around dividend announcement date T1. CARs are separately estimated from 
three event windows: (T1 - 30, T1 - 1), (T1, T1 + 1), and (T1 + 2, T1 + 30). A standard market model is used with the value-weighted 
Ziman REIT index being the market return index, and the estimation period spans from 250 to 10 days prior the announcement. 
Columns (1) and (4) reports the numbers of dividend announcements. Columns (2) and (5) reports CARs. Columns (3) and (6) report 
percentage of positive daily returns during each event window. Column (7) reports the difference of CARs between REITs with 
DRSPP and REITs without DRSPP. Columns 1-3 (4-7) report results based on REITs with (without) DRSPP. Stable regular dividend 
announcements in Panel A are defined as regular dividends paid at date t are the same as the most recent regular dividends. Regular 
dividend increase (decrease) announcements in Panel B (Panel C) are defined as regular dividends paid at date t are greater (less) than 
the most recent regular dividends. Extra dividend announcements in Panel E include the announcements of special dividends and 
irregular dividends. Increased (decreased) extra dividend announcements in Panel F (Panel G) are defined as extra dividends paid at 
date t are greater (less) than the most recent regular dividends. In bracket is t-stat based on standardized cross-sectional test. 
 
Variable 
REITs With DRSPP   REITs Without DRSPP   
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) (7) 
N CAR1 % of Returns > 0   N CAR2 % of Returns > 0 CAR2 – CAR1 
Panel A. Stable Regular Dividend Announcements 
0 to +1 3,321 0.07 52%   2,329 0.10 53% 0.03 
  
(1.81) 
  
  (1.78) 
 
(0.36) 
-30 to -2 
 
-0.30 48% 
 
  -0.46 45% -0.16 
  
(-2.56) 
  
  (-3.66) 
 
(-1.70) 
2 to 30 
 
-0.12 49% 
 
  0.37 52% 0.49 
  
(-1.19) 
  
  (1.63) 
 
(2.40) 
 -30 to 30 
 
-0.37 49% 
 
  -0.02 49% 0.35 
    (-2.24)       (-0.79)   (0.61) 
Panel B. Regular Dividend Increase Announcements 
0 to +1 837 0.30 59%   524 0.73 61% 0.43 
  
(4.80) 
  
  (6.97) 
 
(2.75) 
-30 to -2 
 
-0.21 47% 
 
  -0.53 46% -0.32 
  
(-1.29) 
  
  (-2.81) 
 
(-0.58) 
2 to 30 
 
0.38 52% 
 
  -0.06 49% -0.44 
  
(1.96) 
  
  (-0.40) 
 
(-1.81) 
-30 to 30 
 
0.39 55% 
 
  0.12 48% -0.27 
    (1.54)       (-0.19)   (-1.55) 
Panel C. Regular Dividend Decrease Announcements 
0 to +1 97 -0.48 45%   71 -1.12 42% -0.64 
  
(-1.15) 
  
  (-0.87) 
 
(-0.99) 
-30 to -2 
 
0.90 44% 
 
  -4.09 38% -4.99 
  
(-0.49) 
  
  (-2.41) 
 
(-1.46) 
2 to 30 
 
2.60 59% 
 
  -0.40 45% -3.00 
  
(1.34) 
  
  (-0.43) 
 
(-1.57) 
-30 to 30 
 
2.88 54% 
 
  -5.90 35% -8.78 
    (0.11)       (-3.28)   (-2.48) 
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Table 6 (Cont’d) 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
N CAR1 % of Returns > 0  N Ab. Returns CAR2 CAR2-CAR1 
Panel D. Dividend Suspension Announcements 
0 to +1 20 -4.00 35%   59 -2.65 27% 1.35 
  
(-0.70) 
  
  (-1.95) 
 
(0.87) 
-30 to -2 
 
-11.00 20% 
 
  -6.75 42% 4.25 
  
(-1.84) 
  
  (-2.68) 
 
(0.50) 
2 to 30 
 
2.08 20% 
 
  8.16 39% 6.08 
  
(0.38) 
  
  (0.76) 
 
(0.03) 
-30 to 30 
 
-12.33 25% 
 
  -1.48 39% 10.85 
    (-1.71)       (-1.83)   (0.67) 
Panel E. Extra Dividend Announcements 
0 to +1 101 0.36 62%   116 2.57 67% 2.21 
  
(2.37) 
  
  (5.30) 
 
(2.61) 
-30 to -2 
 
0.90 53% 
 
  0.24 54% -0.66 
  
(0.84) 
  
  (0.41) 
 
(-0.10) 
2 to 30 
 
1.51 59% 
 
  1.00 53% -0.51 
  
(1.31) 
  
  (1.13) 
 
(-0.67) 
-30 to 30 
 
2.85 63% 
 
  3.60 59% 0.75 
    (2.34)       (2.86)   (0.75) 
Panel F. Increased Extra Dividend Announcements 
0 to +1 45 0.80 69%   66 3.10 71% 2.30 
  
(2.59) 
  
  (5.27) 
 
(2.17) 
-30 to -2 
 
1.80 51% 
 
  2.69 59% 0.89 
  
(0.10) 
  
  (1.73) 
 
(0.84) 
2 to 30 
 
1.22 62% 
 
  1.73 58% 0.51 
  
(1.47) 
  
  (1.21) 
 
(0.34) 
-30 to 30 
 
3.67 69% 
 
  7.32 70% 3.65 
    (2.20)       (3.85)   (1.61) 
Panel G. Decreased Extra Dividend Announcements 
0 to +1 56 0.00 57%   50 1.86 62% 1.86 
  
(0.52) 
  
  (2.08) 
 
(1.08) 
-30 to -2 
 
0.17 55% 
 
  -2.99 48% -3.16 
  
(1.04) 
  
  (-1.50) 
 
(-1.34) 
2 to 30 
 
1.74 57% 
 
  0.05 48% -1.69 
  
(0.56) 
  
  (0.26) 
 
(-0.73) 
-30 to 30 
 
2.19 59% 
 
  -1.31 44% -3.50 
    (1.23)       (-0.19)   (-1.08) 
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Table 7 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Dividend Payment Date 
 
This table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around dividend payment date T2. CARs are separately estimated from three 
event windows: (T2 - 10, T2 - 1), (T2, T2 + 1), and (T2 + 2, T2 + 10). A standard market model is used with the value-weighted Ziman 
REIT index being the market return index, and the estimation period spans from 250 to 10 days prior the dividend payment date. 
Columns (1) and (4) reports the numbers of dividend announcements. Columns (2) and (5) reports CARs. Columns (3) and (6) report 
percentage of positive daily returns during each event window. Column (7) reports the difference of CARs between REITs with 
DRSPP and REITs without DRSPP. Columns 1-3 (4-7) report results based on REITs with (without) DRSPP. Stable regular dividend 
announcements in Panel A are defined as current regular dividends are the same as the most recent regular dividends. Regular 
dividend increase (decrease) announcements in Panel B (Panel C) are defined as current regular dividends paid are greater (less) than 
the most recent regular dividends. Extra dividend announcements in Panel D include the announcements of special dividends and 
irregular dividends. Increased (decreased) extra dividend announcements in Panel E (Panel F) are defined as current extra dividends 
paid are greater (less) than the most recent regular dividends. In bracket is t-stat based on standardized cross-sectional test. 
Variable  
REITs With DRSPP   REITs Without DRSPP 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) (7) 
N CAR1 % of Returns > 0   N CAR2 % of Returns > 0 CAR2 - CAR1 
Panel A .Stable Regular Dividend Announcements 
0 to +1 3,217 0.18 53%   2,252 0.09 50% -0.09 
  
(4.21) 
   
(1.50) 
 
(-1.36) 
-10 to -1 
 
-0.15 48% 
  
-0.10 48% 0.05 
  
(-2.60) 
   
(-1.12) 
 
(0.67) 
2 to 10 
 
-0.24 45% 
  
-0.46 45% -0.22 
  
(-3.37) 
   
(-4.59) 
 
(-1.77) 
-10 to 10 
 
-0.21 48% 
  
-0.46 46% -0.25 
    (-2.60)       (-3.41)   (-1.38) 
Panel B. Regular Dividend Increase Announcements 
0 to +1 806 0.23 54% 
 
506 0.02 49% -0.21 
  
(3.65) 
   
(0.26) 
 
(-2.13) 
-10 to -1 
 
-0.17 48% 
  
-0.34 44% -0.17 
  
(-1.10) 
   
(-2.10) 
 
(-0.91) 
2 to 10 
 
-0.28 47% 
  
-0.78 40% -0.50 
  
(-1.77) 
   
(-4.13) 
 
(-1.77) 
-10 to 10 
 
-0.22 48% 
  
-1.10 40% -0.88 
    (-0.97)       (-4.39)   (-2.61) 
Panel C. Regular Dividend Decrease Announcements 
0 to +1 95 0.10 52%   70 0.62 53% 0.52 
  
(-0.29) 
   
(1.05) 
 
(0.85) 
-10 to -1 
 
1.52 51% 
  
0.01 50% -1.51 
  
(0.83) 
   
(0.06) 
 
(-1.29) 
2 to 10 
 
-0.16 45% 
  
-0.87 47% -0.71 
  
(0.29) 
   
(-0.88) 
 
(-0.62) 
-10 to 10 
 
1.46 53% 
  
-0.24 49% -1.70 
    (0.68)       (-0.22)   (-0.93) 
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Table 7 (Cont'd) 
Variable  
(1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) (7) 
N CAR1 % of Returns > 0   N CAR2 % of Returns > 0 CAR2 - CAR1 
Panel D.  Extra Dividend Announcements  
0 to +1 95 0.76 58%   122 0.55 54% -0.21 
  
(3.34) 
   
(1.53) 
 
(-0.46) 
-10 to -1 
 
0.37 50% 
  
-0.76 49% -1.13 
  
(0.18) 
   
(-0.81) 
 
(-1.24) 
2 to 10 
 
-0.47 31% 
  
-1.04 36% -0.57 
  
(-2.58) 
   
(-1.63) 
 
(-0.58) 
-10 to 10 
 
0.63 46% 
  
-1.25 48% -1.88 
    (-0.68)       (-1.20)   (-1.19) 
Panel E. Increased Extra Dividend Announcements 
0 to +1 43 1.25 67%   69 0.51 51% -0.74 
  
(3.34) 
   
(0.44) 
 
(-1.33) 
-10 to -1 
 
-0.52 41% 
  
-0.76 52% -0.24 
  
(-0.40) 
   
(-0.43) 
 
(-0.18) 
2 to 10 
 
-1.67 27% 
  
-0.46 38% 1.21 
  
(-2.08) 
   
(-0.70) 
 
(1.04) 
-10 to 10 
 
-0.96 45% 
  
-0.72 49% 0.24 
    (-0.49)       (-0.70)   (0.15) 
Panel F. Decreased Extra Dividend Announcements 
0 to +1 52 0.34 50%   53 0.61 58% 0.27 
  
(1.30) 
   
(1.78) 
 
(0.40) 
-10 to -1 
 
1.09 57% 
  
-0.76 45% -1.85 
  
(0.57) 
   
(-0.76) 
 
(-1.48) 
2 to 10 
 
0.51 33% 
  
-1.80 34% -2.31 
  
(-1.59) 
   
(-1.80) 
 
(-1.43) 
-10 to 10 
 
1.93 46% 
  
-1.94 47% -3.87 
    (-0.47)       (-1.01)   (-1.39) 
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Table 8  
Logistic Regression of REIT Payout Choice 
 
This table reports estimation from logistic regression of REIT payout choice. We model the logit of the probability of REITs that 
pay stable regular dividends in column (1), REITs that decrease regular dividends in column (2), REITs that increase regular 
dividends in column (3), REITs that pay extra dividends in column (4), and REITs that repurchase shares in column (5) during 
each of the years, respectively. We predict the probability of REITs that pay stable regular dividends (decrease regular dividends, 
increase regular dividends, pay extra dividends, or repurchase shares) taking on a value of 1, rather than the probability of REITs 
that do not pay stable regular dividends (do not decrease regular dividends, do not increase regular dividends, do not pay extra 
dividends, or do not repurchase shares) taking on a value of 0.Independent variables are defined in detail in Appendix A.  All the 
independent variables except DRSPP are standardized. The corresponding odds ratios (O.R.) are reported. The total number of 
observations for this analysis is 1,828. Year-fixed effects and property-type fixed effects are also included. In bracket is the P-
value. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Stable Reg. Div. Reg. Div. Decrease Reg. Div. Increase Extra Div. Share Repurchase 
 Coef. O.R. Coef. O.R. Coef. O.R. Coef. O.R. Coef. O.R. 
DRSPP -0.072 0.931 0.322** 1.380 0.382*** 1.464 -0.128 0.880 -0.134 0.875 
 (0.60)  
(0.05) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.54) 
 
(0.27) 
 MTB -0.242 0.785 -2.516*** 0.081 0.082 1.086 -0.464 0.629 -2.005*** 0.135 
 (0.54)  
(0.00) 
 
(0.52) 
 
(0.36) 
 
(0.00) 
 BLEV -1.593** 0.203 -0.044 0.957 -0.009 0.991 -3.242*** 0.039 -0.531 0.588 
 (0.03)  
(0.97) 
 
(0.99) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.48) 
 SIZE -0.281** 0.755 -0.224* 0.800 0.669*** 1.951 0.442*** 1.555 0.603*** 1.827 
 (0.02)  
(0.10) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.00) 
 IO 0.016 1.016 -0.121 0.886 0.355*** 1.426 -0.267* 0.766 -0.017 0.984 
 (0.88)  
(0.33) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.86) 
 ∆DRAWN -0.024 0.977 0.000 1.000 0.020 1.020 -0.122 0.885 0.006 1.006 
 (0.71)  
(1.00) 
 
(0.71) 
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.92) 
 ROA -0.229 0.795 0.621*** 1.860 -0.449** 0.638 1.496*** 4.462 -0.197 0.821 
 (0.27)  
(0.00) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.35) 
 FFO 0.486* 1.626 -1.054*** 0.349 1.623*** 5.070 -1.433*** 0.239 0.078 1.081 
 (0.10)  
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.78) 
 BETA-1 -0.138 0.871 0.308*** 1.360 -0.177* 0.838 -0.015 0.985 -0.347*** 0.707 
 (0.22)  
(0.01) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.93) 
 
(0.00) 
 ∆BETA -0.152* 0.859 0.141* 1.152 -0.032 0.968 -0.205* 0.815 -0.146** 0.864 
 (0.08)  
(0.08) 
 
(0.67) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.03) 
 PAYOUT RATIO 0.092 1.096 0.135 1.145 0.503*** 1.654 0.145 1.156 -0.006 0.994 
 
(0.39) 
 
(0.46) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.27) 
 
(0.97) 
 DIVIDEND YIELD 0.586*** 1.797 0.102 1.107 0.279*** 1.322 -0.256* 0.774 -0.191*** 0.826 
 (0.00)  
(0.16) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.01) 
 CREDIT/AT -0.077 0.926 0.110 1.116 0.530*** 1.699 0.056 1.058 0.067 1.070 
 
(0.51) 
 
(0.42) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.75) 
 
(0.52) 
 Year-Fixed-Effect  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Property-Type-Effect  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Obs. 1,828 
 
1,828 
 
1,828 
 
1,828 
 
1,828 
 
R
2
 0.09 
 
0.13 
 
0.26 
 
0.07 
 
0.10 
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Table 9  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Dividend Announcement Date                                                                     
- Alternative Definition of Payout Choice 
     
     This table is similar to Table 6 and reports cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around dividend announcement 
date t; but uses alternative definition of payout choice. Stable regular dividend announcements in Panel A are 
defined as regular dividends paid at quarter Q are the same as the regular dividends paid at the same quarter of last 
year, or quarter (Q - 4). Regular dividend increase (decrease) announcements in Panel B (Panel C) are defined as 
regular dividends paid at quarter Q are greater (less) than the regular dividends paid at the same quarter of last year. 
CARs are separately estimated from three event windows: (t - 30, t - 1), (t, t + 1), and (t + 2, t + 30). A standard 
market model is used with the value-weighted Ziman REIT index being the market return index, and the estimation 
period spans from 250 to 10 days prior the announcement. Columns (1) and (4) reports the numbers of dividend 
announcements. Columns (2) and (5) reports CARs. Columns (3) and (6) report percentage of positive daily returns 
during each event window. Column (7) reports the difference of CARs between REITs with DRSPP and REITs 
without DRSPP. Columns 1-3 (4-7) report results based on REITs with (without) DRSPP. In bracket is t-stat based 
on standardized cross-sectional test. 
Variable  
REITs With DRSPP 
 
REITs Without DRSPP 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) (7) 
N CAR1 % of Returns > 0 
 
N CAR2 % of Returns > 0 CAR2- CAR1 
Panel A. Stable Regular Dividend Announcements 
0 to +1 1,333 0.10 52% 
 
1,024 0.19 56% 0.09 
  
(1.83) 
   
(2.44) 
 
(1.08) 
-30 to -2 
 
-0.34 49% 
  
-0.64 43% -0.30 
  
(-1.87) 
   
(-3.23) 
 
(-2.09) 
2 to 30 
 
-0.25 48% 
  
0.37 53% 0.62 
  
(-1.57) 
   
(1.52) 
 
(2.13) 
 -30 to 30 
 
-0.50 48% 
  
-0.09 49% 0.41 
  
(-1.98) 
   
(-0.33) 
 
(0.66) 
Panel B. Regular Dividend Increase Announcements 
0 to +1 2,361 0.13 54% 
 
1,366 0.26 56% 0.13 
  
(3.09) 
   
(4.46) 
 
(1.86) 
-30 to -2 
 
-0.32 47% 
  
-0.56 46% -0.24 
  
(-2.42) 
   
(-3.88) 
 
(-1.33) 
2 to 30 
 
0.05 50% 
  
-0.08 50% -0.13 
  
(0.36) 
   
(-0.29) 
 
(-0.20) 
-30 to 30 
 
-0.18 51% 
  
-0.42 48% -0.24 
  
(-0.72) 
   
(-1.79) 
 
(-1.13) 
Panel C. Regular Dividend Decrease Announcements 
0 to +1 319 -0.05 49% 
 
181 -0.29 46% -0.24 
  
(-0.91) 
   
(-0.55) 
 
(-1.33) 
-30 to -2 
 
1.56 53% 
  
-1.00 48% -2.56 
  
(1.78) 
   
(-1.36) 
 
(-1.69) 
2 to 30 
 
1.20 58% 
  
2.00 52% 0.80 
  
(1.25) 
   
(1.63) 
 
(0.17) 
-30 to 30 
 
2.62 58% 
  
0.92 49% -1.7 
  
(1.74)  (-0.17)  (-1.49) 
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Table 10 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Dividend Payment Date 
- Alternative Definition of Payout Choice 
 
     This table is similar to Table 7 and reports cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around dividend payment date T, but 
uses alternative definition of payout choice. Stable regular dividend announcements in Panel A are defined as regular 
dividends paid at quarter Q are the same as the regular dividends paid at the same quarter of last year, or quarter (Q - 4). 
Regular dividend increase (decrease) announcements in Panel B (Panel C) are defined as regular dividends paid at quarter 
Q are greater (less) than the regular dividends paid at the same quarter of last year. CARs are separately estimated from 
three event windows: (T - 10, T - 1), (T, T + 1), and (T + 2, T + 10). A standard market model is used with the value-
weighted Ziman REIT index being the market return index, and the estimation period spans from 250 to 10 days prior the 
announcement. Columns (1) and (4) reports the numbers of dividend announcements. Columns (2) and (5) reports CARs. 
Columns (3) and (6) report percentage of positive daily returns during each event window. Column (7) reports the 
difference of CARs between REITs with DRSPP and REITs without DRSPP. Columns 1-3 (4-7) report results based on 
REITs with (without) DRSPP. In bracket is t-stat based on standardized cross-sectional test. 
Variable  
REITs With DRIP   REITs Without DRIP   
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) (7) 
N CAR1 % of Returns > 0   N CAR2 % of Returns > 0 CAR2 - CAR1 
Panel A. Stable Regular Dividend Announcements 
0 to +1 1,401 0.26 54%   1,054 0.09 51% -0.17 
  
(3.83) 
   
(0.81) 
 
(-1.54) 
-10 to -1 
 
-0.16 49% 
  
-0.01 50% 0.15 
  
(-1.44) 
   
(-0.18) 
 
(0.88) 
2 to 10 
 
-0.17 46% 
  
-0.47 45% -0.30 
  
(-2.38) 
   
(-2.59) 
 
(-1.63) 
-10 to 10 
 
-0.07 48% 
  
-0.38 47% -0.31 
    (-1.24)       (-1.63)   (-1.12) 
Panel B. Regular Dividend Increase Announcements 
0 to +1 2,401 0.17 54% 
 
1,402 0.07 49% -0.10 
  
(4.26) 
   
(1.31) 
 
(-1.63) 
-10 to -1 
 
-0.13 48% 
  
-0.26 47% -0.13 
  
(-2.71) 
   
(-2.42) 
 
(-1.01) 
2 to 10 
 
-0.19 46% 
  
-0.61 42% -0.42 
  
(-2.31) 
   
(-5.04) 
 
(-2.96) 
-10 to 10 
 
-0.15 48% 
  
-0.78 45% -0.63 
    (-2.09)       (-4.75)   (-3.24) 
Panel C. Regular Dividend Decrease Announcements 
0 to +1 326 -0.01 48% 
 
190 0.33 53% 0.34 
  
(-1.13) 
   
(1.64) 
 
(0.94) 
-10 to -1 
 
0.64 53% 
  
0.87 49% 0.23 
  
(0.62) 
   
(1.47) 
 
(0.32) 
2 to 10 
 
-0.74 45% 
  
0.26 48% 1.00 
  
(-0.72) 
   
(0.11) 
 
(1.41) 
-10 to 10 
 
-0.10 50% 
  
1.46 52% 1.56 
    (-0.37)       (1.69)   (1.58) 
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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to show how local authorities (municipalities) deal with their 
community real estate. The study is an annually recurring research: every year since 2008 
(except for 2013), Dutch municipalities have been asked to complete a questionnaire about 
how they manage their real estate. With these results it is possible to perform quantitative 
analyses on both trends and the current situation.  
The questionnaire responses have led to the following conclusions: (1) Half of the 
municipalities has a policy but takes few risk measures, (2) Withdrawing local government, 
(3) Management and operations most outsourced tasks, (4) Obstacles remain unchanged, (5) 
Cost reduction most relevant policy theme since 2009, (6) Relevance of some policy themes 
depends on municipality size, (7) More real estate is offered, smaller percentage is sold, 8) 
More FTEs for real estate management, especially executive tasks and (9) Conscious focus 
on quality. 
Dutch municipalities tune their new developments of the municipal real estate policy to the 
results of the Barometer for Municipal Community Real Estate. This leads to a further 
development of professionalism of the municipal real estate portfolios. 
The contribution to science is showing patterns of community real estate management at 
Dutch municipalities. A longitudinal study of this size on this subject is unique in The 
Netherlands. 
  
Introduction 
This article lists the results of the Barometer for Municipal Community Real Estate 2015 
study. The study was carried out by the Professorship Public Real Estate of the 
NoorderRuimte Centre of Research and Innovation for Built Environment, Hanze University 
of Applied Sciences.  For the seventh time Dutch municipalities have completed the 
Barometer for Municipal Community Real Estate questionnaire. 227 respondents (51%) 
opened the questionnaire and 173 municipalities (39%) then completed the list in whole or in 
part. As a result, the response rate may differ per question. The specific number of 
respondents is indicated at each question.  
Methodology  
Every year since 2008 (except for 2013), municipalities have been asked to complete a 
questionnaire about how they manage their real estate. With these results it is possible to 
perform quantitative analyses on both trends and the current situation. The questionnaire 
was sent by email to all municipalities. On April 15th (2015) the invitations to complete the 
questionnaire were sent, on May 11th (2015) a reminder was sent and starting on 18 May 
municipalities were contacted by phone. The questionnaire was available to participants for 
a total of 7 weeks.  
 
All Dutch 
municipalities 
(n=393) 
Response  
(n=81) 
Small municipalities 
(<20.000 citizens) 
32% 25% 
Medium sized municipalities 
(20.000 – 50.000 citizens) 
49% 48% 
Large municipalities 
(50.000 ≤ citizens) 
19% 27% 
Table 1: Dutch municipalities and response rate 
Definition of community real estate 
This year again, the questionnaire saw the change and addition of several questions. One of 
the new questions concerned the definition of respondents of community real estate. The 52 
open answers to this question paint the following picture. A large part of the municipalities 
(85%) indicated in their description of community real estate that it revolves around the 
function and/or use of real estate, or they named examples of this to establish a description. 
More than half of the respondents mentioned ‘community’ in their description of community 
real estate. However, the combination ‘community real estate’ was obviously not counted. 
‘Community’ was mainly combined with (community) function, (community) goal and 
(community) activities. Policy and goals were used by a quarter of the municipalities to 
describe community real estate, and in half of those cases these terms were mentioned 
together (i.e. ‘policy goals’). A small number of municipalities (13%) indicated that community 
real estate is real estate that is the property of municipalities, and only one municipality 
mentioned (community) return in its description.   
Vision and policy  
More than half of the municipalities has a maintenance policy (76%), municipal real estate 
policy (63%) accommodation policy (62%) and/or lease policy (54%). A surprisingly low 
percentage can be seen for the number of municipalities that has a risk management real 
estate policy: this has only been established in 25% of the municipalities. However, 29% are 
currently working on drawing up such a policy. Also see figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Vision and policy (n=76) 
Generally it is mainly the medium sized municipalities (46%) that have a policy. A 
maintenance policy is the policy that is most present among small (80%), medium sized (77%) 
and large municipalities (96%). What is especially striking are the high percentages among 
large municipalities: (more than) half of these municipalities has one or more of the policies 
or visions mentioned (see table 2).  
 
Small 
municipalities 
Medium sized 
municipalities 
Large 
municipalities 
Maintenance policy 80% 77% 96% 
Municipal real estate policy 40% 74% 86% 
Accommodation policy 33% 74% 86% 
Lease policy 53% 45% 82% 
Real estate management vision 27% 45% 86% 
Rent policy 40% 52% 68% 
Exploitation policy 20% 45% 77% 
Risk management real estate policy 20% 13% 50% 
Table 2: Policies according to municipality size 
Risk management 
Last year 18 municipalities (44%) indicated that they had taken measures concerning 
financial risks of community real estate. This year the questionnaire included items asking 
more specific information on these measures. Currently 36% of the municipalities (n=39) has 
not established any measures, and 10% is currently drawing up measures. Almost a quarter 
(23%) has included a risk section in their real estate policy, while the rest (41%) assumes a 
following position through financial monitoring such as quarterly and monthly reports. 
Furthermore, 10% indicated that they have taken other measures concerning financial risks. 
Core tasks 
Figure 2 shows which tasks are regarded as core tasks concerning community real estate 
(n=52) within municipalities. Management and operations and Development planning were 
most commonly mentioned as core tasks.  
 
Figure 2: Tasks regarded as core tasks (n=52) 
Tasks that have come to be regarded more as core tasks compared to last year are initiating 
projects (+8%) and development planning (+3%). With these changes, the top 3 looks a little 
different this year: only management and operations has maintained its place. The tasks that 
dropped most substantially are at the bottom of the list and are appointing locations (-22%) 
and project and process management (-16%).   
From 2008 all tasks mentioned have been regarded less and less as core tasks within 
municipalities concerning community real estate. The figure below (3, with a trend line) 
visualises this trend.  
 Figure 3: Trends in vision on municipal core tasks 
All tasks are seen as core tasks for community real estate most by large municipalities (see 
table 3). It is true for five core tasks that the larger the municipality, the more it is seen as a 
core task: development planning, initiating projects, measuring and maintaining quality, 
financing and appointing locations. Among small municipalities the percentages are 
generally lower this year than last year. In 2012 they were lower than in 2014 as well. Save 
for some exceptions, this seems to be fairly consistent for medium sized municipalities, while 
among large municipalities an increase can be observed between 2012 and 2015. 
 Small 
municipalities 
Medium sized 
municipalities 
Large municipalities 
2012 2014 2015 2012 2014 2015 2012 2014 2015 
Management and 
operations  
32% 56% 53% 42% 57% 35% 26% 56% 65% 
Development planning 23% 63% 40% 55% 40% 45% 23% 44% 65% 
Initiating projects 26% 38% 40% 47% 43% 45% 26% 33% 59% 
Measuring and 
maintaining quality 
23% 38% 20% 55% 43% 45% 23% 78% 59% 
Ownership 23% 50% 33% 50% 47% 30% 27% 56% 59% 
Financing 30% 56% 27% 44% 43% 45% 26% 44% 47% 
Appointing locations 30% 56% 20% 44% 63% 35% 26% 67% 65% 
Project and process 
management 
27% 44% 20% 47% 50% 20% 27% 44% 53% 
Table 3: Tasks regarded as core tasks – according to municipality size and years 
71% of the municipalities (n=46) indicated that they do not outsource any tasks and are not 
planning to do so. Plans to outsource tasks mainly focus on the fields of management and 
operations (33%), development planning (23%), ownership (22%) and project and process 
management (22%). Management and operations is also the core task that is currently being 
outsourced most, at 24%. 
Municipalities indicated that outsourcing is currently not opportune, but that they would not 
exclude it when it is more useful or wise and that they are investigating whether ownership, 
management and operations of several clusters can be outsourced. Some municipalities 
cannot answer this question straightforwardly, because in certain locations outsourcing is 
applied for, for example, operating or management while in other locations it has not (yet) 
been applied because they are currently working on establishing a policy. Furthermore, the 
municipalities concretely mention property, (technical) management, operating, (direction of) 
multiple-year maintenance and sustainability. 
If municipalities are considering outsourcing real estate tasks, they mainly (43%, n=44) 
consider privatization (company, foundation, corporation). Last year, municipalities mainly 
considered cooperation with other municipalities (71%), which has almost halved this year to 
36%. Other organisational forms mentioned by municipalities (23%) are cooperation with 
citizens (initiatives), transfer to community initiators and operating by foundations or 
associations. In addition, municipalities indicated that they are currently undergoing 
reorganisation, are establishing a real estate company (/ internal privatization / independent 
real estate company), and are busy making an inventory of this process (including much 
hiving off). Finally they also mention that the organisational form for outsourcing will depend 
on the specific situation: a different partner per situation might be desirable. 
Obstacles 
The lack of a rent price that covers the  costs was mentioned most often (20%) as an obstacle 
when carrying out community real estate tasks, followed by low occupancy rates (18%) and 
fragmentation of tasks (17%). Compared to last year, few (major) differences can be observed 
(figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Obstacles when carrying out community real estate tasks (n=52) 
About half of the municipalities that indicated that they experience the lack of a rent price 
that covers the costs (n=39) as an obstacle. 
Other obstacles mentioned by the respondents are the decreasing demand leading to 
oversupply of community real estate, the traditional separation between the various policy 
fields and legislation (such as the Education Act), the historic growth in diversity of property 
relations, prices and subsidising agreements (no clear line), the vagueness of terminology, 
the conservation of facilities in depopulating areas, the threat of corporate tax for renter 
activities (for community use) and the fragmentation of expertise. 
Relevant policy themes 
The most relevant real estate related policy theme this year is again cost reduction (89%). 
Since 2009 this theme has occupied the number one spot. Last year it was followed closely by 
the separation of subsidy for housing and operating expenses with 92%, which is also in 
second place this year. However, its relevance has dropped a little compared to last year 
(61%) and it shares the second place now with increase of returns (61%).  
Another striking fact when comparing the results of this year to those of 2014 is that all 
policy themes mentioned have become less relevant (also see figure 5). The following themes 
have seen the largest decrease: 
 Protection of the facility level in small centres (-48%) 
 Improvement of quality and management (-35%) 
 Development of integral accommodation policies (-33%) 
 Protection of the facility level in neighbourhoods and districts (-32%) 
 Separation of subsidy for housing and operating expenses (-31%) 
 
Figure 5: Relevancy of policy themes (n=44) 
Other policy themes that are (also) relevant for municipalities (14%) are portfolio 
management, measurement of community performance / social return on investment, 
sustainability and the introduction of rent prices that cover expenses combined with the 
reduction of the number of objects in the portfolio while at the same time using objects to 
realise policy goals. 
When ordering the relevance of the policy themes according to municipality size, we see that 
cost reduction is on top for all three municipality sizes (table 4). For the improvement of 
policy quality, the integration of tasks in the municipality and the physical clustering of 
cultural functions, the trend is that the larger the municipality is, the more relevant these 
themes are. The reverse applies to MFA formation: this is more relevant to small 
municipalities (73%) than to medium sized (50%) or large (27%) municipalities. For 
development of an integral accommodation policy, practically no difference can be observed 
between small, medium sized and large municipalities. 
 Small 
municipalities 
(n=11) 
Medium sized 
municipalities 
(n=18) 
Large 
municipalities 
(n=15) 
Cost reduction 91% 83% 93% 
Separation of subsidy for housing and 
operating expenses 
46% 78% 53% 
Increase revenue 55% 56% 73% 
Development of integral 
accommodation policies 
55% 50% 53% 
Improvement of quality and 
management 
27% 44% 67% 
MFA formation 73% 50% 27% 
Increase user satisfaction 36% 39% 60% 
Cooperation with other 
municipalities 
46% 56% 33% 
Integration of tasks within the 
municipality 
18% 39% 60% 
Physical clustering cultural functions 0% 39% 53% 
Outsourcing of tasks 18% 39% 40% 
Protection of facility level in small 
centres 
46% 44% 0% 
Protection of the facility level in 
neighborhoods and districts 
18% 39% 27% 
Table 4: Relevancy of policy themes according to municipality size 
Selling community real estate 
The policy theme section already shows that cost reduction is the most relevant theme for 
most municipalities. 74% (n=39) indicated that for them, selling community real estate is a 
means to control expenses. This is almost equal to last year: in 2014 76% of the municipalities 
confirmed that this was the case for them. The number of community real estate objects on 
offer varied between 0 and 60 in 2014 with an average of 7.2. The number of objects that was 
actually sold varied between 0 and 11 with an average of 1.5. Compared to the year before 
that, the number of transactions had increased slightly (1.2 in 2013). The number of objects 
on offer was more than two and a half times higher (on average 2.7 in 2013). This means that 
the percentage of objects sold compared to the number of objects on offer halved from 44% to 
21%. 
Municipal organisation 
This year an average of 14.9 FTEs (full-time equivalents) were allocated to real estate 
management activities. This is almost 3.5 times as much as last year: that was the first year 
we asked for this statistic and the average then was 4.4 FTE. Table 5 distinguishes FTEs 
according to municipality size. It shows that large municipalities employ the most FTEs for 
real estate management, followed by small municipalities. Medium sized municipalities have 
the least FTEs, on average, for real estate management activities. 
 n Average Min Max 
Small municipalities 20 15 1 62 
Medium-sized municipalities 39 8 0 25 
Large municipalities 21 24 0 80 
Tabel 5: FTEs allocated to real estate management activities (n-40) 
Municipalities were also asked to indicate in percentages how the number of FTEs are 
divided within their organisation. On average, 56% is dedicated to executive tasks. 23% of 
the employees are policy-makers, 13% is operating on management level and the other 10% 
to ‘other’ tasks. This shows that municipalities work mostly on an executive level. Per FTE 
for policy and management, municipalities employ an average of 1.5 FTE for executive tasks. 
Community real estate tasks are commonly organised and carried out centrally within 
municipalities (55%). Over the past years it can be seen that this form of organisation and 
execution has been the most commonly applied form (see figure 6) and that centralised 
organisation and decentralised execution decreased from 24% in 2012 to 14% in 2015. The 
variant in which all tasks are decentralised doubled between 2012 and 2014 for a number of 
applications, but decreased slightly in 2015. 
 
Figure 6: Organisation and execution of the community real estate (n=42) 
For some municipalities tasks are still fragmented, or it is unclear after a reorganisation 
what the organisation and execution of tasks looks like. There is also one municipality that 
has a system in which a number of tasks have a centralised organisation and execution, while 
a number of other tasks have a decentralised organisation and centralised execution. 
If we look at the organisation and execution of community real estate tasks according to 
municipality size (see table 6), we see that regardless of size centralised organisation and 
execution is employed most commonly. Centralised organisation and decentralised execution 
is carried out mainly among medium sized municipalities (25%), and it is predominantly the 
small and the large municipalities that employ a decentralised organisation and execution 
system (27% and 31%, respectively). This is about the same as last year. 
 
Small 
municipalities 
(n=11) 
Medium-sized 
municipalities 
(n=16) 
Large 
municipalities 
(n=14) 
Organized and carried out centrally 64% 38% 71% 
Centralised organisation and 
decentralised execution 
9% 25% 0% 
Organized and carried out 
decentrally 
27% 31% 14% 
Otherwise organised 0% 6% 14% 
Table 6: Organisation and execution of community real estate tasks according to municipality size 
More than half of the municipalities (61%) have plans to organise real estate tasks differently 
in the future than they currently do (n=41). 27% of the municipalities that have this intention 
chose for centralised organisation and execution. This is only half of last year, when 56% 
chose for this system. More than half (54%) chose for another form from the aforementioned 
three: integrating more internally, designing real estate companies, organising teams for real 
estate, and ensuring less fragmentation. A small number of municipalities indicated that 
(partly) outsourcing is a possibility, but most do not yet know how tasks will be organised in 
the future. Most municipalities (68%) want to introduce the changes in the short term (1 to 
2 years). About half (n=41) of the municipalities expect that the number of FTEs allocated to 
real estate management activities will change during the next year, while the other half do 
not expect any change. 
Quality measurements 
Like in all previous years, municipalities were asked how often they measured technical 
quality, user satisfaction and the contribution of community real estate to policy goals. The 
results can be found in figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Quality measurements at municipalities in 2015 (n=40) 
Table 7 and figure 8 provide an overview of the number of municipalities (in %) that have 
measured technical quality, user satisfaction and the contribution of community real estate 
to policy goals in previous years. These overviews combine the answers ‘multiple times per 
year’, ‘annually’, ‘biannually’ and ‘other/incidentally’ because they only indicate that the 
elements mentioned are being measured. This year was the first time that the municipalities 
were asked how often they measure community / social return: 70% of the municipalities 
indicate that they measure this. 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2014 2015 
Technical quality 86% 90% 88% 73% 86% 98% 100% 
User satisfaction 70% 70% 60% 83% 47% 61% 87% 
Contribution of community 
real estate to policy goals 
71% 60% 30% 79% 33% 56% 90% 
Community / social return - - - - - - 70% 
Table 7: Quality measurements at municipalities over the years 
 
Figure 8: Quality measurements at municipalities 
Compared to last year, all three elements have been measured more: the number of 
municipalities that measure technical quality is currently 100%. The number of 
municipalities that measure user satisfaction increased by 26%, while the largest increase 
can be observed with the number of municipalities that measure the contribution of 
community real estate to policy goals: compared to last year 34% more municipalities 
indicated that they measure this. The measurement of community return cannot be 
compared to last year, because this is the first year that the municipalities were asked for 
this statistic. 
Conclusions 
In 2015 the Barometer for Community Real Estate was carried out for the seventh time 
among municipalities in the Netherlands. This year 51% of the 393 municipalities opened 
the questionnaire and 173 municipalities (39%) completed the questionnaire in whole or in 
part. The ratio for small, medium sized and large municipalities in the response group is 
fairly representative for all municipalities in the Netherlands. The questionnaire responses 
have led to the following conclusions.  
Half of the municipalities has a policy but takes few risk measures 
About half of all municipalities have a maintenance policy, municipal real estate policy, 
accommodation policy, rental policy, vision of real estate management, a rent price policy 
and/or an operating policy. An exception is risk management: only a limited number of 
municipalities have established proactive measures concerning financial risks of community 
real estate. A larger number of municipalities takes measures through financial monitoring, 
while almost half of the municipalities has no measures concerning community real estate.  
Withdrawing local government 
Various tasks have been regarded less and less by municipalities as municipal core tasks 
concerning community real estate. In 2008 80% of the municipalities regarded the tasks as 
municipal core tasks, which has dropped to 50% in 2015. This leads to the conclusion that 
municipalities in the Netherlands may be withdrawing. 
Management and operations most outsourced tasks 
Almost three quarters of the municipalities do not want to outsource tasks and are not 
planning to do so. Management and operations is the core task that is currently being 
outsourced the most and of which the intentions to outsource it are strongest. For 
municipalities, outsourcing in this case mainly means privatization.  
Obstacles remain unchanged 
Half of the municipalities face obstacles when carrying out community real estate tasks. 
Compared to last year, few (large) differences can be observed. The three most common 
obstacles are the lack of a rent price that covers expenses, low utilisation rates and the 
fragmentation of tasks. About half of the municipalities that experience the lack of a rent 
price that covers expenses as an obstacle have a municipal real estate policy and/or a rental 
policy.  
Other obstacles mentioned by respondents are the decreasing demand leading to oversupply 
of community real estate, the traditional separation between the various policy fields and 
legislation (such as the Education Act), the historic growth in diversity of property relations, 
prices and subsidising agreements (no clear line), the vagueness of terminology, the 
conservation of facilities in depopulating areas, the threat of corporate tax for renter 
activities (for community use) and the fragmentation of expertise. 
Cost reduction most relevant policy theme since 2009 
The most relevant real estate related policy theme is again cost reduction. Since 2009 this 
theme has occupied the number one spot, followed this year by the separation of subsidy for 
housing and operating expenses. What is striking when comparing the results of this year to 
those of 2014 is that all policy themes mentioned have become less relevant. The strongest 
decrease of relevance can be seen with protection of the facility level in small centres, 
improvement of policy quality, development of integral accommodation policies, protection of 
the facility level in neighbourhoods and districts, and the separation of subsidy for housing 
and operating expenses.  
Relevance of some policy themes depends on municipality size 
Cost reduction is the most relevant topic for small, medium sized and large municipalities. 
For the improvement of policy quality, the integration of tasks in the municipality and the 
physical clustering of cultural functions, the trend is that the larger the municipality is, the 
more relevant these themes are. The reverse applies to MFA formation: this is more relevant 
to small municipalities than to medium sized or large municipalities. For development of an 
integral accommodation policy, practically no difference can be observed between small, 
medium sized and large municipalities. 
More real estate is offered, smaller percentage is sold 
Three quarters of the municipalities regard selling community real estate as a means to 
control expenses. In that light they offered 7.2 objects on average on 2014, of which 1.5 on 
average were sold (21%). The year before that these figures were 2.7 and 1.2 (44%), 
respectively. 
More FTEs for real estate management, especially executive tasks 
This year was the second time the questionnaire included questions on the number of FTEs 
(full-time equivalents) with the municipalities for real estate management. This is almost 3.5 
times as much as last year: The average then was 4.4 FTE while this year it is 14.9 FTE. The 
additional question on the division of the FTEs for real estate management reveals that 
municipalities work mostly on an executive level. Per FTE for policy and management, 
municipalities employ an average of 1.5 FTE for executive tasks. Large municipalities employ 
the most FTEs for real estate management, followed by small municipalities. Medium 
municipalities have the least FTEs, on average, for real estate management activities. Most 
municipalities organise the organisation and execution of community real estate tasks 
centrally and more than half of the municipalities is planning to organise this differently in 
the future. About half of the municipalities expect that the number of FTEs will change next 
year: most expect the number to decrease. 
Consciously control quality  
The number of municipalities that measure quality has increased. Measurement of technical 
quality, user satisfaction, contribution to policy goals, and community return takes place 
multiple times per year, annually, biannually, incidentally or with another frequency. It is 
striking that 70% of the municipalities indicated that they measure community return, while 
a clear definition is lacking and it is often unclear how community return can be measured.  
  
References 
Veuger, J. et al (2015), Barometer Maatschappelijk Vastgoed. Public real estate international 
(Barometer for Community Real Estate: Public real estate international). 2e oplage: 
1000 exemplaren, uitverkocht. Lectoraat Maatschappelijk Vastgoed, Kenniscentrum 
NoorderRuimte, Hanzehogeschool Groningen. Assen: Van Gorcum (301 p.). 
Veuger, J. et al (2014), Barometer Maatschappelijk Vastgoed: maatschappelijk verantwoord 
ondernemen (Barometer for Community Real Estate: Corporate Social Responsibility). 
Oplage: 500 exemplaren, uitverkocht. Lectoraat Maatschappelijk Vastgoed, 
Kenniscentrum NoorderRuimte, Hanzehogeschool Groningen. Assen: Van Gorcum (593 
p). 
Veuger, J. et al. (2013), Barometer Maatschappelijk Vastgoed: onderzoeken en perspectieven 
op maatschappelijk en financieel rendement (Barometer for Community Real Estate: 
research and perspectives on social and financial returns). Oplage: 1000, uitverkocht. 
Lectoraat Maatschappelijk Vastgoed, Kenniscentrum  NoorderRuimte, 
Hanzehogeschool Groningen. Assen: Van Gorcum (365 p). 
Veuger, J. et al (2012), Barometer maatschappelijk vastgoed. Visie en onderzoeken 
(Barometer for Community Real Estate: vision and studies). Lectoraat Maatschappelijk 
Vastgoed, Kenniscentrum NoorderRuimte, Hanzehogeschool Groningen. Assen: Van 
Gorcum (163 p). 
Tjeerdsma, A. en J. Veuger (2014), Barometer Gemeentelijk Maatschappelijk Vastgoed 2014. 
Gemeenten verkopen nog zeer beperkt hun vastgoed (Barometer for Municipal 
Community Real Estate 2014: Municipalities sell their real estate highly limited). In: 
Vastgoedmarkt, september 2014, jrg. 41, p. 18-19. Den Haag: Sdu uitgevers.  
Tjeerdsma, A. en J. Veuger (2014), Barometer gemeentelijk Maatschappelijk Vastgoed 2014: 
gemeenten in beweging (Barometer for Municipal Community Real Estate 2014: 
municipalities in motion) . In: Barometer Maatschappelijk Vastgoed 2014: 22-37. 
Groningen: lectoraat Maatschappelijk Vastgoed Kenniscentrum NoorderRuimte 
Hanzehogeschool Groningen. 
Tjeerdsma, A. en J. Veuger (2014), Barometer Vastgoedmanagement Nederland 2014: meer 
vastgoedmanagement uitbesteden (Barometer for Dutch Real Estate Management: 
more outsourcing of real estate management). In: Barometer Maatschappelijk 
Vastgoed 2014: 554-561. Groningen: lectoraat Maatschappelijk Vastgoed 
Kenniscentrum NoorderRuimte Hanzehogeschool Groningen. 
Veuger, J. & A. Tjeerdsma (2012), Regionale samenwerking voor beter beheer 
maatschappelijk vastgoed. Barometer Maatschappelijk vastgoed 2012 (Regional 
cooperation to better manage community real estate. Barometer for Community Real 
Estate 2012). In: Vastgoedmarkt, oktober 2012, jrg. 39,  p. 68-69. Den Haag: Sdu 
uitgevers. 
Veuger, J. (2011), Barometer maatschappelijk vastgoed: trends & ontwikkelingen in 
maatschappelijk vastgoed (Barometer for Community Real Estate: trends & 
developments in community real estate). Groningen: Kenniscentrum NoorderRuimte 
Hanzehogeschool Groningen. 
Veuger, J. & A. Tjeerdsma (2011), Barometer maatschappelijk vastgoed 2011 (Barometer for 
Community Real Estate 2011). Groningen: Kenniscentrum NoorderRuimte 
Hanzehogeschool Groningen. 
Veuger, J. & O. Buiter (2010), Barometer maatschappelijk vastgoed 2010 (Barometer for 
Community Real Estate 2010). Groningen: Kenniscentrum NoorderRuimte 
Hanzehogeschool Groningen. 
Hanzehogeschool Groningen (2009), Barometer maatschappelijk vastgoed 2009 (Barometer 
for Community Real Estate 2009). Groningen: Hanzehogeschool Groningen. 
Hanzehogeschool Groningen (2008), Barometer maatschappelijk vastgoed 2008 (Barometer 
for Community Real Estate 2008). Groningen: Hanzehogeschool Groningen. 
Biographical Details 
Annette van den Beemt - Tjeerdsma: Annette has a bachelor Real Estate Management and 
a master’s degree in Change Management. Since 2010, she is a researcher at the 
professorship of Public Real Estate at the Hanze University of Applied Sciences Groningen 
and she works as a consultant at Thorbecke. In 2015 Annette started her PhD research on 
community real estate (management) under supervision of dr. Ing. Jan Veuger and prof. dr. 
Erwin van der Krabben (Radboud University Nijmegen). Additionally, she teaches research 
skills to bachelor students of Human Resource Management (Hanze University Groningen). 
Jan Veuger: The common thread in the curriculum vitae of Jan Veuger (1966) is strategic 
management of (social) property in the business and social housing. Jan completed his 
studies Master of Real Estate (MRE) in 2006 on a study on governance of social housing and 
consistency of quality instruments. He is thereby distinguished as best student MRE in 2006. 
Jan is the owner / director of CORPORATE © Real Estate Management, professor Public 
Real Estate at Hanze University of Applied Sciences Groningen, member of Committee or 
quality certificates in Quality Centre Housing Associations Rented Sector (KWH), supervisor 
at four various civil society organizations (130 to 2,000 employees) in the field of secondary 
education, youth and elderly. Furthermore he is foundation president at Quality 
Improvement Development Service organizations Netherlands (KOVON), Fellow of the Royal 
Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS), author of 13 (part of) books and 97 scientific- and 
professional publications, 4 syllabi, 63 research reports and 90 lectured . 
 
    No. 183 Real Estate Management  
  ERES 2016   8-11 June 2016 Regensburg 
Debt Capital Markets as a Funding Source for Listed Property Funds in South Africa  
Colin Murphy Head  Structured Debt Corporate and Investment Banking - Real Estate Finance Standard Bank Chris Cloete Programme Leader: MSc Real Estate Department of Construction Economics University of Pretoria  
Property finance in South Africa has traditionally been a market dominated by bank lending. However in the context of the Basel III Accord creating cost and other regulatory implications for bank lending, as well a maturing listed property market adopting international best practise in the form of REIT legislation, debt capital markets funding is becoming a significant  The study seeks to determine the merits of this nascent funding source are for REITs in South Africa.  With Debt Capital Markets funding now a material contributor to listed property fund capital structures, it is important to assess the impact this funding source has on REITs. Following a review of applicable literature, interviews with senior management of ten listed property funds and other debt capital markets stakeholders were undertaken. Certain advantages and disadvantages of debt capital markets funding, in comparison to other lending sources, were presented as hypotheses to the interviewees. The responses show support from a significant majority of the interviewees for four particular advantages and two disadvantages. The study also finds support for these advantages and disadvantages as being transient and it is advisable for REITs to periodically reassess the respective advantages and disadvantages of this funding source for their business. 
Keywords: REIT, Basel III, debt funding, South Africa, debt capital structure 
Session: Real Estate Management VG002, June 10, 2016, 2:15 - 3:45pm
 
1	  
DEBT	  CAPITAL	  MARKETS	  AS	  A	  FUNDING	  SOURCE	  FOR	  LISTED	  
PROPERTY	  FUNDS	  IN	  SOUTH	  AFRICA	  
C	  M	  Murphy	  and	  C	  E	  Cloete	  
Department	  of	  Construction	  Economics	  
University	  of	  Pretoria	  
	  
Corresponding	  author:	  chris.cloete@up.ac.za	  
	  
Abstract	  
Property	   finance	   in	   South	   Africa	   has	   traditionally	   been	   a	   market	   dominated	   by	   bank	  
lending.	  However	   in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Basel	   III	  Accord	  creating	  cost	  and	  other	  regulatory	  
implications	   for	   bank	   lending,	   as	   well	   a	   maturing	   listed	   property	   market	   adopting	  
international	  best	  practise	   in	   the	   form	  of	  REIT	   legislation,	  debt	   capital	  markets	   funding	   is	  
becoming	  a	  significant	  component	  of	  REITs’	  capital	  structure.	  The	  study	  seeks	  to	  determine	  
the	   merits	   of	   this	   nascent	   funding	   source	   for	   REITs	   in	   South	   Africa.	   	   With	   Debt	   Capital	  
Markets	  funding	  now	  a	  material	  contributor	  to	  listed	  property	  fund	  capital	  structures,	  it	  is	  
important	   to	   assess	   the	   impact	   this	   funding	   source	   has	   on	   REITs.	   Following	   a	   review	   of	  
applicable	   literature,	   interviews	  with	  senior	  management	  of	  ten	   listed	  property	  funds	  and	  
other	   debt	   capital	   markets	   stakeholders	   were	   undertaken.	   Certain	   advantages	   and	  
disadvantages	   of	   debt	   capital	   markets	   funding,	   in	   comparison	   to	   other	   lending	   sources,	  
were	   presented	   as	   hypotheses	   to	   the	   interviewees.	   The	   responses	   show	   support	   from	   a	  
significant	   majority	   of	   the	   interviewees	   for	   four	   particular	   advantages	   and	   two	  
disadvantages.	  The	  study	  also	  found	  support	  for	  these	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  to	  be	  
transient.	   	   It	   is	   therefore	   advisable	   for	   REITs	   to	   periodically	   reassess	   the	   respective	  
advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  this	  funding	  source	  for	  their	  business.	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INTRODUCTION	  
The	  property	  finance	  market	  in	  South	  Africa	  (“SA”)	  has	  historically	  been	  the	  preserve	  of	  the	  
SA	   banks,	   with	   property	   finance	   loans,	   secured	   by	   mortgage	   bonds	   over	   the	   subject	  
properties,	   being	   the	   principal	   product	   offered.	   The	   following	   table	   sets	   out	   the	   lending	  
landscape	  (participants	  and	  market	  share)	  for	  property	  finance	  amongst	  commercial	  banks:	  
Table	  1:	  BA900	  Market	  Share	  2010	  –	  2014	  
BA900	  Market	  Share 
Bank	   Dec-­‐10	   Dec-­‐11	   Dec-­‐12	   Dec-­‐13	   Dec-­‐14	  
R'000	   %	   R'000	   %	   R'000	   %	   R'000	   %	   R'000	   %	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ABSA	   	  51	  	   22%	   	  46	  	   19%	   	  42	  	   17%	   	  39	  	   15%	   	  37	  	   13%	  
FirstRand	   	  11	  	   5%	   	  12	  	   5%	   	  14	  	   6%	   	  13	  	   5%	   	  19	  	   6%	  
Investec	   	  42	  	   18%	   	  46	  	   19%	   	  50	  	   20%	   	  49	  	   19%	   	  54	  	   18%	  
Nedbank	   	  88	  	   38%	   	  92	  	   38%	   	  97	  	   38%	   	  103	  	   40%	   	  121	  	   41%	  
Standard	   	  36	  	   16%	   	  44	  	   18%	   	  45	  	   18%	   	  49	  	   19%	   	  57	  	   19%	  
Other	   	  3	  	   1%	   	  4	  	   2%	   	  5	  	   2%	   	  6	  	   2%	   	  7	  	   2%	  
Total	  per	  BA	  900	   	  231	  	   	  	   	  244	  	   	  	   	  253	  	   	  	   	  259	  	   	  	   	  295	  	   	  	  
Source:	  data	  per	  South	  African	  Reserve	  Bank,	  2015	  and	  SBG	  Securities,	  2015	  
In	   recent	   years,	   notably	   from	   2010	   onwards,	   a	   number	   of	   new	   facets	   to	   the	   property	  
finance	  market	  emerged.	  Undoubtedly	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  Basel	  III	  regulations,	  implemented	  
post	  the	  2008	  global	  financial	  crisis,	  have	  led	  to	  a	  change	  in	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  banks	  are	  
capitalised	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  source	  the	  required	  liquidity	  to	  provide	  loans	  to	  
the	  borrower.	  
The	  primary	  drivers	  of	  the	  Basel	  III	  Accord	  (“B	  III”)	  are:	  
• Net	   Stable	   Funding	   Ratio	   (“NSFR”)	   –	   Intended	   to	   promote	   a	  more	   stable	   funding	  
structure	   for	  banks	   (reduce	  dependency	  on	  short	   term	  wholesale	   funding).	  Stable	  
funding	   is	   defined	   as	   contractually	   long-­‐term	   funding	   (>12	   months	   remaining	  
maturity).	  Measured	   as:	  Available	   amount	   of	   stable	   funding/Required	   amount	   of	  
stable	   funding	   (BCBS,	   2014:2).	   There	   is	   a	   marked	   shortage	   of	   these	   high	   quality	  
liquid	   assets	   in	   certain	   countries,	   including	   SA,	   (Bech	   &	   Keister,	   2014:3)	   and,	   as	  
such,	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  dynamics	  are	  driving	  up	  the	  cost	  of	  borrowing.	  
• Liquidity	   Coverage	   Ratio	   (“LCR”)	   –	   Intended	   to	   ensure	   banks	   have	   enough	   high	  
quality	   liquid	   assets	   (“HQLA”)	   to	   protect	   against	   a	   short	   term	   liquidity	   shock.	  
Measured	   as:	  Stock	   of	   high	   quality	   liquid	   assets/Net	   cash	   outflows	   over	   a	   30	   day	  
period	  (BCBS,	  2013:4)	  
With	   the	   above	   structural	   changes	   in	   bank	   funding	   parameters,	   new	   aspects	   to	   the	  
property	   finance	  market	   have	   been	   observed.	   This	   includes	   the	   emergence	   of	   Non-­‐Bank	  
Financial	  Institutions	  (“NBFI’s”)	  –	  such	  as	  life	  assurance	  companies	  and	  asset	  managers	  that	  
seek	   to	   hold	   fixed	   income	   investments	   (including	   corporate	   debt)	   as	   well	   as	   the	   Debt	  
Capital	  Markets	  (“DCM”)	  that	  has	  shown	  itself	  to	  be	  a	  well-­‐supported	  platform	  offering	  an	  
efficient	  means	  of	   funding	   for	  both	  corporates	  and	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises.	  Total	  annual	  
credit	   issuance	  has	  grown	   from	  annual	   levels	  of	  below	  R30	  million	  per	  annum	   in	  2004	   to	  
above	  R100	  million	  per	  annum	  from	  2012	  onwards	  (Standard	  Bank	  Research,	  2015a:13).	  
Listed	  property	  companies	  have	  focussed	  on	  the	  DCM	  to	  introduce	  a	  new	  funding	  source	  to	  
their	  capital	   structure.	  The	   following	   table	   illustrates	   the	  growth	   in	  DCM	  activity	  by	   listed	  
property	  entities	  (outstanding	  balances	  as	  at	  31	  Dec	  2014):	  
Table	  2:	  Outstanding	  Property	  DCM	  Issuance	  
Year	   Bond	  Issuance	   Commercial	  paper	   Total	   %	  growth	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2010	   500,000,000	   835,000,000	   1,335,000,000	   	  
2011	   3,485,000,000	   2,175,000,000	   5,660,000,000	   324%	  
2012	   8,764,000,000	   5,102,000,000	   13,866,000,000	   145%	  
2013	   13,595,000,000	   5,905,000,000	   19,500,000,000	   41%	  
2014	   18,427,000,000	   5,982,000,000	   24,409,000,000	   25%	  
Source:	  data	  per	  Standard	  Bank	  Research,	  2015b	  
The	  following	  table	  illustrates	  the	  composition	  of	  debt	  funding	  for	  all	  listed	  property	  funds	  
that	  have	  a	  DCM	  programme	  in	  place	  as	  at	  December	  2014:	  
Table	  3:	  Listed	  Property	  Funds	  –	  Lending	  composition	  
	  
Source:	  data	  per	  Standard	  Bank	  Research	  (2015b),	  REIT	  annual	  financial	  statements	  (2014a	  -­‐	  m)	  and	  
Catalyst	  Fund	  Managers	  (2015)	  
The	   above	   funds	   represent	   75%	  of	   total	  market	   capitalisation	   (as	   adjusted	   below)	   of	   the	  
listed	  property	  sector	  on	  the	  JSE.	  This	  derivation	  is	  illustrated	  below:	  
Table	  4:	  Proportion	  of	  Listed	  Property	  Sector	  with	  DCM	  programmes	  
	   	   	   	  
Listed	  Property	  Sector	  Market	  Cap	  –	  Dec	  2014	   	   365	  117	  547	  446	  	   	  
Less:	  International	  Funds	  (with	  Offshore	  debt)	   	   	  	   	  
	  	   NEPI	   	   31	  707	  760	  000	  	   	  
	  	   Redefine	  International	   	   13	  001	  100	  000	  	   	  
	  	   Investec	  Australia	  Property	  Fund	   	   2	  934	  317	  446	  	   	  
Adjusted	  Sector	  Market	  Cap	   	   317	  474	  370	  000	  	   	  
4	  
Market	  Cap	  -­‐	  Funds	  with	  DCM	  programmes	  (Table	  2)	   	   238	  523	  050	  000	  	   	  
Proportion	  of	  Sector	  with	  DCM	  programmes	   	   75.1%	   	  
	  
	  
	   	  
Source:	  data	  per	  Catalyst	  Fund	  Managers,	  2015	  
With	   75%	   of	   listed	   property	   funds,	   by	  market	   capitalisation	   (as	   adjusted),	   having	   a	   DCM	  
programme	  and	  this	  DCM	  issuance	  representing	  26%	  of	  their	  total	  funding,	  it	  appears	  that	  
DCM	  funding	  has	  become	  a	  material	  contributor	  to	  listed	  property	  funds’	  capital	  structure.	  
Accordingly	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   advantages	   and	   disadvantages	   of	   the	   DCM	   as	   a	   funding	  
source	  for	  listed	  property	  funds	  is	  necessary.	  
The	  question	  to	  be	  examined	   is	   thus	  “What	  are	  the	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  the	  
DCM	  as	  a	  funding	  source	  for	  listed	  property	  funds	  in	  South	  Africa?”	  
To	  answer	  the	  above	  research	  question,	  the	  following	  hypotheses	  were	  tested:	  
• H1:	   The	   following	   are	   advantages	   of	   DCM	   as	   a	   funding	   source	   (relative	   to	   other	  
sources	  of	  debt):	  
o H1.1	  Cheap	  –	  lowering	  the	  fund’s	  average	  cost	  of	  debt	  
o H1.2	  Simpler	  documentation	  	  
o H1.3	  Longer	  debt	  maturities	  
• H2:	  The	  following	  are	  disadvantages	  of	  DCM	  as	  a	  funding	  source	  (relative	  to	  other	  
sources	  of	  debt):	  
o H2.1	  Inflexible	  as	  regards	  variations	  to	  terms	  
o H2.2	  Volatility	  of	  the	  investor	  base	  –	  and	  thus	  uncertainty	  of	  availability	  of	  
the	  funding	  source	  
By	  drawing	  from	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  study,	  listed	  property	  funds	  in	  SA	  will	  have	  information	  
pertaining	   to	   some	   significant	   positive	   and	   negative	   attributes	   that	   a	   new	   and	   growing	  
source	   of	   funding	   has	   for	   them.	   In	   so	   doing,	   listed	   property	   funds	   can	   better	   position	  
themselves	   to	   respond	   to	   these	   advantages	   and	   disadvantages.	   In	   addition,	   investors	   in	  
these	   instruments	  can	  benefit	   from	  the	  study	  by	  critically	  assessing	   their	  own	   investment	  
criteria	   against	   the	   advantages	   and	   disadvantages	   identified	   in	   the	   study	   and	   place	  
themselves	   in	   a	   position	   to	   improve	   their	   standing	   as	   a	   reliable	   and	   robust	   source	   of	  
funding	   for	   the	   listed	  property	  sector.	  Consequently,	  benefit	   to	   the	  above	  parties	  may	  be	  
found	  in	  improved	  dialogue	  that	  could	  shape	  a	  better	  outcome	  for	  both	  parties	  in	  a	  nascent	  
funding	  source	  for	  the	  listed	  property	  sector.	  
The	   remainder	   of	   the	   article	   is	   structured	   as	   follows:	   	   Firstly	   it	   reviews	   the	   literature	  
pertaining	   to	   the	   REIT	   legislation	   in	   SA,	   the	   Basel	   III	   developments	   that	   can	   affect	   reit	  
funding	  decisions	  and	   lastly	   the	  DCM	  context	  and	  how	  REIT	   funding	  decisions	  and	  capital	  
structure	  are	  shaped.	  	  Subsequently	  the	  research	  methodology	  is	  introduced	  and	  discussed.	  
The	   findings	   of	   the	   research	   study	   are	   then	   presented.	   The	   paper	   concludes	   with	   a	  
discussion	  of	  the	  findings,	  implications	  and	  aspects	  for	  further	  research.	  
LITERATURE	  REVIEW	  
The	  literature	  review	  commences	  by	  providing	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  development	  of	  
the	   various	   Basel	   Accords,	  mostly	   notably	   B	   III,	   on	   the	   lending	   landscape	   as	   it	   relates	   to	  
bank	  funding	  costs.	  The	  literature	  review	  continues	  with	  an	  outline	  of	  the	  DCM	  in	  SA	  as	  well	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positioning	  the	  findings	  of	  various	  authors	  that	  have	  studied	  the	  decision	  making	  drivers	  for	  
listed	   property	   funds	   and	   their	   capital	   structures.	   This	   section	   of	   the	   literature	   review	  
identifies	  research	  undertaken	  that	  studies	  the	  reasons	  why	  listed	  property	  funds	  make	  the	  
decisions	  they	  do	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  types	  of	  debt	  are	  introduced	  into	  their	  capital	  structure.	  
That	   is,	  what	   advantages	   and	  disadvantages	   are	   listed	  property	   funds	   attributing	   to	   their	  
various	  funding	  sources.	  	  
Implications	  of	  Basel	  III	  Accord	  
A	   number	   of	   studies	   have	   been	   conducted	   to	   assess	   and	   quantify	   the	   impact	   of	   higher	  
capital	  requirements	  as	  well	  as	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  global	  liquidity	  standard	  under	  B	  III.	  
The	   findings	   of	   these	   studies	   and	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   they	   may	   inform	   the	   SA	   lending	  
context	  are	  examined	  below.	  In	  particular	  the	  intention	  is	  to	  understand	  the	  bank	  lending	  
framework	  confronting	  listed	  property	  funds.	  
When	   the	   Basel	   III	   literature	   is	   considered	   in	   the	   SA	   listed	   property	   fund	   context,	  where	  
gross	   lending	  margins	   for	   listed	   property	   funds	   are	   reported	   to	   be	   between	   155bps	   and	  
175bps	  for	  a	  5	  year	  bullet	  tenor	  (REIT	  annual	  financial	  statements,	  2014a	  –	  m)),	  it	  becomes	  
clear	   that	   increased	   lending	   spreads	   of	   25bps	   to	   40bps	   (determined	   by	   applying	   the	  
percentages	   of	   15%	   to	   23%	   per	   King	   (2010),	   in	   conjunction	  with	   the	   various	   actual	   basis	  
point	  ranges	  cited	  by	  Cohen	  and	  Scatigna	  (2014:3))	  for	  a	  one	  percentage	  point	  increase	  in	  
capital	  ratios,	  would	  have	  a	  material	  impact	  on	  the	  cost	  of	  funding.	  This	  is	  a	  critical	  factor	  in	  
a	   sector	   that	   is	   assessed	   on	   its	   ability	   to	   provide	   investors	   with	   an	   escalating	   income	  
stream.	  
A	   point	   of	   interest	   for	   the	   SA	   context	   is	   that	   King	   (2010:28)	   emphasises	   the	   offering	   of	  
shorter	  dated	  debt	  by	  banks	  as	  a	  means	  of	  reducing	  the	  cost	  impact	  of	  the	  NSFR.	  It	  is	  noted	  
that	  this	  would	  not	  likely	  hold	  appeal	  for	  listed	  property	  funds	  who	  seek	  liquidity	  for	  growth	  
in	  the	  form	  of	  medium	  term	  bullet	  profile	  debt.	  In	  addition	  the	  associated	  refinance	  risk	  of	  
too	  much	  short	  tenor	  debt	  is	  not	  preferred	  by	  listed	  property	  fund	  stakeholders	  (Moody’s	  
Investors	  Service,	  2002:4).	  
The	  key	  points	  to	  draw	  from	  the	  literature	  review	  as	  regards	  the	  banking	  environment	  and	  
B	  III	  are	  that:	  
• Banks	  in	  developed	  markets	  appear	  to	  require	  a	  lower	  increase	  in	  lending	  spreads	  
to	   recoup	   the	   costs	   of	   meeting	   the	   B	   III	   capital	   adequacy	   ratios	   than	   those	   in	  
emerging	   markets	   (of	   which	   SA	   is	   one)	   (Chun,	   Kim	   &	   Ko	   (2012:22),	   Di	   Biase	  
(2012:1276),	  Schanz,	  Aikman,	  Collazos,	  Farag,	  Gregory	  &	  Kapadia	  (2011:74));	  
• Real	  estate	  lending	  is	  shown	  to	  be	  on	  the	  lower	  end	  of	  the	  lending	  spread	  increases	  
required	   as	   a	   result	   of	  meeting	   the	   capital	   requirements	   under	   B	   III	   (Chun	   et	   al.,	  
2012:3);	  
• SA	  is	  one	  of	  the	  markets	  identified	  as	  having	  a	  shortage	  of	  HQLA	  necessary	  to	  meet	  
the	   LCR	   (South	   African	   Reserve	   Bank,	   2013:4	   and	   Bech	   &	   Keister,	   2014:3).	   The	  
South	  African	  Reserve	  Bank	  provision	  of	  a	  CLF	  highlights	   the	  constraints	  SA	  banks	  
face	   to	   secure	  adequate	  sources	  of	   funding	   to	  meet	   the	  global	   liquidity	   standard,	  
suggesting	  that	   the	  cost	   implications	   for	  borrowers	  are	  more	   likely	   to	  be	  material	  
increases	  of	  a	  nature	  that	  banks	  will	  not	  absorb;	  and	  
• The	  cost	   impact	  of	   the	  global	   liquidity	  standard	  on	   lending	  spreads	  appears	   to	  be	  
greater	   than	  that	  of	   the	  heightened	  capital	   requirements.	  The	  primary	  cost	  driver	  
under	   the	   global	   liquidity	   standard	   is	   the	   NSFR,	   with	   forecast	   lending	   spread	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increases	   of	   20	   to	   24bps	   required	   to	   offset	   the	   cost	   of	   higher	   levels	   of	   longer	  
maturity	  funding	  sources	  (King,	  2010:28),	  Chun	  et	  al.	  (2012:25).	  
Thus	  the	  take	  away	  for	  debt	  funding	  for	  price	  sensitive	  listed	  property	  funds	  in	  an	  emerging	  
market,	  is	  one	  of	  a	  high	  likelihood	  of	  increased	  lending	  spreads.	  In	  particular	  the	  preference	  
to	  reduce	  refinance	  risk	  with	  longer	  dated	  funding	  could	  prove	  problematic	  where	  a	  market	  
was	  limited	  to	  bank	  lending	  as	  a	  sole	  debt	  source.	  
Debt	  Capital	  Markets	  and	  REIT	  capital	  structure	  decisions	  
SA	  has	  a	  well-­‐established	  DCM,	  with	  participation	  across	  a	  number	  of	  categories	  including	  
municipalities,	  SOE’s,	  financial	  institutions	  (including	  banks)	  and	  corporates	  (including	  listed	  
property	   funds).	   The	   local	   DCM	   has	   outstanding	   issuance	   of	   approximately	   R	   1,9	   trillion	  
(Nedbank	  Capital	  Research,	  2014:3).	  Leading	  categories	  are	  SA	  Government	  bonds	  at	  62.6%	  
of	   total	   issuance,	   followed	   by	   the	   financial	   sector	   with	   15.3%	   and	   the	   SOE	   sector	   with	  
12.8%.	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  DCM	  –	  Outstanding	  balance	  per	  category	  	  (Source:	  Nedbank	  Capital	  Research,	  2014)	  
The	  DCM	  has	   seen	  consistent	  growth	   in	  annual	   issuance	   since	  2000,	  with	  2008	  being	   the	  
only	  exception.	  The	   issuance	   levels	  over	  the	  past	  three	  years	   (2012,	  2013	  and	  2014)	  have	  
been	   the	   highest	   in	   the	   15	   years	   since	   2000	   per	   graph	   below	   (Standard	   Bank	   Research,	  
2015a:13).	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Figure	  2:	  DCM	  –	  annual	  issuance	  and	  forecast	  	  (Source:	  Standard	  Bank	  Research,	  2015a)	  
The	   property	   sector	   constitutes	   the	   largest	   and	   most	   active	   contributor	   within	   the	  
corporate	  DCM	  issuer	  universe	  (Nedbank	  Capital	  Research,	  2014:6)	  with	   its	   issuance	  as	  of	  
December	  2014	  of	  R24bn	  (Standard	  Bank	  Research,	  2015b)	  comprising	  approximately	  25%	  
of	  the	  total	  of	  R101.5bn	  in	  outstanding	  bonds	  and	  CP	  (Nedbank	  Capital	  Research,	  2014:5).	  
Property	   funds	   show	  growing	  evidence	  of	  drawing	  on	   the	  DCM	  as	  a	   funding	   source,	  with	  
particular	  emphasis	  on	  short-­‐term	  funding	  in	  the	  CP	  market,	  a	  segment	  in	  which	  property	  
issuers	   account	   for	   approximately	   half	   of	   the	   total	   corporate	   CP	   issuance	   outstanding.	  
Listed	   property	   funds	   comprise	   10	   out	   of	   the	   17	   corporate	   issuers	   with	   outstanding	  
issuances	  as	  at	  October	  2014	  (Nedbank	  Capital	  Research,	  2014:9).	  
Drivers	  of	  REIT	  capital	  structure	  and	  their	  associated	  effects	  
The	  key	  points	  to	  draw	  from	  the	  literature	  review	  as	  regards	  REIT	  participation	  in	  the	  DCM	  
and	  the	  impact	  on	  REIT	  capital	  structure	  are	  that:	  
• Most	   listed	   property	   funds	   in	   SA	   	   have	   established	   a	   DCM	   programme	   and	   this	  
funding	   source	   constitutes	   a	  material	   component	  of	   total	   debt	   funding	   (Standard	  
Bank	  Research,	  2015b)	  
• DCM	  participation	  is	  a	  function	  of	  REIT	  maturity	  (Hardin	  III	  &	  Wu,	  2010:281)	  
• An	  investment	  grade	  credit	  rating	  is	  key	  for	  DCM	  participation	  (Brown	  &	  Riddiough,	  
2003:315)	  
• Secured	   versus	   unsecured	   debt	   plays	   a	  meaningful	   role	   in	   REIT	   funding	   decisions	  
(Moody’s	  Investors	  Service,	  2002:1)	  
• Unsecured	  DCM	  issuance	  is	  seen	  to	  allow	  the	  issuer	  to	  remain	  flexible	  and	  manage	  
its	  asset	  decisions	  with	   limited,	   if	  any,	   third	  party	   intervention	  (Moody’s	   Investors	  
Service,	  2002:3-­‐4)	  
• REIT	  funding	  decisions	  are	  a	  function	  of	  market	  timing	  and	  a	  trade-­‐off	  between	  the	  
relative	  costs	  of	  debt	  and	  equity	  funding	  at	  the	  point	  at	  which	  the	  funding	  decision	  
is	  made	  (Boudry,	  Kalberg	  &	  Liu,	  2010:118	  and	  Feng,	  Ghosh	  &	  Sirmans,	  2007:82)	  
• Banking	  relationships	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  facilitator	  to	  DCM	  entry	  due	  to	  the	  perceived	  
validation	   and	   monitoring	   benefit	   of	   this	   funding	   source	   (Hardin	   III	   &	   Wu,	  
2010:260)	  	  
In	  summary	  the	  following	  can	  be	  gained	  from	  the	  literature	  review:	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• SA	   has	   a	  well-­‐established	   and	   growing	   listed	   property	   sector	  with	   a	   track	   record	  
spanning	  many	  years	  
• SA	   is	   adopting	   international	   best	   practise	  with	  REIT	   legislation	   introduced	   in	  May	  
2013.	   A	   number	   of	   property	   funds	   have	   completed,	   or	   are	   underway,	   with	   their	  
REIT	  conversion	  
• SA	   listed	   property	   funds	   show	   good	   credit	   quality	   as	   evidenced	   by	   their	   stable	  
external	  credit	  ratings	  
• The	  introduction	  of	  B	  III	  (as	  well	  as	  the	  previous	  accords)	  has	  led	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  
the	   cost	   of	   capital	   and	   liquidity	   for	   banks,	   such	   that	   a	   passing	   on	   of	   costs	   to	  
borrowers	  appears	  unavoidable	  
• REITs	  are	  evaluating	  and	  incorporating	  both	  secured	  and	  unsecured	  lending	  in	  their	  
capital	  structure.	  These	  two	  forms	  of	  debt	  have	  discernible	  pros	  and	  cons	  	  
• A	  number	  of	  studies	  show	  differing	  quantification	  of	  this	  cost,	  but	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  
cost	  increase	  will	  result	  
• The	  DCM	  in	  SA	  is	  a	  growing	  source	  of	  funding	  across	  borrower	  types,	  with	  evidence	  
of	  strong	  growth	  and	  material	  representation	  as	  a	  funding	  source	  
• It	   is	   indicated	   that	   listed	   property	   funds	   see	   the	  DCM	  as	   a	   lasting,	   or	   permanent	  
feature	  of	  their	  capital	  structure	  
• It	   can	   be	   shown	   that	   the	   DCM	   is	   not	   a	   perfect	   source	   of	   funding	   and	   that	   it	   is	  
susceptible	   to	   volatile	   investor	   appetite	   and	   is	   meaningfully	   influenced	   by	  
externalities.	   Clearly	   these	   attributes	   of	   the	   DCM	  must	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   listed	  
property	  funds.	  
Based	  on	  the	  above,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  following	  gaps	  in	  the	  available	  literature:	  
• A	  mapping	  of	  the	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  the	  DCM	  as	  a	  funding	  source	  for	  
listed	  property	  funds	  
• The	  conducting	  of	  the	  above	  research	  in	  the	  SA	  context	  
• An	   identification	   of	   steps	   (a	   possible	   subject	   for	   further	   research)	   that	   listed	  
property	  funds	  can	  take	  to	  better	  position	  themselves	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  identified	  
advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  DCM	  funding.	  
METHODOLOGY	  
The	  aim	  of	  the	  research	  is	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  hypotheses	  regarding	  the	  advantages	  
and	  disadvantages	  of	  DCM	  as	  a	  funding	  source	  for	   listed	  property	  funds	  have	  any	  support	  
and	  can,	  or	  cannot,	  thus	  be	  rejected.	  
To	   test	   these	   hypotheses	   constitutes	   an	   in-­‐depth	   study	   that	  will	   focused	   on	   the	   findings	  
elicited	  from	  the	  senior	  management	  of	  SA	  listed	  property	  funds	  as	  well	  as	  industry	  experts	  
involved	   in	   supporting	   listed	   property	   funds	   to	   establish	   and	   operate	   their	   DCM	  
programmes.	  
In	   order	   to	   achieve	   adequate	   sampling	   of	   sufficient	   participants	   in	   the	   listed	   property	  
sector,	  with	  DCM	  programmes,	  the	  following	  four	  considerations	  were	  assessed:	  
1) A	  form	  of	  ranking	  by	  market	  capitalisation	  (as	  at	  31	  December	  2014)	  –	  as	  a	  means	  
of	   assessing	   the	   proportion	   of	   the	   sector	   responding	   in	   a	   certain	   way	   –	   this	  
approach	  also	   tends	   to	  speak	   to	   the	  maturity	  of	   the	   funds	   in	   the	  sector,	  with	   the	  
larger	  funds	  typically	  having	  the	  longer	  track	  records	  in	  the	  sector	  relative	  to	  those	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funds	  with	  smaller	  market	  capitalisations,	  which	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  recent	  entrants	  to	  
the	  listed	  property	  market.	  
2) The	   alternative	  was	   to	   focus	   on	   the	  DCM	  experience	  of	   the	   funds	   in	   the	   form	  of	  
aggregating	  the	  number	  of	  years	  for	  which	  their	  DCM	  programme	  has	  been	  active	  
and	  weighting	  responses	  on	  this	  basis.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  years	  of	  DCM,	  each	  part	  of	  a	  
year	   for	  which	  DCM	  was	   in	   issuance,	  was	   included	  as	   a	   full	   year.	   The	  basis	  being	  
that	  although	  an	  issuance	  may	  have	  been,	  say,	   in	  Dec	  2010,	  the	  lead	  time,	  ratings	  
agency	   interaction	   and	   investor	   road	   shows	   would	   have	   covered	   a	   number	   of	  
months	  of	  the	  year,	  such	  that	  the	  experience	  was	  being	  built	  up	  in	  the	  lead	  up	  to	  
the	  issuance.	  This	  is	  all	  the	  more	  relevant	  in	  the	  instance	  of	  the	  maiden	  issuance	  of	  
each	  fund.	  The	  period	  covered	  by	  the	  study	  was	  2010	  to	  2014.	  
3) The	   third	   method	   considered	   weighting	   responses	   based	   on	   the	   interviewee’s	  
proportion	  of	  outstanding	  DCM	  issuance	  to	  the	  total	  outstanding	  REIT	  sector	  DCM	  
issuance	  as	  at	  31	  December	  2014.	  
4) The	  fourth	  method	  applied	  was	  to	  weight	  the	  responses	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  the	  total	  
number	  of	  interviewees.	  
The	   table	  below	   sets	  out	   the	  proportion	  of	   the	  universe	  of	   13	   listed	  property	   funds	  with	  
DCM	  programmes	  and	  issuance	  as	  at	  31	  Dec	  2014	  that	  the	  achieved	  sample	  covers	  across	  
the	  four	  weighting	  approaches.	  
Table	  5:	  Determination	  of	  sampling	  coverage	  	  
	   Market	  capitalisation	  
Years	   of	   DCM	  
Issuance	  
Proportion	   of	  
DCM	   Issuance	  
Outstanding	  
No.	   of	  
interviewees	  
Participants	   R225.9bn	   35	   R21,522bn	   10	  
Universe	   R238.5bn	   41	   R24,409bn	   13	  
%	   94.7%	   85.4%	   88.2%	   76.9%	  
Source:	  data	  from	  Standard	  Bank	  Research,	  2015b	  and	  Catalyst	  Fund	  Managers,	  2015	  
The	   interviews	  followed	  a	  semi-­‐structured	  format	  using	  the	  same	  questions	  as	  a	  basis	   for	  
each	   interview	   and	   allowed	   for	   further	   opinion	   and	   insight	   to	   be	   expressed	   by	   the	  
interviewee.	   This	   dialogue	   served	   to	   further	   unlock	   the	   reasoning	   and	   rationale	   for	   the	  
answers	  provided	  by	  the	  interviewees.	  	  
In	  total	   twelve	   interviewees	  participated	   in	  the	  research.	  These	   interviewees	   included	  ten	  
REIT	   executives	   (the	   “insiders”),	   with	   eight	   being	   the	   CFO	   or	   an	   executive	   with	   finance	  
responsibilities,	   and	   two	   being	   CEOs.	   The	   “outsiders”	   comprised	   the	   head	   of	   a	   local	   SA	  
bank’s	   	   DCM	   advisory	   team	   and	   an	   analyst	   in	   the	   SA	   office	   of	   an	   international	   ratings	  
agency.	  	  
The	  following	  questions	  were	  posed	  to	  all	  interviewees:	  
1) Do	   you	   think	   that	   including	   DCM	   funding	   could	   lower	   the	   average	   cost	   of	   debt	  
funding	  for	  a	  listed	  property	  fund?	  
2) Do	   you	   view	   the	   DCM	   documentation	   as	   simpler	   compared	   to	   that	   of	   private	  
lending	  sources	  (bank	  and	  NBFI’s)?	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3) Do	  you	  believe	  that	  longer	  term	  debt	  could	  be	  sourced	  from	  the	  DCM	  as	  opposed	  
to	  the	  private	  lending	  sources?	  
4) Do	  you	  consider	  the	  DCM	  to	  be	  less	  flexible	  as	  opposed	  to	  private	  lending	  sources	  
in	  terms	  of	  variations	  to	  the	  lending	  terms	  and	  conditions?	  
5) Do	   you	   believe	   the	   availability	   of	   DCM	   funding	   to	   be	   less	   stable	   as	   opposed	   to	  
private	  lending	  sources?	  
In	   order	   to	   enhance	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   research	   project,	   corroboration	   or	   convergence	  
between	  the	  views	  of	  the	  “insiders”	  and	  “outsiders”	  was	  assessed	  as	  a	  means	  of	  adding	  a	  
layer	  of	  robustness	  to	  the	  research.	  
FINDINGS	  
As	  a	  point	  of	  departure,	   the	   literature	   review	  has	  highlighted	   certain	   findings	   that	   create	  
some	  context	  for	  the	  environment	  in	  which	  listed	  property	  funds	  are	  evaluating	  their	  debt	  
funding	   sources	   and	   serve	   to	   frame	   the	   research	   question	   and	   associated	   hypotheses.	  
These	  findings	  include:	  
• A	   developing	   listed	   property	   market	   in	   SA	   that	   is	   adopting	   international	   best	  
practice	  in	  the	  form	  of	  REIT	  legislation	  and	  that	   is	   incorporating	  DCM	  funding	  into	  
its	  debt	  sources	  at	  a	  growing	  rate	  
• BIII	   regulations,	   in	  particular	   the	   introduction	  of	   the	  NSFR,	  which	  are	  expected	   to	  
increase	   the	   lending	   spreads	   charged	   to	   borrowers	   in	   the	   years	   ahead.	   Thus	  
diversification	  of	  funding	  sources	  is	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  that	  long	  dated,	  low	  cost,	  
reliable	   funding	   is	   available	   for	  a	   listed	  property	   sector	   that	  needs	   to	  distribute	  a	  
growing	  income	  stream.	  
• The	  differing	  impact	  of	  secured	  and	  unsecured	  debt	  on	  a	  REIT’s	  credit	  rating	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  necessity	  of	  a	  strong	  credit	  rating	  to	  optimise	  access	  to	  various	  debt	  sources	  
• The	   introduction	   of	   listed	   debt	   serving	   to	   reduce	   the	   proportion	   of	   secured	   debt	  
owing	  and/or	  extending	  the	  maturity	  profile	  of	  the	  issuer,	  in	  that	  bank	  debt	  of	  sub	  
five	   year	   tenor	   is	   typically	   replaced	  with	  DCM	   issuances	   of	   between	   five	   and	   ten	  
year	  tenor.	  Empirically,	   this	  extension	  of	   the	  maturity	  profile	  does	  not	  definitively	  
seem	  to	  be	  the	  case	  for	  listed	  property	  funds	  in	  SA	  yet	  
• The	   indication	   that	   DCM	   is	   susceptible	   to	   volatile	   investor	   appetite	   and	   is	  
meaningfully	  influenced	  by	  externalities	  (such	  as	  the	  ABIL	  failure)	  
Testing	  of	  hypotheses	  –	  summation	  of	  interview	  responses	  
In	   summary,	   the	   responses	   received	   on	   each	   of	   the	   interview	   questions	   leads	   to	   the	  
following	   conclusions	   regarding	   the	  hypotheses	  H1.1	   to	  H2.2	   (Refer	  Tables	  6,	  7	  and	  8	   for	  
calculations):	  
H.1.1	  –	  All	   interviewees	   confirmed	   that	  DCM	   funding	   can	   lower	   the	  average	   cost	  of	  debt	  
funding	   for	   a	   listed	   property	   fund,	   particularly	   when	   including	   CP	   in	   the	   debt	   funding	  
structure.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  average	  cost	  of	  debt	  funding	  can	  be	  lowered	  is	  market	  
dependent.	  A	   caveat	  highlighted	  was	   the	  need	   for	   standby	   facilities	   to	  provide	  a	   liquidity	  
back-­‐stop	   for	   short	   dated	   CP	   issuances.	   A	   further	   point	   noted	   was	   that	   the	   DCM	  
programme	  requires	  some	  scale	   in	  the	   issuance	   levels	  to	  absorb	  the	   initial	  set	  up	  costs	  of	  
the	   programme.	   Furthermore,	   despite	   the	   negative	   impact	   of	   the	   ABIL	   event	   on	   DCM	  
pricing	  and	  appetite,	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  DCM	  funding	  can	  lower	  the	  average	  cost	  of	  debt	  
funding	  was	   still	   supported	   in	   a	   post-­‐ABIL	   environment,	   suggesting	   this	   advantage	   to	   be	  
quite	  robust,	  especially	  with	  CP	  in	  the	  funding	  mix.	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H.1.2	  –	  In	  excess	  of	  89%	  of	  interviewees	  (with	  an	  average	  of	  90%),	  across	  all	  measurement	  
weightings	  supported	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  DCM	  documentation	  was	  simpler	  than	  that	  of	  the	  
private	  lending	  sources.	  The	  opinions	  on	  whether	  this	  simplicity	  was	  a	  material	  advantage	  
of	  DCM	  funding	  reduced	  to	  no	  less	  than	  50%	  across	  the	  measurements	  weightings	  (57%	  on	  
average)	   being	   in	   support	   of	   the	   hypothesis.	   A	   common	   theme	   emanating	   from	   the	  
interviews	   was	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   initial	   DCM	   programme	   establishment,	   but	   the	  
subsequent	  ease	  of	   issuance	  thereafter.	   It	  was	  also	  noted	  that	  the	  private	   lending	  market	  
was	   levelling	   the	  playing	   field	   through	   the	  use	  of	  a	  common	  terms	  agreement	   format	   for	  
loan	   documentation,	   also	   leading	   to	   a	   simplified	   documentation	   process	   for	   providing	  
further	  loan	  facilities	  to	  the	  borrower.	  
H.1.3	   –	   No	   more	   than	   40%	   of	   interviewees	   (with	   an	   average	   of	   35%),	   across	   all	  
measurement	  weightings,	   supported	   the	  hypothesis	   that	   obtaining	   longer	   term	  debt	  was	  
an	  advantage	  of	   the	  DCM.	  A	  consistent	  view	  expressed	  was	  that	   longer	  term	  debt	  should	  
theoretically	   be	   possible,	   as	   the	   construct	   of	   the	  DCM	   caters	   for	   this	  with	   its	   long	   dated	  
parastatal	   and	   government	   issuers	   as	   well	   as	   the	   institutional	   DCM	   investor	   base	   (asset	  
managers	   and	   life	   assurance	   companies)	   that	   should	   be	   targeting	   longer	   dated	   assets	   to	  
match	   their	   liabilities.	   It	  was	   noted	  by	   certain	   interviewees	   that	   the	   cost	   of	   longer	   dated	  
debt,	  may	  be	  a	   reason	  why	  yield	   focussed	   listed	  property	   funds	  are	  not	  actively	  pursuing	  
the	  potential	  tenor	  benefit	  available	  through	  the	  DCM.	  A	  number	  of	  interviewees	  allude	  to	  
the	  private	  placement	  route	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  Dutch	  auction	  route,	  being	  the	  route	  to	  use	  
to	  explore	  an	  issuance	  of	  a	  longer	  tenor.	  	  
H.2.1	  –	  In	  excess	  of	  70%	  of	  interviewees	  (with	  an	  average	  of	  76%),	  across	  all	  measurement	  
weightings,	   supported	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   the	   inflexibility	   of	   DCM	   to	   variations	   was	   a	  
disadvantage.	  Mention	  was	  made	  that	  a	  defined	  point	  of	  contact	  and	  a	  strong	  relationship	  
with	  the	  lender	  was	  key	  to	  ensuring	  a	  simple	  and	  reliable	  means	  of	  negotiating	  variation	  of	  
terms	  as	  regards	  private	  lending	  sources.	  It	  was	  noted	  that	  although	  securing	  a	  favourable	  
decision	  for	  a	  variation	  under	  an	  existing	  DCM	  issuance	  was	  possible,	  both	  the	  cumbersome	  
process	  involved	  and	  the	  potential	  negative	  market	  reaction	  to	  such	  variation	  were	  likely	  to	  
deter	  issuers.	  
H.2.2	   -­‐	   All	   interviewees,	   irrespective	   of	   measurement	   weighting,	   were	   in	   support	   of	   the	  
hypothesis	   that	   the	   DCM	   is	   a	   less	   stable	   source	   of	   funding	   relative	   to	   private	   lending	  
sources.	   Some	   interviewees	   challenged	   the	   view	   that	  DCM	  availability	   could	   be	   achieved	  
“at	  a	  price”	  in	  that	  negative	  market	  events	  had	  shown	  that	  DCM	  investors	  could	  withdraw	  
from	  the	  market	  entirely.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  relationship	  with	  lenders	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  
business	  as	  real	  estate	  financiers,	  made	  bank	  and	  NBFI	   lending	  more	  stable,	  although	  at	  a	  
price.	  A	  further	  contributor	  to	  the	  instability	  of	  DCM	  funding	  was	  the	  inability	  to	  secure	  an	  
early	   refinance	   of	   an	   issuance	   and	   thus	   the	   issuer	  was	   vulnerable	   to	   the	   vagaries	   of	   the	  
market	  on	  the	  given	  date	  of	  refinance	  or	  new	  issuance.	  
Further	  advantages	  revealed	  
In	   the	   process	   of	   the	   interviews	   that	   formed	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   study,	   certain	   other	  
advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  outside	  of	  those	  encapsulated	  in	  the	  hypotheses	  were	  raised	  
by	   the	   interviewees.	   In	   particular,	   two	   further	   advantages	   were	   supported	   by	   sufficient	  
interviewees	  such	   that	  had	   they	  been	  hypothesis	   to	  start	  with,	   the	  study	  would	  not	  have	  
shown	  any	  basis	  on	  which	  to	  reject	  them.	  
The	  further	  advantages	  are:	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Additional	  advantage	  1	  –	  Diversification	  of	  funding	  sources.	   In	  what	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  
relatively	   small	  market	   for	   real	   estate	   debt	   sources	   in	   SA,	   having	   a	   further	   alternative	   to	  
choose	   from	   is	   an	   advantage.	   Comments	   raised	   included	   that	   this	   additional	   source	   of	  
funding	  benefited	  the	  listed	  property	  funds	  by	  simply	  being	  a	  further	  option,	  regardless	  of	  
price,	   as	   well	   as	   driving	   some	   price	   tension	   and	   competition	   amongst	   the	   REIT’s	   debt	  
funding	  sources.	  
Additional	  advantage	  2	  –	  Operational	  flexibility.	  This	  advantage	  covers	  both	  the	  ease	  of	  use	  
of	  the	  DCM	  (short	  time	  to	  bring	  an	  issuance	  to	  market	  off	  an	  existing	  DCM	  programme)	  and	  
the	  unfettered	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  allows	  the	  listed	  property	  fund	  to	  manage	  its	  asset	  base,	  
particularly	  in	  the	  case	  of	  unsecured	  DCM	  issuances,	  where	  no	  lender	  consent	  is	  required	  if	  
properties	  are	  being	  disposed	  of	  or	  altered.	  This	  advantage	  is	  not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  
disadvantage	  of	  inflexibility	  of	  a	  DCM	  note	  as	  regards	  variation	  of	  agreed	  upon	  terms	  post	  
issuance,	  referred	  to	  in	  H2.1.	  
In	  considering	  the	  five	  hypotheses	  as	  well	  as	  the	  two	  additional	  advantages	  presented,	  the	  
views	  of	  the	  “outsiders”	  are	  supportive	  of	  the	  views	  expressed	  by	  the	  “insiders”,	  i.e.	  the	  ten	  
senior	   management	   interviewees.	   A	   number	   of	   similar	   themes	   were	   raised	   by	   the	  
“outsiders”	   such	   that	   there	   is	   a	   good	   indication	  of	   convergence	  of	   opinions	  between	   the	  
“insiders”	  and	  outsiders”	  which	  further	  serves	  to	  support	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  testing	  of	  the	  
hypotheses.	  
	  	  
Table	   6:	   Interview	   responses	   –	   By	   Market	   Capitalisation	   and	   By	   Proportion	   of	   DCM	  
Issuance	  
Listed	  Property	  Fund Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Add	  1 Add	  2
Interviewee	  1 Yes 4	  681	  660	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 4	  681	  660	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 4	  681	  660	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 4	  681	  660	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  2 Yes 10	  850	  040	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 10	  850	  040	  000	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 10	  850	  040	  000	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 10	  850	  040	  000	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  3 Yes 40	  280	  610	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 40	  280	  610	  000	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 40	  280	  610	  000	  	  	  	   Yes 40	  280	  610	  000	  	  	  	   Yes 40	  280	  610	  000	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  4 Yes 64	  077	  040	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 64	  077	  040	  000	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 64	  077	  040	  000	  	  	  	   Yes 64	  077	  040	  000	  	  	  	   Yes 64	  077	  040	  000	  	  	  	   Yes 64	  077	  040	  000	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  5 Yes 8	  842	  730	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 8	  842	  730	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 8	  842	  730	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 8	  842	  730	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 8	  842	  730	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 8	  842	  730	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  6 Yes 28	  742	  150	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 28	  742	  150	  000	  	  	  	   Yes 28	  742	  150	  000	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 28	  742	  150	  000	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  7 Yes 23	  387	  070	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 23	  387	  070	  000	  	  	  	   Yes 23	  387	  070	  000	  	  	  	   Yes 23	  387	  070	  000	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  8 Yes 15	  745	  300	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 15	  745	  300	  000	  	  	  	   Yes 15	  745	  300	  000	  	  	  	   Yes 15	  745	  300	  000	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 15	  745	  300	  000	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  9 Yes 5	  555	  480	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 5	  555	  480	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 5	  555	  480	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 5	  555	  480	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 5	  555	  480	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  10 Yes 23	  717	  470	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 23	  717	  470	  000	  	  	   Yes 23	  717	  470	  000	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 23	  717	  470	  000	  	  	  	   Yes 23	  717	  470	  000	  	  	  	   Yes 23	  717	  470	  000	  	  	  	  
Grand	  Total
Market	  Cap	  -­‐	  Yes 225	  879	  550	  000	  	  	  	  	   142	  473	  330	  000	   59	  155	  540	  000	  	  	  	   185	  756	  560	  000	   225	  879	  550	  000	   170	  542	  060	  000	   148	  687	  480	  000	  
Market	  Cap	  -­‐	  All	  Interviewees 225	  879	  550	  000	  	  	  	  	   225	  879	  550	  000	   225	  879	  550	  000	   225	  879	  550	  000	   225	  879	  550	  000	   225	  879	  550	  000	   225	  879	  550	  000	  
Percentage	  supporting	  hypothesis 100% 63% 26% 82% 100% 76% 66%
Market	  Cap	  -­‐	  Yes	  &	  N/A 202	  492	  480	  000	  
Percentage	  supporting	  advantage 90%
Listed	  Property	  Fund Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Add	  1 Add	  2
Interviewee	  1 Yes 701	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 701	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 701	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 701	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  2 Yes 1	  620	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  620	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  620	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  620	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  3 Yes 3	  542	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 3	  542	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 3	  542	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 3	  542	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 3	  542	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  4 Yes 4	  302	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 4	  302	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 4	  302	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 4	  302	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 4	  302	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 4	  302	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  5 Yes 1	  970	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  970	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  970	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  970	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  970	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  970	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  6 Yes 2	  458	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 2	  458	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 2	  458	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 2	  458	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  7 Yes 1	  862	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  862	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  862	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  862	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  8 Yes 1	  857	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  857	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  857	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  857	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  857	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  9 Yes 920	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 920	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 920	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 920	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 920	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  10 Yes 2	  290	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 2	  290	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 2	  290	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 2	  290	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 2	  290	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 2	  290	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  
Grand	  Total
DCM	  Issuance	  -­‐	  Yes 21	  522	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	   13	  024	  000	  000	  	  	   7	  737	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	   16	  692	  000	  000	  	  	  	   21	  522	  000	  000	  	  	  	   15	  587	  000	  000	  	  	  	   13	  447	  000	  000	  	  	  	  
DCM	  Issuance	  -­‐	  All	  Interviewees 21	  522	  000	  000	  	  	  	  	  	  	   21	  522	  000	  000	  	  	   21	  522	  000	  000	  	  	  	   21	  522	  000	  000	  	  	  	   21	  522	  000	  000	  	  	  	   21	  522	  000	  000	  	  	  	   21	  522	  000	  000	  	  	  	  
Percentage	  supporting	  hypothesis 100% 61% 36% 78% 100% 72% 62%
DCM	  Issuance	  -­‐	  Yes	  &	  N/A 19	  660	  000	  000	  	  	  
Percentage	  supporting	  advantage 91%
By	  Market	  Capitalisation
By	  Proportion	  of	  DCM	  Issuance
	  
Source:	  data	  from	  Standard	  Bank	  Research,	  2015b	  and	  Catalyst	  Fund	  Managers,	  2015	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Table	  7:	  Interview	  responses	  –	  By	  Years	  of	  DCM	  Issuance	  and	  By	  Number	  of	  Interviewees	  	  
Listed	  Property	  Fund Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Add	  1 Add	  2
Interviewee	  1 Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  2 Yes 3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  3 Yes 4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  4 Yes 5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  5 Yes 4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  6 Yes 5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  7 Yes 4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  8 Yes 3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  9 Yes 3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  10 Yes 3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   yes 3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Grand	  Total
Years	  of	  DCM	  -­‐	  Yes 35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   19	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   13	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   26	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   24	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   22	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Year	  of	  DCM	  -­‐	  All	  Interviewees 35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Percentage	  supporting	  hypothesis 100% 54% 37% 74% 100% 69% 63%
Years	  of	  DCM	  -­‐	  Yes	  &	  N/A 31	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Percentage	  supporting	  advantage 89%
Listed	  Property	  Fund Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Add	  1 Add	  2
Interviewee	  1 Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  2 Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  3 Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  4 Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  5 Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  6 Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  7 Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  8 Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  9 Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   No -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Interviewee	  10 Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   N/A -­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Yes 1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Grand	  Total
No.	  of	  Interviewees	  -­‐	  Yes 10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
No.	  of	  Interviewees	  -­‐	  All	  Interviewees 10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Percentage	  supporting	  hypothesis 100% 50% 40% 70% 100% 70% 60%
No.	  of	  Interviewees	  -­‐	  Yes	  &	  N/A 9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Percentage	  supporting	  advantage 90%
By	  Years	  of	  DCM	  Issuance
By	  Number	  of	  Interviewees
	  
Source:	  data	  from	  Standard	  Bank	  Research,	  2015b	  and	  Catalyst	  Fund	  Managers,	  2015	  
	  
Table	  8:	  Interview	  responses	  –	  range	  and	  average	  and	  corroborative	  “outsiders”	  responses	  	  
	  
Source:	  data	  from	  Standard	  Bank	  Research,	  2015b	  and	  Catalyst	  Fund	  Managers,	  2015	  
DISCUSSION	  
The	   study	   was	   intended	   to	   answer	   the	   following	   research	   question:	   “What	   are	   the	  
advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  the	  DCM	  as	  a	  funding	  source	  for	  listed	  property	  funds	  in	  
South	  Africa?”	  
Research	  proposition	  or	  hypotheses	  
To	  answer	  the	  above	  research	  question,	  the	  following	  hypotheses	  were	  tested:	  
• H1:	   The	   following	   are	   advantages	   of	   DCM	   as	   a	   funding	   source	   (relative	   to	   other	  
sources	  of	  debt):	  
o H1.1	  Cheap	  –	  lowering	  the	  fund’s	  average	  cost	  of	  debt	  
o H1.2	  Simpler	  documentation	  
o H1.3	  Longer	  debt	  maturities	  
• H2:	  The	  following	  are	  disadvantages	  of	  DCM	  as	  a	  funding	  source	  (relative	  to	  other	  
sources	  of	  debt):	  
o H2.1	  Inflexible	  as	  regards	  variations	  to	  terms	  
o H2.2	  Volatility	  of	  the	  investor	  base	  –	  and	  thus	  uncertainty	  of	  availability	  of	  
the	  funding	  source	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The	   above	   research	   question	   and	   hypotheses	   were	   answered	   and	   tested	   through	   the	  
analysis	  of	  the	  responses	  to	  a	  set	  of	  questions	  put	  to	  the	  interviewees.	  
The	   results	   of	   the	   study	   indicate	   that	   hypotheses	  H1.1,	  H1.2,	  H2.1	   and	  H2.2	   have	   strong	  
support	   and	   cannot	   be	   rejected,	   while	   hypothesis	   H1.3	   has	   little	   support	   and	   could	   be	  
rejected.	  
This	  suggests	  that	  DCM	  as	  a	  funding	  source:	  
• Can	  be	  a	  cheap	  source	  of	  funding	  that	  can	  lower	  a	  REIT’s	  average	  cost	  debt;	  
• Does	  offer	  simpler	  documentation	  that	  that	  of	  private	  lending	  sources;	  
• Is	  inflexible	  as	  regards	  variation	  to	  its	  terms	  relative	  to	  private	  lending	  sources;	  
• Is	  volatile	  and	  lacks	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  private	  lending	  sources;	  
• However,	   does	  not	   necessarily	   result	   in	   securing	  debt	  of	   a	   longer	   tenor	   that	   that	  
achievable	  from	  private	  lending	  sources.	  
The	   literature	   review	   uncovered	   a	   number	   of	   factors	   affecting	   the	   landscape	   for	   debt	  
funding	   to	   listed	   property	   funds.	   The	   study	   finds	   that	   these	   factors,	   set	   out	   below,	   do	  
permeate	   the	   thinking	   of	   listed	   sector	   senior	   management	   when	   considering	   the	  
advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  DCM	  as	  a	  funding	  source	  for	  listed	  property	  funds:	  
• The	  REIT	   sector	   in	   SA	   is	   catching	   up	   to	   its	   international	   peer	   group	   and	   can	   thus	  
start	   to	   adopt	   similar	   practices	   of	   incorporating	   listed	   debt	   as	   an	   additional	   debt	  
source	  and	  further	  diversifier	  of	  their	  capital	  structure	  
• The	   introduction	   of	   listed	   debt,	   such	   as	   DCM	   issuance,	   as	   a	   funding	   source	   is	   a	  
feature	  of	  a	  maturing	  REIT	  market	  
• Cognisance	  amongst	  REIT	  management	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  BIII	  increasing	  lending	  
spreads	  for	  bank	  debt	  
• SA	  property	  funds	  see	  DCM	  as	  a	  permanent	  feature	  of	  their	  capital	  structure	  
• The	   SA	  DCM	   is	   vulnerable	   to	   negative	   externalities,	   as	   demonstrated	  by	   the	  ABIL	  
event,	  and	  accordingly	  price	  and	  appetite	  respond	  to	  this	  information	  	  
Limitations	  and	  assumptions	  of	  the	  study	  
The	   study	  was	   limited	   to	   SA	  domiciled	   listed	  property	   funds	   and	   to	   those	   listed	  property	  
funds	  that,	  at	  31	  December	  2014,	  had	  established	  DCM	  programmes.	  It	  was	  assumed	  that	  
the	   listed	   fund	   interviewees	   were	   sufficiently	   unbiased	   to	   assess	   the	   advantages	   and	  
disadvantages	  of	   their	  DCM	   funding	  activity	   and	   that	   the	  advantages	  or	  disadvantages	  of	  
the	  DCM	  are	  separately	  identifiable	  and	  not	  interdependent.	  
Certain	   limitations	   were	   inherent	   in	   the	   interviewees.	   A	   notable	   differentiator,	   although	  
difficult	  to	  quantify	  is	  the	  differing	  real	  estate,	  finance	  and	  in	  particular,	  DCM	  experience	  of	  
the	  respective	  “insiders”	  and	  “outsiders”.	  A	  further	   intrinsic	   limitation	  of	  the	  study	   is	   that	  
DCM	  as	  a	  REIT	  funding	  source	  is	  a	  fairly	  recent	  event,	  with	  a	  track	  record	  of	  approximately	  5	  
years	  since	  2010.	  Notwithstanding,	  the	  respective	  context	  of	  a	  robust	  DCM	  over	  a	  number	  
of	  years	  coupled	  with	  the	  recent	  and	  very	  market-­‐negative	  event	  in	  the	  failure	  of	  ABIL,	  does	  
create	  an	  environment	  in	  which	  the	  actions	  and	  repercussions	  of	  the	  DCM	  are	  very	  topical	  
for	  REIT	  senior	  management.	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Aspects	  for	  further	  research	  
During	   the	   course	  of	   the	   interviews	   conducted	   for	   this	   research	   study,	   certain	   aspects	  of	  
the	   DCM	  were	   identified	   that	   could	   be	   researched	   in	   greater	   detail.	   Theses	   aspects	   are	  
presented	  below:	  	  
1) A	   study	   examining	   secured	   versus	   unsecured	   DCM	   issuance	   for	   listed	   property	  
funds.	   Areas	   to	   investigate	   could	   include	   the	   interactions	   when	   secured	   and	  
unsecured	  DCM	  issuances	  are	  undertaken	  by	  the	  same	  issuer,	  as	  well	  as	  what	  the	  
advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  each	  type	  of	  issuance	  are	  for	  the	  issuing	  property	  
fund.	  What	  can	  also	  be	  considered	  is	  the	  rating	  differential	  achieved	  between	  the	  
secured	  and	  unsecured	  issuance	  of	  the	  same	  issuer	  and	  the	  impact	  that	  the	  rating	  
of	   the	   secured	   issuance	  may	  have	  on	   the	  unsecured	   rating	  of	   the	   issuer	   and	  vice	  
versa.	  
2) A	   study	   examining	   the	   merits	   of	   a	   listed	   property	   fund	   following	   a	   private	  
placement	  strategy	  versus	  a	  public	  auction	   route	  when	   issuing	  DCM.	  At	  a	  cursory	  
level	   it	   appears	   that	   the	   private	   placement	   route	   is	   the	   more	   robust	   means	   of	  
achieving	  issuance	  objectives	  for	  an	  issuer.	  
3) A	   case	   study	   covering	   the	   impact	  of	   the	  ABIL	   event	  on	   the	  DCM	  activity	  of	   listed	  
property	  funds	  in	  SA.	  Consideration	  could	  be	  given	  to	  facets	  such	  as	  attempting	  to	  
quantify	   the	   movement	   in	   pricing	   and/or	   issuance	   size	   in	   a	   pre-­‐	   and	   post-­‐ABIL	  
environment.	  
4) It	  may	  be	  worth	   revisiting	   the	   topic	  of	   this	   research	   study	   in	   future,	   given	   that	   it	  
was	   the	   view	   of	   a	   number	   of	   the	   interviewees	   that	   the	   advantages	   and	  
disadvantages	  of	  the	  DCM	  as	  a	  funding	  source	  for	  listed	  property	  funds	  may	  change	  
over	  time.	  
Conclusion	  and	  recommendation	  
Use	   of	   the	   DCM	   by	   listed	   property	   funds	   in	   South	   Africa	   is	   well	   established,	   with	  
approximately	   a	   quarter	   of	   the	   debt	   funding	   of	   REITs	   representing	   75%	   of	   the	   listed	  
property	  sector	  by	  market	  capitalisation	  (as	  adjusted,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  December	  2014),	  being	  
in	  the	  form	  of	  DCM	  issuance.	  
The	   results	   of	   the	   research	   study	   show	   that	   DCM	   is	   an	   established	   and	   viable	   form	   of	  
funding	  that	  has	  a	  role	  to	  play	  in	  the	  debt	  composition	  of	  listed	  property	  funds	  in	  SA.	  It	   is	  
clearly	   revealed	   that	   it	   is	   imperative	   that	   listed	   property	   funds	   understand	   both	   the	  
advantages	   and	   disadvantages	   of	   the	   inclusion	   of	   DCM	   funding	   in	   their	   capital	   structure.	  
Furthermore	  the	  study	  highlights	  that	  listed	  property	  funds	  need	  to	  remain	  cognisant	  that	  
the	  particular	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  applicable	  to	  DCM	  funding	  for	  listed	  property	  
funds	   are,	   in	   some	   respects,	   a	   function	   of	   the	   prevailing	   circumstances	   facing	   both	   the	  
property	  sector	  and	  the	  DCM	  at	  a	  point	  in	  time.	  Listed	  property	  fund	  management	  needs	  to	  
be	  alert	  to	  continually	  reassessing	  the	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  DCM	  funding	  as	  it	  
pertains	  to	  listed	  property	  funds	  in	  South	  Africa.	  
	  
REFERENCES	  	  
BCBS	   (2013)	   Basel	   III:	   The	   Liquidity	   Coverage	   Ratio	   and	   liquidity	   risk	   monitoring	  
tools.	  [Online]	   Available	   from:	   http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf	   [Downloaded	  
18/05/15]	  
16	  
BCBS	   (2014)	   Basel	   III:	   the	   net	   stable	   funding	   ratio.	   [Online]	   Available	   from:	  
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d295.pdf	  [Downloaded	  18/05/15]	  
BECH,	   M.L.	   &	   KEISTER,	   T.	   (2014)	   On	   the	   economics	   of	   committed	   liquidity	   facilities.	   BIS	  
Working	  Paper,	  439.	  Bank	  for	  International	  Settlements.	  	  
BOUDRY,	  W.	   I.,	  KALLBERG,	   J.	  G.,	  &	  LIU,	  C.	  H.	   (2010).	  An	  analysis	  of	  REIT	   security	   issuance	  
decisions.	  Real	  Estate	  Economics,	  38(1),	  pp.	  91-­‐120.	  [	  
BROWN,	  D.	   T.	  &	  RIDDIOUGH,	   T.	   J.	   (2003)	   Financing	  Choice	   and	   Liability	   Structure	  of	   Real	  
Estate	  Investment	  Trusts.	  Real	  Estate	  Economics,	  31	  (3),	  pp.	  313–346.	  	  
CATALYST	  FUND	  MANAGERS	  (2015)	  South	  African	  Listed	  Property	  Review	  –	  December	  2014	  
Catalyst	  Fund	  Managers.	  	  
CHUN,	  S.	  E.,	  KIM,	  H.,	  &	  KO,	  W.	   (2012)	  The	   Impact	  of	  Basel	   III	  Bank	  Regulation	  on	  Lending	  
Spreads:	   Comparisons	   across	   Countries	   and	   Business	   Models.	   Korea	   and	   the	   World	  
Economy,	  13,	  pp.	  351-­‐394.	  	  
COHEN,	   B.H.	   &	   SCATIGNA,	   M.	   (2014)	   Banks	   and	   capital	   requirements:	   channels	   of	  
adjustment.	  BIS	  Working	  Paper,	  443.	  Bank	  for	  International	  Settlements.	  	  
DI	   BIASE,	   P.	   (2012)	   The	   Impact	   Of	   Basel	   III	   On	   Italian	   Banks’	   Loan	   Rates:	   An	   Accounting-­‐
Based	  Approach.	   International	   Business	  &	   Economics	   Research	   Journal	   (IBER),	   11(11),	   pp.	  
1269-­‐1280.	  	  
FENG,	   Z.,	   GHOSH,	   C.,	   &	   SIRMANS,	   C.	   F.	   (2007).	   On	   the	   capital	   structure	   of	   real	   estate	  
investment	  trusts	  (REITs).	  The	  Journal	  of	  Real	  Estate	  Finance	  and	  Economics,	  34(1),	  pp.	  81-­‐
105.	  	  
GILLHAM,	  B.	  (2000).	  Case	  study	  research	  methods.	  Bloomsbury	  Publishing.	  	  
HARDIN	   III,	  W.	  G.	  &	  WU,	   Z.	   (2010)	   Banking	   relationships	   and	   REIT	   capital	   structure.	  Real	  
Estate	  Economics,	  38(2),	  pp.	  257-­‐284.	  	  
KING,	  M.R.	  (2010)	  Mapping	  capital	  and	  liquidity	  requirements	  to	  bank	  lending	  spreads.	  BIS	  
Working	  Paper,	  324.	  Bank	  for	  International	  Settlements	  
MOODY’S	   INVESTORS	   SERVICE	   (2002)	  Moody’s	   Views	   on	   Secured	   vs.	   Unsecured	   Debt	   in	  
REITs’	  Capital	  Structures.	  Special	  Comment,	  April.	  New	  York	  
NEDBANK	  CAPITAL	  RESEARCH	   (2014)	  South	  Africa:	  Credit	  –	  Fixed	   Income	  –	  Monthly	  DCM	  
Review	  October	  2014.	  Nedbank	  Capital	  Research.	  	  
REIT	  ANNUAL	  FINANCIAL	  STATEMENTS	  (2014)	  -­‐	  The	  following	  annual	  and	  interim	  financial	  
results	  (labelled	  a	  –	  m)	  were	  sourced	  for	  the	  13	  REIT’s	  with	  a	  DMTN	  programme	  in	  place	  as	  
at	  31	  December	  2014	  (Financial	  results,	  either	  interim-­‐	  or	  annual	  results,	  closest	  to,	  but	  not	  
after	  31	  December	  2014	  were	  chosen):	  	  
a. ACCELERATE	   PROPERTY	   FUND	   LIMITED	   (2014)	   Unaudited	   interim	   financial	   results	  
for	  the	  six-­‐month	  period	  ended	  30	  September	  2014,	  p.	  3.	  	  
b. CAPITAL	   PROPERTY	   FUND	   LIMITED	   (2015)	   Preliminary	   summarised	   audited	  
consolidated	  financial	  statements	  for	  the	  year	  ended	  31	  December	  2014.	  	  
c. DELTA	   PROPERTY	   FUND	   LIMITED	   (2014)	   Interim	   results	   for	   the	   period	   ended	   31	  
August	  2014,	  p.	  12.	  	  
d. EMIRA	  PROPERTY	  FUND	  LIMITED	  (2015)	  Unaudited	   interim	  financial	  results	   for	  six	  
months	  to	  31	  December	  2014	  and	  income	  distribution	  declaration,	  p.	  2.	  	  
17	  
e. FORTRESS	   INCOME	   FUND	   LIMITED	   (2015)	   Condensed	   unaudited	   consolidated	  
interim	  financial	  statements	  for	  the	  six	  months	  ended	  31	  December	  2014	  
f. GROWTHPOINT	  PROPERTIES	   LIMITED	   (2015)	  Condensed	  unaudited	   results	   for	   the	  
six	  months	  ended	  31	  December	  2014,	  p.	  1.	  	  
g. HOSPITALITY	  PROPERTY	  FUND	  LIMITED	  (2015)	  Unaudited	  Interim	  Results	  for	  the	  six	  
months	  ended	  31	  December	  2014	  and	  interest	  payment	  declaration,	  p.	  2.	  [Online]	  	  
h. HYPROP	   INVESTMENTS	   LIMITED	   (2015)	   Summarised	   unaudited	   consolidated	  
interim	  results	  for	  the	  six	  months	  ended	  31	  December	  2014,	  p.	  3.	  	  
i. INVESTEC	   PROPERTY	   FUND	   LIMITED	   (2014)	   Reviewed	   interim	   condensed	  
consolidated	  financial	  results	  for	  the	  six	  months	  ended	  30	  September	  2014,	  p.	  4.	  	  
j. OCTODEC	   INVESTMENTS	   LIMITED	   (2014)	   Financial	   results	   for	   the	   twelve	   months	  
ended	  31	  August	  2014,	  p.	  10.	  	  
k. REDEFINE	   PROPERTIES	   LIMITED	   (2014)	   Summarised	   audited	   financial	   statements	  
for	  the	  year	  ended	  31	  August	  2014,	  p.	  2.	  	  
l. RESILIENT	   PROPERTY	   INCOME	   FUND	   LIMITED	   (2015)	   Condensed	   reviewed	  
consolidated	   interim	   financial	   statements	   for	   the	   six	  months	  ended	  31	  December	  
2014.	  	  
m. VUKILE	   PROPERTY	   FUND	   LIMITED	   (2014)	   Unaudited	   condensed	   consolidated	  
interim	  results	  for	  the	  six	  months	  ended	  30	  September	  2014,	  p.	  15.	  
SBG	   SECURITIES	   (2015)	   BA900	   regulatory	   returns	   for	   December	   2014.	   Anthonyrajah,	   V	   .	  	  
Personal	  communication	  to	  Murphy,	  CM	  [12/02/15]	  	  
SCHANZ,	  J.,	  AIKMAN,	  D.,	  COLLAZOS,	  P.,	  FARAG,	  M.,	  GREGORY,	  D.	  &	  KAPADIA,	  S.	  (2011).	  The	  
long-­‐term	   economic	   impact	   of	   higher	   capital	   levels.	   BIS	   Papers,	   60,	   pp.	   73-­‐81	   Bank	   for	  
International	  Settlements.	  	  
SOUTH	  AFRICAN	  RESERVE	  BANK	  (2013).	  Addendum	  1:	  Operational	  notice	  pertaining	  to	  the	  
committed	  liquidity	  facility	  South	  African	  Reserve	  Bank.	  	  
SOUTH	  AFRICAN	  RESERVE	   BANK	   (2015).	   Banks	   BA900	   Returns	   –	  December	   2010	   to	   2014	  
South	  African	  Reserve	  Bank	  
STANDARD	   BANK	   RESEARCH	   (2015a)	   South	   Africa:	   Corporate	   Credit	   –	   Monthly	   –	   2015	  
forecasts,	  6th	  Feb	  Standard	  Bank.	  	  
STANDARD	   BANK	   RESEARCH	   (2015b)	   South	   Africa:	   Corporate	   Credit.	   Data	   for	   property	  
sector	  debt	  capital	  markets	  issuance	  over	  the	  period	  2010	  to	  2014.	  [Email	  to:	  Murphy,	  CM	  	  
16/02/15]	  
INTERNATIONAL REAL ESTATE SOCIETY
